Title III Regulations Supplementary Information

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

28 CFR Part 36

[CRT Docket No. 106; AG Order No. 3181-2010]

RIN 1190–AA44 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and in Commercial Facilities

AGENCY: Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This final rule revises the Department of Justice (Department) regulation that implements title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), relating to nondiscrimination on the basis of disability by public accommodations and in commercial facilities. The Department is issuing this final rule in order to adopt enforceable accessibility standards under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) that are consistent with the minimum guidelines and requirements issued by the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board, and to update or amend certain provisions of the title III regulation so that they comport with the Department’s legal and practical experiences in enforcing the ADA since 1991. Concurrently with the publication of the final rule for title III, the Department is publishing a final rule amending its ADA title II regulation, which covers nondiscrimination on the basis of disability in State and local government services.

DATES: Effective Date: March 15, 2011.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

CONTACT:

Janet L. Blizard, Deputy Chief, or Christina Galindo-Walsh, Attorney Advisor, Disability Rights Section, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice, at (202) 307–0663 (voice or TTY). This is not a toll-free number. Information may also be obtained from the Department’s toll-free ADA Information Line at (800) 514–0301 (voice) or (800) 514–0383 (TTY).

This rule is also available in an accessible format on the ADA Home Page at https://americandisabilityacts.com/

You may obtain copies of this rule in large print or on computer disk by calling the ADA Information Line listed above.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

The Roles of the Access Board and the Department of Justice

The Access Board was established by section 502 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 29 U.S.C. 792. The Board consists of 13 public members appointed by the President, the majority of whom must be individuals with disabilities, and the heads of 12 Federal departments and agencies specified by statute, including the heads of the Department of Justice and the Department of Transportation (DOT). Originally, the Access Board was established to develop and maintain accessibility guidelines for facilities designed, constructed, altered, or leased with Federal dollars under the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968 (ABA). 42 U.S.C. 4151 et seq The passage of the ADA expanded the Access Board’s responsibilities.

The ADA requires the Access Board to “issue minimum guidelines that shall supplement the existing Minimum Guidelines and Requirements for Accessible Design for purposes of subchapters II and III of this chapter*** to ensure that buildings, facilities, rail passenger cars, and vehicles are accessible, in terms of architecture and design, transportation, and communication, to individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. 12204. The ADA requires the Department to issue regulations that include enforceable accessibility standards applicable to facilities subject to title II or title III that are consistent with the “minimum guidelines” issued by the Access Board, 42 U.S.C. 12134(c), 12186(c), but vests in the Attorney General sole responsibility for the promulgation of those standards that fall within the Department’s jurisdiction and enforcement of the regulations.

The ADA also requires the Department to develop regulations with respect to existing facilities subject to title II (Subtitle A) and title III. How and to what extent the Access Board’s guidelines are used with respect to the barrier removal requirement applicable to existing facilities under title III of the ADA and to the provision of program accessibility under title II of the ADA are solely within the discretion of the Department.

Enactment of the ADA and Issuance of the 1991 Regulations

On July 26, 1990, President George H.W. Bush signed into law the ADA, a comprehensive civil rights law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability¹. The ADA broadly protects the rights of individuals with disabilities in employment, access to State and local government services, places of public accommodation, transportation, and other important areas of American life. The ADA also requires newly designed and constructed or altered State and local government facilities, public accommodations, and commercial facilities to be readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. Section 306(a) of the ADA directs the Secretary of Transportation to issue regulations for demand responsive or fixed route systems operated by private entities not primarily engaged in the business of transporting people (sections 302(b)(2)(B) and (C)) and for private entities that are primarily engaged in the business of transporting people (section 304). See 42 U.S.C. 12182(b), 12184, 12186(a). Section 306(b) directs the Attorney General to promulgate regulations to carry out the provisions of the rest of title III. 42 U.S.C. 12186(b).

Title II applies to State and local government entities, and, in Subtitle A, protects qualified individuals with disabilities from discrimination on the basis of disability in services, programs, and activities provided by State and local government entities. Title II extends the prohibition on discrimination established by section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 794 (section 504), to all activities of State and local governments regardless of whether these entities receive Federal financial assistance. 42 U.S.C. 12131–65.

Title III, which this rule addresses, prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in the activities of places of public accommodation (businesses that are generally open to the public and that fall into one of 12 categories listed in the ADA, such as restaurants, movie theaters, schools, day care facilities, recreation facilities, and doctors’ offices) and requires newly constructed or altered places of public accommodation—as well as commercial facilities (privately owned, nonresidential facilities such as factories, warehouses, or office buildings)—to comply with the ADA Standards. 42 U.S.C. 12181–89.

On July 26, 1991, the Department issued rules implementing title II and title III, which are codified at 28 CFR part 35 (title II) and part 36 (title III). Appendix A of the 1991 title III regulation, which is republished as Appendix D to 28 CFR part 36, contains the ADA Standards for Accessible Design (1991 Standards), which were based upon the version of the Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines (1991 ADAAG) published by the Access Board on the same date. Under the Department’s 1991 title III regulation, places of public accommodation and commercial facilities currently are required to comply with the 1991 Standards with respect to newly constructed or altered facilities.

The Access Board’s publication of the 2004 ADA/ABA Guidelines was the culmination of a long-term effort to facilitate ADA compliance by eliminating, to the extent possible, inconsistencies among Federal accessibility requirements and between Federal accessibility requirements and State and local building codes. In support of this effort, the Department is amending its regulation implementing title III and adopting standards consistent with ADA Chapter 1, ADA Chapter 2, and Chapters 3 through 10 of the 2004 ADA/ABA Guidelines. The Department is also amending its title II regulation, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in State and local government services, concurrently with the publication of this rule in this issue of the Federal Register.

Development of the 2004 ADA/ABA Guidelines

In 1994, the Access Board began the process of updating the 1991 ADAAG by establishing an advisory committee composed of members of the design and construction industry, the building code community, and State and local government entities, as well as individuals with disabilities. In 1998, the Access Board added specific guidelines on State and local government facilities, 63 FR 2000 (Jan. 13, 1998), and building elements designed for use by children, 63 FR 2060 (Jan. 13, 1998). In 1999, based largely on the report and recommendations of the advisory committee, the Access Board issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to update and revise its ADA and ABA Accessibility Guidelines. See 64 FR 62248 (Nov. 16, 1999). In 2000, the Access Board added specific guidelines on play areas. See 65 FR 62498 (Oct. 18, 2000). The Access Board released an interim draft of its guidelines to the public on April 2, 2002, 67 FR 15509, in order to provide an opportunity for entities with model codes to consider amendments that would promote further harmonization. In September of 2002, the Access Board set forth specific guidelines on recreation facilities. 67 FR 56352 (Sept. 3, 2002).

By the date of its final publication on July 23, 2004, the 2004 ADA/ABA Guidelines had been the subject of extraordinary review and public participation. The Access Board received more than 2,500 comments from individuals with disabilities, affected industries, State and local governments, and others. The Access Board provided further opportunity for participation by holding public hearings.

The Department was involved extensively in the development of the 2004 ADA/ABA Guidelines. As a Federal member of the Access Board, the Attorney General’s representative voted to approve the revised guidelines. ADA Chapter 1 and ADA Chapter 2 of the 2004 ADA/ABA Guidelines provide scoping requirements for facilities subject to the ADA; ‘scoping” is a term used in the 2004 ADA/ABA Guidelines to describe requirements that prescribe which elements and spaces—and, in some cases, how many—must comply with the technical specifications. ABA Chapter 1 and ABA Chapter 2 provide scoping requirements for facilities subject to the ABA (i.e., facilities designed, built, altered, or leased with Federal funds). Chapters 3 through 10 of the 2004 ADA/ABA Guidelines provide uniform technical specifications for facilities subject to either the ADA or the ABA. This revised format is designed to eliminate unintended conflicts between the two sets of Federal accessibility standards and to minimize conflicts between the Federal regulations and the model codes that form the basis of many State and local building codes. For the purposes of this final rule, the Department will refer to ADA Chapter 1, ADA Chapter 2, and Chapters 3 through 10 of the 2004 ADA/ABA Guidelines as the 2004 ADAAG.

These amendments to the 1991 ADAAG have not been adopted previously by the Department as ADA Standards. Through this rule, the Department is adopting revised ADA Standards consistent with the 2004 ADAAG, including all of the amendments to the 1991 ADAAG since 1998. For the purposes of this part, the Department’s revised standards are entitled “The 2010 Standards for Accessible Design” and consist of the 2004 ADAAG and the requirements contained in subpart D of 28 CFR part 36. Because the Department has adopted the 2004 ADAAG as part of its title II and title III regulations, once the Department’s final rules become effective, the 2004 ADAAG will have legal effect with respect to the Department’s title II and title III regulations and will cease to be mere guidance for those areas regulated by the Department. In 2006, DOT adopted the 2004 ADAAG. With respect to those areas regulated by DOT, these guidelines, as adopted by DOT, have had legal effect since 2006.

Under this regulation, the Department of Justice covers passenger vessels operated by private entities not primarily engaged in the business of transporting people with respect to the provision of goods and services of a public accommodation on the vessel. For example, a vessel operator whose vessel departs from Point A, takes passengers on a recreational trip, and returns passengers to Point A without ever providing for disembarkation at a Point B (e.g., a dinner or harbor cruise, a fishing charter) is a public accommodation operated by a private entity not primarily engaged in the business of transporting people. This regulation covers those aspects of the vessel’s operation relating to the use and enjoyment of the public accommodation, including, for example, the boarding process, safety policies, accessible routes on the vessel, and the provision of effective communication. Persons with complaints or concerns about discrimination on the basis of disability by vessel operators who are private entities not primarily engaged in the business of transporting people, or questions about how this regulation applies to such operators and vessels, should contact the Department of Justice.

Vessels operated by private entities primarily engaged in the business of transporting people and that provide the goods and services of a public accommodation are covered by this regulation and the Department of Transportation’s passenger vessel rule, 49 CFR part 39. A vessel operator whose vessel takes passengers from Point A to Point B (e.g., a cruise ship that sails from Miami to one or more Caribbean islands, a private ferry boat between two points on either side of a river or bay, a water taxi between two points in an urban area) is most likely a private entity primarily engaged in the business of transporting people. Persons with questions about how this regulation applies to such operators and vessels may contact the Department of Justice or the Department of Transportation for guidance or further information. However, the Department of Justice has enforcement authority for all private entities under title III of the ADA, so individuals with complaints about noncompliance with part 39 should provide those complaints to the Department of Justice.

The provisions of this rule and 49 CFR part 39 are intended to be substantively consistent with one another. Consequently, in interpreting the application of this rule to vessel operators who are private entities not primarily engaged in the business of transporting people, the Department of Justice views the obligations of those vessel operators as being similar to those of private entities primarily engaged in the business of transporting people under the provisions of 49 CFR part 39.

The Department’s Rulemaking History

The Department published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) on September 30, 2004, 69 FR 58768 for two reasons: (1) To begin the process of adopting the 2004 ADAAG by soliciting public input on issues relating to the potential application of the Access Board’s revisions once the Department adopts them as revised standards; and (2) to request background information that would assist the Department in preparing a regulatory analysis under the guidance provided in Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A–4 sections D (Analytical Approaches) and E (Identifying and Measuring Benefits and Costs) (Sept. 17, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/OMB/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf (last visited June 24, 2010). While underscoring that the Department, as a member of the Access Board, already had reviewed comments provided to the Access Board during its development of the 2004 ADAAG, the Department specifically requested public comment on the potential application of the 2004 ADAAG to existing facilities. The extent to which the 2004 ADAAG is used with respect to the barrier removal requirement applicable to existing facilities under title III (as well as with respect to the program access requirement in title II) is within the sole discretion of the Department. The ANPRM dealt with the Department’s responsibilities under both title II and title III.

The public response to the ANPRM was substantial. The Department extended the comment deadline by four months at the public’s request. 70 FR 2992 (Jan. 19, 2005). By the end of the extended comment period, the Department had received more than 900 comments covering a broad range of issues. Many of the commenters responded to questions posed specifically by the Department, including questions regarding the Department’s application of the 2004 ADAAG once adopted by the Department and the Department’s regulatory assessment of the costs and benefits of particular elements. Many other commenters addressed areas of desired regulation or of particular concern.

To enhance accessibility strides made since the enactment of the ADA, commenters asked the Department to focus on previously unregulated areas, such as ticketing in assembly areas; reservations for hotel rooms, rental cars, and boat slips; and captioning. They also asked for clarification on some issues in the 1991 regulations, such as the requirements regarding service animals. Other commenters dealt with specific requirements in the 2004 ADAAG or responded to questions regarding elements scoped for the first time in the 2004 ADAAG, including recreation facilities and play areas. Commenters also provided some information on how to assess the cost of elements in small facilities, office buildings, hotels and motels, assembly areas, hospitals and long-term care facilities, residential units, recreation facilities, and play areas. Still other commenters addressed the effective date of the proposed standards, the triggering event by which the effective date is calculated for new construction, and variations on a safe harbor that would excuse elements built in compliance with the 1991 Standards from compliance with the proposed standards.

After careful consideration of the public comments in response to the ANPRM, on June 17, 2008, the Department published an NPRM covering title III. 73 FR 34508. The Department also published an NPRM on that day covering title II. 73 FR 34466. The NPRMs addressed the issues raised in the public’s comments to the ANPRM and sought additional comment, generally and in specific areas, such as the Department’s adoption of the 2004 ADAAG, the Department’s regulatory assessment of the costs and benefits of the rule, its updates and amendments of certain provisions of the existing title II and III regulations, and areas that were in need of additional clarification or specificity.

A public hearing was held on July 15, 2008, in Washington, DC. Forty-five individuals testified in person or by phone. The hearing was streamed live over the Internet. By the end of the 60-day comment period, the Department had received 4,435 comments addressing a broad range of issues, many of which were common to the title II and title III NPRMs, from representatives of businesses and industries, State and local government agencies, disability advocacy organizations, and private individuals.

The Department notes that this rulemaking was unusual in that much of the proposed regulatory text and many of the questions asked across titles II and III were the same. Consequently, many of the commenters did not provide separate sets of documents for the proposed title II and title III rules, and in many instances, the commenters did not specify which title was being commented upon. As a result, where comments could be read to apply to both titles II and III, the Department included them in the comments and responses for each final rule.

Most of the commenters responded to questions posed specifically by the Department, including what were the most appropriate definitions for terms such as “wheelchair,” “mobility device,” and ‘service animal”; how to quantify various benefits that are difficult to monetize; what requirements to adopt for ticketing and assembly areas; whether to adopt safe harbors for small businesses; and how best to regulate captioning. Some comments addressed specific requirements in the 2004 ADAAG or responded to questions regarding elements scoped for the first time in the 2004 ADAAG, including recreation facilities and play areas. Other comments responded to questions posed by the Department concerning certain specific requirements in the 2004 ADAAG.

Relationship to Other Laws

The Department of Justice regulation implementing title III, 28 CFR 36.103, provides the following:

(a) Rule of interpretation. Except as otherwise provided in this part, this part shall not be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 791) or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to that title. (b) Section 504. This part does not affect the obligations of a recipient of Federal financial assistance to comply with the requirements of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794) and regulations issued by Federal agencies implementing section 504. (c) Other laws. This part does not invalidate or limit the remedies, rights, and procedures of any other Federal, State, or local laws (including State common law) that provide greater or equal protection for the rights of individuals with disabilities or individuals associated with them.

These provisions remain unchanged by the final rule. The Department recognizes that public accommodations subject to title III of the ADA may also be subject to title I of the ADA, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in employment; section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and other Federal statutes that prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability in the programs and activities of recipients of Federal financial assistance; and other Federal statutes such as the Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA), 49 U.S.C. 41705 et seq, and the Fair Housing Act (FHAct), 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq. Compliance with the Department’s title II and title III regulations does not ensure compliance with other Federal statutes.

Public accommodations that are subject to the ADA as well as other Federal disability discrimination laws must be aware of the requirements of all applicable laws and must comply with these laws and their implementing regulations. Although in many cases similar provisions of different statutes are interpreted to impose similar requirements, there are circumstances in which similar provisions are applied differently because of the nature of the covered entity or activity, or because of distinctions between the statutes. For example, emotional support animals that do not qualify as service animals under the Department’s title III regulations may nevertheless qualify as permitted reasonable accommodations for persons with disabilities under the FHAct and the ACAA. See, e.g., Overlook Mutual Homes, Inc. v. Spencer, 666 F. Supp. 2d 850 (S.D. Ohio 2009). Public accommodations that operate housing facilities must ensure that they apply the reasonable accommodation requirements of the FHAct in determining whether to allow a particular animal needed by a person with a disability into housing and may not use the ADA definition as a justification for reducing their FHAct obligations. In addition, nothing in the ADA prevents a public accommodation subject to one statute from modifying its policies and providing greater access in order to assist individuals with disabilities in achieving access to entities subject to other Federal statutes. For example, a quick service restaurant at an airport is, as a public accommodation, subject to the title III requirements, not to the ACAA requirements. Conversely, an air carrier that flies in and out of the same airport is required to comply with the ACAA, but is not covered by title III of the ADA. If a particular animal is a service animal for purposes of the ACAA and is thus allowed on an airplane, but is not a service animal for purposes of the ADA, nothing in the ADA prohibits an airport restaurant from allowing a ticketed passenger with a disability who is traveling with a service animal that meets the ACAA’s definition of a service animal to bring that animal into the facility even though under the ADA’s definition of service animal the animal lawfully could be excluded.

Organization of This Rule

Throughout this rule, the original ADA Standards, which are republished as Appendix D to 28 CFR part 36, will be referred to as the “1991 Standards.” The original title III regulation, codified at 28 CFR part 36 (2009), will be referred to as the “1991 regulation” or the “1991 title III regulation.” ADA Chapter 1, ADA Chapter 2, and Chapters 3 through 10 of the 2004 ADA/ABA Guidelines, 36 CFR part 1191, app. B and D (2009), will be referred to as the “2004 ADAAG.” The Department’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 73 FR 34508 (June 17, 2008), will be referred to as the “NPRM.” As noted above, the 2004 ADAAG, taken together with the requirements contained in subpart D of 28 CFR part 36 (New Construction and Alterations) of the final rule, will be referred to as the “2010 Standards.” The amendments made to the 1991 title III regulation and the adoption of the 2004 ADAAG, taken together, will be referred to as the “final rule.”

In performing the required periodic review of its existing regulation, the Department has reviewed the title III regulation section by section, and, as a result, has made several clarifications and amendments in this rule. Appendix A of the final rule, “Guidance on Revisions to ADA Regulation on Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and Commercial Facilities,” codified as Appendix A to 28 CFR part 36, provides the Department’s response to comments and its explanations of the changes to the regulation. The section entitled ‘section-by-Section Analysis and Response to Comments” in provides a detailed discussion of the changes to the title III regulation. The Section-by-Section Analysis follows the order of the 1991 title III regulation, except that regulatory sections that remain unchanged are not referenced. The discussion within each section explains the changes and the reasoning behind them, as well as the Department’s response to related public comments. Subject areas that deal with more than one section of the regulation include references to the related sections, where appropriate. The Section-by-Section Analysis also discusses many of the questions asked by the Department for specific public response. The section of entitled “Other Issues” discusses public comment on several issues of concern to the Department that were the subject of questions that are not specifically addressed in the Section-by-Section Analysis.

The Department’s description of the 2010 Standards, as well as a discussion of the public comments on specific sections of the 2004 ADAAG, is found in Appendix B of this final rule, “Analysis and Commentary on the 2010 ADA Standards for Accessible Design,” codified as Appendix B to 28 CFR part 36.

The provisions of this rule generally take effect six months from its publication in the Federal Register. The Department has determined, however, that compliance with the requirements related to new construction and alterations and reservations at a place of lodging shall not be required until 18 months from the publication date of this rule. These exceptions are set forth in §§ 36.406(a) and 36.302(e)(3), respectively, and are discussed in greater detail in Appendix A. See discussions in Appendix A entitled ‘section 36.406 Standards for New Construction and Alterations” and ‘section 36.302(e) Hotel Reservations.”

This final rule only addresses issues that were identified in the NPRM as subjects the Department intended to regulate through this rulemaking proceeding. Because the Department indicated in the NPRM that it did not intend to regulate certain areas, including equipment and furniture, accessible golf cars, and movie captioning and video description, as part of this rulemaking proceeding, the Department believes it would be appropriate to solicit more public comment about these areas prior to making them the subject of a rulemaking. The Department intends to engage in additional rulemaking in the near future addressing accessibility in these areas and others, including next generation 9–1–1 and accessibility of Web sites operated by covered public entities and public accommodations.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: Regulatory Process Matters (SBREFA, Regulatory Flexibility Act, and Executive Orders)

The Department must provide two types of assessments as part of its final rule: An analysis of the costs and benefits of adopting the changes contained in this rule, and a periodic review of its existing regulations to consider their impact on small entities, including small businesses, small nonprofit organizations, and small governmental jurisdictions. See E.O. 12866, 58 FR 51735, 3 CFR, 1994 Comp., p. 638, as amended; Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA), 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq, as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA), 5 U.S.C. 610(a); OMB Circular A–4, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/OMB/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf (last visited June 24, 2010); E.O. 13272, 67 FR 53461, 3 CFR, 2003 Comp., p. 247.

In the NPRM, the Department kept open the possibility that, if warranted by public comments received on an issue raised by the 2004 ADAAG or by the results of the Department’s Initial Regulatory Impact Analysis (Initial RIA), available at http://archive.ada.gov/NPRM2008/ria.htm, showing that the likely costs of making a particular feature or facility accessible were disproportionate to the benefits (including both monetized and nonmonetized benefits) to persons with disabilities, the Attorney General, as a member of the Access Board, could return the issue to the Access Board for further consideration. After careful consideration, the Department has determined that it is unnecessary to return any issues to the Access Board for additional consideration.

Executive Order 12866

This rule has been reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under Executive Order 12866. The Department has evaluated its existing regulations for title II and title III section by section, and many of the provisions in the final rule for both titles reflect its efforts to mitigate any negative effects on small entities. A Final Regulatory Impact Analysis (Final RIA or RIA) was prepared by the Department’s contractor, HDR HLB Decision Economics, Inc. (HDR). In accordance with Executive Order 12866, as amended, and OMB Circular A–4, the Department has reviewed and considered the Final RIA and has accepted the results of this analysis as its assessment of the benefits and costs of the final rules.

Executive Order 12866 refers explicitly not only to monetizable costs and benefits but also to “distributive impacts” and “equity,” See E.O. 12866, section 1(a), and it is important to recognize that the ADA is intended to provide important benefits that are distributional and equitable in character. The ADA states, “[i]t is the purpose of this [Act] (1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities; [and] (2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities[.]” 42 U.S.C. 12101(b). Many of the benefits of this rule stem from the provision of such standards, which will promote inclusion, reduce stigma and potential embarrassment, and combat isolation, segregation, and second-class citizenship of individuals with disabilities. Some of these benefits are, in the words of Executive Order 12866, “difficult to quantify, but nevertheless essential to consider.” E.O. 12866, section 1(a). The Department has considered such benefits here.

Final Regulatory Impact Analysis

The Final RIA embodies a comprehensive benefit-cost analysis of the final rules for both title II and title III and assesses the incremental benefits and costs of the 2010 Standards relative to a primary baseline scenario (1991 Standards). In addition, the Department conducted additional research and analyses for requirements having the highest negative net present values under the primary baseline scenario. This approach was taken because, while the 1991 Standards are the only uniform set of accessibility standards that apply to public accommodations, commercial facilities, and State and local government facilities nationwide, it is also understood that many State and local jurisdictions have already adopted IBC/ANSI model code provisions that mirror those in the 2004 ADAAG. The assessments based on this approach assume that covered entities currently implementing codes that mirror the 2004 ADAAG will not need to modify their code requirements once the rules are finalized. They also assume that, even without the final rules, the current level of compliance would be unchanged. The Final RIA contains specific information, including data in chart form, detailing which States have already adopted the accessibility standards for this subset of six requirements. The Department believes that the estimates resulting from this approach represent a reasonable upper and lower measure of the likely effects these requirements will have that the Department was able to quantify and monetize.

The Final RIA estimates the benefits and costs for all new (referred to as ‘supplemental”) requirements and revised requirements across all types of newly constructed and existing facilities. The Final RIA also incorporates a sophisticated risk analysis process that quantifies the inherent uncertainties in estimating costs and benefits and then assesses (through computer simulations) the relative impact of these factors when varied simultaneously. A copy of the Final RIA will be made available online for public review on the Department’s ADA Home Page

From an economic perspective (as specified in OMB Circular A–B4), the results of the Final RIA demonstrate that the Department’s final rules increase social resources and thus represent a public good because monetized benefits exceed monetized costs—that is, the regulations have a positive net present value (NPV). Indeed, under every scenario assessed in the Final RIA, the final rules have a positive NPV. The Final RIA’s first scenario examines the incremental impact of the final rules using the “main” set of assumptions (i.e., assuming a primary baseline (1991 Standards), that the safe harbor applies, and that for title III entities barrier removal is readily achievable for 50 percent of elements subject to supplemental requirements).

Under this set of assumptions, the final rules have an expected NPV of $9.3 billion (7 percent discount rate) and $40.4 billion (3 percent discount rate). See Final RIA, table ES–1 and figure ES–2.

Water Closet Clearances

The Department gave careful consideration to the costs and benefits of its adoption of the standards relating to water closet clearances in single-user toilet rooms. The primary effect of the Department’s proposed final rules governing water closet clearances in single-user toilet rooms with in-swinging and out-swinging doors is to allow sufficient room for ‘side” or “parallel” methods of transferring from a wheelchair to a toilet. Under the current 1991 Standards, the requisite clearance space in single-user toilet rooms between and around the toilet and the lavatory does not permit these methods of transfer. Side or parallel transfers are used by large numbers of persons who use wheelchairs and are regularly taught in rehabilitation and occupational therapy. Currently, persons who use side or parallel transfer methods from their wheelchairs are faced with a stark choice at establishments with single-user toilet rooms — i.e., patronize the establishment but run the risk of needing assistance when using the restroom, travel with someone who would be able to provide assistance in toileting, or forgo the visit entirely. The revised water closet clearance regulations would make single-user toilet rooms accessible to all persons who use wheelchairs, not just those with the physical strength, balance, and dexterity and the training to use a front-transfer method. Single-user toilet rooms are located in a wide variety of public and private facilities, including restaurants, fast-food establishments, schools, retail stores, parks, sports stadiums, and hospitals. Final promulgation of these requirements might thus, for example, enable a person who uses a side or parallel transfer method to use the restroom (or use the restroom independently) at his or her local coffee shop for the first time.

Because of the complex nature of its cost-benefit analysis, the Department is providing “plain language” descriptions of the benefits calculations for the two revised requirements with the highest estimated total costs: Water closet clearance in single-user toilet rooms with out-swinging doors (RIA Req. #28) (section 604.3 of the 2010 Standards) and water closet clearance in single-user toilet rooms with in-swinging doors (RIA Req. #32) (sections 604.3 and 603.2.3 Exception 2 of the 2010 Standards). Since many of the concepts and calculations in the Final RIA are highly technical, it is hoped that, by providing “lay” descriptions of how benefits are monetized for an illustrative set of requirements, the Final RIA will be more transparent and afford readers a more complete understanding of the benefits model generally. Because of the widespread adoption of the water closet clearance standards in existing State and local building codes, the following calculations use the IBC/ANSI baseline.

General description of monetized benefits for water closet clearance in single-user toilet rooms—out-swinging doors (Req. #28). In order to assess monetized benefits for the requirement covering water closet clearances in single-user toilet rooms with out-swinging doors, a determination needed to be made concerning the population of users with disabilities who would likely benefit from this revised standard. Based on input received from a panel of experts jointly convened by HDR and the Department to discuss benefits-related estimates and assumptions used in the RIA model, it was assumed that accessibility changes brought about by this requirement would benefit persons with any type of ambulatory (i.e., mobility-related) disability, such as persons who use wheelchairs, walkers, or braces. Recent census figures estimate that about 11.9 percent of Americans ages 15 and older have an ambulatory disability, or about 35 million people. This expert panel also estimated that single-user toilet rooms with out-swinging doors would be used slightly less than once every other visit to a facility with such toilet rooms covered by the final rules (or, viewed another way, about once every two hours spent at a covered facility assumed to have one or more single-user toilet rooms with out-swinging doors) by an individual with an ambulatory disability. The expert panel further estimated that, for such individuals, the revised requirement would result in an average time savings of about five and a half minutes when using the restroom. This time savings is due to the revised water closet clearance standard, which permits, among other things, greater flexibility in terms of access to the toilet by parallel or side transfer, thereby perhaps reducing the wait for another person to assist with toileting and the need to twist or struggle to access the toilet independently. Based on average hourly wage rates compiled by the U.S. Department of Labor, the time savings for Req. #28 is valued at just under $10 per hour.

For public and private facilities covered by the final rules, it is estimated that there are currently about 11 million single-user toilet rooms with out-swinging doors. The majority of these types of single-user toilet rooms, nearly 7 million, are assumed to be located at “Indoor Service Establishments,” a broad facility group that encompasses various types of indoor retail stores such as bakeries, grocery stores, clothing stores, and hardware stores. Based on construction industry data, it was estimated that approximately 3 percent of existing single-user toilet rooms with out-swinging doors would be altered each year, and that the number of newly constructed facilities with these types of toilet rooms would increase at the rate of about 1 percent each year. However, due to the widespread adoption at the State and local level of model code provisions that mirror Req. #28, it is further understood that about half of all existing facilities assumed to have single-user toilet rooms with out-swinging doors already are covered by State or local building codes that require equivalent water closet clearances. Due to the general element-by-element safe harbor provision in the final rules, no unaltered single-user toilet rooms that comply with the current 1991 Standards will be required to retrofit to meet the revised clearance requirements in the final rules.

With respect to new construction, it is assumed that each single-user toilet room with an out-swinging door will last the life of the building, about 40 years. For alterations, the amount of time such a toilet room will be used depends upon the remaining life of the building (i.e. a period of time between 1 and 39 years).

Summing up monetized benefits to users with disabilities across all types of public and private facilities covered by the final rules, and assuming 46 percent of covered facilities nationwide are located in jurisdictions that have adopted the relevant equivalent IBC/ ANSI model code provisions, it is expected that the revised requirement for water closet clearance in single-user toilet rooms with out-swinging doors will result in net benefits of approximately $900 million over the life of these regulations.

General description of monetized benefits for water closet clearance in single-user toilet rooms—in-swinging doors (Req. # 32).For the water closet clearance in single-user toilet rooms with the in-swinging door requirement (Req. #32), the expert panel determined that the primary beneficiaries would be persons who use wheelchairs. As compared to single-user toilet rooms with out-swinging doors, those with in-swinging doors tend to be larger (in terms of square footage) in order to accommodate clearance for the in-swinging door and, thus, are already likely to have adequate clear floor space for persons with disabilities who use other types of mobility aids such as walkers and crutches.

The expert benefits panel estimated that single-user toilet rooms with in-swinging doors are used less frequently on average—about once every 20 visits to a facility with such a toilet room by a person who uses a wheelchair—than their counterpart toilet rooms with out-swinging doors. This panel also determined that, on average, each user would realize a time savings of about 9 minutes as a result of the enhanced clearances required by this revised standard.

The RIA estimates that there are about 4 million single-user toilet rooms with in-swinging doors in existing facilities. About half of the single-user toilet rooms with in-swinging doors are assumed to be located in single-level stores, and about a quarter of them are assumed to be located in restaurants. Based on construction industry data, it was estimated that approximately 3 percent of existing single-user toilet rooms with in-swinging doors would be altered each year, and that the number of newly constructed facilities with these types of toilet rooms would increase at the rate of about 1 percent each year. However, due to the widespread adoption at the State and local level of model code provisions that mirror Req. #32, it is further understood that slightly more than 70 percent of all existing facilities assumed to have single-user toilet rooms with in-swinging doors already are covered by State or local building codes that require equivalent water closet clearances. Due to the general element-by-element safe harbor provision in the final rules, no unaltered single-user toilet rooms that comply with the current 1991 Standards will be required to retrofit to meet the revised clearance requirements in the final rules.

Similar to the assumptions for Req. #28, it is assumed that newly constructed single-user toilet rooms with in-swinging doors will last the life of the building, about 40 years. For alterations, the amount of time such a toilet room will be used depends upon the remaining life of the building (i.e., a period of time between 1 and 39 years). Over this time period, the total estimated value of benefits to users of water closets with in-swinging doors from the time they will save and decreased discomfort they will experience is nearly $12 million.

Additional benefits of water closet clearance standards. The standards requiring sufficient space in single-user toilet rooms for a wheelchair user to effect a side or parallel transfer are among the most costly (in monetary terms) of the new provisions in the Access Board’s guidelines that the Department adopts in this rule—but also, the Department believes, one of the most beneficial in non-monetary terms. Although the monetized costs of these requirements substantially exceed the monetized benefits, the additional benefits that persons with disabilities will derive from greater safety, enhanced independence, and the avoidance of stigma and humiliation— benefits that the Department’s economic model could not put in monetary terms—are, in the Department’s experience and considered judgment, likely to be quite high. Wheelchair users, including veterans returning from our Nation’s wars with disabilities, are taught to transfer onto toilets from the side. Side transfers are the safest, most efficient, and most independence-promoting way for wheelchair users to get onto the toilet. The opportunity to effect a side transfer will often obviate the need for a wheelchair user or individual with another type of mobility impairment to obtain the assistance of another person to engage in what is, for most people, among the most private of activities. Executive Order 12866 refers explicitly not only to monetizable costs and benefits but also to “distributive impacts” and “equity,”See E.O. 12866, section 1(a), and it is important to recognize that the ADA is intended to provide important benefits that are distributional and equitable in character. These water closet clearance provisions will have non-monetized benefits that promote equal access and equal opportunity for individuals with disabilities, and will further the ADA’ s purpose of providing “a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. 12101(b)(1).

The Department’s calculations indicated that, in fact, people with the relevant disabilities would have to place only a very small monetary value on these quite substantial benefits for the costs and benefits of these water closet clearance standards to break even. To make these calculations, the Department separated out toilet rooms with out-swinging doors from those with in-swinging doors, because the costs and benefits of the respective water closet clearance requirements are significantly different. The Department estimates that, assuming 46 percent of covered facilities nationwide are located in jurisdictions that have adopted the relevant equivalent IBC/ANSI model code provisions, the costs of the requirement as applied to toilet rooms with out-swinging doors will exceed the monetized benefits by $454 million, an annualized net cost of approximately $32.6 million. But a large number of people with disabilities will realize benefits of independence, safety, and avoided stigma and humiliation as a result of the requirement’s application in this context. Based on the estimates of its expert panel and its own experience, the Department believes that both wheelchair users and people with a variety of other mobility disabilities will benefit. The Department estimates that people with the relevant disabilities will use a newly accessible single-user toilet room with an out-swinging door approximately 677 million times per year. Dividing the $32.6 million annual cost by the 677 million annual uses, the Department concludes that for the costs and benefits to break even in this context, people with the relevant disabilities will have to value safety, independence, and the avoidance of stigma and humiliation at just under 5 cents per visit. The Department believes, based on its experience and informed judgment, that 5 cents substantially understates the value people with the relevant disabilities would place on these benefits in this context.

There are substantially fewer single-user toilet rooms with in-swinging doors, and substantially fewer people with disabilities will benefit from making those rooms accessible. While both wheelchair users and individuals with other ambulatory disabilities will benefit from the additional space in a room with an out-swinging door, the Department believes, based on the estimates of its expert panel and its own experience, that wheelchair users likely will be the primary beneficiaries of the in-swinging door requirement. The Department estimates that people with the relevant disabilities will use a newly accessible single-user toilet room with an in-swinging door approximately 8.7 million times per year. Moreover, the alteration costs to make a single-user toilet room with an in-swinging door accessible are substantially higher (because of the space taken up by the door) than the equivalent costs of making a room with an out-swinging door accessible. Thus, the Department calculates that, assuming 72 percent of covered facilities nationwide are located in jurisdictions that have adopted the relevant equivalent IBC/ANSI model code provisions, the costs of applying the toilet room accessibility standard to rooms with in-swinging doors will exceed the monetized benefits of doing so by $266.3 million over the life of the regulations, or approximately $19.14 million per year. Dividing the $19.14 million annual cost by the 8.7 million annual uses, the Department concludes that for the costs and benefits to break even in this context, people with the relevant disabilities will have to value safety, independence, and the avoidance of stigma and humiliation at approximately $2.20 per visit. The Department believes, based on its experience and informed judgment, that this figure approximates, and probably understates, the value wheelchair users place on safety, independence, and the avoidance of stigma and humiliation in this context.

Alternate Scenarios

Another scenario in the Final RIA explores the incremental impact of varying the assumptions concerning the percentage of existing elements subject to supplemental requirements for which barrier removal would be readily achievable. Readily achievable barrier removal rates are modeled at 0 percent, 50 percent, and 100 percent levels. The results of this scenario show that the expected NPV is positive for each readily achievable barrier removal rate and that varying this assumed rate has little impact on expected NPV. See Final RIA, figure ES–3.

A third set of analyses in the Final RIA demonstrates the impact of using alternate baselines based on model codes instead of the primary baseline. The IBC model codes, which have been widely adopted by State and local jurisdictions around the country, are significant because many of the requirements in the final rules mirror accessibility provisions in the IBC model codes (or standards incorporated therein by reference, such as ANSI A117.1). The actual economic impact of the Department’s final rules is, therefore, tempered by the fact that many jurisdictions nationwide have already adopted and are enforcing portions of the final rules—indeed, this was one of the goals underlying the Access Board’s efforts to harmonize the 2004 ADAAG Standards with the model codes. However, capturing the economic impact of this reality poses a difficult modeling challenge due to the variety of methods by which States and localities have adopted the IBC/ANSI model codes (e.g., in whole, in part, and with or without amendments), as well as the lack of a national “facility census’ establishing the location, type, and age of existing ADA-covered facilities.

As a result, in the first set of alternate IBC baseline analyses, the Final RIA assumes that all of the three IBC model codes—IBC 2000, IBC 2003, and IBC 2006—have been fully adopted by all jurisdictions and apply to all facilities nationwide. As with the primary baseline scenarios examined in the Final RIA, use of these three alternate IBC baselines results in positive expected NPVs in all cases. See Final RIA, figure ES–4. These results also indicate that IBC 2000 and IBC 2006 respectively have the highest and lowest expected NPVs. These results are due to changes in the make-up of the set of requirements that is included in each alternative baseline.

Additionally, a second, more limited alternate baseline analysis in the Final RIA uses a State-specific and requirement-specific alternate IBC/ANSI baseline in order to demonstrate the likely actual incremental impact of an illustrative subset of 20 requirements under current conditions nationwide. For this analysis, research was conducted on a subset of 20 requirements in the final rules that have negative net present values under the primary baseline and readily identifiable IBC/ANSI counterparts to determine the extent to which they each respectively have been adopted at the State or local level. With respect to facilities, the population of adopting jurisdictions was used as a proxy for facility location. In other words, it was assumed that the number of ADA-covered facilities respectively compliant with these 20 requirements was equal to the percentage of the United States population (based on statistics from the Census Bureau) currently residing in those States or local jurisdictions that have adopted the IBC/ANSI counterparts to these requirements. The results of this more limited analysis, using State-specific and requirement-specific alternate IBC/ANSI baselines for these 20 requirements, demonstrate that the widespread adoption of IBC model codes by States and localities significantly lessens the financial impact of these specific requirements. Indeed, the Final RIA estimates that, if the NPVs for these 20 requirements resulting from the requirement-specific alternate IBC/ANSI baseline are substituted for their respective results under the primary baseline, the overall NPV for the final rules increases from $9.2 billion to $12.0 billion. See Final RIA, section 6.2.2 & table 10.

Benefits Not Monetized in the Formal Analysis Finally, the RIA recognizes that additional benefits are likely to result from the new standards. Many of these benefits are more difficult to quantify. Among the potential benefits that have been discussed by researchers and advocates are reduced administrative costs due to harmonized guidelines, increased business opportunities, increased social development, and improved health benefits. For example, the final rules will substantially increase accessibility at newly scoped facilities such as recreation facilities and judicial facilities, which previously have been very difficult for persons with disabilities to access. Areas where the Department believes entities may incur benefits that are not monetized in the formal analysis include, but may not be limited to, the following:

Use benefits accruing to persons with disabilities. The final rules should improve the overall sense of well-being of persons with disabilities, who will know that public entities and places of public accommodation are generally accessible, and who will have improved individual experiences. Some of the most frequently cited qualitative benefits of increased access are the increase in one’s personal sense of dignity that arises from increased access and the decrease in possibly humiliating incidents due to accessibility barriers. Struggling to join classmates on a stage, to use a bathroom with too little clearance, or to enter a swimming pool all negatively affect a person’s sense of independence and can lead to humiliating accidents, derisive comments, or embarrassment. These humiliations, together with feelings of being stigmatized as different or inferior from being relegated to use other, less comfortable or pleasant elements of a facility (such as a bathroom instead of a kitchen sink for rinsing a coffee mug at work), all have a negative effect on persons with disabilities.

Use benefits accruing to persons without disabilities. Improved accessibility can affect more than just the rule’s target population; persons without disabilities may also benefit from many of the requirements. Even though the requirements were not designed to benefit persons without disabilities, any time savings or easier access to a facility experienced by persons without disabilities are also benefits that should properly be attributed to that change in accessibility. Curb cuts in sidewalks make life easier for those using wheeled suitcases or pushing a baby stroller. For people with a lot of luggage or a need to change clothes, the larger bathroom stalls can be highly valued. A ramp into a pool can allow a child (or adult) with a fear of water to ease into that pool. All are examples of “unintended” benefits of the rule. And ideally, all should be part of the calculus of the benefits to society of the rule.

Social benefits. Evidence supports the notion that children with and without disabilities benefit in their social development from interaction with one another. Therefore, there will likely be social development benefits generated by an increase in accessible play areas. However, these benefits are nearly impossible to quantify for several reasons. First, there is no guarantee that accessibility will generate play opportunities between children with and without disabilities. Second, there may be substantial overlap between interactions at accessible play areas and interactions at other facilities, such as schools and religious facilities. Third, it is not certain what the unit of measurement for social development should be.

Non-use benefits. There are additional, indirect benefits to society that arise from improved accessibility. For instance, resource savings may arise from reduced social service agency outlays when people are able to access centralized points of service delivery rather than receiving home-based care. Home-based and other social services may include home health care visits and welfare benefits. Third-party employment effects can arise when enhanced accessibility results in increasing rates of consumption by disabled and non-disabled populations, which in turn results in reduced unemployment.

Two additional forms of benefits are discussed less often, let alone quantified: Option value and existence value. Option value is the value that people with and without disabilities derive from the option of using accessible facilities at some point in the future. As with insurance, people derive benefit from the knowledge that the option to use the accessible facility exists, even if it ultimately goes unused. Simply because an individual is a nonuser of accessible elements today does not mean that he or she will remain so tomorrow. In any given year, there is some probability that an individual will develop a disability (either temporary or permanent) that will necessitate use of these features. For example, the 2000 Census found that 41.9 percent of adults 65 years and older identified themselves as having a disability. Census Bureau figures, moreover, project that the number of people 65 years and older will more than double between 2000 and 2030—from 35 million to 71.5 million. Therefore, even individuals who have no direct use for accessibility features today get a direct benefit from the knowledge of their existence should such individuals need them in the future.

Existence value is the benefit that individuals get from the plain existence of a good, service or resource—in this case, accessibility. It can also be described as the value that people both with and without disabilities derive from the guarantees of equal treatment and non-discrimination that are accorded through the provision of accessible facilities. In other words, people value living in a country that affords protections to individuals with disabilities, whether or not they themselves are directly or indirectly affected. Unlike use benefits and option value, existence value does not require an individual ever to use the resource or plan on using the resource in the future. There are numerous reasons why individuals might value accessibility even if they do not require it now and do not anticipate needing it in the future.

Costs Not Monetized in the Formal Analysis The Department also recognizes that in addition to benefits that cannot reasonably be quantified or monetized, there may be negative consequences and costs that fall into this category as well. The absence of a quantitative assessment of such costs in the formal regulatory analysis is not meant to minimize their importance to affected entities; rather, it reflects the inherent difficulty in estimating those costs. Areas where the Department believes entities may incur costs that are not monetized in the formal analysis include, but may not be limited to, the following:

Costs from deferring or forgoing alterations. Entities covered by the final rules may choose to delay otherwise desired alterations to their facilities due to the increased incremental costs imposed by compliance with the new requirements. This may lead to facility deterioration and decrease in the value of such facilities. In extreme cases, the costs of complying with the new requirements may lead some entities to opt to not build certain facilities at all. For example, the Department estimates that the incremental costs of building a new wading pool associated with the final rules will increase by about $142,500 on average. Some facilities may opt to not build such pools to avoid incurring this increased cost.

Loss of productive space while modifying an existing facility. During complex alterations, such as where moving walls or plumbing systems will be necessary to comply with the final rules, productive space may be unavailable until the alterations are complete. For example, a hotel altering its bathrooms to comply with the final rules will be unable to allow guests to occupy these rooms while construction activities are underway, and thus the hotel may forgo revenue from these rooms during this time. While the amount of time necessary to perform alterations varies significantly, the costs associated with unproductive space could be high in certain cases, especially if space is already limited or if an entity or facility is located in an area where real estate values are particularly high (e.g., New York or San Francisco).

Expert fees. Another type of cost to entities that is not monetized in the formal analysis is legal fees to determine what, if anything, a facility needs to do in order to comply with the new rules or to respond to lawsuits. Several commenters indicated that entities will incur increased legal costs because the requirements are changing for the first time since 1991. Since litigation risk could increase, entities could spend more on legal fees than in the past. Likewise, covered entities may face incremental costs when undertaking alterations because their engineers, architects, or other consultants may also need to consider what modifications are necessary to comply with the new requirements. The Department has not quantified the incremental costs of the services of these kinds of experts.

Reduction in facility value and losses to individuals without disabilities due to the new accessibility requirements. It is possible that some changes made by entities to their facilities in order to comply with the new requirements may result in fewer individuals without disabilities using such facilities (because of decreased enjoyment) and may create a disadvantage for individuals without disabilities, even though the change might increase accessibility for individuals with disabilities. For example, the new requirements for wading pools might decrease the value of the pool to the entity that owns it due to fewer individuals using it (because the new requirements for a sloped entry might make the pool too shallow). Similarly, several commenters from the miniature golf industry expressed concern that it would be difficult to comply with the regulations for accessible holes without significantly degrading the experience for other users. Finally, with respect to costs to individuals who do not have disabilities, a very tall person, for example, may be inconvenienced by having to reach further for a lowered light switch.

Section 610 Review

The Department also is required to conduct a periodic regulatory review pursuant to section 610 of the RFA, as amended by the SBREFA.

The review requires agencies to consider five factors: (1) The continued need for the rule; (2) the nature of complaints or comments received concerning the rule from the public; (3) the complexity of the rule; (4) the extent to which the rule overlaps, duplicates, or conflicts with other Federal rules, and, to the extent feasible, with State and local governmental rules; and (5) the length of time since the rule has been evaluated or the degree to which technology, economic conditions, or other factors have changed in the area affected by the rule. 5 U.S.C. 610(b). Based on these factors, the agency is required to determine whether to continue the rule without change or to amend or rescind the rule, to minimize any significant economic impact of the rule on a substantial number of small entities. See id. 610(a).

In developing the 2010 Standards, the Department reviewed the 1991 Standards section by section, and, as a result, has made several clarifications and amendments in both the title II and title III implementing regulations. The changes reflect the Department’s analysis and review of complaints or comments from the public, as well as changes in technology. Many of the amendments aim to clarify and simplify the obligations of covered entities. As discussed in greater detail above, one significant goal of the development of the 2004 ADAAG was to eliminate duplication or overlap in Federal accessibility guidelines, as well as to harmonize the Federal guidelines with model codes. The Department also has worked to create harmony where appropriate between the requirements of titles II and III. Finally, while the regulation is required by statute and there is a continued need for it as a whole, the Department proposes several modifications that are intended to reduce its effects on small entities.

The Department has consulted with the Small Business Administration’s Office of Advocacy about this process. The Office of Advocacy has advised that although the process followed by the Department was ancillary to the proposed adoption of revised ADA Standards, the steps taken to solicit public input and to respond to public concerns are functionally equivalent to the process required to complete a section 610 review. Therefore, this rulemaking fulfills the Department’s obligations under the RFA.

Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

This final rule also has been reviewed by the Small Business Administration’s Office of Advocacy (Advocacy) in accordance with Executive Order 13272, 67 FR 53461, 3 CFR, 2003 Comp., p. 247. Chapter Seven of the Final RIA demonstrates that the final rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The Department has also conducted a final regulatory flexibility analysis (FRFA) as a component of this rulemaking. Collectively, the ANPRM, NPRM, Initial RIA, Final RIA, and 2010 Standards include all of the elements of a FRFA required by the RFA. See 5 U.S.C. 604(a)(1)–(5).

Section 604(a) lists the specific requirements for a FRFA. The Department has addressed these RFA requirements throughout the ANPRM, NPRM, the 2010 Standards, and the RIA. In summary, the Department has satisfied its FRFA obligations under section 604(a) by providing the following:

1. Succinct summaries of the need for, and objectives of, the final rule. The Department is issuing this final rule in order to comply with its obligations under both the ADA and the SBREFA. The Department is also updating or amending certain provisions of the existing title III regulation so that they are consistent with the title II regulations and comport with the Department’s legal and practical experiences in enforcing the ADA.

The ADA requires the Department to adopt enforceable accessibility standards under the ADA that are consistent with the Access Board’s minimum accessibility guidelines and requirements. Accordingly, this rule adopts ADA Chapter 1, ADA Chapter 2, and Chapters 3 through 10 of the 2004 ADA/ABA Guidelines as part of the 2010 Standards, which will give the guidelines legal effect with respect to the Department’s title II and title III regulations.

Under the SBREFA, the Department is required to perform a periodic review of its 1991 rule because the rule may have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The SBREFA also requires the Department to make a regulatory assessment of the costs and benefits of any significant regulatory action. See preamble sections of the final rules for titles II and III entitled ‘summary”; Department of Justice Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 69 FR 58768, 58768B70, (Sept. 30, 2004) (outlining the regulatory history, goals, and rationale underlying the Department’s proposal to revise its regulations implementing titles II and III of the ADA); and Department of Justice Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 73 FR 34508, 34508B14 (June 17, 2008) (outlining the regulatory history and rationale underlying the Department’s proposal to revise its regulations implementing titles II and III of the ADA).

1. Summaries of significant issues raised by public comments in response to the Department’s initial regulatory flexibility analysis (IRFA) and discussions of regulatory revisions made as a result of such comments. The majority of the comments received by the Department addressing its IRFA set forth in the title III NPRM were submitted by the Advocacy. Advocacy acknowledged that the Department took into account the comments and concerns of small businesses; however, Advocacy remained concerned about certain items in the Department’s NPRM and requested clarification or additional guidance on certain items.

General Safe Harbor. Advocacy expressed support for the Department’s proposal to allow an element-by-element safe harbor for elements that now comply with the 1991 Standards and encouraged the Department to include specific technical assistance in the Small Business Compliance Guide that the Department is required to publish pursuant to section 212 of the SBREFA, 5 U.S.C. 610 et seq.

Advocacy requested that technical assistance outlining which standards are subject to the safe harbor be included in the Department’s guidance. The Department has provided a list of the new requirements in the 2010 Standards that are not eligible for the safe harbor in § 36.304(d)(2)(iii)(A)–(L) of the final rule and plans to include additional information about the application of the safe harbor in the Department’s Small Business Compliance Guide. Advocacy also requested that guidance regarding the two effective dates for regulations also be provided, and the Department plans to include such guidance in its Small Business Compliance Guide.

Small Business Safe Harbor. Advocacy expressed disappointment that the Department did not include a small business safe harbor in the final rule. In the NPRM, the Department proposed to include a small business safe harbor. Advocacy conceptually supported this safe harbor but had concerns regarding its application. Commenters from both the disability community and the business community uniformly, and quite adamantly, opposed the Department’s proposal. Some business commenters suggested alternative safe harbors, but there was no common thread among their suggestions that would enable the Department to craft a proposal that would draw support from the affected communities.

Advocacy recommended that the Department continue to study how the proposed small business safe harbor might be made workable in future rulemakings, and recommended that the Department also seek other alternatives that minimize the economic impact of the ADA rulemakings in the future. The Department is mindful of its obligations under the SBREFA and will be sensitive to the need to mitigate costs for small businesses in any future rulemaking; however, based on the information currently available, the Department has declined to commit to a specific regulatory approach in the final rule.

Indirect Costs. Advocacy and other commenters representing business interests expressed concern that businesses would incur substantial indirect costs under the final rule for accessibility consultants, legal counsel, training, and the development of new policies and procedures. The Department believes that such “indirect costs,” even assuming they would occur as described by these commenters, are not properly attributed to the Department’s final rule implementing the ADA.

The vast majority of the new requirements are incremental changes subject to a safe harbor. All businesses currently in compliance with the 1991 Standards will neither need to undertake further retrofits nor require the services of a consultant to tell them so. If, on the other hand, elements at an existing facility are not currently in compliance with the 1991 Standards, then the cost of making such a determination and bringing these elements into compliance are not properly attributed to the final rule, but to lack of compliance with the 1991 Standards.

For the limited number of requirements in the final rule that are supplemental, the Department believes that covered entities simply need to determine whether they have an element covered by a supplemental requirement (e.g., a swimming pool) and then conduct any necessary barrier removal work either in-house or by contacting a local contractor. Determining whether such an element exists is expected to take only a minimal amount of staff time. Nevertheless, Chapter 5 of the Final RIA has a high-end estimate of the additional management costs of such evaluation (from 1 to 8 hours of staff time).

The Department also anticipates that businesses will incur minimal costs for accessibility consultants to ensure compliance with the new requirements for New Construction and Alterations in the final rule. Both the 2004 ADAAG and the proposed requirements have been made public for some time and are already being incorporated into design plans by architects and builders. Further, in adopting the final rule, the Department has sought to harmonize, to the greatest extent possible, the ADA Standards with model codes that have been adopted on a widespread basis by State and local jurisdictions across the country. Accordingly, many of the requirements in the final rule are already incorporated into building codes nationwide. Additionally, it is assumed to be part of the regular course of business—and thereby incorporated into standard professional services or construction contracts—for architects and contractors to keep abreast of changes in applicable Federal, State, and local laws and building codes. Given these considerations, the Department has determined that the additional costs, if any, for architectural or contractor services that arise out of the final rule should be minimal.

Some commenters stated that the final rule would require them to develop new policies or manuals to retrain employees on the revised ADA standards. However, it is the Department’s view that because the revised and supplemental requirements address architectural issues and features, the final rule would require minimal, if any, changes to the overall policies and procedures of covered entities.

Finally, commenters representing business interests expressed the view that the final rule would cause businesses to incur significant legal costs in order to defend ADA lawsuits. However, regulatory impact analyses are not an appropriate forum for assessing the cost covered entities may bear, or the repercussions they may face, for failing to comply (or allegedly failing to comply) with current law. See Final RIA, Ch. 3, section 3.1.4, “Other Management Transition Costs”; Ch. 5,”Updates to the Regulatory Impact Analysis”; and table 15, “Impact of NPV of Estimated Managerial Costs for Supplemental Requirements at All Facilities.”

1. Estimates of the number and type of small entities to which the final rule will apply. The Department estimates that the final rule will apply to approximately three million small entities or facilities covered by title III. See Final RIA, Ch. 7, ‘small Business Impact Analysis,” table 17, and app. 5, ‘small Business Data”; see also 73 FR 36964, 36996–37009 (June 30, 2008) (estimating the number of small entities the Department believes may be impacted by the NPRM and calculating the likely incremental economic impact of the rule on small facilities/entities versus “typical” (i.e., average-sized facilities/entities).

2. A description of the projected reporting, record-keeping, and other compliance requirements of the final rule, including an estimate of the classes of small entities that will be subject to the requirement and the type of professional skills necessary for preparation of the report or record. The final rule imposes no new recordkeeping or reporting requirements. See preamble section entitled “Paperwork Reduction Act.” Small entities may incur costs as a result of complying with the final rules. These costs are detailed in the Final RIA, Chapter 7, ‘small Business Impact Analysis” and accompanying Appendix 5, ‘small Business Data.”

3. Descriptions of the steps taken by the Department to minimize any significant economic impact on small entities consistent with the stated objectives of the ADA, including the reasons for selecting the alternatives adopted in the final rule and for rejecting other significant alternatives. From the outset of this rulemaking, the Department has been mindful of small entities and has taken numerous steps to minimize the impact of the final rule on small businesses. Several of these steps are summarized below.

As an initial matter, the Department— as a voting member of the Access Board—was extensively involved in the development of the 2004 ADAAG. These guidelines, which are incorporated into the 2010 Standards, reflect a conscious effort to mitigate any significant economic impact on small businesses in several respects. First, one of the express goals of the 2004 ADAAG is harmonization of Federal accessibility guidelines with industry standards and model codes that often form the basis of State and local building codes, thereby minimizing the impact of these guidelines on all covered entities, but especially small businesses. Second, the 2004 ADAAG is the product of a 10-year rulemaking effort in which a host of private and public entities, including small business groups, worked cooperatively to develop accessibility guidelines that achieved an appropriate balance between accessibility and cost. For example, as originally recommended by the Access Board’s Recreation Access Advisory Committee, all holes on a miniature golf course would be required to be accessible except for sloped surfaces where the ball could not come to rest. See, e.g.. “ADA Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities—Recreation Facilities and Outdoor Developed Areas,” Access Board Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 59 FR 48542 (Sept. 21, 1994). Miniature golf trade groups and facility operators, who are nearly all small businesses, expressed significant concern that such requirements would be prohibitively expensive, would require additional space, and might fundamentally alter the nature of their courses. See, e.g., “ADA Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities—Recreation Facilities,” Access Board Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 64 FR 37326 (July 9, 1999). In consideration of such concerns and after holding informational meetings with miniature golf representatives and persons with disabilities, the Access Board significantly revised the final miniature golf guidelines. The final guidelines not only reduced significantly the number of holes required to be accessible to 50 percent of all holes (with one break in the sequence of consecutive holes permitted), but also added an exemption for carpets used on playing surfaces, modified ramp landing slope and size requirements, and reduced the space required for start of play areas. See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities—Recreation Facilities Final Rule, 36 CFR parts 1190 and 1191.

The Department also published an ANPRM to solicit public input on the adoption of the 2004 ADAAG as the revised Federal accessibility standards implementing titles II and III of the ADA. Among other things, the ANPRM specifically invited comment from small entities regarding the proposed rule’s potential economic impact and suggested regulatory alternatives to ameliorate any such impact. See “Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and in Commercial Facilities,” Department of Justice Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 69 FR 58768, 58778–79 (Sept. 30, 2004). The Department received over 900 comments, and small business interests figured prominently. See “Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and in Commercial Facilities,” Department of Justice Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 73 FR 34508, 34511, 34550 (June 17, 2008).

Subsequently, when the Department published its NPRM in June 2008, several regulatory proposals were included to address concerns raised by the small business community in ANPRM comments. First, to mitigate costs to existing facilities, the Department proposed an element-by-element safe harbor that would exempt elements in compliance with applicable technical and scoping requirements in the 1991 Standards from any retrofit obligations under the revised title III rule. Id. at 34514–15, 34532–33. While this proposed safe harbor applied to title III covered entities irrespective of size, it was small businesses that especially stood to benefit since, according to comments from small business advocates, small businesses are more likely to operate in older buildings and facilities. The title III NPRM also offered for public comment a novel safe harbor provision specifically designed to address small business advocates’ request for clearer guidance on the readily achievable barrier removal requirement. This proposal provided that qualified small businesses would be deemed to have satisfied their readily achievable barrier removal obligations for a given year if, during that tax year, they had spent at least 1 percent of their respective gross revenues undertaking measures in compliance with title III barrier removal requirements. Id. at 34538–39. Lastly, the NPRM sought public input on the inclusion of reduced scoping provisions for certain types of small existing recreation facilities (i.e. swimming pools, play areas, and saunas). Id. at 34515, 34534–37.

During the NPRM comment period, the Department engaged in considerable public outreach to the small business community. A public hearing was held in Washington, D.C., during which nearly 50 persons, including several small business owners, testified in person or by phone. See Transcript of the Public Hearing on Notices of Proposed Rulemaking (July 15, 2008), available at archive.ada.gov/NPRM2008/public_hearing_transcript.htm. This hearing was also streamed live over the Internet. By the end of the 60-day comment period, the Department had also received nearly 4,500 public comments on the title III NPRM, including a significant number of comments reflecting small businesses’ perspectives on a wide range of regulatory issues.

In addition to soliciting input from small entities through the formal process for public comment, the Department also targeted the small business community with less formal regulatory discussions, including a Small Business Roundtable convened by the Office of Advocacy and held at the offices of the Small Business Administration in Washington, D.C., and an informational question-and-answer session concerning the titles II and III NPRMs at the Department of Justice in which business representatives attended in-person and by telephone. These outreach efforts provided the small business community with information on the NPRM proposals being considered by the Department and gave small businesses the opportunity to ask questions of the Department and provide feedback.

As a result of the feedback provided by representatives of small business interests on the title III NPRM, the Department was able to assess the impact of various alternatives on small businesses before adopting its final rule and took steps to minimize any significant impact on small entities. Most notably, the final rule retains the element-by-element safe harbor for which the small business community voiced strong support. See Appendix A discussion of removal of barriers (§ 36.304). The Department believes that this element-by-element safe harbor provision will go a long way toward mitigating the economic impact of the final rule on existing facilities owned or operated by small businesses. Indeed, as demonstrated in the Final RIA, the element-by-element safe harbor will provide substantial relief to small businesses that is estimated at $ 7.5 billion over the expected life of the final rule.

Additional regulatory measures mitigating the economic impact of the final rule on title III-covered entities (including small businesses) include deletion of the proposed requirement for captioning of safety and emergency information on scoreboards at sporting venues, retention of the proposed path of travel safe harbor, extension of the compliance date of the 2010 Standards as applied to new construction and alterations from 6 months to 18 months after publication of the final rule, and, in response to public comments, modification of the triggering event for application of the 2010 Standards to new construction and alterations from a unitary approach (commencement of physical construction) to a two-pronged approach (date of last application for building permit or commencement of physical construction) depending on whether a building permit is or is not required for the type of construction at issue by State or local building authorities. See Appendix A discussions of captioning at sporting venues (§ 36.303), alterations and path of travel (§ 36.403), and compliance dates and triggering events for new construction and alterations (§ 36.406).

Two sets of proposed alternative measures that would have potentially provided some cost savings to small businesses—the safe harbor for qualified small businesses and reduced scoping for certain existing recreation facilities—were not adopted by the Department in the final rule. As discussed in more depth previously, the safe harbor for qualified small businesses was omitted from the final rule because the general safe harbor already provides significant relief for small businesses located in existing facilities, the proposed safe harbor provision lacked support from the small business community and no consensus emerged from business commenters concerning feasible bases for the final regulatory provision, and commenters noted practical considerations that would potentially make some small businesses incur greater expense or administrative burden. See Appendix A discussion of the safe harbor for qualified small businesses (§ 36.304).

The Department also omitted the proposals to reduce scoping for certain existing recreation facilities in the final rule. While these proposals were not specific to small entities, they nonetheless might have mitigated the impact of the final rule for some small businesses that owned or operated existing facilities at which these recreational elements were located. See Appendix A discussion of reduced scoping for play areas and other recreation facilities (§ 36.304). The Department gave careful consideration to how best to insulate small businesses from overly burdensome barrier removal costs under the 2010 Standards for existing small play areas, swimming pools, and saunas, while still providing accessible and integrated recreation facilities that are of great importance to persons with disabilities. The Department concluded that the existing readily achievable barrier removal standard, rather than specific exemptions for these types of existing facilities, is the most efficacious method by which to protect small businesses.

Once the final rule is promulgated, small businesses will also have a wealth of documents to assist them in complying with the 2010 Standards. For example, accompanying the final rule in the Federal Register is the Department’s “Analysis and Commentary on the 2010 ADA Standards for Accessible Design,” which provides a plain language description of the revised scoping and technical requirements in these Standards and provides illustrative figures. The Department also expects to publish guidance specifically tailored to small businesses in the form of a small business compliance guide, as well as to publish technical assistance materials of general interest to all covered entities following promulgation of the final rule. Additionally, the Access Board has published a number of guides that discuss and illustrate application of the 2010 Standards to play areas and various types of recreation facilities.

Executive Order 13132: Federalism

Executive Order 13132, 64 FR 43255, 3 CFR, 2000 Comp., p. 206, requires executive branch agencies to consider whether a rule will have federalism implications. That is, the rulemaking agency must determine whether the rule is likely to have substantial direct effects on State and local governments, a substantial direct effect on the relationship between the Federal government and the States and localities, or a substantial direct effect on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the different levels of government. If an agency believes that a rule is likely to have federalism implications, it must consult with State and local elected officials about how to minimize or eliminate the effects.

Title III of the ADA covers public accommodations and commercial facilities. These facilities are generally subject to regulation by different levels of government, including Federal, State, and local governments. The ADA and the 2010 Standards set minimum civil rights protections for individuals with disabilities that in turn may affect the implementation of State and local laws, particularly building codes. The 2010 Standards address federalism concerns and mitigate federalism implications, particularly the provisions that streamline the administrative process for State and local governments seeking ADA code certification under title III.

As a member of the Access Board, the Department was privy to substantial feedback from State and local governments throughout the development of the Board’s 2004 guidelines. Before those guidelines were finalized as the 2004 ADA/ABA Guidelines, they addressed and minimized federalism concerns expressed by State and local governments during the development process. Because the Department adopted ADA Chapter 1, ADA Chapter 2, and Chapters 3 through 10 of the 2004 ADA/ABA Guidelines as part of the 2010 Standards, the steps taken in the 2004 ADA/ABA Guidelines to address federalism concerns are reflected in the 2010 Standards.

The Department also solicited and received input from public entities in the September 2004 ANPRM and the June 2008 NPRM. Through the ANPRM and NPRM processes, the Department solicited comments from elected State and local officials and their representative national organizations about the potential federalism implications. The Department received comments addressing whether the ANPRM and NPRM directly affected State and local governments, the relationship between the Federal government and the States, and the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. The rule preempts State laws affecting entities subject to the ADA only to the extent that those laws conflict with the requirements of the ADA, as set forth in the rule.

National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995

The National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (NTTAA) directs that, as a general matter, all Federal agencies and departments shall use technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, which are private, generally non-profit organizations that develop technical standards or specifications using well-defined procedures that require openness, balanced participation among affected interests and groups, fairness and due process, and an opportunity for appeal, as a means to carry out policy objectives or activities. Public Law 104– 113 section 12(d)(1) (15 U.S.C. 272 Note). In addition, the NTTAA directs agencies to consult with voluntary, private sector, consensus standards bodies and requires that agencies participate with such bodies in the development of technical standards when such participation is in the public interest and is compatible with agency and departmental missions, authorities, priorities, and budget resources. Id. section 12(d)1). The Department, as a member of the Access Board, was an active participant in the lengthy process of developing the 2004 ADAAG, on which the 2010 Standards are based. As part of this update, the Board has made its guidelines more consistent with model building codes, such as the IBC, and industry standards. It coordinated extensively with model code groups and standard-setting bodies throughout the process so that differences could be reconciled. As a result, an historic level of harmonization has been achieved that has brought about improvements to the guidelines, as well as to counterpart provisions in the IBC and key industry standards, including those for accessible facilities issued through the American National Standards Institute.

Plain Language Instructions

The Department makes every effort to promote clarity and transparency in its rulemaking. In any regulation, there is a tension between drafting language that is simple and straightforward and drafting language that gives full effect to issues of legal interpretation. The Department operates a toll-free ADA Information Line (800) 514–0301(voice); (833) 610-1264 (TTY) that the public is welcome to call at any time to obtain assistance in understanding anything in this rule. If any commenter has suggestions for how the regulation could be written more clearly, please contact Janet L. Blizard, Deputy Chief, Disability Rights Section, whose contact information is provided in the introductory section of this rule, entitled FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT.

Paperwork Reduction Act

The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (PRA) requires agencies to clear forms and recordkeeping requirements with OMB before they can be introduced. 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. This rule does not contain any paperwork or recordkeeping requirements and does not require clearance under the PRA.

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

Section 4(2) of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. 1503(2), excludes from coverage under that Act any proposed or final Federal regulation that “establishes or enforces any statutory rights that prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or disability.” Accordingly, this rulemaking is not subject to the provisions of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act.

List of Subjects for 28 CFR Part 36

Administrative practice and procedure, Buildings and facilities, Business and industry, Civil rights, Individuals with disabilities, Penalties, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

• By the authority vested in me as Attorney General by law, including 28 U.S.C. 509 and 510, 5 U.S.C. 301, and section 306 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Public Law 101–336 (42 U.S.C. 12186), and for the reasons set forth in Appendix A to 28 CFR part 36, chapter I of title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations is amended as follows:

Title III Regulations – Revised Final Title III Regulation with Integrated Text

NOTE: These provisions update the relevant portions of the title III regulation to incorporate changes made to the regulatory text through January 17, 2017. These modifications stem from the Pool Extension Final Rule (77 FR 30174, published May 21, 2012), the ADA Amendments Act Final Rule (81 FR 53204, published Aug. 11, 2016), and the Movie Captioning and Audio Description Final Rule (81 FR 87348, published Dec. 2, 2016). All section headings and changes are noted in bold.

Part 36 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in Public Accommodations and Commercial Facilities (as amended by the final rules published on August 11, 2016, and December 2, 2016)

Authority: 5 U.S.C. 301; 28 U.S.C. 509, 510; 42 U.S.C. 12186(b) and 12205a.

Subpart A – General

§ 36.101 Purpose and broad coverage.

• (a) Purpose. The purpose of this part is to implement title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12181–12189), as amended by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADA Amendments Act) (Public Law 110–325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008)), which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability by covered public accommodations and requires places of public accommodation and commercial facilities to be designed, constructed, and altered in compliance with the accessibility standards established by this part.

(b) Broad coverage. The primary purpose of the ADA Amendments Act is to make it easier for people with disabilities to obtain protection under the ADA. Consistent with the ADA Amendments Act’s purpose of reinstating a broad scope of protection under the ADA, the definition of “disability” in this part shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA. The primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether entities covered under the ADA have complied with their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred, not whether the individual meets the definition of “disability.” The question of whether an individual meets the definition of “disability” under this part should not demand extensive analysis.

§ 36.102 Application.

(a) General. This part applies to any –

(1) Public accommodation; (2) Commercial facility; or (3) Private entity that offers examinations or courses related to applications, licensing, certification, or credentialing for secondary or postsecondary education, professional, or trade purposes.

(b) Public accommodations.

(1) The requirements of this part applicable to public accommodations are set forth in subparts B, C, and D of this part. (2) The requirements of subparts B and C of this part obligate a public accommodation only with respect to the operations of a place of public accommodation. (3) The requirements of subpart D of this part obligate a public accommodation only with respect to

(i) A facility used as, or designed or constructed for use as, a place of public accommodation; or (ii) A facility used as, or designed and constructed for use as, a commercial facility.

(c) Commercial facilities. The requirements of this part applicable to commercial facilities are set forth in subpart D of this part.

(d) Examinations and courses. The requirements of this part applicable to private entities that offer examinations or courses as specified in paragraph (a) of this section are set forth in § 36.309.

(e) Exemptions and exclusions. This part does not apply to any private club (except to the extent that the facilities of the private club are made available to customers or patrons of a place of public accommodation), or to any religious entity or public entity.

§ 36.103 Relationship to other laws.

(a) Rule of interpretation. Except as otherwise provided in this part, this part shall not be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 791) or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to that title.

(b) Section 504. This part does not affect the obligations of a recipient of Federal financial assistance to comply with the requirements of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794) and regulations issued by Federal agencies implementing section 504.

(c) Other laws. This part does not invalidate or limit the remedies, rights, and procedures of any other Federal laws, or State or local laws (including State common law) that provide greater or equal protection for the rights of individuals with disabilities or individuals associated with them.

§ 36.104 Definitions.

For purposes of this part, the term-

1991 Standards means requirements set forth in the ADA Standards for Accessible Design, originally published on July 26, 1991, and republished as Appendix D to this part.

2004 ADAAG means the requirements set forth in appendices B and D to 36 CFR part 1191 (2009).

2010 Standards means the 2010 ADA Standards for Accessible Design, which consist of the 2004 ADAAG and the requirements contained in subpart D of this part.

Act means the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Pub. L. 101 – 336, 104 Stat. 327, 42 U.S.C. 12101 – 12213 and 47 U.S.C. 225 and 611).

Commerce means travel, trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication –

(1) Among the several States; (2) Between any foreign country or any territory or possession and any State; or (3) Between points in the same State but through another State or foreign country.

Commercial facilities means facilities –

(1) Whose operations will affect commerce; (2) That are intended for nonresidential use by a private entity; and (3) That are not –

(i) Facilities that are covered or expressly exempted from coverage under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, as amended (42 U.S.C. 3601 – 3631); (ii) Aircraft; or (iii) Railroad locomotives, railroad freight cars, railroad cabooses, commuter or intercity passenger rail cars (including coaches, dining cars, sleeping cars, lounge cars, and food service cars), any other railroad cars described in section 242 of the Act or covered under title II of the Act, or railroad rights-of-way. For purposes of this definition, “rail” and “railroad” have the meaning given the term “railroad” in section 202(e) of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 431(e)).

Current illegal use of drugs means illegal use of drugs that occurred recently enough to justify a reasonable belief that a person’s drug use is current or that continuing use is a real and ongoing problem.

Direct threat means a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures, or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services, as provided in § 36.208.

Disability. The definition of disability can be found at § 36.105.

Drug means a controlled substance, as defined in schedules I through V of section 202 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 812).

Existing facility means a facility in existence on any given date, without regard to whether the facility may also be considered newly constructed or altered under this part.

Facility means all or any portion of buildings, structures, sites, complexes, equipment, rolling stock or other conveyances, roads, walks, passageways, parking lots, or other real or personal property, including the site where the building, property, structure, or equipment is located.

Housing at a place of education means housing operated by or on behalf of an elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate school, or other place of education, including dormitories, suites, apartments, or other places of residence.

Illegal use of drugs means the use of one or more drugs, the possession or distribution of which is unlawful under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 812). The term “illegal use of drugs” does not include the use of a drug taken under supervision by a licensed health care professional, or other uses authorized by the Controlled Substances Act or other provisions of Federal law.

Individual with a disability means a person who has a disability. The term “individual with a disability” does not include an individual who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs, when the private entity acts on the basis of such use.

Other power-driven mobility device means any mobility device powered by batteries, fuel, or other engines – whether or not designed primarily for use by individuals with mobility disabilities – that is used by individuals with mobility disabilities for the purpose of locomotion, including golf cars, electronic personal assistance mobility devices (EPAMDs), such as the Segway® PT, or any mobility device designed to operate in areas without defined pedestrian routes, but that is not a wheelchair within the meaning of this section. This definition does not apply to Federal wilderness areas; wheelchairs in such areas are defined in section 508(c)(2) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12207(c)(2).

Place of public accommodation means a facility operated by a private entity whose operations affect commerce and fall within at least one of the following categories –

(1) Place of lodging, except for an establishment located within a facility that contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and that actually is occupied by the proprietor of the establishment as the residence of the proprietor. For purposes of this part, a facility is a “place of lodging” if it is –

(i) An inn, hotel, or motel; or
(ii) A facility that –

(A) Provides guest rooms for sleeping for stays that primarily are short-term in nature (generally 30 days or less) where the occupant does not have the right to return to a specific room or unit after the conclusion of his or her stay; and
(B) Provides guest rooms under conditions and with amenities similar to a hotel, motel, or inn, including the following –

(1) On- or off-site management and reservations service;
(2) Rooms available on a walk-up or call-in basis;
(3) Availability of housekeeping or linen service; and
(4) Acceptance of reservations for a guest room type without guaranteeing a particular unit or room until check-in, and without a prior lease or security deposit.

(2) A restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink;
(3) A motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of exhibition or entertainment;
(4) An auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of public gathering;
(5) A bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center, or other sales or rental establishment;
(6) A laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment;
(7) A terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public transportation;
(8) A museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or collection;
(9) A park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation;
(10) A nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate private school, or other place of education;
(11) A day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank, adoption agency, or other social service center establishment; and
(12) A gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of exercise or recreation.

Private club means a private club or establishment exempted from coverage under title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000a(e)).

Private entity means a person or entity other than a public entity.

Public accommodation means a private entity that owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.

Public entity means –

(1) Any State or local government; (2) Any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government; and (3) The National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority (as defined in section 103(8) of the Rail Passenger Service Act). (45 U.S.C. 541)

Qualified interpreter means an interpreter who, via a video remote interpreting (VRI) service or an on-site appearance, is able to interpret effectively, accurately, and impartially, both receptively and expressively, using any necessary specialized vocabulary. Qualified interpreters include, for example, sign language interpreters, oral transliterators, and cued-language transliterators.

Qualified reader means a person who is able to read effectively, accurately, and impartially using any necessary specialized vocabulary.

Readily achievable means easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense. In determining whether an action is readily achievable factors to be considered include–

(1) The nature and cost of the action needed under this part; (2) The overall financial resources of the site or sites involved in the action; the number of persons employed at the site; the effect on expenses and resources; legitimate safety requirements that are necessary for safe operation, including crime prevention measures; or the impact otherwise of the action upon the operation of the site; (3) The geographic separateness, and the administrative or fiscal relationship of the site or sites in question to any parent corporation or entity; (4) If applicable, the overall financial resources of any parent corporation or entity; the overall size of the parent corporation or entity with respect to the number of its employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and (5) If applicable, the type of operation or operations of any parent corporation or entity, including the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of the parent corporation or entity.

Religious entity means a religious organization, including a place of worship.

Service animal means any dog that is individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of an individual with a disability, including a physical, sensory, psychiatric, intellectual, or other mental disability. Other species of animals, whether wild or domestic, trained or untrained, are not service animals for the purposes of this definition. The work or tasks performed by a service animal must be directly related to the individual’s disability. Examples of work or tasks include, but are not limited to, assisting individuals who are blind or have low vision with navigation and other tasks, alerting individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing to the presence of people or sounds, providing non-violent protection or rescue work, pulling a wheelchair, assisting an individual during a seizure, alerting individuals to the presence of allergens, retrieving items such as medicine or the telephone, providing physical support and assistance with balance and stability to individuals with mobility disabilities, and helping persons with psychiatric and neurological disabilities by preventing or interrupting impulsive or destructive behaviors. The crime deterrent effects of an animal’s presence and the provision of emotional support, well-being, comfort, or companionship do not constitute work or tasks for the purposes of this definition.

Specified public transportation means transportation by bus, rail, or any other conveyance (other than by aircraft) that provides the general public with general or special service (including charter service) on a regular and continuing basis.

State means each of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.

Undue burden means significant difficulty or expense. In determining whether an action would result in an undue burden, factors to be considered include –

(1) The nature and cost of the action needed under this part; (2) The overall financial resources of the site or sites involved in the action; the number of persons employed at the site; the effect on expenses and resources; legitimate safety requirements that are necessary for safe operation, including crime prevention measures; or the impact otherwise of the action upon the operation of the site; (3) The geographic separateness, and the administrative or fiscal relationship of the site or sites in question to any parent corporation or entity; (4) If applicable, the overall financial resources of any parent corporation or entity; the overall size of the parent corporation or entity with respect to the number of its employees; the number, type, and location of its facilities; and (5) If applicable, the type of operation or operations of any parent corporation or entity, including the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of the parent corporation or entity.

Video remote interpreting (VRI) service means an interpreting service that uses video conference technology over dedicated lines or wireless technology offering high-speed, wide-bandwidth video connection that delivers high-quality video images as provided in § 36.303(f).

Wheelchair means a manually-operated or power-driven device designed primarily for use by an individual with a mobility disability for the main purpose of indoor or of both indoor and outdoor locomotion. This definition does not apply to Federal wilderness areas; wheelchairs in such areas are defined in section 508(c)(2) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12207(c)(2).

§ 36.105 Definition of “disability.”

(a)

(1) Disability means, with respect to an individual:

(i) A physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (ii) A record of such an impairment; or (iii) Being regarded as having such an impairment as described in paragraph (f) of this section.

(2) Rules of construction.

(i) The definition of “disability” shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA. (ii) An individual may establish coverage under any one or more of the three prongs of the definition of disability in paragraph (a)(1) of this section, the “actual disability” prong in paragraph (a)(1)(i) of this section, the “record of” prong in paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of this section, or the “regarded as” prong in paragraph (a)(1)(iii) of this section. (iii) Where an individual is not challenging a public accommodation’s failure to provide reasonable modifications under § 36.302, it is generally unnecessary to proceed under the “actual disability” or “record of” prongs, which require a showing of an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity or a record of such an impairment. In these cases, the evaluation of coverage can be made solely under the “regarded as” prong of the definition of “disability,” which does not require a showing of an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity or a record of such an impairment. An individual may choose, however, to proceed under the “actual disability” or “record of” prong regardless of whether the individual is challenging a public accommodation’s failure to provide reasonable modifications.

(b)

(1) Physical or mental impairment means:

(i) Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems, such as: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, immune, circulatory, hemic, lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or (ii) Any mental or psychological disorder such as intellectual disability, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disability.

(2) Physical or mental impairment includes, but is not limited to, contagious and noncontagious diseases and conditions such as the following: orthopedic, visual, speech and hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, intellectual disability, emotional illness, dyslexia and other specific learning disabilities, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection (whether symptomatic or asymptomatic), tuberculosis, drug addiction, and alcoholism.

(3)Physical or mental impairment does not include homosexuality or bisexuality.

(c)

(1) Major life activities include, but are not limited to:

(i) Caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, sitting, reaching, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, writing, communicating, interacting with others, and working; and (ii) The operation of a major bodily function, such as the functions of the immune system, special sense organs and skin, normal cell growth, and digestive, genitourinary, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, cardiovascular, endocrine, hemic, lymphatic, musculoskeletal, and reproductive systems. The operation of a major bodily function includes the operation of an individual organ within a body system.

(2) Rules of construction.

(i) In determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity, the term major shall not be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard. (ii) Whether an activity is a major life activity is not determined by reference to whether it is of central importance to daily life.

(d) Substantially limits.

(1)Rules of construction. The following rules of construction apply when determining whether an impairment substantially limits an individual in a major life activity.

(i) The term “substantially limits” shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA. “Substantially limits” is not meant to be a demanding standard. (ii) The primary object of attention in cases brought under title III of the ADA should be whether public accommodations have complied with their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred, not the extent to which an individual’s impairment substantially limits a major life activity. Accordingly, the threshold issue of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity should not demand extensive analysis. (iii) An impairment that substantially limits one major life activity does not need to limit other major life activities in order to be considered a substantially limiting impairment. (iv) An impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active. (v) An impairment is a disability within the meaning of this part if it substantially limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population. An impairment does not need to prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting. Nonetheless, not every impairment will constitute a disability within the meaning of this section. (vi) The determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity requires an individualized assessment. However, in making this assessment, the term “substantially limits” shall be interpreted and applied to require a degree of functional limitation that is lower than the standard for substantially limits applied prior to the ADA Amendments Act. (vii) The comparison of an individual’s performance of a major life activity to the performance of the same major life activity by most people in the general population usually will not require scientific, medical, or statistical evidence. Nothing in this paragraph (d)(1) is intended, however, to prohibit or limit the presentation of scientific, medical, or statistical evidence in making such a comparison where appropriate. (viii) The determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures. However, the ameliorative effects of ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses shall be considered in determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity. Ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses are lenses that are intended to fully correct visual acuity or to eliminate refractive error. (ix) The six-month “transitory” part of the “transitory and minor” exception in paragraph (f)(2) of this section does not apply to the “actual disability” or “record of” prongs of the definition of “disability.” The effects of an impairment lasting or expected to last less than six months can be substantially limiting within the meaning of this section for establishing an actual disability or a record of a disability.

(2) Predictable assessments.

(i) The principles set forth in the rules of construction in this section are intended to provide for more generous coverage and application of the ADA’s prohibition on discrimination through a framework that is predictable, consistent, and workable for all individuals and entities with rights and responsibilities under the ADA. (ii) Applying these principles, the individualized assessment of some types of impairments will, in virtually all cases, result in a determination of coverage under paragraph (a)(1)(i) of this section (the “actual disability” prong) or paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of this section (the “record of” prong). Given their inherent nature, these types of impairments will, as a factual matter, virtually always be found to impose a substantial limitation on a major life activity. Therefore, with respect to these types of impairments, the necessary individualized assessment should be particularly simple and straightforward. (iii) For example, applying these principles it should easily be concluded that the set forth in paragraphs (d)(2)(iii)(A) through (K) types of impairments will, at a minimum, substantially limit the major life activities indicated. The types of impairments described in this paragraph may substantially limit additional major life activities (including major bodily functions) not explicitly listed in paragraphs (d)(2)(iii)(A) through (K).

(A) Deafness substantially limits hearing; (B) Blindness substantially limits seeing; (C) Intellectual disability substantially limits brain function; (D) Partially or completely missing limbs or mobility impairments requiring the use of a wheelchair substantially limit musculoskeletal function; (E) Autism substantially limits brain function; (F) Cancer substantially limits normal cell growth; (G) Cerebral palsy substantially limits brain function; (H) Diabetes substantially limits endocrine function; (I) Epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, and multiple sclerosis each substantially limits neurological function; (J) Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) infection substantially limits immune function; and (K) Major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, traumatic brain injury, obsessive compulsive disorder, and schizophrenia each substantially limits brain function.

(3) Condition, manner, or duration.

(i) At all times taking into account the principles set forth in the rules of construction, in determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity, it may be useful in appropriate cases to consider, as compared to most people in the general population, the conditions under which the individual performs the major life activity; the manner in which the individual performs the major life activity; or the duration of time it takes the individual to perform the major life activity, or for which the individual can perform the major life activity. (ii) Consideration of facts such as condition, manner, or duration may include, among other things, consideration of the difficulty, effort or time required to perform a major life activity; pain experienced when performing a major life activity; the length of time a major life activity can be performed; or the way an impairment affects the operation of a major bodily function. In addition, the non-ameliorative effects of mitigating measures, such as negative side effects of medication or burdens associated with following a particular treatment regimen, may be considered when determining whether an individual’s impairment substantially limits a major life activity. (iii) In determining whether an individual has a disability under the “actual disability” or “record of” prongs of the definition of “disability,” the focus is on how a major life activity is substantially limited, and not on what outcomes an individual can achieve. For example, someone with a learning disability may achieve a high level of academic success, but may nevertheless be substantially limited in one or more major life activities, including, but not limited to, reading, writing, speaking, or learning because of the additional time or effort he or she must spend to read, write, speak, or learn compared to most people in the general population. (iv) Given the rules of construction set forth in this section, it may often be unnecessary to conduct an analysis involving most or all of the facts related to condition, manner, or duration. This is particularly true with respect to impairments such as those described in paragraph (d)(2)(iii) of this section, which by their inherent nature should be easily found to impose a substantial limitation on a major life activity, and for which the individualized assessment should be particularly simple and straightforward.

(4) Mitigating measures include, but are not limited to:

(i) Medication, medical supplies, equipment, appliances, low-vision devices (defined as devices that magnify, enhance, or otherwise augment a visual image, but not including ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses), prosthetics including limbs and devices, hearing aid(s) and cochlear implant(s) or other implantable hearing devices, mobility devices, and oxygen therapy equipment and supplies; (ii) Use of assistive technology; (iii) Reasonable modifications or auxiliary aids or services as defined in this regulation; (iv) Learned behavioral or adaptive neurological modifications; or (v) Psychotherapy, behavioral therapy, or physical therapy.

(e) Has a record of such an impairment.

(1) An individual has a record of such an impairment if the individual has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

(2) Broad construction. Whether an individual has a record of an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity shall be construed broadly to the maximum extent permitted by the ADA and should not demand extensive analysis. An individual will be considered to fall within this prong of the definition of “disability” if the individual has a history of an impairment that substantially limited one or more major life activities when compared to most people in the general population, or was misclassified as having had such an impairment. In determining whether an impairment substantially limited a major life activity, the principles articulated in paragraph (d)(1) of this section apply.

(3) Reasonable modification. An individual with a record of a substantially limiting impairment may be entitled to a reasonable modification if needed and related to the past disability.

(f) Is regarded as having such an impairment. The following principles apply under the “regarded” as prong of the definition of “disability” (paragraph (a)(1)(iii) of this section):

(1) Except as set forth in paragraph (f)(2) of this section, an individual is “regarded as having such an impairment” if the individual is subjected to a prohibited action because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment, whether or not that impairment substantially limits, or is perceived to substantially limit, a major life activity, even if the public accommodation asserts, or may or does ultimately establish, a defense to the action prohibited by the ADA.

(2) An individual is not “regarded as having such an impairment” if the public accommodation demonstrates that the impairment is, objectively, both “transitory” and “minor.” A public accommodation may not defeat “regarded as” coverage of an individual simply by demonstrating that it subjectively believed the impairment was transitory and minor; rather, the public accommodation must demonstrate that the impairment is (in the case of an actual impairment) or would be (in the case of a perceived impairment), objectively, both “transitory” and “minor.” For purposes of this section, “transitory” is defined as lasting or expected to last six months or less.

(3) Establishing that an individual is “regarded as having such an impairment” does not, by itself, establish liability. Liability is established under title III of the ADA only when an individual proves that a public accommodation discriminated on the basis of disability within the meaning of title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12181–12189.

(g) Exclusions. The term “disability” does not include—

(1) Transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments, or other sexual behavior disorders; (2) Compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania; or (3) Psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from current illegal use of drugs.

Subpart B – General Requirements

§ 36.201 General.

(a) Prohibition of discrimination. No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any private entity who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.

(b) Landlord and tenant responsibilities. Both the landlord who owns the building that houses a place of public accommodation and the tenant who owns or operates the place of public accommodation are public accommodations subject to the requirements of this part. As between the parties, allocation of responsibility for complying with the obligations of this part may be determined by lease or other contract.

(c) Claims of no disability. Nothing in this part shall provide the basis for a claim that an individual without a disability was subject to discrimination because of a lack of disability, including a claim that an individual with a disability was granted a reasonable modification that was denied to an individual without a disability.

§ 36.202 Activities.

(a) Denial of participation. A public accommodation shall not subject an individual or class of individuals on the basis of a disability or disabilities of such individual or class, directly, or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, to a denial of the opportunity of the individual or class to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a place of public accommodation. (b) Participation in unequal benefit. A public accommodation shall not afford an individual or class of individuals, on the basis of a disability or disabilities of such individual or class, directly, or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, with the opportunity to participate in or benefit from a good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation that is not equal to that afforded to other individuals. (c) Separate benefit. A public accommodation shall not provide an individual or class of individuals, on the basis of a disability or disabilities of such individual or class, directly, or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements with a good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation that is different or separate from that provided to other individuals, unless such action is necessary to provide the individual or class of individuals with a good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation, or other opportunity that is as effective as that provided to others. (d) Individual or class of individuals. For purposes of paragraphs (a) through (c) of this section, the term “individual or class of individuals” refers to the clients or customers of the public accommodation that enters into the contractual, licensing, or other arrangement.

§ 36.203 Integrated settings.

(a) General. A public accommodation shall afford goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations to an individual with a disability in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of the individual. (b) Opportunity to participate. Notwithstanding the existence of separate or different programs or activities provided in accordance with this subpart, a public accommodation shall not deny an individual with a disability an opportunity to participate in such programs or activities that are not separate or different. (c) Accommodations and services.

(1) Nothing in this part shall be construed to require an individual with a disability to accept an accommodation, aid, service, opportunity, or benefit available under this part that such individual chooses not to accept. (2) Nothing in the Act or this part authorizes the representative or guardian of an individual with a disability to decline food, water, medical treatment, or medical services for that individual.

§ 36.204 Administrative methods.

A public accommodation shall not, directly or through contractual or other arrangements, utilize standards or criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability, or that perpetuate the discrimination of others who are subject to common administrative control.

§ 36.205 Association.

A public accommodation shall not exclude or otherwise deny equal goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations, or other opportunities to an individual or entity because of the known disability of an individual with whom the individual or entity is known to have a relationship or association.

§ 36.206 Retaliation or coercion.

(a) No private or public entity shall discriminate against any individual because that individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this part, or because that individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under the Act or this part.

(b) No private or public entity shall coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his or her having aided or encouraged any other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by the Act or this part.

(c) Illustrations of conduct prohibited by this section include, but are not limited to:

(1) Coercing an individual to deny or limit the benefits, services, or advantages to which he or she is entitled under the Act or this part; (2) Threatening, intimidating, or interfering with an individual with a disability who is seeking to obtain or use the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a public accommodation; (3) Intimidating or threatening any person because that person is assisting or encouraging an individual or group entitled to claim the rights granted or protected by the Act or this part to exercise those rights; or (4) Retaliating against any person because that person has participated in any investigation or action to enforce the Act or this part.

§ 36.207 Places of public accommodation located in private residences,

(a) When a place of public accommodation is located in a private residence, the portion of the residence used exclusively as a residence is not covered by this part, but that portion used exclusively in the operation of the place of public accommodation or that portion used both for the place of public accommodation and for residential purposes is covered by this part.

(b) The portion of the residence covered under paragraph (a) of this section extends to those elements used to enter the place of public accommodation, including the homeowner’s front sidewalk, if any, the door or entryway, and hallways; and those portions of the residence, interior or exterior, available to or used by customers or clients, including restrooms.

§ 36.208 Direct threat.

(a) This part does not require a public accommodation to permit an individual to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations of that public accommodation when that individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others. (b) In determining whether an individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others, a public accommodation must make an individualized assessment, based on reasonable judgment that relies on current medical knowledge or on the best available objective evidence, to ascertain: The nature, duration, and severity of the risk; the probability that the potential injury will actually occur; and whether reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or procedures or the provision of auxiliary aids or services will mitigate the risk.

§ 36.209 Illegal use of drugs.

(a) General.

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, this part does not prohibit discrimination against an individual based on that individual’s current illegal use of drugs. (2) A public accommodation shall not discriminate on the basis of illegal use of drugs against an individual who is not engaging in current illegal use of drugs and who –

(i) Has successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation program or has otherwise been rehabilitated successfully; (ii) Is participating in a supervised rehabilitation program; or (iii) Is erroneously regarded as engaging in such use.

(b) Health and drug rehabilitation services.

(1) A public accommodation shall not deny health services, or services provided in connection with drug rehabilitation, to an individual on the basis of that individual’s current illegal use of drugs, if the individual is otherwise entitled to such services. (2) A drug rehabilitation or treatment program may deny participation to individuals who engage in illegal use of drugs while they are in the program.

(c) Drug testing.

(1) This part does not prohibit a public accommodation from adopting or administering reasonable policies or procedures, including but not limited to drug testing, designed to ensure that an individual who formerly engaged in the illegal use of drugs is not now engaging in current illegal use of drugs.

(2) Nothing in this paragraph (c) shall be construed to encourage, prohibit, restrict, or authorize the conducting of testing for the illegal use of drugs.

§ 36.210 Smoking.

This part does not preclude the prohibition of, or the imposition of restrictions on, smoking in places of public accommodation.

§ 36.211 Maintenance of accessible features.

(a) A public accommodation shall maintain in operable working condition those features of facilities and equipment that are required to be readily accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities by the Act or this part. (b) This section does not prohibit isolated or temporary interruptions in service or access due to maintenance or repairs. (c) If the 2010 Standards reduce the technical requirements or the number of required accessible elements below the number required by the 1991 Standards, the technical requirements or the number of accessible elements in a facility subject to this part may be reduced in accordance with the requirements of the 2010 Standards.

§ 36.212 Insurance.

(a) This part shall not be construed to prohibit or restrict –

(1) An insurer, hospital or medical service company, health maintenance organization, or any agent, or entity that administers benefit plans, or similar organizations from underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State law; or (2) A person or organization covered by this part from establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that are based on underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State law; or (3) A person or organization covered by this part from establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that is not subject to State laws that regulate insurance.

(b) Paragraphs (a) (1), (2), and (3) of this section shall not be used as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the Act or this part. (c) A public accommodation shall not refuse to serve an individual with a disability because its insurance company conditions coverage or rates on the absence of individuals with disabilities.

§ 36.213 Relationship of subpart B to subparts C and D of this part.

Subpart B of this part sets forth the general principles of nondiscrimination applicable to all entities subject to this part. Subparts C and D of this part provide guidance on the application of the statute to specific situations. The specific provisions, including the limitations on those provisions, control over the general provisions in circumstances where both specific and general provisions apply.

§§ 36.214 – 36.299 [Reserved]

Subpart C – Specific Requirements

§36.301 Eligibility criteria.

(a) General. A public accommodation shall not impose or apply eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or any class of individuals with disabilities from fully and equally enjoying any goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations, unless such criteria can be shown to be necessary for the provision of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations being offered.

(b) Safety. A public accommodation may impose legitimate safety requirements that are necessary for safe operation. Safety requirements must be based on actual risks and not on mere speculation, stereotypes, or generalizations about individuals with disabilities.

(c) Charges. A public accommodation may not impose a surcharge on a particular individual with a disability or any group of individuals with disabilities to cover the costs of measures, such as the provision of auxiliary aids, barrier removal, alternatives to barrier removal, and reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, that are required to provide that individual or group with the nondiscriminatory treatment required by the Act or this part.

§ 36.302 Modifications in policies, practices, or procedures.

(a) General. A public accommodation shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when the modifications are necessary to afford goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the public accommodation can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations. (b) Specialties –

(1) General. A public accommodation may refer an individual with a disability to another public accommodation, if that individual is seeking, or requires, treatment or services outside of the referring public accommodation’s area of specialization, and if, in the normal course of its operations, the referring public accommodation would make a similar referral for an individual without a disability who seeks or requires the same treatment or services. (2) Illustration – medical specialties. A health care provider may refer an individual with a disability to another provider, if that individual is seeking, or requires, treatment or services outside of the referring provider’s area of specialization, and if the referring provider would make a similar referral for an individual without a disability who seeks or requires the same treatment or services. A physician who specializes in treating only a particular condition cannot refuse to treat an individual with a disability for that condition, but is not required to treat the individual for a different condition.

(c) Service animals.

(1) General. Generally, a public accommodation shall modify policies, practices, or procedures to permit the use of a service animal by an individual with a disability. (2) Exceptions. A public accommodation may ask an individual with a disability to remove a service animal from the premises if:

(i) The animal is out of control and the animal’s handler does not take effective action to control it; or (ii) The animal is not housebroken.

(3) If an animal is properly excluded. If a public accommodation properly excludes a service animal under § 36.302(c)(2), it shall give the individual with a disability the opportunity to obtain goods, services, and accommodations without having the service animal on the premises. (4) Animal under handler’s control. A service animal shall be under the control of its handler. A service animal shall have a harness, leash, or other tether, unless either the handler is unable because of a disability to use a harness, leash, or other tether, or the use of a harness, leash, or other tether would interfere with the service animal’s safe, effective performance of work or tasks, in which case the service animal must be otherwise under the handler’s control (e.g., voice control, signals, or other effective means). (5) Care or supervision. A public accommodation is not responsible for the care or supervision of a service animal. (6) Inquiries. A public accommodation shall not ask about the nature or extent of a person’s disability, but may make two inquiries to determine whether an animal qualifies as a service animal. A public accommodation may ask if the animal is required because of a disability and what work or task the animal has been trained to perform. A public accommodation shall not require documentation, such as proof that the animal has been certified, trained, or licensed as a service animal. Generally, a public accommodation may not make these inquiries about a service animal when it is readily apparent that an animal is trained to do work or perform tasks for an individual with a disability (e.g., the dog is observed guiding an individual who is blind or has low vision, pulling a person’s wheelchair, or providing assistance with stability or balance to an individual with an observable mobility disability). (7) Access to areas of a public accommodation. Individuals with disabilities shall be permitted to be accompanied by their service animals in all areas of a place of public accommodation where members of the public, program participants, clients, customers, patrons, or invitees, as relevant, are allowed to go. (8) Surcharges. A public accommodation shall not ask or require an individual with a disability to pay a surcharge, even if people accompanied by pets are required to pay fees, or to comply with other requirements generally not applicable to people without pets. If a public accommodation normally charges individuals for the damage they cause, an individual with a disability may be charged for damage caused by his or her service animal. (9) Miniature horses.

(i) A public accommodation shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures to permit the use of a miniature horse by an individual with a disability if the miniature horse has been individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of the individual with a disability. (ii) Assessment factors. In determining whether reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures can be made to allow a miniature horse into a specific facility, a public accommodation shall consider –

(A) The type, size, and weight of the miniature horse and whether the facility can accommodate these features; (B) Whether the handler has sufficient control of the miniature horse; (C) Whether the miniature horse is housebroken; and (D) Whether the miniature horse’s presence in a specific facility compromises legitimate safety requirements that are necessary for safe operation.

(iii) Other requirements. Sections 36.302(c)(3) through (c)(8), which apply to service animals, shall also apply to miniature horses.

(d) Check-out aisles. A store with check-out aisles shall ensure that an adequate number of accessible check-out aisles are kept open during store hours, or shall otherwise modify its policies and practices, in order to ensure that an equivalent level of convenient service is provided to individuals with disabilities as is provided to others. If only one check-out aisle is accessible, and it is generally used for express service, one way of providing equivalent service is to allow persons with mobility impairments to make all their purchases at that aisle.

(e)

(1) Reservations made by places of lodging. A public accommodation that owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of lodging shall, with respect to reservations made by any means, including by telephone, in-person, or through a third party –

(i) Modify its policies, practices, or procedures to ensure that individuals with disabilities can make reservations for accessible guest rooms during the same hours and in the same manner as individuals who do not need accessible rooms; (ii) Identify and describe accessible features in the hotels and guest rooms offered through its reservations service in enough detail to reasonably permit individuals with disabilities to assess independently whether a given hotel or guest room meets his or her accessibility needs; (iii) Ensure that accessible guest rooms are held for use by individuals with disabilities until all other guest rooms of that type have been rented and the accessible room requested is the only remaining room of that type; (iv) Reserve, upon request, accessible guest rooms or specific types of guest rooms and ensure that the guest rooms requested are blocked and removed from all reservations systems; and (v) Guarantee that the specific accessible guest room reserved through its reservations service is held for the reserving customer, regardless of whether a specific room is held in response to reservations made by others.

(2) Exception. The requirements in paragraphs (iii), (iv), and (v) of this section do not apply to reservations for individual guest rooms or other units not owned or substantially controlled by the entity that owns, leases, or operates the overall facility. (3) Compliance date. The requirements in this section will apply to reservations made on or after March 15, 2012.

(f) Ticketing.

(i) For the purposes of this section, “accessible seating” is defined as wheelchair spaces and companion seats that comply with sections 221 and 802 of the 2010 Standards along with any other seats required to be offered for sale to the individual with a disability pursuant to paragraph (4) of this section. (ii) Ticket sales. A public accommodation that sells tickets for a single event or series of events shall modify its policies, practices, or procedures to ensure that individuals with disabilities have an equal opportunity to purchase tickets for accessible seating –

(A) During the same hours; (B) During the same stages of ticket sales, including, but not limited to, pre-sales, promotions, lotteries, wait-lists, and general sales; (C) Through the same methods of distribution; (D) In the same types and numbers of ticketing sales outlets, including telephone service, in-person ticket sales at the facility, or third-party ticketing services, as other patrons; and (E) Under the same terms and conditions as other tickets sold for the same event or series of events.

(2) Identification of available accessible seating. A public accommodation that sells or distributes tickets for a single event or series of events shall, upon inquiry –

(i) Inform individuals with disabilities, their companions, and third parties purchasing tickets for accessible seating on behalf of individuals with disabilities of the locations of all unsold or otherwise available accessible seating for any ticketed event or events at the facility; (ii) Identify and describe the features of available accessible seating in enough detail to reasonably permit an individual with a disability to assess independently whether a given accessible seating location meets his or her accessibility needs; and (iii) Provide materials, such as seating maps, plans, brochures, pricing charts, or other information, that identify accessible seating and information relevant thereto with the same text or visual representations as other seats, if such materials are provided to the general public.

(3) Ticket prices. The price of tickets for accessible seating for a single event or series of events shall not be set higher than the price for other tickets in the same seating section for the same event or series of events. Tickets for accessible seating must be made available at all price levels for every event or series of events. If tickets for accessible seating at a particular price level cannot be provided because barrier removal in an existing facility is not readily achievable, then the percentage of tickets for accessible seating that should have been available at that price level but for the barriers (determined by the ratio of the total number of tickets at that price level to the total number of tickets in the assembly area) shall be offered for purchase, at that price level, in a nearby or similar accessible location.

(4) Purchasing multiple tickets.

(i) General. For each ticket for a wheelchair space purchased by an individual with a disability or a third-party purchasing such a ticket at his or her request, a public accommodation shall make available for purchase three additional tickets for seats in the same row that are contiguous with the wheelchair space, provided that at the time of purchase there are three such seats available. A public accommodation is not required to provide more than three contiguous seats for each wheelchair space. Such seats may include wheelchair spaces. (ii) Insufficient additional contiguous seats available. If patrons are allowed to purchase at least four tickets, and there are fewer than three such additional contiguous seat tickets available for purchase, a public accommodation shall offer the next highest number of such seat tickets available for purchase and shall make up the difference by offering tickets for sale for seats that are as close as possible to the accessible seats. (iii) Sales limited to fewer than four tickets. If a public accommodation limits sales of tickets to fewer than four seats per patron, then the public accommodation is only obligated to offer as many seats to patrons with disabilities, including the ticket for the wheelchair space, as it would offer to patrons without disabilities. (iv) Maximum number of tickets patrons may purchase exceeds four. If patrons are allowed to purchase more than four tickets, a public accommodation shall allow patrons with disabilities to purchase up to the same number of tickets, including the ticket for the wheelchair space. (v) Group sales. If a group includes one or more individuals who need to use accessible seating because of a mobility disability or because their disability requires the use of the accessible features that are provided in accessible seating, the group shall be placed in a seating area with accessible seating so that, if possible, the group can sit together. If it is necessary to divide the group, it should be divided so that the individuals in the group who use wheelchairs are not isolated from their group.

(5) Hold and release of tickets for accessible seating.

(i) Tickets for accessible seating may be released for sale in certain limited circumstances. A public accommodation may release unsold tickets for accessible seating for sale to individuals without disabilities for their own use for a single event or series of events only under the following circumstances –

(A) When all non-accessible tickets (excluding luxury boxes, club boxes, or suites) have been sold; (B) When all non-accessible tickets in a designated seating area have been sold and the tickets for accessible seating are being released in the same designated area; or (C) When all non-accessible tickets in a designated price category have been sold and the tickets for accessible seating are being released within the same designated price category.

(ii) No requirement to release accessible tickets. Nothing in this paragraph requires a facility to release tickets for accessible seating to individuals without disabilities for their own use. (iii) Release of series-of-events tickets on a series-of-events basis.

(A) Series-of-events tickets sell-out when no ownership rights are attached. When series-of-events tickets are sold out and a public accommodation releases and sells accessible seating to individuals without disabilities for a series of events, the public accommodation shall establish a process that prevents the automatic reassignment of the accessible seating to such ticket holders for future seasons, future years, or future series, so that individuals with disabilities who require the features of accessible seating and who become newly eligible to purchase tickets when these series-of-events tickets are available for purchase have an opportunity to do so. (B) Series-of-events tickets when ownership rights are attached. When series-of-events tickets with an ownership right in accessible seating areas are forfeited or otherwise returned to a public accommodation, the public accommodation shall make reasonable modifications in its policies, practices, or procedures to afford individuals with mobility disabilities or individuals with disabilities that require the features of accessible seating an opportunity to purchase such tickets in accessible seating areas.

(6) Ticket transfer. Individuals with disabilities who hold tickets for accessible seating shall be permitted to transfer tickets to third parties under the same terms and conditions and to the same extent as other spectators holding the same type of tickets, whether they are for a single event or series of events.

(7) Secondary ticket market.

(i) A public accommodation shall modify its policies, practices, or procedures to ensure that an individual with a disability may use a ticket acquired in the secondary ticket market under the same terms and conditions as other individuals who hold a ticket acquired in the secondary ticket market for the same event or series of events. (ii) If an individual with a disability acquires a ticket or series of tickets to an inaccessible seat through the secondary market, a public accommodation shall make reasonable modifications to its policies, practices, or procedures to allow the individual to exchange his ticket for one to an accessible seat in a comparable location if accessible seating is vacant at the time the individual presents the ticket to the public accommodation.

(8) Prevention of fraud in purchase of tickets for accessible seating. A public accommodation may not require proof of disability, including, for example, a doctor’s note, before selling tickets for accessible seating.

(i) Single-event tickets. For the sale of single-event tickets, it is permissible to inquire whether the individual purchasing the tickets for accessible seating has a mobility disability or a disability that requires the use of the accessible features that are provided in accessible seating, or is purchasing the tickets for an individual who has a mobility disability or a disability that requires the use of the accessible features that are provided in the accessible seating. (ii) Series-of-events tickets. For series-of-events tickets, it is permissible to ask the individual purchasing the tickets for accessible seating to attest in writing that the accessible seating is for a person who has a mobility disability or a disability that requires the use of the accessible features that are provided in the accessible seating. (iii) Investigation of fraud. A public accommodation may investigate the potential misuse of accessible seating where there is good cause to believe that such seating has been purchased fraudulently.

(g) Reasonable modifications for individuals “regarded as” having a disability. A public accommodation is not required to provide a reasonable modification to an individual who meets the definition of “disability” solely under the “regarded as” prong of the definition of “disability” at § 36.105(a)(1)(iii).

§ 36.303 Auxiliary aids and services.

(a) General. A public accommodation shall take those steps that may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the public accommodation can demonstrate that taking those steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden, i.e., significant difficulty or expense.

(b) Examples. The term “auxiliary aids and services” includes –

(1) Qualified interpreters on-site or through video remote interpreting (VRI) services; notetakers; real-time computer-aided transcription services; written materials; exchange of written notes; telephone handset amplifiers; assistive listening devices; assistive listening systems; telephones compatible with hearing aids; closed caption decoders; open and closed captioning, including real-time captioning; voice, text, and video-based telecommunications products and systems, including text telephones (TTYs), videophones, and captioned telephones, or equally effective telecommunications devices; videotext displays; accessible electronic and information technology; or other effective methods of making aurally delivered information available to individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing; (2) Qualified readers; taped texts; audio recordings; Brailled materials and displays; screen reader software; magnification software; optical readers; secondary auditory programs (SAP); large print materials; accessible electronic and information technology; or other effective methods of making visually delivered materials available to individuals who are blind or have low vision; (3) Acquisition or modification of equipment or devices; and (4) Other similar services and actions.

(c) Effective communication.

(1) A public accommodation shall furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to ensure effective communication with individuals with disabilities. This includes an obligation to provide effective communication to companions who are individuals with disabilities.

(i) For purposes of this section, “companion” means a family member, friend, or associate of an individual seeking access to, or participating in, the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a public accommodation, who, along with such individual, is an appropriate person with whom the public accommodation should communicate. (ii) The type of auxiliary aid or service necessary to ensure effective communication will vary in accordance with the method of communication used by the individual; the nature, length, and complexity of the communication involved; and the context in which the communication is taking place. A public accommodation should consult with individuals with disabilities whenever possible to determine what type of auxiliary aid is needed to ensure effective communication, but the ultimate decision as to what measures to take rests with the public accommodation, provided that the method chosen results in effective communication. In order to be effective, auxiliary aids and services must be provided in accessible formats, in a timely manner, and in such a way as to protect the privacy and independence of the individual with a disability.

(2) A public accommodation shall not require an individual with a disability to bring another individual to interpret for him or her. (3) A public accommodation shall not rely on an adult accompanying an individual with a disability to interpret or facilitate communication, except –

(i) In an emergency involving an imminent threat to the safety or welfare of an individual or the public where there is no interpreter available; or (ii) Where the individual with a disability specifically requests that the accompanying adult interpret or facilitate communication, the accompanying adult agrees to provide such assistance, and reliance on that adult for such assistance is appropriate under the circumstances.

(4) A public accommodation shall not rely on a minor child to interpret or facilitate communication, except in an emergency involving an imminent threat to the safety or welfare of an individual or the public where there is no interpreter available.

(d) Telecommunications.

(1) When a public accommodation uses an automated-attendant system, including, but not limited to, voicemail and messaging, or an interactive voice response system, for receiving and directing incoming telephone calls, that system must provide effective real-time communication with individuals using auxiliary aids and services, including text telephones (TTYs) and all forms of FCC-approved telecommunications relay systems, including Internet-based relay systems. (2) A public accommodation that offers a customer, client, patient, or participant the opportunity to make outgoing telephone calls using the public accommodation’s equipment on more than an incidental convenience basis shall make available public telephones, TTYs, or other telecommunications products and systems for use by an individual who is deaf or hard of hearing, or has a speech impairment. (3) A public accommodation may use relay services in place of direct telephone communication for receiving or making telephone calls incident to its operations. (4) A public accommodation shall respond to telephone calls from a telecommunications relay service established under title IV of the ADA in the same manner that it responds to other telephone calls. (5) This part does not require a public accommodation to use a TTY for receiving or making telephone calls incident to its operations.

(e) Closed caption decoders. Places of lodging that provide televisions in five or more guest rooms and hospitals that provide televisions for patient use shall provide, upon request, a means for decoding captions for use by an individual with impaired hearing.

(f) Video remote interpreting (VRI) services. A public accommodation that chooses to provide qualified interpreters via VRI service shall ensure that it provides –

(1) Real-time, full-motion video and audio over a dedicated high-speed, wide-bandwidth video connection or wireless connection that delivers high-quality video images that do not produce lags, choppy, blurry, or grainy images, or irregular pauses in communication; (2) A sharply delineated image that is large enough to display the interpreter’s face, arms, hands, and fingers, and the participating individual’s face, arms, hands, and fingers, regardless of his or her body position; (3) A clear, audible transmission of voices; and (4) Adequate training to users of the technology and other involved individuals so that they may quickly and efficiently set up and operate the VRI.

(g) Movie theater captioning and audio description.

(1) Definitions. For the purposes of this paragraph (g)—

(i) Analog movie means a movie exhibited in analog film format. (ii) Audio description means the spoken narration of a movie’s key visual elements, such as the action, settings, facial expressions, costumes, and scene changes.Audio description generally requires the use of an audio description device for delivery to a patron. (iii) Audio description device means the individual device that a patron may use at any seat to hear audio description. (iv) Captioning device means the individual device that a patron may use at any seat to view closed movie captioning. (v) Closed movie captioning means the written display of a movie’s dialogue and non-speech information, such as music, the identity of the character who is speaking, and other sounds or sound effects.Closed movie captioning generally requires the use of a captioning device for delivery of the captions to the patron. (vi) Digital movie means a movie exhibited in digital cinema format. (vii) Movie theater means a facility, other than a drive-in theater, that is owned, leased by, leased to, or operated by a public accommodation and that contains one or more auditoriums that are used primarily for the purpose of showing movies to the public for a fee. (viii) Open movie captioning means the written on-screen display of a movie’s dialogue and non-speech information, such as music, the identity of the character who is speaking, and other sounds and sound effects.

(2) General. A public accommodation shall ensure that its movie theater auditoriums provide closed movie captioning and audio description whenever they exhibit a digital movie that is distributed with such features. Application of the requirements of paragraph (g) of this section is deferred for any movie theater auditorium that exhibits analog movies exclusively, but may be addressed in a future rulemaking. (3) Minimum requirements for captioning devices. (i) A public accommodation shall provide a minimum number of fully operational captioning devices at its movie theaters in accordance with the following Table:

(4) Minimum requirements for audio description devices. (i) A public accommodation shall provide at its movie theaters a minimum of one fully operational audio description device for every two movie theater auditoriums exhibiting digital movies and no less than two devices per movie theater. When calculation of the required number of devices results in a fraction, the next greater whole number of devices shall be provided.

(ii) A public accommodation may comply with the requirements in paragraph (g)(4)(i) of this section by using the existing assistive listening receivers that the public accommodation is already required to provide at its movie theaters in accordance with Table 219.3 of the 2010 Standards, if those receivers have a minimum of two channels available for sound transmission to patrons.

(5) Performance requirements for captioning devices and audio description devices. Each captioning device and each audio description device must be properly maintained by the movie theater to ensure that each device is fully operational, available to patrons in a timely manner, and easily usable by patrons. Captioning devices must be adjustable so that the captions can be viewed as if they are on or near the movie screen, and must provide clear, sharp images in order to ensure readability of captions.

(6) Alternative technologies. (i) A public accommodation may meet its obligation to provide captioning and audio description in its movie theaters to persons with disabilities through any technology so long as that technology provides communication as effective as that provided to movie patrons without disabilities.

(ii) A public accommodation may use open movie captioning as an alternative to complying with the requirements specified in paragraph (g)(3) of this section, either by providing open movie captioning at all showings of all movies available with captioning, or whenever requested by or for an individual who is deaf or hard of hearing prior to the start of the movie.

(7) Compliance date for providing captioning and audio description. (i) A public accommodation must comply with the requirements in paragraphs (g)(2)–(6) of this section in its movie theaters that exhibit digital movies by June 2, 2018.

(ii) If a public accommodation converts a movie theater auditorium from an analog projection system to a system that allows it to exhibit digital movies after December 2, 2016, then that auditorium must comply with the requirements in paragraph (g) of this section by December 2, 2018, or within 6 months of that auditorium’s complete installation of a digital projection system, whichever is later.

(8) Notice. On or after January 17, 2017, whenever a public accommodation provides captioning and audio description in a movie theater auditorium exhibiting digital movies, it shall ensure that all notices of movie showings and times at the box office and other ticketing locations, on Web sites and mobile apps, in newspapers, and over the telephone, inform potential patrons of the movies or showings that are available with captioning and audio description. This paragraph does not impose any obligation on third parties that provide information about movie theater showings and times, so long as the third party is not part of or subject to the control of the public accommodation.

(9) Operational requirements. On or after January 17, 2017, whenever a public accommodation provides captioning and audio description in a movie theater auditorium exhibiting digital movies, it shall ensure that at least one employee is available at the movie theater to assist patrons seeking or using captioning or audio description whenever a digital movie is exhibited with these features. Such assistance includes the ability to—

(i) Locate all necessary equipment that is stored and quickly activate the equipment and any other ancillary systems required for the use of the captioning devices and audio description devices;

(ii) Operate and address problems with all captioning and audio description equipment prior to and during the movie;

(iii) Turn on open movie captions if the movie theater is relying on open movie captioning to meet the requirements of paragraph (g)(3) of this section; and

(iv) Communicate effectively with individuals with disabilities, including those who are deaf or hard of hearing or who are blind or have low vision, about how to use, operate, and resolve problems with captioning devices and audio description devices.

(10) This section does not require the use of open movie captioning as a means of compliance with paragraph (g) of this section, even if providing closed movie captioning for digital movies would be an undue burden.

(h) Alternatives. If provision of a particular auxiliary aid or service by a public accommodation would result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations being offered or in an undue burden, i.e., significant difficulty or expense, the public accommodation shall provide an alternative auxiliary aid or service, if one exists, that would not result in an alteration or such burden but would nevertheless ensure that, to the maximum extent possible, individuals with disabilities receive the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations offered by the public accommodation.

§ 36.304 Removal of barriers.

(a) General. A public accommodation shall remove architectural barriers in existing facilities, including communication barriers that are structural in nature, where such removal is readily achievable, i.e., easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense.

(b) Examples. Examples of steps to remove barriers include, but are not limited to, the following actions –

(1) Installing ramps; (2) Making curb cuts in sidewalks and entrances; (3) Repositioning shelves; (4) Rearranging tables, chairs, vending machines, display racks, and other furniture; (5) Repositioning telephones; (6) Adding raised markings on elevator control buttons; (7) Installing flashing alarm lights; (8) Widening doors; (9) Installing offset hinges to widen doorways; (10) Eliminating a turnstile or providing an alternative accessible path; (11) Installing accessible door hardware; (12) Installing grab bars in toilet stalls; (13) Rearranging toilet partitions to increase maneuvering space; (14) Insulating lavatory pipes under sinks to prevent burns; (15) Installing a raised toilet seat; (16) Installing a full-length bathroom mirror; (17) Repositioning the paper towel dispenser in a bathroom; (18) Creating designated accessible parking spaces; (19) Installing an accessible paper cup dispenser at an existing inaccessible water fountain; (20) Removing high pile, low density carpeting; or (21) Installing vehicle hand controls.

(c) Priorities. A public accommodation is urged to take measures to comply with the barrier removal requirements of this section in accordance with the following order of priorities.

(1) First, a public accommodation should take measures to provide access to a place of public accommodation from public sidewalks, parking, or public transportation. These measures include, for example, installing an entrance ramp, widening entrances, and providing accessible parking spaces. (2) Second, a public accommodation should take measures to provide access to those areas of a place of public accommodation where goods and services are made available to the public. These measures include, for example, adjusting the layout of display racks, rearranging tables, providing Brailled and raised character signage, widening doors, providing visual alarms, and installing ramps. (3) Third, a public accommodation should take measures to provide access to restroom facilities. These measures include, for example, removal of obstructing furniture or vending machines, widening of doors, installation of ramps, providing accessible signage, widening of toilet stalls, and installation of grab bars. (4) Fourth, a public accommodation should take any other measures necessary to provide access to the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a place of public accommodation.

(d) Relationship to alterations requirements of subpart D of this part.

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (d)(3) of this section, measures taken to comply with the barrier removal requirements of this section shall comply with the applicable requirements for alterations in § 36.402 and §§ 36.404 through 36.406 of this part for the element being altered. The path of travel requirements of § 36.403 shall not apply to measures taken solely to comply with the barrier removal requirements of this section.

(2)

(i) Safe harbor. Elements that have not been altered in existing facilities on or after March 15, 2012, and that comply with the corresponding technical and scoping specifications for those elements in the 1991 Standards are not required to be modified in order to comply with the requirements set forth in the 2010 Standards.

(ii) (A) Before March 15, 2012, elements in existing facilities that do not comply with the corresponding technical and scoping specifications for those elements in the 1991 Standards must be modified to the extent readily achievable to comply with either the 1991 Standards or the 2010 Standards. Noncomplying newly constructed and altered elements may also be subject to the requirements of § 36.406(a)(5). (B) On or after March 15, 2012, elements in existing facilities that do not comply with the corresponding technical and scoping specifications for those elements in the 1991 Standards must be modified to the extent readily achievable to comply with the requirements set forth in the 2010 Standards. Noncomplying newly constructed and altered elements may also be subject to the requirements of § 36.406(a)(5). (iii) The safe harbor provided in § 36.304(d)(2)(i) does not apply to those elements in existing facilities that are subject to supplemental requirements (i.e., elements for which there are neither technical nor scoping specifications in the 1991 Standards), and therefore those elements must be modified to the extent readily achievable to comply with the 2010 Standards. Noncomplying newly constructed and altered elements may also be subject to the requirements of § 36.406(a)(5). Elements in the 2010 Standards not eligible for the element-by-element safe harbor are identified as follows –

(A) Residential facilities and dwelling units, sections 233 and 809. (B) Amusement rides, sections 234 and 1002; 206.2.9; 216.12. (C) Recreational boating facilities, sections 235 and 1003; 206.2.10. (D) Exercise machines and equipment, sections 236 and 1004; 206.2.13. (E) Fishing piers and platforms, sections 237 and 1005; 206.2.14. (F) Golf facilities, sections 238 and 1006; 206.2.15. (G) Miniature golf facilities, sections 239 and 1007; 206.2.16. (H) Play areas, sections 240 and 1008; 206.2.17. (I) Saunas and steam rooms, sections 241 and 612. (J) Swimming pools, wading pools, and spas, sections 242 and 1009. (K) Shooting facilities with firing positions, sections 243 and 1010. (L) Miscellaneous.

(1) Team or player seating, section 221.2.1.4. (2) Accessible route to bowling lanes, section 206.2.11. (3) Accessible route in court sports facilities, section 206.2.12.

(3) If, as a result of compliance with the alterations requirements specified in paragraph (d)(1) and (d)(2) of this section, the measures required to remove a barrier would not be readily achievable, a public accommodation may take other readily achievable measures to remove the barrier that do not fully comply with the specified requirements. Such measures include, for example, providing a ramp with a steeper slope or widening a doorway to a narrower width than that mandated by the alterations requirements. No measure shall be taken, however, that poses a significant risk to the health or safety of individuals with disabilities or others.

Appendix to § 36.304(d)

(e) Portable ramps. Portable ramps should be used to comply with this section only when installation of a permanent ramp is not readily achievable. In order to avoid any significant risk to the health or safety of individuals with disabilities or others in using portable ramps, due consideration shall be given to safety features such as nonslip surfaces, railings, anchoring, and strength of materials.

(f) Selling or serving space. The rearrangement of temporary or movable structures, such as furniture, equipment, and display racks is not readily achievable to the extent that it results in a significant loss of selling or serving space.

(g) Limitation on barrier removal obligations.

(1) The requirements for barrier removal under § 36.304 shall not be interpreted to exceed the standards for alterations in subpart D of this part. (2) To the extent that relevant standards for alterations are not provided in subpart D of this part, then the requirements of § 36.304 shall not be interpreted to exceed the standards for new construction in subpart D of this part. (3) This section does not apply to rolling stock and other conveyances to the extent that § 36.310 applies to rolling stock and other conveyances. (4) This requirement does not apply to guest rooms in existing facilities that are places of lodging where the guest rooms are not owned by the entity that owns, leases, or operates the overall facility and the physical features of the guest room interiors are controlled by their individual owners. (5) With respect to facilities built before March 15, 2012, the requirements in this section for accessible means of entry for swimming pools, wading pools, and spas, as set forth in sections 242 and 1009 of the 2010 Standards, shall not apply until January 31, 2013.

§ 36.305 Alternatives to barrier removal.

(a) General. Where a public accommodation can demonstrate that barrier removal is not readily achievable, the public accommodation shall not fail to make its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations available through alternative methods, if those methods are readily achievable. (b) Examples. Examples of alternatives to barrier removal include, but are not limited to, the following actions –

(1) Providing curb service or home delivery; (2) Retrieving merchandise from inaccessible shelves or racks; (3) Relocating activities to accessible locations;

(c) Multiscreen cinemas. If it is not readily achievable to remove barriers to provide access by persons with mobility impairments to all of the theaters of a multiscreen cinema, the cinema shall establish a film rotation schedule that provides reasonable access for individuals who use wheelchairs to all films. Reasonable notice shall be provided to the public as to the location and time of accessible showings.

§ 36.306 Personal devices and services.

This part does not require a public accommodation to provide its customers, clients, or participants with personal devices, such as wheelchairs; individually prescribed devices, such as prescription eyeglasses or hearing aids; or services of a personal nature including assistance in eating, toileting, or dressing.

§ 36.307 Accessible or special goods.

(a) This part does not require a public accommodation to alter its inventory to include accessible or special goods that are designed for, or facilitate use by, individuals with disabilities. (b) A public accommodation shall order accessible or special goods at the request of an individual with disabilities, if, in the normal course of its operation, it makes special orders on request for unstocked goods, and if the accessible or special goods can be obtained from a supplier with whom the public accommodation customarily does business. (c) Examples of accessible or special goods include items such as Brailled versions of books, books on audio cassettes, closed-captioned video tapes, special sizes or lines of clothing, and special foods to meet particular dietary needs.

§ 36.308 Seating in assembly areas.

A public accommodation shall ensure that wheelchair spaces and companion seats are provided in each specialty seating area that provides spectators with distinct services or amenities that generally are not available to other spectators. If it is not readily achievable for a public accommodation to place wheelchair spaces and companion seats in each such specialty seating area, it shall provide those services or amenities to individuals with disabilities and their companions at other designated accessible locations at no additional cost. The number of wheelchair spaces and companion seats provided in specialty seating areas shall be included in, rather than in addition to, wheelchair space requirements set forth in table 221.2.1.1 in the 2010 Standards.

§ 36.309 Examinations and courses.

(a) General. Any private entity that offers examinations or courses related to applications, licensing, certification, or credentialing for secondary or postsecondary education, professional, or trade purposes shall offer such examinations or courses in a place and manner accessible to persons with disabilities or offer alternative accessible arrangements for such individuals.

(b) Examinations.

(1) Any private entity offering an examination covered by this section must assure that –

(i) The examination is selected and administered so as to best ensure that, when the examination is administered to an individual with a disability that impairs sensory, manual, or speaking skills, the examination results accurately reflect the individual’s aptitude or achievement level or whatever other factor the examination purports to measure, rather than reflecting the individual’s impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills (except where those skills are the factors that the examination purports to measure); (ii) An examination that is designed for individuals with impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills is offered at equally convenient locations, as often, and in as timely a manner as are other examinations; and (iii) The examination is administered in facilities that are accessible to individuals with disabilities or alternative accessible arrangements are made. (iv) Any request for documentation, if such documentation is required, is reasonable and limited to the need for the modification, accommodation, or auxiliary aid or service requested. (v) When considering requests for modifications, accommodations, or auxiliary aids or services, the entity gives considerable weight to documentation of past modifications, accommodations, or auxiliary aids or services received in similar testing situations, as well as such modifications, accommodations, or related aids and services provided in response to an Individualized Education Program (IEP) provided under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act or a plan describing services provided pursuant to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended (often referred as a Section 504 Plan). (vi) The entity responds in a timely manner to requests for modifications, accommodations, or aids to ensure equal opportunity for individuals with disabilities.

(2) Required modifications to an examination may include changes in the length of time permitted for completion of the examination and adaptation of the manner in which the examination is given. (3) A private entity offering an examination covered by this section shall provide appropriate auxiliary aids for persons with impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills, unless that private entity can demonstrate that offering a particular auxiliary aid would fundamentally alter the measurement of the skills or knowledge the examination is intended to test or would result in an undue burden. Auxiliary aids and services required by this section may include taped examinations, interpreters or other effective methods of making orally delivered materials available to individuals with hearing impairments, Brailled or large print examinations and answer sheets or qualified readers for individuals with visual impairments or learning disabilities, transcribers for individuals with manual impairments, and other similar services and actions. (4) Alternative accessible arrangements may include, for example, provision of an examination at an individual’s home with a proctor if accessible facilities or equipment are unavailable. Alternative arrangements must provide comparable conditions to those provided for nondisabled individuals.

(c) Courses.

(1) Any private entity that offers a course covered by this section must make such modifications to that course as are necessary to ensure that the place and manner in which the course is given are accessible to individuals with disabilities. (2) Required modifications may include changes in the length of time permitted for the completion of the course, substitution of specific requirements, or adaptation of the manner in which the course is conducted or course materials are distributed. (3) A private entity that offers a course covered by this section shall provide appropriate auxiliary aids and services for persons with impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills, unless the private entity can demonstrate that offering a particular auxiliary aid or service would fundamentally alter the course or would result in an undue burden. Auxiliary aids and services required by this section may include taped texts, interpreters or other effective methods of making orally delivered materials available to individuals with hearing impairments, Brailled or large print texts or qualified readers for individuals with visual impairments and learning disabilities, classroom equipment adapted for use by individuals with manual impairments, and other similar services and actions. (4) Courses must be administered in facilities that are accessible to individuals with disabilities or alternative accessible arrangements must be made. (5) Alternative accessible arrangements may include, for example, provision of the course through videotape, cassettes, or prepared notes. Alternative arrangements must provide comparable conditions to those provided for nondisabled individuals.

§ 36.310 Transportation provided by public accommodations.

(a) General.

(1) A public accommodation that provides transportation services, but that is not primarily engaged in the business of transporting people, is subject to the general and specific provisions in subparts B, C, and D of this part for its transportation operations, except as provided in this section. (2) Examples. Transportation services subject to this section include, but are not limited to, shuttle services operated between transportation terminals and places of public accommodation, customer shuttle bus services operated by private companies and shopping centers, student transportation systems, and transportation provided within recreational facilities such as stadiums, zoos, amusement parks, and ski resorts.

(b) Barrier removal. A public accommodation subject to this section shall remove transportation barriers in existing vehicles and rail passenger cars used for transporting individuals (not including barriers that can only be removed through the retrofitting of vehicles or rail passenger cars by the installation of a hydraulic or other lift) where such removal is readily achievable.

(c) Requirements for vehicles and systems. A public accommodation subject to this section shall comply with the requirements pertaining to vehicles and transportation systems in the regulations issued by the Secretary of Transportation pursuant to section 306 of the Act.

§ 36.311 Mobility devices.

(a) Use of wheelchairs and manually-powered mobility aids. A public accommodation shall permit individuals with mobility disabilities to use wheelchairs and manually-powered mobility aids, such as walkers, crutches, canes, braces, or other similar devices designed for use by individuals with mobility disabilities in any areas open to pedestrian use.

(b)

(1) Use of other power-driven mobility devices. A public accommodation shall make reasonable modifications in its policies, practices, or procedures to permit the use of other power-driven mobility devices by individuals with mobility disabilities, unless the public accommodation can demonstrate that the class of other power-driven mobility devices cannot be operated in accordance with legitimate safety requirements that the public accommodation has adopted pursuant to § 36.301(b). (2) Assessment factors. In determining whether a particular other power-driven mobility device can be allowed in a specific facility as a reasonable modification under paragraph (b)(1) of this section, a public accommodation shall consider –

(i) The type, size, weight, dimensions, and speed of the device; (ii) The facility’s volume of pedestrian traffic (which may vary at different times of the day, week, month, or year); (iii) The facility’s design and operational characteristics (e.g., whether its business is conducted indoors, its square footage, the density and placement of stationary devices, and the availability of storage for the device, if requested by the user); (iv) Whether legitimate safety requirements can be established to permit the safe operation of the other power-driven mobility device in the specific facility; and (v) Whether the use of the other power-driven mobility device creates a substantial risk of serious harm to the immediate environment or natural or cultural resources, or poses a conflict with Federal land management laws and regulations.

(c)

(1) Inquiry about disability. A public accommodation shall not ask an individual using a wheelchair or other power-driven mobility device questions about the nature and extent of the individual’s disability. (2) Inquiry into use of other power-driven mobility device. A public accommodation may ask a person using an other power-driven mobility device to provide a credible assurance that the mobility device is required because of the person’s disability. A public accommodation that permits the use of an other power-driven mobility device by an individual with a mobility disability shall accept the presentation of a valid, State-issued disability parking placard or card, or State-issued proof of disability, as a credible assurance that the use of the other power-driven mobility device is for the individual’s mobility disability. In lieu of a valid, State-issued disability parking placard or card, or State-issued proof of disability, a public accommodation shall accept as a credible assurance a verbal representation, not contradicted by observable fact, that the other power-driven mobility device is being used for a mobility disability. A “valid” disability placard or card is one that is presented by the individual to whom it was issued and is otherwise in compliance with the State of issuance’s requirements for disability placards or cards.

§§ 36.312 – 36.399 [Reserved]

Subpart D – New Construction and Alterations

§ 36.401 New construction.

(a) General.

(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section, discrimination for purposes of this part includes a failure to design and construct facilities for first occupancy after January 26, 1993, that are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities. (2) For purposes of this section, a facility is designed and constructed for first occupancy after January 26, 1993, only –

(i) If the last application for a building permit or permit extension for the facility is certified to be complete, by a State, County, or local government after January 26, 1992 (or, in those jurisdictions where the government does not certify completion of applications, if the last application for a building permit or permit extension for the facility is received by the State, County, or local government after January 26, 1992); and (ii) If the first certificate of occupancy for the facility is issued after January 26, 1993.

(b) Commercial facilities located in private residences.

(1) When a commercial facility is located in a private residence, the portion of the residence used exclusively as a residence is not covered by this subpart, but that portion used exclusively in the operation of the commercial facility or that portion used both for the commercial facility and for residential purposes is covered by the new construction and alterations requirements of this subpart. (2) The portion of the residence covered under paragraph (b)(1) of this section extends to those elements used to enter the commercial facility, including the homeowner’s front sidewalk, if any, the door or entryway, and hallways; and those portions of the residence, interior or exterior, available to or used by employees or visitors of the commercial facility, including restrooms.

(c) Exception for structural impracticability.

(1) Full compliance with the requirements of this section is not required where an entity can demonstrate that it is structurally impracticable to meet the requirements. Full compliance will be considered structurally impracticable only in those rare circumstances when the unique characteristics of terrain prevent the incorporation of accessibility features. (2) If full compliance with this section would be structurally impracticable, compliance with this section is required to the extent that it is not structurally impracticable. In that case, any portion of the facility that can be made accessible shall be made accessible to the extent that it is not structurally impracticable. (3) If providing accessibility in conformance with this section to individuals with certain disabilities (e.g., those who use wheelchairs) would be structurally impracticable, accessibility shall nonetheless be ensured to persons with other types of disabilities (e.g., those who use crutches or who have sight, hearing, or mental impairments) in accordance with this section.

(d) Elevator exemption.

(1) For purposes of this paragraph (d) –

(i) Professional office of a health care provider means a location where a person or entity regulated by a State to provide professional services related to the physical or mental health of an individual makes such services available to the public. The facility housing the “professional office of a health care provider” only includes floor levels housing at least one health care provider, or any floor level designed or intended for use by at least one health care provider. (ii) Shopping center or shopping mall means –

(A) A building housing five or more sales or rental establishments; or (B) A series of buildings on a common site, either under common ownership or common control or developed either as one project or as a series of related projects, housing five or more sales or rental establishments. For purposes of this section, places of public accommodation of the types listed in paragraph (5) of the definition of “place of public accommodation” in section § 36.104 are considered sales or rental establishments. The facility housing a “shopping center or shopping mall” only includes floor levels housing at least one sales or rental establishment, or any floor level designed or intended for use by at least one sales or rental establishment.

(2) This section does not require the installation of an elevator in a facility that is less than three stories or has less than 3000 square feet per story, except with respect to any facility that houses one or more of the following:

(i) A shopping center or shopping mall, or a professional office of a health care provider. (ii) A terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public transportation, or an airport passenger terminal. In such a facility, any area housing passenger services, including boarding and debarking, loading and unloading, baggage claim, dining facilities, and other common areas open to the public, must be on an accessible route from an accessible entrance.

(3) The elevator exemption set forth in this paragraph (d) does not obviate or limit, in any way the obligation to comply with the other accessibility requirements established in paragraph (a) of this section. For example, in a facility that houses a shopping center or shopping mall, or a professional office of a health care provider, the floors that are above or below an accessible ground floor and that do not house sales or rental establishments or a professional office of a health care provider, must meet the requirements of this section but for the elevator.

§ 36.402 Alterations.

(a) General.

(1) Any alteration to a place of public accommodation or a commercial facility, after January 26, 1992, shall be made so as to ensure that, to the maximum extent feasible, the altered portions of the facility are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs. (2) An alteration is deemed to be undertaken after January 26, 1992, if the physical alteration of the property begins after that date.

(b) Alteration. For the purposes of this part, an alteration is a change to a place of public accommodation or a commercial facility that affects or could affect the usability of the building or facility or any part thereof.

(1) Alterations include, but are not limited to, remodeling, renovation, rehabilitation, reconstruction, historic restoration, changes or rearrangement in structural parts or elements, and changes or rearrangement in the plan configuration of walls and full-height partitions. Normal maintenance, reroofing, painting or wallpapering, asbestos removal, or changes to mechanical and electrical systems are not alterations unless they affect the usability of the building or facility. (2) If existing elements, spaces, or common areas are altered, then each such altered element, space, or area shall comply with the applicable provisions of appendix A to this part.

(c) To the maximum extent feasible. The phrase “to the maximum extent feasible,” as used in this section, applies to the occasional case where the nature of an existing facility makes it virtually impossible to comply fully with applicable accessibility standards through a planned alteration. In these circumstances, the alteration shall provide the maximum physical accessibility feasible. Any altered features of the facility that can be made accessible shall be made accessible. If providing accessibility in conformance with this section to individuals with certain disabilities (e.g., those who use wheelchairs) would not be feasible, the facility shall be made accessible to persons with other types of disabilities (e.g., those who use crutches, those who have impaired vision or hearing, or those who have other impairments).

§ 36.403 Alterations: Path of travel.

(a) General.

(1) An alteration that affects or could affect the usability of or access to an area of a facility that contains a primary function shall be made so as to ensure that, to the maximum extent feasible, the path of travel to the altered area and the restrooms, telephones, and drinking fountains serving the altered area, are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, unless the cost and scope of such alterations is disproportionate to the cost of the overall alteration. (2) If a private entity has constructed or altered required elements of a path of travel at a place of public accommodation or commercial facility in accordance with the specifications in the 1991 Standards, the private entity is not required to retrofit such elements to reflect the incremental changes in the 2010 Standards solely because of an alteration to a primary function area served by that path of travel.

(b) Primary function. A “primary function” is a major activity for which the facility is intended. Areas that contain a primary function include, but are not limited to, the customer services lobby of a bank, the dining area of a cafeteria, the meeting rooms in a conference center, as well as offices and other work areas in which the activities of the public accommodation or other private entity using the facility are carried out. Mechanical rooms, boiler rooms, supply storage rooms, employee lounges or locker rooms, janitorial closets, entrances, corridors, and restrooms are not areas containing a primary function.

(c) Alterations to an area containing a primary function.

(1) Alterations that affect the usability of or access to an area containing a primary function include, but are not limited to –

(i) Remodeling merchandise display areas or employee work areas in a department store; (ii) Replacing an inaccessible floor surface in the customer service or employee work areas of a bank; (iii) Redesigning the assembly line area of a factory; or (iv) Installing a computer center in an accounting firm.

(2) For the purposes of this section, alterations to windows, hardware, controls, electrical outlets, and signage shall not be deemed to be alterations that affect the usability of or access to an area containing a primary function.

(d) Landlord/tenant: If a tenant is making alterations as defined in § 36.402 that would trigger the requirements of this section, those alterations by the tenant in areas that only the tenant occupies do not trigger a path of travel obligation upon the landlord with respect to areas of the facility under the landlord’s authority, if those areas are not otherwise being altered.

(e) Path of travel.

(1) A “path of travel” includes a continuous, unobstructed way of pedestrian passage by means of which the altered area may be approached, entered, and exited, and which connects the altered area with an exterior approach (including sidewalks, streets, and parking areas), an entrance to the facility, and other parts of the facility. (2) An accessible path of travel may consist of walks and sidewalks, curb ramps and other interior or exterior pedestrian ramps; clear floor paths through lobbies, corridors, rooms, and other improved areas; parking access aisles; elevators and lifts; or a combination of these elements. (3) For the purposes of this part, the term “path of travel” also includes the restrooms, telephones, and drinking fountains serving the altered area.

(f) Disproportionality.

(1) Alterations made to provide an accessible path of travel to the altered area will be deemed disproportionate to the overall alteration when the cost exceeds 20% of the cost of the alteration to the primary function area. (2) Costs that may be counted as expenditures required to provide an accessible path of travel may include:

(i) Costs associated with providing an accessible entrance and an accessible route to the altered area, for example, the cost of widening doorways or installing ramps; (ii) Costs associated with making restrooms accessible, such as installing grab bars, enlarging toilet stalls, insulating pipes, or installing accessible faucet controls; (iii) Costs associated with providing accessible telephones, such as relocating the telephone to an accessible height, installing amplification devices, or installing a text telephone (TTY); (iv) Costs associated with relocating an inaccessible drinking fountain.

(g) Duty to provide accessible features in the event of disproportionality.

(1) When the cost of alterations necessary to make the path of travel to the altered area fully accessible is disproportionate to the cost of the overall alteration, the path of travel shall be made accessible to the extent that it can be made accessible without incurring disproportionate costs. (2) In choosing which accessible elements to provide, priority should be given to those elements that will provide the greatest access, in the following order:

(i) An accessible entrance; (ii) An accessible route to the altered area; (iii) At least one accessible restroom for each sex or a single unisex restroom; (iv) Accessible telephones; (v) Accessible drinking fountains; and (vi) When possible, additional accessible elements such as parking, storage, and alarms.

(h) Series of smaller alterations.

(1) The obligation to provide an accessible path of travel may not be evaded by performing a series of small alterations to the area served by a single path of travel if those alterations could have been performed as a single undertaking. (2)

(i) If an area containing a primary function has been altered without providing an accessible path of travel to that area, and subsequent alterations of that area, or a different area on the same path of travel, are undertaken within three years of the original alteration, the total cost of alterations to the primary function areas on that path of travel during the preceding three year period shall be considered in determining whether the cost of making that path of travel accessible is disproportionate. (ii) Only alterations undertaken after January 26, 1992, shall be considered in determining if the cost of providing an accessible path of travel is disproportionate to the overall cost of the alterations.

§ 36.404 Alterations: Elevator exemption.

(a) This section does not require the installation of an elevator in an altered facility that is less than three stories or has less than 3,000 square feet per story, except with respect to any facility that houses a shopping center, a shopping mall, the professional office of a health care provider, a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public transportation, or an airport passenger terminal.

(1) For the purposes of this section, “professional office of a health care provider” means a location where a person or entity regulated by a State to provide professional services related to the physical or mental health of an individual makes such services available to the public. The facility that houses a “professional office of a health care provider” only includes floor levels housing by at least one health care provider, or any floor level designed or intended for use by at least one health care provider. (2) For the purposes of this section, shopping center or shopping mall means –

(i) A building housing five or more sales or rental establishments; or (ii) A series of buildings on a common site, connected by a common pedestrian access route above or below the ground floor, that is either under common ownership or common control or developed either as one project or as a series of related projects, housing five or more sales or rental establishments. For purposes of this section, places of public accommodation of the types listed in paragraph (5) of the definition of “place of public accommodation” in § 36.104 are considered sales or rental establishments. The facility housing a “shopping center or shopping mall” only includes floor levels housing at least one sales or rental establishment, or any floor level designed or intended for use by at least one sales or rental establishment.

(b) The exemption provided in paragraph (a) of this section does not obviate or limit in any way the obligation to comply with the other accessibility requirements established in this subpart. For example, alterations to floors above or below the accessible ground floor must be accessible regardless of whether the altered facility has an elevator.

§ 36.405 Alterations: Historic preservation.

(a) Alterations to buildings or facilities that are eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places under the National Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. 470 et seq) or are designated as historic under State or local law, shall comply to the maximum extent feasible with this part. (b) If it is determined that it is not feasible to provide physical access to an historic property that is a place of public accommodation in a manner that will not threaten or destroy the historic significance of the building or the facility, alternative methods of access shall be provided pursuant to the requirements of subpart C of this part.

§ 36.406 Standards for new construction and alterations.

(a) Accessibility standards and compliance date.

(1) New construction and alterations subject to §§ 36.401 or 36.402 shall comply with the 1991 Standards if the date when the last application for a building permit or permit extension is certified to be complete by a State, county, or local government (or, in those jurisdictions where the government does not certify completion of applications, if the date when the last application for a building permit or permit extension is received by the State, county, or local government) is before September 15, 2010, or if no permit is required, if the start of physical construction or alterations occurs before September 15, 2010. (2) New construction and alterations subject to §§ 36.401 or 36.402 shall comply either with the 1991 Standards or with the 2010 Standards if the date when the last application for a building permit or permit extension is certified to be complete by a State, county, or local government (or, in those jurisdictions where the government does not certify completion of applications, if the date when the last application for a building permit or permit extension is received by the State, county, or local government) is on or after September 15, 2010, and before March 15, 2012, or if no permit is required, if the start of physical construction or alterations occurs on or after September 15, 2010, and before March 15, 2012. (3) New construction and alterations subject to §§ 36.401 or 36.402 shall comply with the 2010 Standards if the date when the last application for a building permit or permit extension is certified to be complete by a State, county, or local government (or, in those jurisdictions where the government does not certify completion of applications, if the date when the last application for a building permit or permit extension is received by the State, county, or local government) is on or after March 15, 2012, or if no permit is required, if the start of physical construction or alterations occurs on or after March 15, 2012. (4) For the purposes of this section, “start of physical construction or alterations” does not mean ceremonial groundbreaking or razing of structures prior to site preparation. (5) Noncomplying new construction and alterations.

(i) Newly constructed or altered facilities or elements covered by §§ 36.401 or 36.402 that were constructed or altered before March 15, 2012, and that do not comply with the 1991 Standards shall, before March 15, 2012, be made accessible in accordance with either the 1991 Standards or the 2010 Standards. (ii) Newly constructed or altered facilities or elements covered by §§ 36.401 or 36.402 that were constructed or altered before March 15, 2012 and that do not comply with the 1991 Standards shall, on or after March 15, 2012, be made accessible in accordance with the 2010 Standards.

Appendix to § 36.406(a)

(b) Scope of coverage. The 1991 Standards and the 2010 Standards apply to fixed or built-in elements of buildings, structures, site improvements, and pedestrian routes or vehicular ways located on a site. Unless specifically stated otherwise, advisory notes, appendix notes, and figures contained in the 1991 Standards and 2010 Standards explain or illustrate the requirements of the rule; they do not establish enforceable requirements. (c) Places of lodging. Places of lodging subject to this part shall comply with the provisions of the 2010 Standards applicable to transient lodging, including, but not limited to, the requirements for transient lodging guest rooms in sections 224 and 806 of the 2010 Standards.

(1) Guest rooms. Guest rooms with mobility features in places of lodging subject to the transient lodging requirements of 2010 Standards shall be provided as follows –

(i) Facilities that are subject to the same permit application on a common site that each have 50 or fewer guest rooms may be combined for the purposes of determining the required number of accessible rooms and type of accessible bathing facility in accordance with table 224.2 to section 224.2 of the 2010 Standards. (ii) Facilities with more than 50 guest rooms shall be treated separately for the purposes of determining the required number of accessible rooms and type of accessible bathing facility in accordance with table 224.2 to section 224.2 of the 2010 Standards.

(2) Exception. Alterations to guest rooms in places of lodging where the guest rooms are not owned or substantially controlled by the entity that owns, leases, or operates the overall facility and the physical features of the guest room interiors are controlled by their individual owners are not required to comply with § 36.402 or the alterations requirements in section 224.1.1 of the 2010 Standards. (3) Facilities with residential units and transient lodging units. Residential dwelling units that are designed and constructed for residential use exclusively are not subject to the transient lodging standards.

(d) Social service center establishments. Group homes, halfway houses, shelters, or similar social service center establishments that provide either temporary sleeping accommodations or residential dwelling units that are subject to this part shall comply with the provisions of the 2010 Standards applicable to residential facilities, including, but not limited to, the provisions in sections 233 and 809.

(1) In sleeping rooms with more than 25 beds covered by this part, a minimum of 5% of the beds shall have clear floor space complying with section 806.2.3 of the 2010 Standards. (2) Facilities with more than 50 beds covered by this part that provide common use bathing facilities shall provide at least one roll-in shower with a seat that complies with the relevant provisions of section 608 of the 2010 Standards. Transfer-type showers are not permitted in lieu of a roll-in shower with a seat, and the exceptions in sections 608.3 and 608.4 for residential dwelling units are not permitted. When separate shower facilities are provided for men and for women, at least one roll-in shower shall be provided for each group.

(e) Housing at a place of education. Housing at a place of education that is subject to this part shall comply with the provisions of the 2010 Standards applicable to transient lodging, including, but not limited to, the requirements for transient lodging guest rooms in sections 224 and 806, subject to the following exceptions. For the purposes of the application of this section, the term “sleeping room” is intended to be used interchangeably with the term “guest room” as it is used in the transient lodging standards.

(1) Kitchens within housing units containing accessible sleeping rooms with mobility features (including suites and clustered sleeping rooms) or on floors containing accessible sleeping rooms with mobility features shall provide turning spaces that comply with section 809.2.2 of the 2010 Standards and kitchen work surfaces that comply with section 804.3 of the 2010 Standards. (2) Multi-bedroom housing units containing accessible sleeping rooms with mobility features shall have an accessible route throughout the unit in accordance with section 809.2 of the 2010 Standards. (3) Apartments or townhouse facilities that are provided by or on behalf of a place of education, which are leased on a year-round basis exclusively to graduate students or faculty and do not contain any public use or common use areas available for educational programming, are not subject to the transient lodging standards and shall comply with the requirements for residential facilities in sections 233 and 809 of the 2010 Standards.

(f) Assembly areas. Assembly areas that are subject to this part shall comply with the provisions of the 2010 Standards applicable to assembly areas, including, but not limited to, sections 221 and 802. In addition, assembly areas shall ensure that –

(1) In stadiums, arenas, and grandstands, wheelchair spaces and companion seats are dispersed to all levels that include seating served by an accessible route; (2) In assembly areas that are required to horizontally disperse wheelchair spaces and companion seats by section 221.2.3.1 of the 2010 Standards and that have seating encircling, in whole or in part, a field of play or performance, wheelchair spaces and companion seats are dispersed around that field of play or performance area; (3) Wheelchair spaces and companion seats are not located on (or obstructed by) temporary platforms or other movable structures, except that when an entire seating section is placed on temporary platforms or other movable structures in an area where fixed seating is not provided, in order to increase seating for an event, wheelchair spaces and companion seats may be placed in that section. When wheelchair spaces and companion seats are not required to accommodate persons eligible for those spaces and seats, individual, removable seats may be placed in those spaces and seats; (4) In stadium-style movie theaters, wheelchair spaces and companion seats are located on a riser or cross-aisle in the stadium section that satisfies at least one of the following criteria –

(i) It is located within the rear 60% of the seats provided in an auditorium; or (ii) It is located within the area of an auditorium in which the vertical viewing angles (as measured to the top of the screen) are from the 40th to the 100th percentile of vertical viewing angles for all seats as ranked from the seats in the first row (1st percentile) to seats in the back row (100th percentile).

(g) Medical care facilities. Medical care facilities that are subject to this part shall comply with the provisions of the 2010 Standards applicable to medical care facilities, including, but not limited to, sections 223 and 805. In addition, medical care facilities that do not specialize in the treatment of conditions that affect mobility shall disperse the accessible patient bedrooms required by section 223.2.1 of the 2010 Standards in a manner that is proportionate by type of medical specialty.

§§ 36.407 – 36.499 [Reserved]

Subpart E – Enforcement

§ 36.501 Private suits.

(a) General. Any person who is being subjected to discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of the Act or this part or who has reasonable grounds for believing that such person is about to be subjected to discrimination in violation of section 303 of the Act or subpart D of this part may institute a civil action for preventive relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order. Upon timely application, the court may, in its discretion, permit the Attorney General to intervene in the civil action if the Attorney General or his or her designee certifies that the case is of general public importance. Upon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just, the court may appoint an attorney for such complainant and may authorize the commencement of the civil action without the payment of fees, costs, or security. Nothing in this section shall require a person with a disability to engage in a futile gesture if the person has actual notice that a person or organization covered by title III of the Act or this part does not intend to comply with its provisions. (b) Injunctive relief. In the case of violations of § 36.304, § §36.308, 36.310(b), 36.401, 36.402, 36.403, and 36.405 of this part, injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities to the extent required by the Act or this part. Where appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the provision of an auxiliary aid or service, modification of a policy, or provision of alternative methods, to the extent required by the Act or this part.

§ 36.502 Investigations and compliance reviews.

(a) The Attorney General shall investigate alleged violations of the Act or this part. (b) Any individual who believes that he or she or a specific class of persons has been subjected to discrimination prohibited by the Act or this part may request the Department to institute an investigation. (c) Where the Attorney General has reason to believe that there may be a violation of this part, he or she may initiate a compliance review.

§ 36.503 Suit by the Attorney General.

Following a compliance review or investigation under § 36.502, or at any other time in his or her discretion, the Attorney General may commence a civil action in any appropriate United States district court if the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that –

(a) Any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination in violation of the Act or this part; or (b) Any person or group of persons has been discriminated against in violation of the Act or this part and the discrimination raises an issue of general public importance.

§ 36.504 Relief.

(a) Authority of court. In a civil action under § 36.503, the court –

(1) May grant any equitable relief that such court considers to be appropriate, including, to the extent required by the Act or this part –

(i) Granting temporary, preliminary, or permanent relief; (ii) Providing an auxiliary aid or service, modification of policy, practice, or procedure, or alternative method; and (iii) Making facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities;

(2) May award other relief as the court considers to be appropriate, including monetary damages to persons aggrieved when requested by the Attorney General; and (3) May, to vindicate the public interest, assess a civil penalty against the entity in an amount

(i) Not exceeding $50,000 for a first violation occurring before September 29, 1999, and not exceeding $55,000 for a first violation occurring on or after September 29, 1999, and before April 28, 2014, and not exceeding $75,000 for a first violation occurring on or after April 28, 2014, except that, for civil penalties assessed after August 1, 2016, for a first violation occurring after November 2, 2015, the civil penalty shall not exceed the applicable amount set forth in 28 CFR 85.5. (ii) Not exceeding $100,000 for any subsequent violation occurring before September 29, 1999, and not exceeding $110,000 for any subsequent violation occurring on or after September 29, 1999, and before April 28, 2014, and not exceeding $150,000 for any subsequent violation occurring on or after April 28, 2014, except that, for civil penalties assessed after August 1, 2016, for any subsequent violation occurring after November 2, 2015, the civil penalty shall not exceed the applicable amount set forth in 28 CFR 85.5.

(b) Single violation. For purposes of paragraph (a) (3) of this section, in determining whether a first or subsequent violation has occurred, a determination in a single action, by judgment or settlement, that the covered entity has engaged in more than one discriminatory act shall be counted as a single violation. (c) Punitive damages. For purposes of paragraph (a)(2) of this section, the terms “monetary damages” and “such other relief” do not include punitive damages. (d) Judicial consideration. In a civil action under § 36.503, the court, when considering what amount of civil penalty, if any, is appropriate, shall give consideration to any good faith effort or attempt to comply with this part by the entity. In evaluating good faith, the court shall consider, among other factors it deems relevant, whether the entity could have reasonably anticipated the need for an appropriate type of auxiliary aid needed to accommodate the unique needs of a particular individual with a disability.

§ 36.505 Attorneys fees.

In any action or administrative proceeding commenced pursuant to the Act or this part, the court or agency, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and costs, and the United States shall be liable for the foregoing the same as a private individual.

§ 36.506 Alternative means of dispute resolution.

Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, factfinding, minitrials, and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under the Act and this part.

§ 36.507 Effect of unavailability of technical assistance.

A public accommodation or other private entity shall not be excused from compliance with the requirements of this part because of any failure to receive technical assistance, including any failure in the development or dissemination of any technical assistance manual authorized by the Act.

§ 36.508 Effective date.

(a) General. Except as otherwise provided in this section and in this part, this part shall become effective on January 26, 1992. (b) Civil actions. Except for any civil action brought for a violation of section 303 of the Act, no civil action shall be brought for any act or omission described in section 302 of the Act that occurs –

(1) Before July 26, 1992, against businesses with 25 or fewer employees and gross receipts of $1,000,000 or less. (2) Before January 26, 1993, against businesses with 10 or fewer employees and gross receipts of $500,000 or less.

(c) Transportation services provided by public accommodations. Newly purchased or leased vehicles required to be accessible by § 36.310 must be readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, if the solicitation for the vehicle is made after August 25, 1990.

§§ 36.509 – 36.599 [Reserved]

Subpart F – Certification of State Laws or Local Building Codes

§ 36.601 Definitions.

Assistant Attorney General means the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights or his or her designee.

Certification of equivalency means a final certification that a code meets or exceeds the minimum requirements of title III of the Act for accessibility and usability of facilities covered by that title.

Code means a State law or local building code or similar ordinance, or part thereof, that establishes accessibility requirements.

Model code means a nationally recognized document developed by a private entity for use by State or local jurisdictions in developing codes as defined in this section. A model code is intended for incorporation by reference or adoption in whole or in part, with or without amendment, by State or local jurisdictions.

Preliminary determination of equivalency means a preliminary determination that a code appears to meet or exceed the minimum requirements of title III of the Act for accessibility and usability of facilities covered by that title.

Submitting official means the State or local official who –

(1) Has principal responsibility for administration of a code, or is authorized to submit a code on behalf of a jurisdiction; and (2) Files a request for certification under this subpart.

§ 36.602 General rule.

On the application of a State or local government, the Assistant Attorney General may certify that a code meets or exceeds the minimum requirements of the Act for the accessibility and usability of places of public accommodation and commercial facilities under this part by issuing a certification of equivalency. At any enforcement proceeding under title III of the Act, such certification shall be rebuttable evidence that such State law or local ordinance does meet or exceed the minimum requirements of title III.

§ 36.603 Preliminary determination. (

Redesignated from Section 36.604)

Upon receipt and review of all information relevant to a request filed by a submitting official for certification of a code, and after consultation with the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board, the Assistant Attorney General shall make a preliminary determination of equivalency or a preliminary determination to deny certification.

§ 36.604 Procedure following preliminary determination of equivalency.

(Redesignated from Section 36.605)

(a) If the Assistant Attorney General makes a preliminary determination of equivalency under § 36.603, he or she shall inform the submitting official, in writing, of that preliminary determination. The Assistant Attorney General also shall –

(1) Publish a notice in the Federal Register that advises the public of the preliminary determination of equivalency with respect to the particular code, and invite interested persons and organizations, including individuals with disabilities, during a period of at least 60 days following publication of the notice, to file written comments relevant to whether a final certification of equivalency should be issued; (2) After considering the information received in response to the notice described in paragraph (a) of this section, and after publishing a separate notice in the Federal Register, hold an informal hearing, in the State or local jurisdiction charged with administration and enforcement of the code, at which interested individuals, including individuals with disabilities, are provided an opportunity to express their views with respect to the preliminary determination of equivalency; and

(b) The Assistant Attorney General, after consultation with the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board and consideration of the materials and information submitted pursuant to this section, as well as information provided previously by the submitting official, shall issue either a certification of equivalency or a final determination to deny the request for certification. The Assistant Attorney General shall publish notice of the certification of equivalency or denial of certification in the Federal Register.

§ 36.605 Procedure following preliminary denial of certification.

(Redesignated from Section 36.606)

(a) If the Assistant Attorney General makes a preliminary determination to deny certification of a code under § 36.603, he or she shall notify the submitting official of the determination. (b) The Assistant Attorney General shall allow the submitting official not less than 15 days to submit data, views, and arguments in opposition to the preliminary determination to deny certification. If the submitting official does not submit materials, the Assistant Attorney General shall not be required to take any further action. If the submitting official submits materials, the Assistant Attorney General shall evaluate those materials and any other relevant information. After evaluation of any newly submitted materials, the Assistant Attorney General shall make either a final denial of certification or a preliminary determination of equivalency.

§ 36.606 Effect of certification.

(Redesignated from Section 36.607)

(a)

(1) A certification shall be considered a certification of equivalency only with respect to those features or elements that are both covered by the certified code and addressed by the standards against which equivalency is measured. (2) For example, if certain equipment is not covered by the code, the determination of equivalency cannot be used as evidence with respect to the question of whether equipment in a building built according to the code satisfies the Act’s requirements with respect to such equipment. By the same token, certification would not be relevant to construction of a facility for children, if the regulations against which equivalency is measured do not address children’s facilities.

(b) A certification of equivalency is effective only with respect to the particular edition of the code for which certification is granted. Any amendments or other changes to the code after the date of the certified edition are not considered part of the certification. (c) A submitting official may reapply for certification of amendments or other changes to a code that has already received certification. (d) When the standards of the Act against which a code is deemed equivalent are revised or amended substantially, a certification of equivalency issued under the preexisting standards is no longer effective, as of the date the revised standards take effect. However, construction in compliance with a certified code during the period when a certification of equivalency was effective shall be considered rebuttable evidence of compliance with the Standards then in effect as to those elements of buildings and facilities that comply with the certified code. A submitting official may reapply for certification pursuant to the Act’s revised standards, and, to the extent possible, priority will be afforded the request in the review process.

§ 36.607 Guidance concerning model codes.

(Redesignated from Section 36.608)

Upon application by an authorized representative of a private entity responsible for developing a model code, the Assistant Attorney General may review the relevant model code and issue guidance concerning whether and in what respects the model code is consistent with the minimum requirements of the Act for the accessibility and usability of places of public accommodation and commercial facilities under this part.

2010 Guidance and Section-by-Section Analysis

Appendix A to Part 36—Guidance on Revisions to ADA Regulation on Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and Commercial Facilities

Note: This Appendix contains guidance providing a section-by-section analysis of the revisions to 28 CFR part 36 published on September 15, 2010.

Section-By-Section Analysis and Response to Public Comments

This section provides a detailed description of the Department’s changes to the title III regulation, the reasoning behind those changes, and responses to public comments received on these topics. The Section-by-Section Analysis follows the order of the title III regulation itself, except that if the Department has not changed a regulatory section, the unchanged section has not been mentioned.

Subpart A—General

Section 36.104 Definitions

“1991 Standards” and “2004 ADAAG”

The Department has included in the final rule new definitions of both the “1991 Standards” and the “2004 ADAAG.” The term “1991 Standards” refers to the ADA Standards for Accessible Design, originally published on July 26, 1991, and republished as Appendix D to 28 CFR part 36. The term “2004 ADAAG” refers to ADA Chapter 1, ADA Chapter 2, and Chapters 3 through 10 of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Architectural Barriers Act Accessibility Guidelines, which were issued by the Access Board on July 23, 2004, codified at 36 CFR 1191, app. B and D (2009), and which the Department has adopted in this final rule. These terms are included in the definitions section for ease of reference.

“2010 Standards”

The Department has added to the final rule a definition of the term “2010 Standards.” The term “2010 Standards” refers to the 2010 ADA Standards for Accessible Design, which consist of the 2004 ADAAG and the requirements contained in subpart D of 28 CFR part 36.

“Direct Threat”

The final rule moves the definition of direct threat from § 36.208(b) to the definitions section at § 36.104. This is an editorial change. Consequently, § 36.208(c) becomes § 36.208(b) in the final rule.

“Existing Facility”

The 1991 title III regulation provided definitions for “new construction” at § 36.401(a) and “alterations” at § 36.402(b). In contrast, the term “existing facility” was not explicitly defined, although it is used in the statute and regulations for titles II and III. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv); 28 CFR 35.150. It has been the Department’s view that newly constructed or altered facilities are also existing facilities subject to title III’s continuing barrier removal obligation, and that view is made explicit in this rule.

The classification of facilities under the ADA is neither static nor mutually exclusive. Newly constructed or altered facilities are also existing facilities. A newly constructed facility remains subject to the accessibility standards in effect at the time of design and construction, with respect to those elements for which, at that time, there were applicable ADA Standards. That same facility, however, after construction, is also an existing facility, and subject to the public accommodation’s continuing obligation to remove barriers where it is readily achievable to do so. The fact that the facility is also an existing facility does not relieve the public accommodation of its obligations under the new construction requirements of this part. Rather, it means that in addition to the new construction requirements, the public accommodation has a continuing obligation to remove barriers that arise, or are deemed barriers, only after construction. Such barriers include but are not limited to the elements that are first covered in the 2010 Standards, as that term is defined in § 36.104.

At some point, the same facility may undergo alterations, which are subject to the alterations requirements in effect at that time. This facility remains subject to its original new construction standards for elements and spaces not affected by the alterations; the facility is subject to the alterations requirements and standards in effect at the time of the alteration for the elements and spaces affected by the alteration; and, throughout, the facility remains subject to the continuing barrier removal obligation.

The Department’s enforcement of the ADA is premised on a broad understanding of “existing facility.” The ADA contemplates that as the Department’s knowledge and understanding of accessibility advances and evolves, this knowledge will be incorporated into and result in increased accessibility in the built environment. Title III’s barrier removal provisions strike the appropriate balance between ensuring that accessibility advances are reflected in the built environment and mitigating the costs of those advances to public accommodations. With adoption of the final rule, public accommodations engaged in barrier removal measures will now be guided by the 2010 Standards, defined in § 36.104, and the safe harbor in § 36.304(d)(2).

The NPRM included the following proposed definition of “existing facility”: “[A] facility that has been constructed and remains in existence on any given date.” 73 FR 34508, 34552 (June 17, 2008). While the Department intended the proposed definition to provide clarity with respect to public accommodations” continuing obligation to remove barriers where it is readily achievable to do so, some commenters pointed out arguable ambiguity in the language and the potential for misapplication of the rule in practice.

The Department received a number of comments on this issue. The commenters urged the Department to clarify that all buildings remain subject to the standards in effect at the time of their construction, that is, that a facility designed and constructed for first occupancy between January 26, 1993, and the effective date of the final rule is still considered “new construction” and that alterations occurring between January 26, 1993, and the effective date of the final rule are still considered “alterations.”

The final rule includes clarifying language to ensure that the Department’s interpretation is accurately reflected. As established by this rule, existing facility means a facility in existence on any given date, without regard to whether the facility may also be considered newly constructed or altered under this part. Thus, this definition reflects the Department’s longstanding interpretation that public accommodations have obligations in existing facilities that are independent of but may coexist with requirements imposed by new construction or alteration requirements in those same facilities.

“Housing at a Place of Education”

The Department has added a new definition to § 36.104, “housing at a place of education,” to clarify the types of educational housing programs that are covered by this title. This section defines “housing at a place of education” as “housing operated by or on behalf of an elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate school, or other place of education, including dormitories, suites, apartments, or other places of residence.” This definition does not apply to social service programs that combine residential housing with social services, such as a residential job training program.

“Other Power-Driven Mobility Device” and “Wheelchair”

Because relatively few individuals with disabilities were using nontraditional mobility devices in 1991, there was no pressing need for the 1991 title III regulation to define the terms “wheelchair” or “other power-driven mobility device,” to expound on what would constitute a reasonable modification in policies, practices, or procedures under § 36.302, or to set forth within that section specific requirements for the accommodation of mobility devices. Since the issuance of the 1991 title III regulation, however, the choices of mobility devices available to individuals with disabilities have increased dramatically. The Department has received complaints about and has become aware of situations where individuals with mobility disabilities have utilized devices that are not designed primarily for use by an individual with a mobility disability, including the Segway® Personal Transporter (Segway® PT), golf cars, all-terrain vehicles (ATVs), and other locomotion devices.

The Department also has received questions from public accommodations and individuals with mobility disabilities concerning which mobility devices must be accommodated and under what circumstances. Indeed, there has been litigation concerning the legal obligations of covered entities to accommodate individuals with mobility disabilities who wish to use an electronic personal assistance mobility device (EPAMD), such as the Segway® PT, as a mobility device. The Department has participated in such litigation as amicus curiae. See Ault v. Walt Disney World Co., No. 6:07–cv–1785–Orl–31KRS, 2009 WL 3242028 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 6, 2009). Much of the litigation has involved shopping malls where businesses have refused to allow persons with disabilities to use EPAMDs. See, e.g., McElroy v. Simon Property Group, No. 08– 404 RDR, 2008 WL 4277716 (D. Kan. Sept. 15, 2008) (enjoining mall from prohibiting the use of a Segway® PT as a mobility device where an individual agrees to all of a mall’s policies for use of the device, except indemnification); Shasta Clark, Local Man Fighting Mall Over Right to Use Segway, WATE 6 News, July 26, 2005, available at http://www.wate.com/Global/story.asp?s=3643674 (last visited June 24, 2010).

In response to questions and complaints from individuals with disabilities and covered entities concerning which mobility devices must be accommodated and under what circumstances, the Department began developing a framework to address the use of unique mobility devices, concerns about their safety, and the parameters for the circumstances under which these devices must be accommodated. As a result, the Department’s NPRM proposed two new approaches to mobility devices. First, the Department proposed a two-tiered mobility device definition that defined the term “wheelchair” separately from “other powerdriven mobility device.” Second, the Department proposed requirements to allow the use of devices in each definitional category. In § 36.311(a), the NPRM proposed that wheelchairs and manually-powered mobility aids used by individuals with mobility disabilities shall be permitted in any areas open to pedestrian use. Section 36.311(b) of the NPRM proposed that a public accommodation ‘shall make reasonable modifications in its policies, practices, and procedures to permit the use of other power-driven mobility devices by individuals with disabilities, unless the public accommodation can demonstrate that the use of the device is not reasonable or that its use will result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of the public accommodation’s goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations.” 73 FR 34508, 34556 (June 17, 2008).

The Department sought public comment with regard to whether these steps would, in fact, achieve clarity on these issues. Toward this end, the Department’s NPRM asked several questions relating to the definitions of “wheelchair,” “other power-driven mobility device,” and “manually-powered mobility aids”; the best way to categorize different classes of mobility devices, the types of devices that should be included in each category; and the circumstances under which certain types of mobility devices must be accommodated or may be excluded pursuant to the policy adopted by the public accommodation.

Because the questions in the NPRM that concerned mobility devices and their accommodation were interrelated, many of the commenters” responses did not identify the specific question to which they were responding. Instead, commenters grouped the questions together and provided comments accordingly. Most commenters spoke to the issues addressed in the Department’s questions in broad terms and using general concepts. As a result, the responses to the questions posed are discussed below in broadly grouped issue categories rather than on a question-by-question basis.

Two-tiered definitional approach. Commenters supported the Department’s proposal to use a two-tiered definition of mobility device. Commenters nearly universally said that wheelchairs always should be accommodated and that they should never be subject to an assessment with regard to their admission to a particular public accommodation. In contrast, the vast majority of commenters indicated they were in favor of allowing public accommodations to conduct an assessment as to whether, and under which circumstances, other power-driven mobility devices will be allowed onsite.

Many commenters also indicated their support for the two-tiered approach in responding to questions concerning the definition of “wheelchair” and “other power-driven mobility device.” Nearly every disability advocacy group said that the Department’s two-tiered approach strikes the proper balance between ensuring access for individuals with disabilities and addressing fundamental alteration and safety concerns held by public accommodations; however, a minority of disability advocacy groups wanted other power-driven mobility devices to be included in the definition of “wheelchair.” Most advocacy, nonprofit, and individual commenters supported the concept of a separate definition for “other power-driven mobility device” because a separate definition would maintain existing legal protections for wheelchairs while recognizing that some devices that are not designed primarily for individuals with mobility disabilities have beneficial uses for individuals with mobility disabilities. They also favored this concept because it recognizes technological developments and that innovative uses of varying devices may provide increased access to individuals with mobility disabilities.

While two business associations indicated that they opposed the concept of “other power-driven mobility device” in its entirety, other business commenters expressed general and industry-specific concerns about permitting their use. They indicated that such devices create a host of safety, cost, and fraud issues that do not exist with wheelchairs. On balance, however, business commenters indicated that they support the establishment of a two-tiered regulatory approach because defining “other power-driven mobility device” separately from “wheelchair” means that businesses will be able to maintain some measure of control over the admission of the former. Virtually all of these commenters indicated that their support for the dual approach and the concept of other power-driven mobility devices was, in large measure, due to the other power-driven mobility device assessment factors in § 36.311(c) of the NPRM.

By maintaining the two-tiered approach to mobility devices and defining “wheelchair” separately from “other power-driven mobility device,” the Department is able to preserve the protection users of traditional wheelchairs and other manually-powered mobility aids have had since the ADA was enacted, while also recognizing that human ingenuity, personal choice, and new technologies have led to the use of devices that may be more beneficial for individuals with certain mobility disabilities.

Moreover, the Department believes the two-tiered approach gives public accommodations guidance to follow in assessing whether reasonable modifications can be made to permit the use of other power-driven mobility devices on-site and to aid in the development of policies describing the circumstances under which persons with disabilities may use such devices. The two-tiered approach neither mandates that all other power-driven mobility devices be accommodated in every circumstance, nor excludes these devices from all protection. This approach, in conjunction with the factor assessment provisions in § 36.311(b)(2), will serve as a mechanism by which public accommodations can evaluate their ability to accommodate other power-driven mobility devices. As will be discussed in more detail below, the assessment factors in § 36.311(b)(2) are specifically designed to provide guidance to public accommodations regarding whether it is permissible to bar the use of a specific other power-driven mobility device in a specific facility. In making such a determination, a public accommodation must consider the device’s type, size, weight dimensions, and speed; the facility’s volume of pedestrian traffic; the facility’s design and operational characteristics; whether the device conflicts with legitimate safety requirements; and whether the device poses a substantial risk of serious harm to the immediate environment or natural or cultural resources, or conflicts with Federal land management laws or regulations. In addition, under § 36.311(b)(i) if the public accommodation claims that it cannot make reasonable modifications to its policies, practices, or procedures to permit the use of other power-driven mobility devices by individuals with disabilities, the burden of proof to demonstrate that such devices cannot be operated in accordance with legitimate safety requirements rests upon the public accommodation.

Categorization of wheelchair versus other power-driven mobility devices. Implicit in the creation of the two-tiered mobility device concept is the question of how to categorize which devices are wheelchairs and which are other power-driven mobility devices. Finding weight and size to be too restrictive, the vast majority of advocacy, nonprofit, and individual commenters opposed using the Department of Transportation’s definition of “common wheelchair” to designate the mobility device’s appropriate category. Business commenters who generally supported using weight and size as the method of categorization did so because of their concerns about having to make physical changes to their facilities to accommodate oversized devices. The vast majority of business commenters also favored using the device’s intended use to categorize which devices constitute wheelchairs and which are other power-driven mobility devices. Furthermore, the intended-use determinant received a fair amount of support from advocacy, nonprofit, and individual commenters, either because they sought to preserve the broad accommodation of wheelchairs or because they sympathized with concerns about individuals without mobility disabilities fraudulently bringing other power-driven mobility devices into places of public accommodation.

Commenters seeking to have the Segway®PT included in the definition of “wheelchair” objected to classifying mobility devices on the basis of their intended use because they felt that such a classification would be unfair and prejudicial to Segway® PT users and would stifle personal choice, creativity, and innovation. Other advocacy and nonprofit commenters objected to employing an intended-use approach because of concerns that the focus would shift to an assessment of the device, rather than the needs or benefits to the individual with the mobility disability. They were of the view that the mobility-device classification should be based on its function—whether it is used to address a mobility disability. A few commenters raised the concern that an intended-use approach might embolden public accommodations to assess whether an individual with a mobility disability really needs to use the other power-driven mobility device at issue or to question why a wheelchair would not provide sufficient mobility. Those citing objections to the intended-use determinant indicated it would be more appropriate to make the categorization determination based on whether the device is being used for a mobility disability in the context of the impact of its use in a specific environment. Some of these commenters preferred this approach because it would allow the Segway® PT to be included in the definition of “wheelchair.”

Some commenters were inclined to categorize mobility devices by the way in which they are powered, such as battery-powered engines versus fuel or combustion engines. One commenter suggested using exhaust level as the determinant. Although there were only a few commenters who would make the determination based on indoor or outdoor use, there was nearly universal support for banning from indoor use devices that are powered by fuel or combustion engines.

A few commenters thought it would be appropriate to categorize the devices based on their maximum speed. Others objected to this approach, stating that circumstances should dictate the appropriate speed at which mobility devices should be operated— for example, a faster speed may be safer when crossing streets than it would be for sidewalk use—and merely because a device can go a certain speed does not mean it will be operated at that speed.

The Department has decided to maintain the device’s intended use as the appropriate determinant for which devices are categorized as “wheelchairs.” However, because wheelchairs may be intended for use by individuals who have temporary conditions affecting mobility, the Department has decided that it is more appropriate to use the phrase “primarily designed” rather than ‘solely designed” in making such categorizations. The Department will not foreclose any future technological developments by identifying or banning specific devices or setting restrictions on size, weight, or dimensions. Moreover, devices designed primarily for use by individuals with mobility disabilities often are considered to be medical devices and are generally eligible for insurance reimbursement on this basis. Finally, devices designed primarily for use by individuals with mobility disabilities are less subject to fraud concerns because they were not designed to have a recreational component. Consequently, rarely, if ever, is any inquiry or assessment as to their appropriateness for use in a public accommodation necessary.

Definition of “wheelchair.” In seeking public feedback on the NPRM’s definition of “wheelchair,” the Department explained its concern that the definition of “wheelchair” in section 508(c)(2) of the ADA (formerly section 507(c)(2), July 26, 1990, 104 Stat. 372, 42 U.S.C. 12207, renumbered section 508(c)(2), Public Law 110–325 section 6(a)(2), Sept. 25, 2008, 122 Stat. 3558), which pertains to Federal wilderness areas, is not specific enough to provide clear guidance in the array of settings covered by title III and that the stringent size and weight requirements for the Department of Transportation’s definition of “common wheelchair” are not a good fit in the context of most public accommodations. The Department noted in the NPRM that it sought a definition of “wheelchair” that would include manually-operated and power-driven wheelchairs and mobility scooters (i.e., those that typically are single-user, have three to four wheels, and are appropriate for both indoor and outdoor pedestrian areas), as well as a variety of types of wheelchairs and mobility scooters with individualized or unique features or models with different numbers of wheels. The NPRM defined a wheelchair as “a device designed solely for use by an individual with a mobility impairment for the primary purpose of locomotion in typical indoor and outdoor pedestrian areas. A wheelchair may be manually-operated or power-driven.” 73 FR 34508, 34553 (June 17, 2008).

Although the NPRM’s definition of “wheelchair” excluded mobility devices that are not designed solely for use by individuals with mobility disabilities, the Department, noting that the use of the Segway® PT by individuals with mobility disabilities is on the upswing, inquired as to whether this device should be included in the definition of “wheelchair.”

Most business commenters wished the definition of “wheelchair” had included size, weight, and dimension maximums. Ultimately, however, they supported the definition because it excludes other power-driven mobility devices and enables them to engage in an assessment to determine whether a particular device can be allowed as a reasonable modification. These commenters felt this approach gave them some measure of control over whether, and under what circumstances, other power-driven mobility devices may be used in their facilities by individuals with mobility disabilities. Two commenters noted that because many mobility scooters are oversized, they are misplaced in the definition of “wheelchair” and belong with other power-driven mobility devices. Another commenter suggested using maximum size and weight requirements to allocate which mobility scooters should be categorized as wheelchairs, and which should be categorized as other power-driven mobility devices.

Many advocacy, nonprofit, and individual commenters indicated that as long as the Department intends the scope of the term “mobility impairments” to include other disabilities that cause mobility impairments (e.g., respiratory, circulatory, stamina, etc.), they were in support of the language. Several commenters indicated a preference for the definition of “wheelchair” in section 508(c)(2) of the ADA. One commenter indicated a preference for the term “assistive device,” as it is defined in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, over the term “wheelchair.” A few commenters indicated that strollers should be added to the preamble’s list of examples of wheelchairs because parents of children with disabilities frequently use strollers as mobility devices until their children get older.

In the final rule, the Department has rearranged some wording and has made some changes in the terminology used in the definition of “wheelchair,” but essentially has retained the definition, and therefore the rationale, that was set forth in the NPRM. Again, the text of the ADA makes the definition of “wheelchair” contained in section 508(c)(2) applicable only to the specific context of uses in designated wilderness areas, and therefore does not compel the use of that definition for any other purpose. Moreover, the Department maintains that limiting the definition to devices suitable for use in an “indoor pedestrian area” as provided for in section 508(c)(2) of the ADA would ignore the technological advances in wheelchair design that have occurred since the ADA went into effect and that the inclusion of the phrase”indoor pedestrian area” in the definition of “wheelchair” would set back progress made by individuals with mobility disabilities who, for many years now, have been using devices designed for locomotion in indoor and outdoor settings. The Department has concluded that same rationale applies to placing limits on the size, weight, and dimensions of wheelchairs.

With regard to the term “mobility impairments,” the Department intended a broad reading so that a wide range of disabilities, including circulatory and respiratory disabilities, that make walking difficult or impossible, would be included. In response to comments on this issue, the Department has revisited the issue and has concluded that the most apt term to achieve this intent is “mobility disability.”

In addition, the Department has decided that it is more appropriate to use the phrase, “primarily” designed for use by individuals with disabilities in the final rule, rather than, ‘solely” designed for use by individuals with disabilities—the phrase, proposed in the NPRM. The Department believes that this phrase more accurately covers the range of devices the Department intends to fall within the definition of “wheelchair.”

After receiving comments that the word “typical” is vague and the phrase “pedestrian areas” is confusing to apply, particularly in the context of similar, but not identical, terms used in the proposed Standards, the Department decided to delete the term “typical indoor and outdoor pedestrian areas” from the final rule. Instead, the final rule references “indoor or*** both indoor and outdoor locomotion,” to make clear that the devices that fall within the definition of “wheelchair” are those that are used for locomotion on indoor and outdoor pedestrian paths or routes and not those that are intended exclusively for traversing undefined, unprepared, or unimproved paths or routes. Thus, the final rule defines the term “wheelchair” to mean “a manually operated or power-driven device designed primarily for use by an individual with a mobility disability for the main purpose of indoor or of both indoor and outdoor locomotion.”

Whether the definition of “wheelchair” includes the Segway® PT. As discussed above, because individuals with mobility disabilities are using the Segway® PT as a mobility device, the Department asked whether it should be included in the definition of “wheelchair.” The basic Segway® PT model is a two-wheeled, gyroscopically-stabilized, battery-powered personal transportation device. The user stands on a platform suspended three inches off the ground by wheels on each side, grasps a T-shaped handle, and steers the device similarly to a bicycle. Most Segway® PTs can travel up to 121⁄2 miles per hour, compared to the average pedestrian walking speed of 3 to 4 miles per hour and the approximate maximum speed for power-operated wheelchairs of 6 miles per hour. In a study of trail and other non-motorized transportation users including EPAMDs, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) found that the eye height of individuals using EPAMDs ranged from approximately 69 to 80 inches. See Federal Highway Administration, Characteristics of Emerging Road and Trail Users and Their Safety (Oct. 14, 2004), available at http://www.tfhrc.gov/safety/pubs/04103 (last visited June 24, 2010). Thus, the Segway® PT can operate at much greater speeds than wheelchairs, and the average user stands much taller than most wheelchair users.

The Segway® PT has been the subject of debate among users, pedestrians, disability advocates, State and local governments, businesses, and bicyclists. The fact that the Segway® PT is not designed primarily for use by individuals with disabilities, nor used primarily by persons with disabilities, complicates the question of to what extent individuals with disabilities should be allowed to operate them in areas and facilities where other power-driven mobility devices are not allowed. Those who question the use of the Segway® PT in pedestrian areas argue that the speed, size, and operating features of the devices make them too dangerous to operate alongside pedestrians and wheelchair users.

Comments regarding whether to include the Segway® PT in the definition of “wheelchair” were, by far, the most numerous received in the category of comments regarding wheelchairs and other power-driven mobility devices. Significant numbers of veterans with disabilities, individuals with multiple sclerosis, and those advocating on their behalf made concise statements of general support for the inclusion of the Segway® PT in the definition of “wheelchair.” Two veterans offered extensive comments on the topic, along with a few advocacy and nonprofit groups and individuals with disabilities for whom sitting is uncomfortable or impossible.

While there may be legitimate safety issues for EPAMD users and bystanders in some circumstances, EPAMDs and other nontraditional mobility devices can deliver real benefits to individuals with disabilities. Among the reasons given by commenters to include the Segway® PT in the definition of “wheelchair” were that the Segway® PT is well-suited for individuals with particular conditions that affect mobility including multiple sclerosis, Parkinson’s disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, amputations, spinal cord injuries, and other neurological disabilities, as well as functional limitations, such as gait limitation, inability to sit or discomfort in sitting, and diminished stamina issues. Such individuals often find that EPAMDs are more comfortable and easier to use than more traditional mobility devices and assist with balance, circulation, and digestion in ways that wheelchairs do not. See Rachel Metz, Disabled Embrace Segway, New York Times, Oct. 14, 2004. Commenters specifically cited pressure relief, reduced spasticity, increased stamina, and improved respiratory, neurologic, and muscular health as secondary medical benefits from being able to stand.

Other arguments for including the Segway® PT in the definition of “wheelchair” were based on commenters” views that the Segway® PT offers benefits not provided by wheelchairs and mobility scooters, including its intuitive response to body movement, ability to operate with less coordination and dexterity than is required for many wheelchairs and mobility scooters, and smaller footprint and turning radius as compared to most wheelchairs and mobility scooters. Several commenters mentioned improved visibility, either due to the Segway® PT’s raised platform or simply by virtue of being in a standing position. And finally, some commenters advocated for the inclusion of the Segway® PT simply based on civil rights arguments and the empowerment and self-esteem obtained from having the power to select the mobility device of choice.

Many commenters, regardless of their position on whether to include the Segway®PT in the definition of “wheelchair,” noted that the Segway® PT’s safety record is as good as, if not better, than the record for wheelchairs and mobility scooters.

Most business commenters were opposed to the inclusion of the Segway® PT in the definition of “wheelchair” but were supportive of its inclusion as an “other power-driven mobility device.” They raised industry- or venue-specific concerns about including the Segway® PT in the definition of “wheelchair.” For example, civic centers, arenas, and theaters were concerned about the impact on sight-line requirements if Segway® PT users remain on their devices in a designated wheelchair seating area; amusement parks expressed concern that rides have been designed, purchased, and installed to enable wheelchair users to transfer easily or to accommodate wheelchairs on the ride itself; and retail stores mentioned size constraints in some stores. Nearly all business commenters expressed concern—and perceived liability issues—related to having to store or stow the Segway® PT, particularly if it could not be stored in an upright position. These commenters cited concerns about possible damage to the device, injury to customers who may trip over it, and theft of the device as a result of not being able to stow the Segway® PT securely.

Virtually every business commenter mentioned concerns about rider safety, as well as concerns for pedestrians unexpectedly encountering these devices or being hit or run over by these devices in crowded venues where maneuvering space is limited. Their main safety objection to the inclusion of the Segway® PT in the definition of “wheelchair” was that the maximum speed at which the Segway® PT can operate is far faster than that of motorized wheelchairs. There was a universal unease among these commenters with regard to relying on the judgment of the Segway®PT user to exercise caution because its top speed is far in excess of a wheelchair’s top speed. Many other safety concerns were industry-specific. For example, amusement parks were concerned that the Segway® PT is much taller than children; that it is too quiet to warn pedestrians, particularly those with low vision or who are blind, of their presence; that it may keep moving after a rider has fallen off or power system fails; and that it has a full-power override which automatically engages when an obstacle is encountered. Hotels and retail stores mentioned that maneuvering the Segway® PT through their tight quarters would create safety hazards.

Business commenters also expressed concern that if the Segway® PT were included in the definition of “wheelchair” they would have to make physical changes to their facilities to accommodate Segway® PT riders who stand much taller in these devices than do users of wheelchairs. They also were concerned that if the Segway® 7 PT was included in the definition of “wheelchair,” they would have no ability to assess whether it is appropriate to allow the entry of the Segway® PT into their facilities the way they would have if the device is categorized as an “other power-driven mobility device.”

Many disability advocacy and nonprofit commenters did not support the inclusion of the Segway® PT in the definition of “wheelchair.” Paramount to these commenters was the maintenance of existing protections for wheelchair users. Because there was unanimous agreement that wheelchair use rarely, if ever, may be restricted, these commenters strongly favored categorizing wheelchairs separately from the Segway® PT and other power-driven mobility devices and applying the intended-use determinant to assign the devices to either category. They indicated that while they support the greatest degree of access in public accommodations for all persons with disabilities who require the use of mobility devices, they recognize that under certain circumstances allowing the use of other power-driven mobility devices would result in a fundamental alteration or run counter to legitimate safety requirements necessary for the safe operation of a public accommodation. While these groups supported categorizing the Segway® PT as an “other power-driven mobility device,” they universally noted that because the Segway® PT does not present environmental concerns and is as safe to use as, if not safer than, a wheelchair, it should be accommodated in most circumstances.

The Department has considered all the comments and has concluded that it should not include the Segway® PT in the definition of “wheelchair.” The final rule provides that the test for categorizing a device as a wheelchair or an other power-driven mobility device is whether the device is designed primarily for use by individuals with mobility disabilities. Mobility scooters are included in the definition of “wheelchair” because they are designed primarily for users with mobility disabilities. However, because the current generation of EPAMDs, including the Segway® PT, was designed for recreational users and not primarily for use by individuals with mobility disabilities, the Department has decided to continue its approach of excluding EPAMDs from the definition of “wheelchair” and including them in the definition of “other power-driven mobility device.” Although EPAMDs, such as the Segway® PT, are not included in the definition of a “wheelchair,” public accommodations must assess whether they can make reasonable modifications to permit individuals with mobility disabilities to use such devices on their premises. The Department recognizes that the Segway® PT provides many benefits to those who use them as mobility devices, including a measure of privacy with regard to the nature of one’s particular disability, and believes that in the vast majority of circumstances, the application of the factors described in § 36.311 for providing access to other powered mobility devices will result in the admission of the Segway® PT.

Treatment of “manually-powered mobility aids.” The Department’s NPRM did not define the term “manually-powered mobility aids.” Instead, the NPRM included a non-exhaustive list of examples in § 36.311(a). The NPRM queried whether the Department should maintain this approach to manually-powered mobility aids or whether it should adopt a more formal definition.

Only a few commenters addressed “manually-powered mobility aids.” Virtually all commenters were in favor of maintaining a non-exhaustive list of examples of “manually-powered mobility aids” rather than adopting a definition of the term. Of those who commented, a couple sought clarification of the term “manually-powered.” One commenter suggested that the term be changed to “human-powered.” Other commenters requested that the Department include ordinary strollers in the non-exhaustive list of manually-powered mobility aids. Since strollers are not devices designed primarily for individuals with mobility disabilities, the Department does not consider them to be manually-powered mobility aids; however, strollers used in the context of transporting individuals with disabilities are subject to the same assessment required by the ADA’s reasonable modification standards at § 36.302. The Department believes that because the existing approach is clear and understood easily by the public, no formal definition of the term “manually-powered mobility aids” is required.

Definition of “other power-driven mobility device.” The Department’s NPRM defined the term “other power-driven mobility device” in § 36.104 as “any of a large range of devices powered by batteries, fuel, or other engines— whether or not designed solely for use by individuals with mobility impairments—that are used by individuals with mobility impairments for the purpose of locomotion, including golf cars, bicycles, electronic personal assistance mobility devices (EPAMDs), or any mobility aid designed to operate in areas without defined pedestrian routes.” 73 FR 34508, 34552 (June 17, 2008).

Business commenters mostly were supportive of the definition of “other power-driven mobility device” because it gave them the ability to develop policies pertaining to the admission of these devices, but they expressed concern that individuals will feign mobility disabilities so that they can use devices that are otherwise banned in public accommodations. Advocacy, nonprofit, and several individual commenters supported the definition of “other power-driven mobility device” because it allows new technologies to be added in the future, maintains the existing legal protections for wheelchairs, and recognizes that some devices, particularly the Segway® PT, which are not designed primarily for individuals with mobility disabilities, have beneficial uses for individuals with mobility disabilities.

Despite support for the definition of “other power-driven mobility device,” however, most advocacy and nonprofit commenters expressed at least some hesitation about the inclusion of fuel-powered mobility devices in the definition. While virtually all of these commenters noted that a blanket exclusion of any device that falls under the definition of “other power-driven mobility device” would violate basic civil rights concepts, they also specifically stated that certain devices, particularly off-highway vehicles, cannot be permitted in certain circumstances. They also made a distinction between the Segway® PT and other power-driven mobility devices, noting that the Segway® PT should be accommodated in most circumstances because it satisfies the safety and environmental elements of the policy analysis. These commenters indicated that they agree that other power-driven mobility devices must be assessed, particularly as to their environmental impact, before they are accommodated.

Business commenters were even less supportive of the inclusion of fuel-powered devices in the other power-driven mobility devices category. They sought a complete ban on fuel-powered devices because they believe they are inherently dangerous and pose environmental and safety concerns.

Although many commenters had reservations about the inclusion of fuel-powered devices in the definition of other power-driven mobility devices, the Department does not want the definition to be so narrow that it would foreclose the inclusion of new technological developments, whether powered by fuel or by some other means. It is for this reason that the Department has maintained the phrase “any mobility device designed to operate in areas without defined pedestrian routes” in the final rule’s definition of other power-driven mobility devices. The Department believes that the limitations provided by “fundamental alteration” and the ability to impose legitimate safety requirements will likely prevent the use of fuel and combustion engine-driven devices indoors, as well as in outdoor areas with heavy pedestrian traffic. The Department notes, however, that in the future technological developments may result in the production of safe fuel-powered mobility devices that do not pose environmental and safety concerns. The final rule allows consideration to be given as to whether the use of a fuel-powered device would create a substantial risk of serious harm to the environment or natural or cultural resources, and to whether the use of such a device conflicts with Federal land management laws or regulations; this aspect of the final rule will further limit the inclusion of fuel-powered devices where they are not appropriate. Consequently, the Department has maintained fuel-powered devices in the definition of “other power-driven mobility devices.” The Department has also added language to the definition of “other power-driven mobility device” to reiterate that the definition does not apply to Federal wilderness areas, which are not covered by title II of the ADA; the use of wheelchairs in such areas is governed by section 508(c)(2) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12207(c)(2).

“Place of Public Accommodation”

Definition of “place of lodging.” The NPRM stated that a covered “place of lodging” is a facility that provides guest rooms for sleeping for stays that are primarily short-term in nature (generally two weeks or less), to which the occupant does not have the right or intent to return to a specific room or unit after the conclusion of his or her stay, and which operates under conditions and with amenities similar to a hotel, motel, or inn, particularly including factors such as: (1) An on-site proprietor and reservations desk; (2) rooms available on a walk-up basis; (3) linen service; and (4) a policy of accepting reservations for a room type without guaranteeing a particular unit or room until check-in, without a prior lease or security deposit. The NPRM stated that timeshares and condominiums or corporate hotels that did not meet this definition would not be covered by § 36.406(c) of the proposed regulation, but may be covered by the requirements of the Fair Housing Act (FHAct).

In the NPRM, the Department sought comment on its definition of “place of lodging,” specifically seeking public input on whether the most appropriate time period for identifying facilities used for stays that primarily are short-term in nature should be set at 2 weeks or 30 days.

The vast majority of the comments received by the Department supported the use of a 30-day limitation on places of lodging as more consistent with building codes, local laws, and common real estate practices that treat stays of 30 days or less as transient rather than residential use. One commenter recommended using the phrase “fourteen days or less.” Another commenter objected to any bright line standard, stating that the difference between two weeks and 30 days for purposes of title III is arbitrary, viewed in light of conflicting regulations by the States. This commenter argued the Department should continue its existing practice under title III of looking to State law as one factor in determining whether a facility is used for stays that primarily are short-term in nature.

The Department is persuaded by the majority of commenters to adopt a 30-day guideline for the purposes of identifying facilities that primarily are short-term in nature and has modified the section accordingly. The 30-day guideline is intended only to determine when the final rule’s transient lodging provisions apply to a facility. It does not alter an entity’s obligations under any other applicable statute. For example, the Department recognizes that the FHAct does not employ a bright line standard for determining which facilities qualify as residential facilities under that Act and that there are circumstances where units in facilities that meet the definition of places of lodging will be covered under both the ADA and the FHAct and will have to comply with the requirements of both laws.

The Department also received comments about the factors used in the NPRM’s definition of “place of lodging.” One commenter proposed modifications to the definition as follows: changing the words “guest rooms” to “accommodations for sleeping”; and adding a fifth factor that states that “the in-room decor, furnishings and equipment being specified by the owner or operator of the lodging operation rather than generally being determined by the owner of the individual unit or room.” The Department does not believe that “guest room” should be changed to “accommodations for sleeping.” Such a change would create confusion because the transient lodging provisions in the 2004 ADAAG use the term “guest rooms” and not “accommodations for sleeping.” In addition, the Department believes that it would be confusing to add a factor relating to who dictates the in-room decor and furnishings in a unit or room, because there may be circumstances where particular rental programs require individual owners to use certain decor and furnishings as a condition of participating in that program.

One commenter stated that the factors the Department has included for determining whether a rental unit is a place of lodging for the purposes of title III, and therefore a “place of public accommodation” under the ADA, address only the way an establishment appears to the public. This commenter recommended that the Department also consider the economic relationships among the unit owners, rental managers, and homeowners” associations, noting that where revenues are not pooled (as they are in a hotel), the economic relationships do not make it possible to spread the cost of providing accessibility features over the entire business enterprise. Another commenter argued that private ownership of sleeping accommodations sets certain facilities apart from traditional hotels, motels, and inns, and that the Department should revise the definition of places of lodging to exempt existing places of lodging that have sleeping accommodations separately owned by individual owners (e.g., condominiums) from the accessible transient lodging guest room requirements in sections 224 and 806 of the 2004 ADAAG, although the commenter agreed that newly constructed places of lodging should meet those standards.

One commenter argued that the Department’s proposed definition of place of lodging does not reflect fully the nature of a timeshare facility and one single definition does not fit timeshares, condo hotels, and other types of rental accommodations. This commenter proposed that the Department adopt a separate definition for timeshare resorts as a subcategory of place of lodging. The commenter proposed defining timeshare resorts as facilities that provide the recurring right to occupancy for overnight accommodations for the owners of the accommodations, and other occupancy rights for owners exchanging their interests or members of the public for stays that primarily are short-term in nature (generally 30 consecutive days or less), where neither the owner nor any other occupant has the right or intent to use the unit or room on other than a temporary basis for vacation or leisure purposes. This proposed definition also would describe factors for determining when a timeshare resort is operating in a manner similar to a hotel, motel, or inn, including some or all of the following: rooms being available on a walk-in or call-in basis; housekeeping or linen services being available; on-site management; and reservations being accepted for a room type without guaranteeing any guest or owner use of a particular unit or room until check-in, without a prior lease or security deposit. Timeshares that do not meet this definition would not be subject to the transient lodging standards.

The Department has considered these comments and has revised the definition of “place of accommodation” in § 36.104 to include a revised subcategory (B), which more clearly defines the factors that must be present for a facility that is not an inn, motel, or hotel to qualify as a place of lodging. These factors include conditions and amenities similar to an inn, motel, or hotel, including on- or off-site management and reservations service, rooms available on a walk-up or call-in basis, availability of housekeeping or linen service, and accepting reservations for a room type without guaranteeing a particular unit or room until check-in without a prior lease or security deposit.

Although the Department understands some of the concerns about the application of the ADA requirements to places of lodging that have ownership structures that involve individually owned units, the Department does not believe that the definitional section of the regulation is the place to address these concerns and has addressed them in § 36.406(c)(2) and the accompanying discussion in Appendix A.

“Qualified Interpreter”

In the NPRM, the Department proposed adding language to the definition of “qualified interpreter” to clarify that the term includes, but is not limited to, sign language interpreters, oral interpreters, and cued-speech interpreters. As the Department explained, not all interpreters are qualified for all situations. For example, a qualified interpreter who uses American Sign Language (ASL) is not necessarily qualified to interpret orally. In addition, someone with only a rudimentary familiarity with sign language or finger spelling is not qualified, nor is someone who is fluent in sign language but unable to translate spoken communication into ASL or to translate signed communication into spoken words.

As further explained, different situations will require different types of interpreters . For example, an oral interpreter who has special skill and training to mouth a speaker’s words silently for individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing may be necessary for an individual who was raised orally and taught to read lips or was diagnosed with hearing loss later in life and does not know sign language. An individual who is deaf or hard of hearing may need an oral interpreter if the speaker’s voice is unclear, if there is a quick-paced exchange of communication (e.g., in a meeting), or when the speaker does not directly face the individual who is deaf or hard of hearing. A cued-speech interpreter functions in the same manner as an oral interpreter except that he or she also uses a hand code or cue to represent each speech sound.

The Department received many comments regarding the proposed modifications to the definition of “qualified interpreter.” Many commenters requested that the Department include within the definition a requirement that interpreters be certified, particularly if they reside in a State that licenses or certifies interpreters. Other commenters opposed a certification requirement as unduly limiting, noting that an interpreter may well be qualified even if that same interpreter is not certified. These commenters noted the absence of nationwide standards or universally accepted criteria for certification.

On review of this issue, the Department has decided against imposing a certification requirement under the ADA. It is sufficient under the ADA that the interpreter be qualified. With respect to the proposed additions to the rule, most commenters supported the expansion of the list of qualified interpreters, and some advocated for the inclusion of other types of interpreters on the list as well, such as deaf-blind interpreters, certified deaf interpreters, and speech-to-speech interpreters. As these commenters explained, deaf-blind interpreters are interpreters who have specialized skills and training to interpret for individuals who are deaf and blind. Certified deaf interpreters are deaf or hard of hearing interpreters who work with hearing sign language interpreters to meet the specific communication needs of deaf individuals. Speech-to-speech interpreters have special skill and training to interpret for individuals who have speech disabilities.

The list of interpreters in the definition of “qualified interpreter” is illustrative, and the Department does not believe it is necessary or appropriate to attempt to provide an exhaustive list of qualified interpreters. Accordingly, the Department has decided not to expand the proposed list. However, if a deaf and blind individual needs interpreting services, an interpreter who is qualified to handle the interpreting needs of that individual may be required. The guiding criterion is that the public accommodation must provide appropriate auxiliary aids and services to ensure effective communication with the individual.

Commenters also suggested various definitions for the term “cued-speech interpreters,” and different descriptions of the tasks they performed. After reviewing the various comments, the Department has determined that it is more accurate and appropriate to refer to such individuals as “cued-language transliterators.” Likewise, the Department has changed the term “oral interpreters” to “oral transliterators.” These two changes have been made to distinguish between sign language interpreters, who translate one language into another language (e.g., ASL to English and English to ASL), from transliterators, who interpret within the same language between deaf and hearing individuals. A cued-language transliterator is an interpreter who has special skill and training in the use of the Cued Speech system of handshapes and placements, along with non-manual information, such as facial expression and body language, to show auditory information visually, including speech and environmental sounds. An oral transliterator is an interpreter who has special skill and training to mouth a speaker’s words silently for individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing. While the Department included definitions for “cued speech interpreter” and “oral interpreter” in the regulatory text proposed in the NPRM, the Department has decided that it is unnecessary to include such definitions in the text of the final rule.

Many commenters questioned the proposed deletion of the requirement that a qualified interpreter be able to interpret both receptively and expressively, noting the importance of both these skills. Commenters noted that this phrase was carefully crafted in the original regulation to make certain that interpreters both (1) are capable of understanding what a person with a disability is saying and (2) have the skills needed to convey information back to that individual. These are two very different skill sets and both are equally important to achieve effective communication. For example, in a medical setting, a sign language interpreter must have the necessary skills to understand the grammar and syntax used by an ASL user (receptive skills) and the ability to interpret complicated medical information—presented by medical staff in English—back to that individual in ASL (expressive skills). The Department agrees and has put the phrase “both receptively and expressively” back in the definition.

Several advocacy groups suggested that the Department make clear in the definition of qualified interpreter that the interpreter may appear either on-site or remotely using a video remote interpreting (VRI) service. Given that the Department has included in this rule both a definition of VRI services and standards that such services must satisfy, such an addition to the definition of qualified interpreter is appropriate.

After consideration of all relevant information submitted during the public comment period, the Department has modified the definition from that initially proposed in the NPRM. The final definition now states that “[q]ualified interpreter means an interpreter who, via a video remote interpreting (VRI) service or an on-site appearance, is able to interpret effectively, accurately, and impartially, both receptively and expressively, using any necessary specialized vocabulary. Qualified interpreters include, for example, sign language interpreters, oral transliterators, and cued-language transliterators.”

“Qualified Reader”

The 1991 title III regulation identified a qualified reader as an auxiliary aid, but did not define the term. Based upon the Department’s investigation of complaints alleging that some entities have provided ineffective readers, the Department proposed in the NPRM to define “qualified reader” similarly to “qualified interpreter” to ensure that public accommodations select qualified individuals to read an examination or other written information in an effective, accurate, and impartial manner. This proposal was suggested in order to make clear to public accommodations that a failure to provide a qualified reader to a person with a disability may constitute a violation of the requirement to provide appropriate auxiliary aids and services.

The Department received comments supporting the inclusion in the regulation of a definition of a “qualified reader.” Some commenters suggested the Department add to the definition a requirement prohibiting the use of a reader whose accent, diction, or pronunciation makes full comprehension of material being read difficult. Another commenter requested that the Department include a requirement that the reader “will follow the directions of the person for whom he or she is reading.” Commenters also requested that the Department define “accurately” and “effectively” as used in this definition.

While the Department believes that the regulatory definition proposed in the NPRM adequately addresses these concerns, the Department emphasizes that a reader, in order to be “qualified,” must be skilled in reading the language and subject matter and must be able to be easily understood by the individual with the disability. For example, if a reader is reading aloud the questions for a bar examination, that reader, in order to be qualified, must know the proper pronunciation of all legal terminology used and must be sufficiently articulate to be easily understood by the individual with a disability for whom he or she is reading. In addition, the terms “effectively” and “accurately” have been successfully used and understood in the Department’s existing definition of “qualified interpreter” since 1991 without specific regulatory definitions. Instead, the Department has relied upon the common use and understanding of those terms from standard English dictionaries. Thus, the definition of “qualified reader” has not been changed from that contained in the NPRM. The final rule defines a “qualified reader” to mean “a person who is able to read effectively, accurately, and impartially using any necessary specialized vocabulary.”

‘service Animal”

Section 36.104 of the 1991 title III regulation defines a ‘service animal” as “any guide dog, signal dog, or other animal individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of an individual with a disability, including, but not limited to, guiding individuals with impaired vision, alerting individuals with impaired hearing to intruders or sounds, providing minimal protection or rescue work, pulling a wheelchair, or fetching dropped items.” Section 36.302(c)(1) of the 1991 title III regulation requires that “[g]enerally, a public accommodation shall modify policies, practices, or procedures to permit the use of a service animal by an individual with a disability.” Section 36.302(c)(2) of the 1991 title III regulation states that “a public accommodation [is not required] to supervise or care for a service animal.”

The Department has issued guidance and provided technical assistance and publications concerning service animals since the 1991 regulations became effective. In the NPRM, the Department proposed to modify the definition of service animal and asked for public input on several issues related to the service animal provisions of the 1991 title III regulation: whether the Department should clarify the phrase “providing minimal protection” in the definition or remove it; whether there are any circumstances where a service animal “providing minimal protection” would be appropriate or expected; whether certain species should be eliminated from the definition of ‘service animal,” and, if so, which types of animals should be excluded; whether “common domestic animal” should be part of the definition; and whether a size or weight limitation should be imposed for common domestic animals, even if the animal satisfies the “common domestic animal” part of the NPRM definition.

The Department received extensive comments on these issues, as well as requests to clarify the obligations of public accommodations to accommodate individuals with disabilities who use service animals, and has modified the final rule in response. In the interests of avoiding unnecessary repetition, the Department has elected to discuss the issues raised in the NPRM questions about service animals and the corresponding public comments in the following discussion of the definition of ‘service animal.”

The Department’s final rule defines ‘service animal” as “any dog that is individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of an individual with a disability, including a physical, sensory, psychiatric, intellectual, or other mental disability. Other species of animals, whether wild or domestic, trained or untrained, are not service animals for the purposes of this definition. The work or tasks performed by a service animal must be directly related to the individual’s disability. Examples of work or tasks include, but are not limited to, assisting individuals who are blind or have low vision with navigation and other tasks, alerting individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing to the presence of people or sounds, providing non-violent protection or rescue work, pulling a wheelchair, assisting an individual during a seizure, alerting individuals to the presence of allergens, retrieving items such as medicine or the telephone, providing physical support and assistance with balance and stability to individuals with mobility disabilities, and helping persons with psychiatric and neurological disabilities by preventing or interrupting impulsive or destructive behaviors. The crime deterrent effects of an animal’s presence and the provision of emotional support, well-being, comfort, or companionship do not constitute work or tasks for the purposes of this definition.”

This definition has been designed to clarify a key provision of the ADA. Many covered entities indicated that they are confused regarding their obligations under the ADA with regard to individuals with disabilities who use service animals. Individuals with disabilities who use trained guide or service dogs are concerned that if untrained or unusual animals are termed ‘service animals,” their own right to use guide or service dogs may become unnecessarily restricted or questioned. Some individuals who are not individuals with disabilities have claimed, whether fraudulently or sincerely (albeit mistakenly), that their animals are service animals covered by the ADA, in order to gain access to hotels, restaurants, and other places of public accommodation. The increasing use of wild, exotic, or unusual species, many of which are untrained, as service animals has also added to the confusion.

Finally, individuals with disabilities who have the legal right under the Fair Housing Act (FHAct) to use certain animals in their homes as a reasonable accommodation to their disabilities have assumed that their animals also qualify under the ADA. This is not necessarily the case, as discussed below.

The Department recognizes the diverse needs and preferences of individuals with disabilities protected under the ADA, and does not wish to unnecessarily impede individual choice. Service animals play an integral role in the lives of many individuals with disabilities, and with the clarification provided by the final rule, individuals with disabilities will continue to be able to use their service animals as they go about their daily activities. The clarification will also help to ensure that the fraudulent or mistaken use of other animals not qualified as service animals under the ADA will be deterred. A more detailed analysis of the elements of the definition and the comments responsive to the service animal provisions of the NPRM follows.

Providing minimal protection. The 1991 title III regulation included language stating that “minimal protection” was a task that could be performed by an individually trained service animal for the benefit of an individual with a disability. In the Department’s “ADA Business Brief on Service Animals” (2002), the Department interpreted the “minimal protection” language within the context of a seizure (i.e., alerting and protecting a person who is having a seizure). The Department received many comments in response to the question of whether the “minimal protection” language should be clarified. Many commenters urged the removal of the “minimal protection” language from the service animal definition for two reasons: (1) The phrase can be interpreted to allow any dog that is trained to be aggressive to qualify as a service animal simply by pairing the animal with a person with a disability; and (2) The phrase can be interpreted to allow any untrained pet dog to qualify as a service animal, since many consider the mere presence of a dog to be a crime deterrent, and thus sufficient to meet the minimal protection standard. These commenters argued, and the Department agrees, that these interpretations were not contemplated under the original title III regulation.

While many commenters stated that they believe that the “minimal protection” language should be eliminated, other commenters recommended that the language be clarified, but retained. Commenters favoring clarification of the term suggested that the Department explicitly exclude the function of attack or exclude those animals that are trained solely to be aggressive or protective. Other commenters identified nonviolent behavioral tasks that could be construed as minimally protective, such as interrupting self-mutilation, providing safety checks and room searches, reminding the individual to take medications, and protecting the individual from injury resulting from seizures or unconsciousness.

Several commenters noted that the existing direct threat defense, which allows the exclusion of a service animal if the animal exhibits unwarranted or unprovoked violent behavior or poses a direct threat, prevents the use of “attack dogs” as service animals. One commenter noted that the use of a service animal trained to provide “minimal protection” may impede access to care in an emergency, for example, where the first responder is unable or reluctant to approach a person with a disability because the individual’s service animal is in a protective posture suggestive of aggression.

Many organizations and individuals stated that in the general dog training community, “protection” is code for attack or aggression training and should be removed from the definition. Commenters stated that there appears to be a broadly held misconception that aggression-trained animals are appropriate service animals for persons with post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). While many individuals with PTSD may benefit by using a service animal, the work or tasks performed appropriately by such an animal would not involve unprovoked aggression, but could include actively cuing the individual by nudging or pawing the individual to alert to the onset of an episode and removing the individual from the anxiety-provoking environment.

The Department recognizes that despite its best efforts to provide clarification, the “minimal protection” language appears to have been misinterpreted. While the Department maintains that protection from danger is one of the key functions that service animals perform for the benefit of persons with disabilities, the Department recognizes that an animal individually trained to provide aggressive protection, such as an attack dog, is not appropriately considered a service animal. Therefore, the Department has decided to modify the “minimal protection” language to read “nonviolent protection,” thereby excluding so-called ‘attack dogs” or dogs with traditional “protection training” as service animals. The Department believes that this modification to the service animal definition will eliminate confusion, without restricting unnecessarily the type of work or tasks that service animals may perform. The Department’s modification also clarifies that the crime-deterrent effect of a dog’s presence, by itself, does not qualify as work or tasks for purposes of the service animal definition.

Alerting to intruders. The phrase “alerting to intruders” is related to the issues of minimal protection and the work or tasks an animal may perform to meet the definition of a service animal. In the original 1991 regulatory text, this phrase was intended to identify service animals that alert individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing to the presence of others. This language has been misinterpreted by some to apply to dogs that are trained specifically to provide aggressive protection, resulting in the assertion that such training qualifies a dog as a service animal under the ADA. The Department reiterates that public accommodations are not required to admit any animal whose use poses a direct threat. In addition, the Department has decided to remove the word “intruders” from the service animal definition and replace it with the phrase “the presence of people or sounds.” The Department believes this clarifies that so-called “attack training” or other aggressive response types of training that cause a dog to provide an aggressive response do not qualify a dog as a service animal under the ADA.

Conversely, if an individual uses a breed of dog that is perceived to be aggressive because of breed reputation, stereotype, or the history or experience the observer may have with other dogs, but the dog is under the control of the individual with a disability and does not exhibit aggressive behavior, the public accommodation cannot exclude the individual or the animal from the place of public accommodation. The animal can only be removed if it engages in the behaviors mentioned in § 36.302(c) (as revised in the final rule) or if the presence of the animal constitutes a fundamental alteration to the nature of the goods, services, facilities, and activities of the place of public accommodation.

“Doing work” or “performing tasks.” The NPRM proposed that the Department maintain the requirement first articulated in the 1991 title III regulation that in order to qualify as a service animal, the animal must “perform tasks” or “do work” for the individual with a disability. The phrases “perform tasks” and “do work” describe what an animal must do for the benefit of an individual with a disability in order to qualify as a service animal.

The Department received a number of comments in response to the NPRM proposal urging the removal of the term “do work” from the definition of a service animal. These commenters argued that the Department should emphasize the performance of tasks instead. The Department disagrees. Although the common definition of work includes the performance of tasks, the definition of work is somewhat broader, encompassing activities that do not appear to involve physical action.

One service dog user stated that, in some cases, “critical forms of assistance can”t be construed as physical tasks,” noting that the manifestations of “brain-based disabilities,” such as psychiatric disorders and autism, are as varied as their physical counterparts. The Department agrees with this statement but cautions that unless the animal is individually trained to do something that qualifies as work or a task, the animal is a pet or support animal and does not qualify for coverage as a service animal. A pet or support animal may be able to discern that the individual is in distress, but it is what the animal is trained to do in response to this awareness that distinguishes a service animal from an observant pet or support animal.

The NPRM contained an example of “doing work” that stated “a psychiatric service dog can help some individuals with dissociative identity disorder to remain grounded in time or place.” 73 FR 34508, 34521 (June 17, 2008). Several commenters objected to the use of this example, arguing that grounding was not a “task” and therefore the example inherently contradicted the basic premise that a service animal must perform a task in order to mitigate a disability. Other commenters stated that “grounding” should not be included as an example of “work” because it could lead to some individuals claiming that they should be able to use emotional support animals in public because the dog makes them feel calm or safe. By contrast, one commenter with experience in training service animals explained that grounding is a trained task based upon very specific behavioral indicators that can be observed and measured. These tasks are based upon input from mental health practitioners, dog trainers, and individuals with a history of working with psychiatric service dogs.

It is the Department’s view that an animal that is trained to “ground” a person with a psychiatric disorder does work or performs a task that would qualify it as a service animal as compared to an untrained emotional support animal whose presence affects a person’s disability. It is the fact that the animal is trained to respond to the individual’s needs that distinguishes an animal as a service animal. The process must have two steps: Recognition and response. For example, if a service animal senses that a person is about to have a psychiatric episode and it is trained to respond, for example, by nudging, barking, or removing the individual to a safe location until the episode subsides, then the animal has indeed performed a task or done work on behalf of the individual with the disability, as opposed to merely sensing an event.

One commenter suggested defining the term “task,” presumably to improve the understanding of the types of services performed by an animal that would be sufficient to qualify the animal for coverage. The Department believes that the common definition of the word “task” is sufficiently clear and that it is not necessary to add to the definitions section. However, the Department has added examples of other kinds of work or tasks to help illustrate and provide clarity to the definition. After careful evaluation of this issue, the Department has concluded that the phrases “do work” and “perform tasks” have been effective during the past two decades to illustrate the varied services provided by service animals for the benefit of individuals with all types of disabilities. Thus, the Department declines to depart from its longstanding approach at this time.

Species limitations. When the Department originally issued its title III regulation in the early 1990s, the Department did not define the parameters of acceptable animal species. At that time, few anticipated the variety of animals that would be promoted as service animals in the years to come, which ranged from pigs and miniature horses to snakes, iguanas, and parrots. The Department has followed this particular issue closely, keeping current with the many unusual species of animals represented to be service animals. Thus, the Department has decided to refine further this aspect of the service animal definition in the final rule.

The Department received many comments from individuals and organizations recommending species limitations. Several of these commenters asserted that limiting the number of allowable species would help stop erosion of the public’s trust, which has resulted in reduced access for many individuals with disabilities who use trained service animals that adhere to high behavioral standards. Several commenters suggested that other species would be acceptable if those animals could meet nationally recognized behavioral standards for trained service dogs. Other commenters asserted that certain species of animals (e.g., reptiles) cannot be trained to do work or perform tasks, so these animals would not be covered.

In the NPRM, the Department used the term “common domestic animal” in the service animal definition and excluded reptiles, rabbits, farm animals (including horses, miniature horses, ponies, pigs, and goats), ferrets, amphibians, and rodents from the service animal definition. 73 FR 34508, 34553 (June 17, 2008). However, the term “common domestic animal” is difficult to define with precision due to the increase in the number of domesticated species. Also, several State and local laws define a “domestic” animal as an animal that is not wild.

The Department is compelled to take into account the practical considerations of certain animals and to contemplate their suitability in a variety of public contexts, such as restaurants, grocery stores, hospitals, and performing arts venues, as well as suitability for urban environments. The Department agrees with commenters” views that limiting the number and types of species recognized as service animals will provide greater predictability for public accommodations as well as added assurance of access for individuals with disabilities who use dogs as service animals. As a consequence, the Department has decided to limit this rule’s coverage of service animals to dogs, which are the most common service animals used by individuals with disabilities.

Wild animals, monkeys, and other nonhuman primates. Numerous business entities endorsed a narrow definition of acceptable service animal species, and asserted that there are certain animals (e.g., reptiles) that cannot be trained to do work or perform tasks. Other commenters suggested that the Department should identify excluded animals, such as birds and llamas, in the final rule. Although one commenter noted that wild animals bred in captivity should be permitted to be service animals, the Department has decided to make clear that all wild animals, whether born or bred in captivity or in the wild, are eliminated from coverage as service animals. The Department believes that this approach reduces risks to health or safety attendant with wild animals. Some animals, such as certain nonhuman primates, including certain monkeys, pose a direct threat; their behavior can be unpredictably aggressive and violent without notice or provocation. The American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA) issued a position statement advising against the use of monkeys as service animals, stating that “[t]he AVMA does not support the use of nonhuman primates as assistance animals because of animal welfare concerns, and the potential for serious injury and zoonotic [animal to human disease transmission] risks.” AVMA Position Statement, Nonhuman Primates as Assistance Animals (2005), available at http://www.avma.org/issues/policy/nonhuman_primates.asp (last visited June 24, 2010).

An organization that trains capuchin monkeys to provide in-home services to individuals with paraplegia and quadriplegia was in substantial agreement with the AVMA’s views but requested a limited recognition in the service animal definition for the capuchin monkeys it trains to provide assistance for persons with disabilities. The organization commented that its trained capuchin monkeys undergo scrupulous veterinary examinations to ensure that the animals pose no health risks, and are used by individuals with disabilities exclusively in their homes. The organization acknowledged that the capuchin monkeys it trains are not necessarily suitable for use in a place of public accommodation but noted that the monkeys may need to be used in circumstances that implicate title III coverage, e.g., in the event the handler had to leave home due to an emergency, to visit a veterinarian, or for the initial delivery of the monkey to the individual with a disability. The organization noted that several State and local government entities have local zoning, licensing, health, and safety laws that prohibit non-human primates, and that these prohibitions would prevent individuals with disabilities from using these animals even in their homes.

The organization argued that including capuchin monkeys under the service animal umbrella would make it easier for individuals with disabilities to obtain reasonable modifications of State and local licensing, health, and safety laws that would permit the use of these monkeys. The organization argued that this limited modification to the service animal definition was warranted in view of the services these monkeys perform, which enable many individuals with paraplegia and quadriplegia to live and function with increased independence.

The Department has carefully considered the potential risks associated with the use of nonhuman primates as service animals in places of public accommodation, as well as the information provided to the Department about the significant benefits that trained capuchin monkeys provide to certain individuals with disabilities in residential settings. The Department has determined, however, that nonhuman primates, including capuchin monkeys, will not be recognized as service animals for purposes of this rule because of their potential for disease transmission and unpredictable aggressive behavior. The Department believes that these characteristics make nonhuman primates unsuitable for use as service animals in the context of the wide variety of public settings subject to this rule. As the organization advocating the inclusion of capuchin monkeys acknowledges, capuchin monkeys are not suitable for use in public facilities.

The Department emphasizes that it has decided only that capuchin monkeys will not be included in the definition of service animals for purposes of its regulation implementing the ADA. This decision does not have any effect on the extent to which public accommodations are required to allow the use of such monkeys under other Federal statutes, like the FHAct or the Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA). For example, a public accommodation that also is considered to be a “dwelling” may be covered under both the ADA and the FHAct. While the ADA does not require such a public accommodation to admit people with service monkeys, the FHAct may. Under the FHAct an individual with a disability may have the right to have an animal other than a dog in his or her home if the animal qualifies as a “reasonable accommodation” that is necessary to afford the individual equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling, assuming that the use of the animal does not pose a direct threat. In some cases, the right of an individual to have an animal under the FHAct may conflict with State or local laws that prohibit all individuals, with or without disabilities, from owning a particular species. However, in this circumstance, an individual who wishes to request a reasonable modification of the State or local law must do so under the FHAct, not the ADA.

Having considered all of the comments about which species should qualify as service animals under the ADA, the Department has determined the most reasonable approach is to limit acceptable species to dogs.

Size or weight limitations. The vast majority of commenters did not support a size or weight limitation. Commenters were typically opposed to a size or weight limit because many tasks performed by service animals require large, strong dogs. For instance, service animals may perform tasks such as providing balance and support or pulling a wheelchair. Small animals may not be suitable for large adults. The weight of the service animal user is often correlated with the size and weight of the service animal. Others were concerned that adding a size and weight limit would further complicate the difficult process of finding an appropriate service animal. One commenter noted that there is no need for a limit because “if, as a practical matter, the size or weight of an individual’s service animal creates a direct threat or fundamental alteration to a particular public entity or accommodation, there are provisions that allow for the animal’s exclusion or removal.” Some common concerns among commenters in support of a size and weight limit were that a larger animal may be less able to fit in various areas with its handler, such as toilet rooms and public seating areas, and that larger animals are more difficult to control.

Balancing concerns expressed in favor of and against size and weight limitations, the Department has determined that such limitations would not be appropriate. Many individuals of larger stature require larger dogs. The Department believes it would be inappropriate to deprive these individuals of the option of using a service dog of the size required to provide the physical support and stability these individuals may need to function independently. Since large dogs have always served as service animals, continuing their use should not constitute fundamental alterations or impose undue burdens on public accommodations.

Breed limitations. A few commenters suggested that certain breeds of dogs should not be allowed to be used as service animals. Some suggested that the Department should defer to local laws restricting the breeds of dogs that individuals who reside in a community may own. Other commenters opposed breed restrictions, stating that the breed of a dog does not determine its propensity for aggression and that aggressive and non-aggressive dogs exist in all breeds.

The Department does not believe that it is either appropriate or consistent with the ADA to defer to local laws that prohibit certain breeds of dogs based on local concerns that these breeds may have a history of unprovoked aggression or attacks. Such deference would have the effect of limiting the rights of persons with disabilities under the ADA who use certain service animals based on where they live rather than on whether the use of a particular animal poses a direct threat to the health and safety of others. Breed restrictions differ significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Some jurisdictions have no breed restrictions. Others have restrictions that, while well-meaning, have the unintended effect of screening out the very breeds of dogs that have successfully served as service animals for decades without a history of the type of unprovoked aggression or attacks that would pose a direct threat, e.g., German Shepherds. Other jurisdictions prohibit animals over a certain weight, thereby restricting breeds without invoking an express breed ban. In addition, deference to breed restrictions contained in local laws would have the unacceptable consequence of restricting travel by an individual with a disability who uses a breed that is acceptable and poses no safety hazards in the individual’s home jurisdiction but is nonetheless banned by other jurisdictions. Public accommodations have the ability to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether a particular service animal can be excluded based on that particular animal’s actual behavior or history—not based on fears or generalizations about how an animal or breed might behave. This ability to exclude an animal whose behavior or history evidences a direct threat is sufficient to protect health and safety.

Recognition of psychiatric service animals, but not “emotional support animals.” The definition of ‘service animal” in the NPRM stated the Department’s longstanding position that emotional support animals are not included in the definition of ‘service animal.” The proposed text provided that “[a]nimals whose sole function is to provide emotional support, comfort, therapy, companionship, therapeutic benefits, or to promote emotional well-being are not service animals.” 73 FR 34508, 34553 (June 17, 2008).

Many advocacy organizations expressed concern and disagreed with the exclusion of comfort and emotional support animals. Others have been more specific, stating that individuals with disabilities may need their emotional support animals in order to have equal access. Some commenters noted that individuals with disabilities use animals that have not been trained to perform tasks directly related to their disability. These animals do not qualify as service animals under the ADA. These are emotional support or comfort animals.

Commenters asserted that excluding categories such as “comfort” and “emotional support” animals recognized by laws such as the FHAct or the ACAA is confusing and burdensome. Other commenters noted that emotional support and comfort animals perform an important function, asserting that animal companionship helps individuals who experience depression resulting from multiple sclerosis.

Some commenters explained the benefits emotional support animals provide, including emotional support, comfort, therapy, companionship, therapeutic benefits, and the promotion of emotional well-being. They contended that without the presence of an emotional support animal in their lives they would be disadvantaged and unable to participate in society. These commenters were concerned that excluding this category of animals will lead to discrimination against and excessive questioning of individuals with non-visible or non-apparent disabilities. Other commenters expressing opposition to the exclusion of individually trained “comfort” or “emotional support” animals asserted that the ability to soothe or de-escalate and control emotion is “work” that benefits the individual with the disability.

Many commenters requested that the Department carve out an exception that permits current or former members of the military to use emotional support animals. They asserted that a significant number of service members returning from active combat duty have adjustment difficulties due to combat, sexual assault, or other traumatic experiences while on active duty. Commenters noted that some current or former members of the military service have been prescribed animals for conditions such as PTSD. One commenter stated that service women who were sexually assaulted while in the military use emotional support animals to help them feel safe enough to step outside their homes. The Department recognizes that many current and former members of the military have disabilities as a result of service-related injuries that may require emotional support and that such individuals can benefit from the use of an emotional support animal and could use such animal in their home under the FHAct. However, having carefully weighed the issues, the Department believes that its final rule appropriately addresses the balance of issues and concerns of both the individual with a disability and the public accommodation. The Department also notes that nothing in this part prohibits a public entity from allowing current or former military members or anyone else with disabilities to utilize emotional support animals if it wants to do so.

Commenters asserted the view that if an animal’s “mere presence” legitimately provides such benefits to an individual with a disability and if those benefits are necessary to provide equal opportunity given the facts of the particular disability, then such an animal should qualify as a ‘service animal.” Commenters noted that the focus should be on the nature of a person’s disability, the difficulties the disability may impose and whether the requested accommodation would legitimately address those difficulties, not on evaluating the animal involved. The Department understands this approach has benefitted many individuals under the FHAct and analogous State law provisions, where the presence of animals poses fewer health and safety issues and where emotional support animals provide assistance that is unique to residential settings. The Department believes, however, that the presence of such animals is not required in the context of public accommodations, such as restaurants, hospitals, hotels, retail establishments, and assembly areas.

Under the Department’s previous regulatory framework, some individuals and entities assumed that the requirement that service animals must be individually trained to do work or perform tasks excluded all individuals with mental disabilities from having service animals. Others assumed that any person with a psychiatric condition whose pet provided comfort to them was covered by the 1991 title III regulation. The Department reiterates that psychiatric service animals that are trained to do work or perform a task for individuals whose disability is covered by the ADA are protected by the Department’s present regulatory approach. Psychiatric service animals can be trained to perform a variety of tasks that assist individuals with disabilities to detect the onset of psychiatric episodes and ameliorate their effects. Tasks performed by psychiatric service animals may include reminding the individual to take medicine, providing safety checks or room searches for individuals with PTSD, interrupting self-mutilation, and removing disoriented individuals from dangerous situations.

The difference between an emotional support animal and a psychiatric service animal is the work or tasks that the animal performs. Traditionally, service dogs worked as guides for individuals who were blind or had low vision. Since the original regulation was promulgated, service animals have been trained to assist individuals with many different types of disabilities.

In the final rule, the Department has retained its position on the exclusion of emotional support animals from the definition of ‘service animal.” The definition states that “[t]he provision of emotional support, well-being, comfort, or companionship*** do[es] not constitute work or tasks for the purposes of this definition.” The Department notes, however, that the exclusion of emotional support animals from coverage in the final rule does not mean that individuals with psychiatric or mental disabilities cannot use service animals that meet the regulatory definition. The final rule defines service animal as follows: ‘service animal means any dog that is individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of an individual with a disability, including a physical, sensory, psychiatric, intellectual, or other mental disability.” This language simply clarifies the Department’s longstanding position.

The Department’s position is based on the fact that the title II and title III regulations govern a wider range of public settings than the housing and transportation settings for which the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the DOT regulations allow emotional support animals or comfort animals. The Department recognizes that there are situations not governed by the title II and title III regulations, particularly in the context of residential settings and transportation, where there may be a legal obligation to permit the use of animals that do not qualify as service animals under the ADA, but whose presence nonetheless provides necessary emotional support to persons with disabilities. Accordingly, other Federal agency regulations, case law, and possibly State or local laws governing those situations may provide appropriately for increased access for animals other than service animals as defined under the ADA. Public officials, housing providers, and others who make decisions relating to animals in residential and transportation settings should consult the Federal, State, and local laws that apply in those areas (e.g., the FHAct regulations of HUD and the ACAA) and not rely on the ADA as a basis for reducing those obligations.

Retain term ‘service animal. “Some commenters asserted that the term “assistance animal” is a term of art and should replace the term ‘service animal”; however, the majority of commenters preferred the term ‘service animal” because it is more specific. The Department has decided to retain the term ‘service animal” in the final rule. While some agencies, like HUD, use the terms “assistance animal, “assistive animal,” or ‘support animal,” these terms are used to denote a broader category of animals than is covered by the ADA. The Department has decided that changing the term used in the final rule would create confusion, particularly in view of the broader parameters for coverage under the FHAct, cf. Preamble to HUD’s Final Rule for Pet Ownership for the Elderly and Persons with Disabilities, 73 FR 63834–38 (Oct. 27, 2008); HUD Handbook No. 4350.3 Rev–1, Chapter 2, Occupancy Requirements of Subsidized Multifamily Housing Programs (June 2007), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/adm/hudclips/handbooks/hsgh/4350.3 (last visited June 24, 2010). Moreover, as discussed above, the Department’s definition of ‘service animal” in the final rule does not affect the rights of individuals with disabilities who use assistance animals in their homes under the FHAct or who use “emotional support animals” that are covered under the ACAA and its implementing regulations. See 14 CFR 382.7 et seq.; see also Department of Transportation, Guidance Concerning Service Animals in Air Transportation, 68 FR 24874, 24877 (May 9, 2003) (discussing accommodation of service animals and emotional support animals on aircraft).

“Video Remote Interpreting (VRI) Services”

In the NPRM, the Department proposed adding “Video Interpreting Services (VIS)” to the list of auxiliary aids available to provide effective communication. In the preamble to the NPRM, VIS was defined as “a technology composed of a video phone, video monitors, cameras, a high-speed Internet connection, and an interpreter. The video phone provides video transmission to a video monitor that permits the individual who is deaf or hard of hearing to view and sign to a video interpreter (i.e., a live interpreter in another location), who can See and sign to the individual through a camera located on or near the monitor, while others can communicate by speaking. The video monitor can display a split screen of two live images, with the interpreter in one image and the individual who is deaf or hard of hearing in the other image.” 73 FR 34508, 34522 (June 17, 2008). Comments from advocacy organizations and individuals unanimously requested that the Department use the term “video remote interpreting (VRI),” instead of VIS, for consistency with Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulations, FCC Public Notice, DA–0502417 (Sept. 7, 2005), and with common usage by consumers. The Department has made that change throughout the regulation to avoid confusion and to make the regulation more consistent with existing regulations.

Many commenters also requested that the Department distinguish between VRI and “video relay service (VRS).” Both VRI and VRS use a remote interpreter who is able to See and communicate with a deaf person and a hearing person, and all three individuals may be connected by a video link. VRI is a fee-based interpreting service conveyed via videoconferencing where at least one person, typically the interpreter, is at a separate location. VRI can be provided as an on-demand service or by appointment. VRI normally involves a contract in advance for the interpreter who is usually paid by the covered entity.

VRS is a telephone service that enables persons with disabilities to use the telephone to communicate using video connections and is a more advanced form of relay service than the traditional voice to text telephones (TTY) relay systems that were recognized in the 1991 title III regulation. More specifically, VRS is a video relay service using interpreters connected to callers by video hook-up and is designed to provide telephone services to persons who are deaf and use American Sign Language that are functionally equivalent to those services provided to users who are hearing. VRS is funded through the Interstate Telecommunications Relay Services Fund and overseen by the FCC. See 47 CFR 64.601(a)(26). There are no fees for callers to use the VRS interpreters and the video connection, although there may be relatively inexpensive initial costs to the title III entities to purchase the videophone or camera for on-line video connection, or other equipment to connect to the VRS service. The FCC has made clear that VRS functions as a telephone service and is not intended to be used for interpreting services where both parties are in the same room; the latter is reserved for VRI. The Department agrees that VRS cannot be used as a substitute for in-person interpreters or for VRI in situations that would not, absent one party’s disability, entail use of the telephone.

Many commenters strongly recommended limiting the use of VRI to circumstances where it will provide effective communication. Commenters from advocacy groups and persons with disabilities expressed concern that VRI may not always be appropriate to provide effective communication, especially in hospitals and emergency rooms. Examples were provided of patients who are unable to See the video monitor because they are semi-conscious or unable to focus on the video screen; other examples were given of cases where the video monitor is out of the sightline of the patient or the image is out of focus; still other examples were given of patients who could not See the image because the signal was interrupted, causing unnatural pauses in the communication, or the image was grainy or otherwise unclear. Many commenters requested more explicit guidelines on the use of VRI and some recommended requirements for equipment maintenance, high-speed, wide-bandwidth video links using dedicated lines or wireless systems, and training of staff using VRI, especially in hospital and health care situations. Several major organizations requested a requirement to include the interpreter’s face, head, arms, hands, and eyes in all transmissions.

After consideration of the comments and the Department’s own research and experience, the Department has determined that VRI can be an effective method of providing interpreting services in certain circumstances, but not in others. For example, VRI should be effective in many situations involving routine medical care, as well as in the emergency room where urgent care is important, but no in-person interpreter is available; however, VRI may not be effective in situations involving surgery or other medical procedures where the patient is limited in his or her ability to See the video screen. Similarly, VRI may not be effective in situations where there are multiple people in a room and the information exchanged is highly complex and fast paced. The Department recognizes that in these and other situations, such as where communication is needed for persons who are deaf-blind, it may be necessary to summon an in-person interpreter to assist certain individuals. To ensure that VRI is effective in situations where it is appropriate, the Department has established performance standards in § 36.303(f).

Subpart B—General Requirements

Section 36.208(b) Direct Threat

The Department has revised the language of § 36.208(b) (formerly § 36.208(c) in the 1991 title III regulation) to include consideration of whether the provision of auxiliary aids or services will mitigate the risk that an individual will pose a direct threat to the health or safety of others. Originally, the reference to auxiliary aids or services as a mitigating factor was part of § 36.208. However, that reference was removed from the section when, for editorial purposes, the Department removed the definition of “direct threat” from § 36.208 and placed it in § 36.104. The Department has put the reference to auxiliary aids or services as a mitigating factor back into § 36.208(b) in order to maintain consistency with the current regulation.

Section 36.211 Maintenance of Accessible Features

Section 36.211 of the 1991 title III regulation provides that a public accommodation must maintain in operable working condition those features of facilities and equipment that are required to be readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities. 28 CFR 36.211. In the NPRM, the Department clarified the application of this provision and proposed one change to the section to address the discrete situation in which the scoping requirements provided in the 2010 Standards reduce the number of required elements below the requirements of the 1991 Standards. In that discrete event, a public accommodation may reduce such accessible features in accordance with the requirements in the 2010 Standards.

The Department received only four comments on this proposed amendment. None of the commenters opposed the change. In the final rule, the Department has revised the section to make it clear that if the 2010 Standards reduce either the technical requirements or the number of required accessible elements below that required by the 1991 Standards, then the public accommodation may reduce the technical requirements or the number of accessible elements in a covered facility in accordance with the requirements of the 2010 Standards. One commenter, an association of convenience stores, urged the Department to expand the language of the section to include restocking of shelves as a permissible activity for isolated or temporary interruptions in service or access. It is the Department’s position that a temporary interruption that blocks an accessible route, such as restocking of shelves, is already permitted by existing § 36.211(b), which clarifies that “isolated or temporary interruptions in service or access due to maintenance or repairs” are permitted. Therefore, the Department will not make any additional changes in the language of § 36.211 other than those discussed in the preceding paragraph.

Subpart C—Specific Requirements

Section 36.302 Modifications in Policies, Practices, or Procedures

Section 36.302(c) Service Animals Section 36.302(c)(1) of the 1991 title III regulation states that “[g]enerally, a public accommodation shall modify [its] policies, practices, or procedures to permit the use of service animals by an individual with a disability.” Section 36.302(c)(2) of the 1991 title III regulation states that “[n]othing in this part requires a public accommodation to supervise or care for a service animal.” The Department has decided to retain the scope of the 1991 title III regulation while clarifying the Department’s longstanding policies and interpretations. Toward that end, the final rule has been revised to include the Department’s policy interpretations as outlined in published technical assistance, Commonly Asked Questions about Service Animals in Places of Business (1996), available at http://archive.ada.gov/qasrvc.htm, and ADA Guide for Small Businesses (1999), available at http://archive.ada.gov/smbustxt.htm, and to add that a public accommodation may exclude a service animal in certain circumstances where the service animal fails to meet certain behavioral standards. The Department received extensive comments in response to proposed § 36.302(c) from individuals, disability advocacy groups, organizations involved in training service animals, and public accommodations. Those comments and the Department’s response are discussed below.

Exclusion of service animals. The 1991 regulatory provision in § 36.302(c) addresses reasonable modification and remains unchanged in the final rule. However, based on comments received and the Department’s analysis, the Department has decided to clarify those circumstances where otherwise eligible service animals may be excluded by public accommodations.

In the NPRM, in § 36.302(c)(2)(i), the Department proposed that a public accommodation may ask an individual with a disability to remove a service animal from the place of public accommodation if “[t]he animal is out of control and the animal’s handler does not take effective action to control it.” 73 FR 34508, 34553 (June 17, 2008). The Department has long held that a service animal must be under the control of the handler at all times. Commenters overwhelmingly were in favor of this language, but noted that there are occasions when service animals are provoked to disruptive or aggressive behavior by agitators or troublemakers, as in the case of a blind individual whose service dog is taunted or pinched. While all service animals are trained to ignore and overcome these types of incidents, misbehavior in response to provocation is not always unreasonable. In circumstances where a service animal misbehaves or responds reasonably to a provocation or injury, the public accommodation must give the handler a reasonable opportunity to gain control of the animal. Further, if the individual with a disability asserts that the animal was provoked or injured, or if the public accommodation otherwise has reason to suspect that provocation or injury has occurred, the public accommodation should seek to determine the facts and, if provocation or injury occurred, the public accommodation should take effective steps to prevent further provocation or injury, which may include asking the provocateur to leave the place of public accommodation. This language is unchanged in the final rule.

The NPRM also proposed language at § 36.302(c)(2)(ii) to permit a public accommodation to exclude a service animal if the animal is not housebroken (i.e., trained so that, absent illness or accident, the animal controls its waste elimination) or the animal’s presence or behavior fundamentally alters the nature of the service the public accommodation provides (e.g., repeated barking during a live performance). Several commenters were supportive of this NPRM language, but cautioned against overreaction by the public accommodation in these instances. One commenter noted that animals get sick, too, and that accidents occasionally happen. In these circumstances, simple clean up typically addresses the incident. Commenters noted that the public accommodation must be careful when it excludes a service animal on the basis of “fundamental alteration,” asserting for example, that a public accommodation should not exclude a service animal for barking in an environment where other types of noise, such as loud cheering or a child crying, is tolerated. The Department maintains that the appropriateness of an exclusion can be assessed by reviewing how a public accommodation addresses comparable situations that do not involve a service animal. The Department has retained in § 36.302(c)(2) of the final rule the exception requiring animals to be housebroken. The Department has not retained the specific NPRM language stating that animals can be excluded if their presence or behavior fundamentally alters the nature of the service provided by the public accommodation, because the Department believes that this exception is covered by the general reasonable modification requirement contained in § 36.302(c)(1).

The NPRM also proposed in § 36.302(c)(2)(iii) that a service animal can be excluded where “[t]he animal poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable modifications.” 73 FR 34508, 34553 (June 17, 2008). Commenters were universally supportive of this provision as it makes express the discretion of a public accommodation to exclude a service animal that poses a direct threat. Several commenters cautioned against the overuse of this provision and suggested that the Department provide an example of the rule’s application. The Department has decided not to include regulatory language specifically stating that a service animal can be excluded if it poses a direct threat. The Department believes that the direct threat provision in § 36.208 already provides this exception to public accommodations.

Access to a public accommodation following the proper exclusion of a service animal. The NPRM proposed that in the event a public accommodation properly excludes a service animal, the public accommodation must give the individual with a disability the opportunity to obtain the goods and services of the public accommodation without having the service animal on the premises. Most commenters welcomed this provision as a common sense approach. These commenters noted that they do not wish to preclude individuals with disabilities from the full and equal enjoyment of the goods and services simply because of an isolated problem with a service animal. The Department has elected to retain this provision in § 36.302(c)(2).

Other requirements. The NPRM also proposed that the regulation include the following requirements: that the work or tasks performed by the service animal must be directly related to the handler’s disability; that a service animal must be individually trained to do work or perform a task, be housebroken, and be under the control of the handler; and that a service animal must have a harness, leash, or other tether. Most commenters addressed at least one of these issues in their responses. Most agreed that these provisions are important to clarify further the 1991 service animal regulation. The Department has moved the requirement that the work or tasks performed by the service animal must be related directly to the individual’s disability to the definition of ‘service animal” in § 36.104. In addition, the Department has modified the proposed language relating to the handler’s control of the animal with a harness, leash, or other tether to state that “[a] service animal shall have a harness, leash, or other tether, unless either the handler is unable because of a disability to use a harness, leash, or other tether, or the use of a harness, leash, or other tether would interfere with the service animal’s safe, effective performance of work or tasks, in which case the service animal must be otherwise under the handler’s control (e.g., voice control, signals, or other effective means).” The Department has retained the requirement that the service animal must be individually trained, as well as the requirement that the service animal be housebroken.

Responsibility for supervision and care of a service animal. The 1991 title III regulation, in § 36.302(c)(2), states that “[n]othing in this part requires a public accommodation to supervise or care for a service animal.” The NPRM modified this language to state that “[a] public accommodation is not responsible for caring for or supervising a service animal.” 73 FR 34508, 34553 (June 17, 2008). Most commenters did not address this particular provision. The Department notes that there are occasions when a person with a disability is confined to bed in a hospital for a period of time. In such an instance, the individual may not be able to walk or feed the service animal. In such cases, if the individual has a family member, friend, or other person willing to take on these responsibilities in the place of the individual with a disability, the individual’s obligation to be responsible for the care and supervision of the service animal would be satisfied. The language of this section is retained, with minor modifications, in § 36.302(c)(5) of the final rule.

Inquiries about service animals. The NPRM proposed language at § 36.302(c)(6) setting forth parameters about how a public accommodation may determine whether an animal qualifies as a service animal. The proposed section stated that a public accommodation may ask if the animal is required because of a disability and what task or work the animal has been trained to do but may not require proof of service animal certification or licensing. Such inquiries are limited to eliciting the information necessary to make a decision without requiring disclosure of confidential disability-related information that a public accommodation does not need.

This language is consistent with the policy guidance outlined in two Department publications, Commonly Asked Questions about Service Animals in Places of Business (1996), available at http://archive.ada.gov/qasrvc.htm, and ADA Guide for Small Businesses (1999), available at http://archive.ada.gov/smbustxt.htm.

Although some commenters contended that the NPRM service animal provisions leave unaddressed the issue of how a public accommodation can distinguish between a psychiatric service animal, which is covered under the final rule, and a comfort animal, which is not, other commenters noted that the Department’s published guidance has helped public accommodations to distinguish between service animals and pets on the basis of an individual’s response to these questions. Accordingly, the Department has retained the NPRM language incorporating its guidance concerning the permissible questions into the final rule.

Some commenters suggested that a title III entity be allowed to require current documentation, no more than one year old, on letterhead from a mental health professional stating the following: (1) That the individual seeking to use the animal has a mental health-related disability; (2) that having the animal accompany the individual is necessary to the individual’s mental health or treatment or to assist the person otherwise; and (3) that the person providing the assessment of the individual is a licensed mental health professional and the individual seeking to use the animal is under that individual’s professional care. These commenters asserted that this will prevent abuse and ensure that individuals with legitimate needs for psychiatric service animals may use them. The Department believes that this proposal would treat persons with psychiatric, intellectual, and other mental disabilities less favorably than persons with physical or sensory disabilities. The proposal would also require persons with disabilities to obtain medical documentation and carry it with them any time they seek to engage in ordinary activities of daily life in their communities— something individuals without disabilities have not been required to do. Accordingly, the Department has concluded that a documentation requirement of this kind would be unnecessary, burdensome, and contrary to the spirit, intent, and mandates of the ADA.

Service animal access to areas of a public accommodation. The NPRM proposed at § 36.302(c)(7) that an individual with a disability who uses a service animal has the same right of access to areas of a public accommodation as members of the public, program participants, and invitees. Commenters indicated that allowing individuals with disabilities to go with their service animals into the same areas as members of the public, program participants, clients, customers, patrons, or invitees is accepted practice by most places of public accommodation. The Department has included a slightly modified version of this provision in § 36.302(c)(7) of the final rule. The Department notes that under the final rule, a healthcare facility must also permit a person with a disability to be accompanied by a service animal in all areas of the facility in which that person would otherwise be allowed. There are some exceptions, however. The Department follows the guidance of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) on the use of service animals in a hospital setting. Zoonotic diseases can be transmitted to humans through bites, scratches, direct contact, arthropod vectors, or aerosols.

Consistent with CDC guidance, it is generally appropriate to exclude a service animal from limited-access areas that employ general infection-control measures, such as operating rooms and burn units. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Guidelines for Environmental Infection Control in Health-Care Facilities: Recommendations of CDC and the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee (June 2003), available at http://www.cdc.gov/hicpac/pdf/guidelines/eic_in_HCF_03.pdf (last visited June 24, 2010). A service animal may accompany its handler to such areas as admissions and discharge offices, the emergency room, inpatient and outpatient rooms, examining and diagnostic rooms, clinics, rehabilitation therapy areas, the cafeteria and vending areas, the pharmacy, restrooms, and all other areas of the facility where healthcare personnel, patients, and visitors are permitted without taking added precautions.

Prohibition against surcharges for use of a service animal. In the NPRM, the Department proposed to incorporate the previously mentioned policy guidance, which prohibits the assessment of a surcharge for the use of a service animal, into proposed § 36.302(c)(8). Several commenters agreed that this provision makes clear the obligation of a place of public accommodation to admit an individual with a service animal without surcharges, and that any additional costs imposed should be factored into the overall cost of doing business and passed on as a charge to all participants, rather than an individualized surcharge to the service animal user. Commenters also noted that service animal users cannot be required to comply with other requirements that are not generally applicable to other persons. If a public accommodation normally charges individuals for the damage they cause, an individual with a disability may be charged for damage caused by his or her service animals. The Department has retained this language, with minor modifications, in the final rule at § 36.302(c)(8).

Training requirement. Certain commenters recommended the adoption of formal training requirements for service animals. The Department has rejected this approach and will not impose any type of formal training requirements or certification process, but will continue to require that service animals be individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of an individual with a disability. While some groups have urged the Department to modify this position, the Department has determined that such a modification would not serve the full array of individuals with disabilities who use service animals, since individuals with disabilities may be capable of training, and some have trained, their service animal to perform tasks or do work to accommodate their disability. A training and certification requirement would increase the expense of acquiring a service animal and might limit access to service animals for individuals with limited financial resources.

Some commenters proposed specific behavior or training standards for service animals, arguing that without such standards, the public has no way to differentiate between untrained pets and service animals. Many of the suggested behavior or training standards were lengthy and detailed. The Department believes that this rule addresses service animal behavior sufficiently by including provisions that address the obligations of the service animal user and the circumstances under which a service animal may be excluded, such as the requirements that an animal be housebroken and under the control of its handler.

Miniature horses. The Department has been persuaded by commenters and the available research to include a provision that would require public accommodations to make reasonable modifications to policies, practices, or procedures to permit the use of a miniature horse by a person with a disability if the miniature horse has been individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of the individual with a disability. The traditional service animal is a dog, which has a long history of guiding individuals who are blind or have low vision, and over time dogs have been trained to perform an even wider variety of services for individuals with all types of disabilities. However, an organization that developed a program to train miniature horses, modeled on the program used for guide dogs, began training miniature horses in 1991.

Although commenters generally supported the species limitations proposed in the NPRM, some were opposed to the exclusion of miniature horses from the definition of a service animal. These commenters noted that these animals have been providing assistance to persons with disabilities for many years. Miniature horses were suggested by some commenters as viable alternatives to dogs for individuals with allergies, or for those whose religious beliefs preclude the use of dogs. Another consideration mentioned in favor of the use of miniature horses is the longer life span and strength of miniature horses in comparison to dogs. Specifically, miniature horses can provide service for more than 25 years while dogs can provide service for approximately seven years, and, because of their strength, miniature horses can provide services that dogs cannot provide. Accordingly, use of miniature horses reduces the cost involved to retire, replace, and train replacement service animals.

The miniature horse is not one specific breed, but may be one of several breeds, with distinct characteristics that produce animals suited to service animal work. These animals generally range in height from 24 inches to 34 inches measured to the withers, or shoulders, and generally weigh between 70 and 100 pounds. These characteristics are similar to those of large breed dogs, such as Labrador Retrievers, Great Danes, and Mastiffs. Similar to dogs, miniature horses can be trained through behavioral reinforcement to be “housebroken.” Most miniature service horse handlers and organizations recommend that when the animals are not doing work or performing tasks, the miniature horses should be kept outside in a designated area instead of indoors in a house.

According to information provided by an organization that trains service horses, these miniature horses are trained to provide a wide array of services to their handlers, primarily guiding individuals who are blind or have low vision, pulling wheelchairs, providing stability and balance for individuals with disabilities that impair the ability to walk, and supplying leverage that enables a person with a mobility disability to get up after a fall. According to the commenter, miniature horses are particularly effective for large stature individuals. The animal can be trained to stand (and in some cases, lie down) at the handler’s feet in venues where space is at a premium, such as assembly areas or inside some vehicles that provide public transportation. Some individuals with disabilities have traveled by train and have flown commercially with their miniature horses.

The miniature horse is not included in the definition of service animal, which is limited to dogs. However, the Department has added a specific provision at § 36.302(c)(9) of the final rule covering miniature horses. Under this provision, public accommodations must make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures to permit the use of a miniature horse by an individual with a disability if the miniature horse has been individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the benefit of the individual with a disability. The public accommodation may take into account a series of assessment factors in determining whether to allow a miniature horse into a specific facility. These include the type, size, and weight of the miniature horse, whether the handler has sufficient control of the miniature horse, whether the miniature horse is housebroken, and whether the miniature horse’s presence in a specific facility compromises legitimate safety requirements that are necessary for safe operation. In addition, paragraphs (c)(3)B–(8) of this section, which are applicable to dogs, also apply to miniature horses.

Ponies and full-size horses are not covered by § 36.302(c)(9). Also, because miniature horses can vary in size and can be larger and less flexible than dogs, covered entities may exclude this type of service animal if the presence of the miniature horse, because of its larger size and lower level of flexibility, results in a fundamental alteration to the nature of the services provided.

Section 36.302(e) Hotel Reservations

Section 36.302 of the 1991 title III regulation requires public accommodations to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when such modifications are necessary to afford access to any goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations. Hotels, timeshare resorts, and other places of lodging are subject to this requirement and must make reasonable modifications to reservations policies, practices, or procedures when necessary to ensure that individuals with disabilities are able to reserve accessible hotel rooms with the same efficiency, immediacy, and convenience as those who do not need accessible guest rooms.

Each year the Department receives many complaints concerning failed reservations. Most of these complaints involve individuals who have reserved an accessible hotel room only to discover upon arrival that the room they reserved is either not available or not accessible. Although problems with reservations services were not addressed in the ANPRM, commenters independently noted an ongoing problem with hotel reservations and urged the Department to provide regulatory guidance. In response, the Department proposed specific language in the NPRM to address hotel reservations. In addition, the Department posed several questions regarding the current practices of hotels and other reservations services including questions about room guarantees and the holding and release of accessible rooms. The Department also questioned whether public accommodations that provide reservations services for a place or places of lodging but do not own, lease (or lease to), or operate a place of lodging—referred to in this discussion as “third-party reservations services”—should also be subject to the NPRM’s proposals concerning hotel reservations.

Although reservations issues were discussed primarily in the context of traditional hotels, the new rule modifies the definition of “places of lodging” to clarify the scope of the rule’s coverage of rental accommodations in timeshare properties, condominium hotels, and mixed-use and corporate hotel facilities that operate as places of public accommodation (as that term is now defined in § 36.104), and the Department received detailed comments, discussed below, regarding the application of reservations requirements to this category of rental accommodations.

General rule on reservations. Section 36.302(e)(1) of the NPRM required a public accommodation that owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of lodging to: Modify its policies, practices, or procedures to ensure that individuals with disabilities can make reservations, including reservations made by telephone, in-person, or through a third party, for accessible guest rooms during the same hours and in the same manner as individuals who do not need accessible rooms. 73 FR 34508, 34553 (June 17, 2008).

Most individual commenters and organizations that represent individuals with disabilities strongly supported the requirement that individuals with disabilities should be able to make reservations for accessible guest rooms during the same hours and in the same manner as individuals who do not need accessible rooms. In many cases individuals with disabilities expressed frustration because, while they are aware of improvements in architectural access brought about as a result of the ADA, they are unable to take advantage of these improvements because of shortcomings in current hotel reservations systems. A number of these commenters pointed out that it can be difficult or impossible to obtain information about accessible rooms and hotel features and that even when information is provided it often is found to be incorrect upon arrival. They also noted difficulty reserving accessible rooms and the inability to guarantee or otherwise ensure that the appropriate accessible room is available when the guest arrives. The ability to obtain information about accessible guest rooms, to make reservations for accessible guest rooms in the same manner as other guests, and to be assured of an accessible room upon arrival was of critical importance to these commenters.

Other commenters, primarily hotels, resort developers, travel agencies, and organizations commenting on their behalf, did not oppose the general rule on reservations, but recommended that the language requiring that reservations be made “in the same manner” be changed to require that reservations be made “in a substantially similar manner.” These commenters argued that hotel reservations are made in many different ways and through a variety of systems. In general, they argued that current reservations database systems may not contain s guests, travel agents, or other third-party reservations services to select the most appropriate room without consulting directly with the hotel, and that updating these systems might be expensive and time consuming. They also noted that in some cases, hotels do not always automatically book accessible rooms when requested to do so. Instead, guests may select from a menu of accessibility and other room options when making reservations. This information is transmitted to the hotel’s reservations staff, who then contact the individual to verify the guest’s accessibility needs. Only when such verification occurs will the accessible room be booked.

The Department is not persuaded that individuals who need to reserve accessible rooms cannot be served in the same manner as those who do not, and it appears that there are hotels of all types and sizes that already meet this requirement. Further, the Department has been able to accomplish this goal in settlement agreements resolving complaints about this issue. As stated in the preamble to the NPRM, basic nondiscrimination principles mandate that individuals with disabilities should be able to reserve hotel rooms with the same efficiency, immediacy, and convenience as those who do not need accessible guest rooms. The regulation does not require reservations services to create new methods for reserving hotel rooms or available timeshare units; instead, covered entities must make the modifications needed to ensure that individuals who need accessible rooms are able to reserve them in the same manner as other guests. If, for example, hotel reservations are not final until all hotel guests have been contacted by the hotel to discuss the guest’s needs, a hotel may follow the same process when reserving accessible rooms. Therefore, the Department declines to change this language, which has been moved to § 36.302(e)(1)(i). However, in response to the commenters who recommended a transition period that would allow reservations services time to modify existing reservations systems to meet the requirements of this rule, § 36.302(e)(3) now provides a 18-month transition period before the requirements of § 36.302(e)(1) will be enforced.

Hotels and organizations commenting on their behalf also requested that the language be changed to eliminate any liability for reservations made through third parties, arguing that they are unable to control the actions of unrelated parties. The rule, both as proposed and as adopted, requires covered public accommodations to ensure that reservations made on their behalf by third parties are made in a manner that results in parity between those who need accessible rooms and those who do not.

Hotels and other places of lodging that use third-party reservations services must make reasonable efforts to make accessible rooms available through at least some of these services and must provide these third-party services with information concerning the accessible features of the hotel and the accessible rooms. To the extent a hotel or other place of lodging makes available such rooms and information to a third-party reservation provider, but the third party fails to provide the information or rooms to people with disabilities in accordance with this section, the hotel or other place of lodging will not be responsible.

Identification of accessible features in hotels and guest rooms. NPRM § 36.302(e)(2) required public accommodations that provide hotel reservations services to identify and describe the accessible features in the hotels and guest rooms offered through that service. This requirement is essential to ensure that individuals with disabilities receive the information they need to benefit from the services offered by the place of lodging. As a practical matter, a public accommodation’s designation of a guest room as “accessible” will not ensure necessarily that the room complies with all of the 1991 Standards. In older facilities subject to barrier removal requirements, strict compliance with the 1991 Standards is not required. Instead, public accommodations must remove barriers to the extent that it is readily achievable to do so.

Further, hotel rooms that are in full compliance with current standards may differ, and individuals with disabilities must be able to ascertain which features—in new and existing facilities—are included in the hotel’s accessible guest rooms. For example, under certain circumstances, an accessible hotel bathroom may meet accessibility requirements with either a bathtub or a roll-in shower. The presence or absence of particular accessible features such as these may be the difference between a room that is usable by a particular person with a disability and one that is not.

Individuals with disabilities strongly supported this requirement. In addition to the importance of information about specific access features, several commenters pointed out the importance of knowing the size and number of beds in a room. Many individuals with disabilities travel with family members, personal care assistants, or other companions and require rooms with at least two beds. Although most hotels provide this information when generally categorizing the type or class of room (e.g., deluxe suite with king bed), as described below, all hotels should consider the size and number of beds to be part of the basic information they are required to provide.

Comments made on behalf of reservations services expressed concern that unless the word “hotels” is stricken from the text, § 36.302(e)(2) of the NPRM essentially would require reservations systems to include a full accessibility report on each hotel or resort property in its system. Along these lines, commenters also suggested that the Department identify the specific accessible features of hotel rooms that must be described in the reservations system. For example, commenters suggested limiting features that must be included to bathroom type (tub or roll-in shower) and communications features.

The Department recognizes that a reservations system is not intended to be an accessibility survey. However, specific information concerning accessibility features is essential to travelers with disabilities. Because of the wide variations in the level of accessibility that travelers will encounter, the Department cannot specify what information must be included in every instance. For hotels that were built in compliance with the 1991 Standards, it may be sufficient to specify that the hotel is accessible and, for each accessible room, to describe the general type of room (e.g., deluxe executive suite), the size and number of beds (e.g., two queen beds), the type of accessible bathing facility (e.g., roll-in shower), and communications features available in the room (e.g., alarms and visual notification devices). Based on that information, many individuals with disabilities will be comfortable making reservations.

For older hotels with limited accessibility features, information about the hotel should include, at a minimum, information about accessible entrances to the hotel, the path of travel to guest check-in and other essential services, and the accessible route to the accessible room or rooms. In addition to the room information described above, these hotels should provide information about important features that do not comply with the 1991 Standards. For example, if the door to the “accessible” room or bathroom is narrower than required, this information should be included (e.g., door to guest room measures 30 inches clear). This width may not meet current standards but may be adequate for some wheelchair users who use narrower chairs. In many cases, older hotels provide services through alternatives to barrier removal, for example, by providing check-in or concierge services at a different, accessible location. Reservations services for these entities should include this information and provide a way for guests to contact the appropriate hotel employee for additional information. To recognize that the information and level of detail needed will vary based on the nature and age of the facility, § 36.302(e)(2) has been moved to § 36.302(e)(1)(ii) in the final rule and modified to require reservations services to:

Identify and describe accessible features in the hotels and guest rooms offered through its reservations service in enough detail to reasonably permit individuals with disabilities to assess independently whether a given hotel or guest room meets his or her accessibility needs. [Emphasis added]

As commenters representing hotels have described, once reservations are made, some hotels may wish to contact the guest to offer additional information and services. Or, many individuals with disabilities may wish to contact the hotel or reservations service for more detailed information. At that point, trained staff (including staff located on-site at the hotel and staff located off-site at a reservations center) should be available to provide additional information such as the specific layout of the room and bathroom, shower design, grab-bar locations, and other amenities available (e.g., bathtub bench).

In the NPRM, the Department sought guidance concerning whether this requirement should be applied to third-party reservations services. Comments made by or on behalf of hotels, resort managers, and other members of the lodging and resort industry pointed out that, in most cases, these third parties do not have direct access to this information and must obtain it from the hotel or other place of lodging. Because third-party reservations services must rely on the place of lodging to provide the requisite information and to ensure that it is accurate and timely, the Department has declined to extend this requirement directly to third-party reservations services.

Hold and release of accessible guest rooms. The Department has addressed the hold and release of accessible guest rooms in settlement agreements and recognizes that current practices vary widely. The Department is concerned about current practices by which accessible guest rooms are released to the general public even though the hotel is not sold out. In such instances, individuals with disabilities may be denied an equal opportunity to benefit from the services offered by the public accommodation, i.e., a hotel guest room. In the NPRM, the Department requested information concerning the current practices of hotels and third-party reservations services with respect to (1) holding accessible rooms for individuals with disabilities and (2) releasing accessible rooms to individuals without disabilities.

Individuals with disabilities and organizations commenting on their behalf strongly supported requiring accessible rooms to be held back for rental by individuals with disabilities. In some cases commenters supported holding back all accessible rooms until all non-accessible rooms were rented. Others supported holding back accessible rooms in each category of rooms until all other rooms of that type were reserved. This latter position was also supported in comments received on behalf of the lodging industry; commenters also noted that this is the current practice of many hotels. In general, holding accessible rooms until requested by an individual who needs a room with accessible features or until it is the only available room of its type was viewed widely as a sensible approach to allocating scarce accessible rooms without imposing unnecessary costs on hotels.

The Department agrees with this latter approach and has added § 36.302(e)(1)(iii), which requires covered entities to hold accessible rooms for use by individuals with disabilities until all other guest rooms of that type have been rented and the accessible room requested is the only remaining room of that type. For example, if there are 25 rooms of a given type and two of these rooms are accessible, the reservations service is required to rent all 23 non-accessible rooms before it is permitted to rent these two accessible rooms to individuals without disabilities. If a one-of-a-kind room is accessible, that room is available to the first party to request it. The Department believes that this is the fairest approach available since it reserves accessible rooms for individuals who require them until all non-accessible rooms of that type have been reserved, and then provides equal access to any remaining rooms. It is also fair to hotels because it does not require them to forego renting a room that actually has been requested in favor of the possibility that an individual with a disability may want to reserve it at a later date.

Requirement to block accessible guest room reservations. NPRM § 36.302(e)(3) required a public accommodation that owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of lodging to guarantee accessible guest rooms that are reserved through a reservations service to the same extent that it guarantees rooms that are not accessible. In the NPRM, the Department sought comment on the current practices of hotels and third party reservations services with respect to “guaranteed” hotel reservations and on the impact of requiring a public accommodation to guarantee accessible rooms to the extent it guarantees other rooms.

Comments received by the Department by and on behalf of both individuals with disabilities and public accommodations that provide reservations services made clear that, in many cases, when speaking of room guarantees, parties who are not familiar with hotel terminology actually mean to refer to policies for blocking and holding specific hotel rooms. Several commenters explained that, in most cases, when an individual makes “reservations,” hotels do not reserve specific rooms; rather the individual is reserving a room with certain features at a given price. When the hotel guest arrives, he or she is provided with a room that has those features.

In most cases, this does not pose a problem because there are many available rooms of a given type. However, in comparison, accessible rooms are much more limited in availability and there may be only one room in a given hotel that meets a guest’s needs. As described in the discussion on the identification of accessible features in hotels and guest rooms, the presence or absence of particular accessible features may be the difference between a room that is usable by a particular person with a disability and one that is not.

For that reason, the Department has added § 36.302(e)(1)(iv) to the final rule. Section 36.302(e)(1)(iv) requires covered entities to reserve, upon request, accessible guest rooms or specific types of guest rooms and ensure that the guest rooms requested are blocked and removed from all reservations systems (to eliminate double-booking, which is a common problem that arises when rooms are made available to be reserved through more than one reservations service). Of course, if a public accommodation typically requires a payment or deposit from its patrons in order to reserve a room, it may require the same payment or deposit from individuals with disabilities before it reserves an accessible room and removes it from all its reservations systems. These requirements should alleviate the widely-reported problem of arriving at a hotel only to discover that, although an accessible room was reserved, the room available is not accessible or does not have the specific accessible features needed. Many hotels already have a similar process in place for other guest rooms that are unique or one-of-a-kind, such as “Presidential” suites. The Department has declined to extend this requirement directly to third-party reservations services. Comments the Department received in response to the NPRM indicate that most of the actions required to implement these requirements primarily are within the control of the entities that own the place of lodging or that manage it on behalf of its owners.

Guarantees of reservations for accessible guest rooms. The Department recognizes that not all reservations are guaranteed, and the rule does not impose an affirmative duty to guarantee reservations. When a public accommodation does guarantee hotel or other room reservations, it must provide the same guarantee for accessible guest rooms as it makes for other rooms, except that it must apply that guarantee to the specific room reserved and blocked, even if in other situations, its guarantee policy only guarantees that a room of a specific type will be available at the guaranteed price. Without this reasonable modification to its guarantee policy, any guarantee for accessible rooms would be meaningless. If, for example, a hotel makes reservations for an accessible “Executive Suite” but, upon arrival, offers its guest an inaccessible Executive Suite that the guest is unable to enter, it would be meaningless to consider the hotel’s guarantee fulfilled. As with the requirements for identifying, holding, and blocking accessible rooms, the Department has declined to extend this requirement directly to third-party reservations services because the fulfillment of guarantees largely is beyond their power to control.

Application to rental units in timeshare, vacation communities, and condo-hotels. Because the Department has revised the definition of “Places of Lodging” in the final rule, the reservations requirements now apply to guest rooms and other rental units in timeshares, vacation communities, and condo-hotels where some or all of the units are owned and controlled by individual owners and rented out some portion of time to the public, as compared to traditional hotels and motels that are owned, controlled, and rented to the public by one entity. If a reservations service owns and controls one or more of the guest rooms or other units in the rental property (e.g., a developer who retains and rents out unsold inventory), it is subject to the requirements set forth in § 36.302(e).

Several commenters expressed concern about any rule that would require accessible units that are owned individually to be removed from the rental pool and rented last. Commenters pointed out that this would be a disadvantage to the owners of accessible units because they would be rented last, if at all. Further, certain vacation property managers consider holding specific units back to be a violation of their ethical responsibility to present all properties they manage at an equal advantage. To address these concerns, the Department has added § 36.302(e)(2), which exempts reservations for individual guest rooms and other units that are not owned or substantially controlled by the entity that owns, leases, or operates the overall facility from the requirement that accessible guest rooms be held back from rental until all other guest rooms of that type have been rented. Section 36.302(e)(2) also exempts such rooms from requirements for blocking and guaranteeing reserved rooms. In resort developments with mixed ownership structures, such as a resort where some units are operated as hotel rooms and others are owned and controlled individually, a reservations service operated by the owner of the hotel portion may apply the exemption only to the rooms that are not owned or substantially controlled by the entity that owns, manages, or otherwise controls the overall facility.

Other reservations-related comments made on behalf of these entities reflected concerns similar to the general concerns expressed with respect to traditional hotel properties. For example, commenters noted that because of the unique nature of the timeshare industry, additional flexibility is needed when making reservations for accessible units. One commenter explained that reservations are sometimes made through unusual entities such as exchange companies, which are not public accommodations and which operate to trade ownership interests of millions of individual owners. The commenter expressed concern that developers or resort owners would be held responsible for the actions of these exchange entities. If, as described, the choice to list a unit with an exchange company is made by the individual owner of the property and the exchange company does not operate on behalf of the reservations service, the reservations service is not liable for the exchange company’s actions.

As with hotels, the Department believes that within the 18-month transition period these reservations services should be able to modify their systems to ensure that potential guests with disabilities who need accessible rooms can make reservations during the same hours and in the same manner as those who do not need accessible rooms.

Section 36.302(f) Ticketing

The 1991 title III regulation did not contain specific regulatory language on ticketing. The ticketing policies and practices of public accommodations, however, are subject to title III’s nondiscrimination provisions. Through the investigation of complaints, enforcement actions, and public comments related to ticketing, the Department became aware that some venue operators, ticket sellers, and distributors were violating title III’s nondiscrimination mandate by not providing individuals with disabilities the same opportunities to purchase tickets for accessible seating as provided to spectators purchasing conventional seats. In the NPRM, the Department proposed § 36.302(f) to provide explicit direction and guidance on discriminatory practices for entities involved in the sale or distribution of tickets.

The Department received comments from advocacy groups, assembly area trade associations, public accommodations, and individuals. Many commenters supported the addition of regulatory language pertaining to ticketing and urged the Department to retain it in the final rule. Several commenters, however, questioned why there were inconsistencies between the title II and title III provisions and suggested that the same language be used for both titles. The Department has decided to retain ticketing regulatory language and to ensure consistency between the ticketing provisions in title II and title III.

Because many in the ticketing industry view season tickets and other multi-event packages differently from individual tickets, the Department bifurcated some season ticket provisions from those concerning single-event tickets in the NPRM. This structure, however, resulted in some provisions being repeated for both types of tickets but not for others even though they were intended to apply to both types of tickets. The result was that it was not entirely clear that some of the provisions that were not repeated also were intended to apply to season tickets. The Department is addressing the issues raised by these commenters using a different approach. For the purposes of this section, a single event refers to an individual performance for which tickets may be purchased. In contrast, a series of events includes, but is not limited to, subscription events, event packages, season tickets, or any other tickets that may be purchased for multiple events of the same type over the course of a specified period of time whose ownership right reverts to the public accommodation at the end of each season or time period. Series-of-events tickets that give their holders an enhanced ability to purchase such tickets from the public accommodation in seasons or periods of time that follow, such as a right of first refusal or higher ranking on waiting lists for more desirable seats, are subject to the provisions in this section. In addition, the final rule merges together some NPRM paragraphs that dealt with related topics and has reordered and renamed some of the paragraphs that were in the NPRM.

Ticket sales. In the NPRM, the Department proposed, in § 36.302(f)(1), a general rule that a public accommodation shall modify its policies, practices, or procedures to ensure that individuals with disabilities can purchase tickets for accessible seating for an event or series of events in the same way as others (i.e., during the same hours and through the same distribution methods as other seating is sold). “Accessible seating” is defined in § 36.302(f)(1)(i) of the final rule to mean “wheelchair spaces and companion seats that comply with sections 221 and 802 of the 2010 Standards along with any other seats required to be offered for sale to the individual with a disability pursuant to paragraph (4) of this section.” The defined term does not include designated aisle seats. A “wheelchair space” refers to a space for a single wheelchair and its occupant.

The NPRM proposed requiring that accessible seats be sold through the ‘same methods of distribution” as non-accessible seats. 73 FR 34508, 34554 (June 17, 2008). Comments from venue managers and others in the business community, in general, noted that multiple parties are involved in ticketing, and because accessible seats may not be allotted to all parties involved at each stage, such parties should be protected from liability. For example, one commenter noted that a third-party ticket vendor, like Ticketmaster, can only sell the tickets it receives from its client. Because § 36.302(f)(1) of the final rule requires venue operators to make available accessible seating through the same methods of distribution they use for their regular tickets, venue operators that provide tickets to third-party ticket vendors are required to provide accessible seating to the third-party ticket vendor. This provision will enhance third-party ticket vendors” ability to acquire and sell accessible seating for sale in the future. The Department notes that once third-party ticket vendors acquire accessible tickets, they are obligated to sell them in accordance with these rules.

The Department also has received frequent complaints that individuals with disabilities have not been able to purchase accessible seating over the Internet, and instead have had to engage in a laborious process of calling a customer service line, or sending an email to a customer service representative and waiting for a response. Not only is such a process burdensome, but it puts individuals with disabilities at a disadvantage in purchasing tickets for events that are popular and may sell out in minutes. Because § 36.302(f)(5) of the final rule authorizes venues to release accessible seating in case of a sell-out, individuals with disabilities effectively could be cut off from buying tickets unless they also have the ability to purchase tickets in real time over the Internet. The Department’s new regulatory language is designed to address this problem.

Several commenters representing assembly areas raised concerns about offering accessible seating for sale over the Internet. They contended that this approach would increase the incidence of fraud since anyone easily could purchase accessible seating over the Internet. They also asserted that it would be difficult technologically to provide accessible seating for sale in real time over the Internet, or that to do so would require simplifying the rules concerning the purchase of multiple additional accompanying seats. Moreover, these commenters argued that requiring an individual purchasing accessible seating to speak with a customer service representative would allow the venue to meet the patron’s needs most appropriately and ensure that wheelchair spaces are reserved for individuals with disabilities who require wheelchair spaces. Finally, these commenters argued that individuals who can transfer effectively and conveniently from a wheelchair to a seat with a movable armrest seat could instead purchase designated aisle seats.

The Department considered these concerns carefully and has decided to continue with the general approach proposed in the NPRM. Although fraud is an important concern, the Department believes that it is best combated by other means that would not have the effect of limiting the ability of individuals with disabilities to purchase tickets, particularly since restricting the purchase of accessible seating over the Internet will, of itself, not curb fraud. In addition, the Department has identified permissible means for covered entities to reduce the incidence of fraudulent accessible seating ticket purchases in § 36.302(f)(8) of the final rule.

Several commenters questioned whether ticket Web sites themselves must be accessible to individuals who are blind or have low vision, and if so, what that requires. The Department has consistently interpreted the ADA to cover Web sites that are operated by public accommodations and stated that such sites must provide their services in an accessible manner or provide an accessible alternative to the Web site that is available 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The final rule, therefore, does not impose any new obligation in this area. The accessibility of Web sites is discussed in more detail in the section entitled “Other Issues.”

In § 36.302(f)(2) of the NPRM, the Department also proposed requiring public accommodations to make accessible seating available during all stages of tickets sales including, but not limited to, presales, promotions, lotteries, waitlists, and general sales. For example, if tickets will be presold or an event that is open only to members of a fan club, or to holders of a particular credit card, then tickets for accessible seating must be made available for purchase through those means. This requirement does not mean that any individual with a disability would be able to purchase those seats. Rather, it means that an individual with a disability who meets the requirement for such a sale (e.g., who is a member of the fan club or holds that credit card) will be able to participate in the special promotion and purchase accessible seating. The Department has maintained the substantive provisions of the NPRM’s §§ 36.302(f)(1) and (f)(2) but has combined them in a single paragraph at § 36.302(f)(1)(ii) of the final rule so that all of the provisions having to do with the manner in which tickets are sold are located in a single paragraph.

Identification of available accessible seating. In the NPRM, the Department proposed § 36.302(f)(3), which, as modified and renumbered § 36.302(f)(2)(iii) in the final rule, requires a facility to identify available accessible seating through seating maps, brochures, or other methods if that information is made available about other seats sold to the general public. This rule requires public accommodations to provide information about accessible seating to the same degree of specificity that it provides information about general seating. For example, if a seating map displays color-coded blocks pegged to prices for general seating, then accessible seating must be similarly color-coded. Likewise, if covered entities provide detailed maps that show exact seating and pricing for general seating, they must provide the same for accessible seating.

The NPRM did not specify a requirement to identify prices for accessible seating. The final rule requires that if such information is provided for general seating, it must be provided for accessible seating as well.

In the NPRM, the Department proposed in § 36.302(f)(4) that a public accommodation, upon being asked, must inform persons with disabilities and their companions of the locations of all unsold or otherwise available seating. This provision is intended to prevent the practice of ‘steering” individuals with disabilities to certain accessible seating so that the facility can maximize potential ticket sales by releasing unsold accessible seating, especially in preferred or desirable locations, for sale to the general public. The Department received no significant comment on this proposal. The Department has retained this provision in the final rule but has added it, with minor modifications, to § 36.302(f)(2) as paragraph (i).

Ticket prices. In the NPRM, the Department proposed § 36.302(f)(7) requiring that ticket prices for accessible seating be set no higher than the prices for other seats in that seating section for that event. The NPRM’s provision also required that accessible seating be made available at every price range, and if an existing facility has barriers to accessible seating within a particular price range, a proportionate amount of seating (determined by the ratio of the total number of seats at that price level to the total number of seats in the assembly area) must be offered in an accessible location at that same price. Under this rule, for example, if it is not readily achievable for a 20,000-seat facility built in 1980 to place accessible seating in the $20-price category, which is on the upper deck, it must place a proportionate number of seats in an accessible location for $20. If the upper deck has 2,000 seats, then the facility must place 10 percent of its accessible seating in an accessible location for $20 provided that it is part of a seating section where ticket prices are equal to or more than $20—a facility may not place the $20-accessible seating in a $10-seating section. The Department received no significant comment on this rule, and it has been retained, as amended, in the final rule in § 36.302(f)(3).

Purchase of multiple tickets. In the NPRM, the Department proposed § 36.302(f)(9) to address one of the most common ticketing complaints raised with the Department: that individuals with disabilities are not able to purchase more than two tickets. The Department proposed this provision to facilitate the ability of individuals with disabilities to attend events with friends, companions, or associates who may or may not have a disability by enabling individuals with disabilities to purchase the maximum number of tickets allowed per transaction to other spectators; by requiring venues to place accompanying individuals in general seating as close as possible to accessible seating (in the event that a group must be divided because of the large size of the group); and by allowing an individual with a disability to purchase up to three additional contiguous seats per wheelchair space if they are available at the time of sale. Section 36.302(f)(9)(ii) of the NPRM required that a group containing one or more wheelchair users must be placed together, if possible, and that in the event that the group could not be placed together, the individuals with disabilities may not be isolated from the rest of the group.

The Department asked in the NPRM whether this rule was sufficient to effectuate the integration of individuals with disabilities. Many advocates and individuals praised it as a welcome and much-needed change, stating that the trade-off of being able to sit with their family or friends was worth reducing the number of seats available for individuals with disabilities. Some commenters went one step further and suggested that the number of additional accompanying seats should not be restricted to three.

Although most of the substance of the proposed provision on the purchase of multiple tickets has been maintained in the final rule, it has been renumbered as § 36.302(f)(4), reorganized, and supplemented. To preserve the availability of accessible seating for other individuals with disabilities, the Department has not expanded the rule beyond three additional contiguous seats. Section 36.302(f)(4)(i) of the final rule requires public accommodations to make available for purchase three additional tickets for seats in the same row that are contiguous with the wheelchair space, provided that at the time of purchase there are three such seats available. The requirement that the additional seats be “contiguous with the wheelchair space” does not mean that each of the additional seats must be in actual contact or have a border in common with the wheelchair space; however, at least one of the additional seats should be immediately adjacent to the wheelchair space. The Department recognizes that it will often be necessary to use vacant wheelchair spaces to provide for contiguous seating.

The Department has added paragraphs (4)(ii) and (4)(iii) to clarify that in situations where there are insufficient unsold seats to provide three additional contiguous seats per wheelchair space or a ticket office restricts sales of tickets to a particular event to less than four tickets per customer, the obligation to make available three additional contiguous seats per wheelchair space would be affected. For example, if at the time of purchase, there are only two additional contiguous seats available for purchase because the third has been sold already, then the ticket purchaser would be entitled to two such seats. In this situation, the public entity would be required to make up the difference by offering one additional ticket for sale that is as close as possible to the accessible seats. Likewise, if ticket purchases for an event are limited to two per customer, a person who uses a wheelchair who seeks to purchase tickets would be entitled to purchase only one additional contiguous seat for the event.

The Department has also added paragraph (4)(iv) to clarify that the requirement for three additional contiguous seats is not intended to serve as a cap if the maximum number of tickets that may be purchased by members of the general public exceeds the four tickets an individual with a disability ordinarily would be allowed to purchase (i.e., a wheelchair space and three additional contiguous seats). If the maximum number of tickets that may be purchased by members of the general public exceeds four, an individual with a disability is to be allowed to purchase the maximum number of tickets; however, additional tickets purchased by an individual with a disability beyond the wheelchair space and the three additional contiguous seats provided in § 36.302(f)(4 )(i) do not have to be contiguous with the wheelchair space.

The NPRM proposed at § 36.302(f)(9)(ii) that for group sales, if a group includes one or more individuals who use a wheelchair, then the group shall be placed in a seating area with accessible seating so that, if possible, the group can sit together. If it is necessary to divide the group, it should be divided so that the individuals in the group who use wheelchairs are not isolated from the rest of the members of their group. The final rule retains the NPRM language in paragraph (4)(v).

Hold and release of unsold accessible seating. The Department recognizes that not all accessible seating will be sold in all assembly areas for every event to individuals with disabilities who need such seating and that public accommodations may have opportunities to sell such seating to the general public. The Department proposed in the NPRM a provision aimed at striking a balance between affording individuals with disabilities adequate time to purchase accessible seating and the entity’s desire to maximize ticket sales. In the NPRM, the Department proposed § 36.302(f)(6), which allowed for the release of accessible seating under the following circumstances: (i) When all seating in the facility has been sold, excluding luxury boxes, club boxes, or suites; (ii) when all seating in a designated area has been sold and the accessible seating being released is in the same area; or (iii) when all seating in a designated price range has been sold and the accessible seating being released is within the same price range.

The Department’s NPRM asked “whether additional regulatory guidance is required or appropriate in terms of a more detailed or set schedule for the release of tickets in conjunction with the three approaches described above. For example, does the proposed regulation address the variable needs of assembly areas covered by the ADA? Is additional regulatory guidance required to eliminate discriminatory policies, practices and procedures related to the sale, hold, and release of accessible seating? What considerations should appropriately inform the determination of when unsold accessible seating can be released to the general public?” 73 FR 34508, 34527 (June 17, 2008).

The Department received comments both supporting and opposing the inclusion of a hold-and-release provision. One side proposed loosening the restrictions on the release of unsold accessible seating. One commenter from a trade association suggested that tickets should be released regardless of whether there is a sell-out, and that these tickets should be released according to a set schedule. Conversely, numerous individuals, advocacy groups, and at least one public entity urged the Department to tighten the conditions under which unsold tickets for accessible seating may be released. These commenters suggested that venues should not be permitted to release tickets during the first two weeks of sale, or alternatively, that they should not be permitted to be released earlier than 48 hours before a sold-out event. Many of these commenters criticized the release of accessible seating under the second and third prongs of § 36.302(f)(6) in the NPRM (when there is a sell-out in general seating in a designated seating area or in a price range), arguing that it would create situations where general seating would be available for purchase while accessible seating would not be.

Numerous commenters—both from the industry and from advocacy groups—asked for clarification of the term ‘sell-out.” Business groups commented that industry practice is to declare a sell-out when there are only ‘scattered singles” available— isolated seats that cannot be purchased as a set of adjacent pairs. Many of those same commenters also requested that ‘sell-out” be qualified with the phrase “of all seating available for sale” since it is industry practice to hold back from release tickets to be used for groups connected with that event (e.g., the promoter, home team, or sports league). They argued that those tickets are not available for sale and any return of these tickets to the general inventory happens close to the event date. Noting the practice of holding back tickets, one advocacy group suggested that covered entities be required to hold back accessible seating in proportion to the number of tickets that are held back for later release.

The Department has concluded that it would be inappropriate to interfere with industry practice by defining what constitutes a ‘sell-out” and that a public accommodation should continue to use its own approach to defining a ‘sell-out.” If, however, a public accommodation declares a sell-out by reference to those seats that are available for sale, but it holds back tickets that it reasonably anticipates will be released later, it must hold back a proportional percentage of accessible seating to be released as well.

Adopting any of the alternatives proposed n the comments summarized above would have upset the balance between protecting the rights of individuals with disabilities and meeting venues” concerns about lost revenue from unsold accessible seating. As a result, the Department has retained § 36.302(f)(6) renumbered as § 36.302(f)(5) in the final rule. The Department has, however, modified the regulation text to specify that accessible seating may be released only when “all non-accessible tickets in a designated seating area have been sold and the tickets for accessible seating are being released in the same designated area.” As stated in the NPRM, the Department intended for this provision to allow, for example, the release of accessible seating at the orchestra level when all other seating at the orchestra level is sold. The Department has added this language to the final rule at § 36.302(f)(5)(B) to clarify that venues cannot designate or redesignate seating areas for the purpose of maximizing the release of unsold accessible seating. So, for example, a venue may not determine on an ad hoc basis that a group of seats at the orchestra level is a designated seating area in order to release unsold accessible seating in that area.

The Department also has maintained the hold-and-release provisions that appeared in the NPRM, but has added a provision to address the release of accessible seating for series-of-events tickets on a series-of-events basis. Many commenters asked the Department whether unsold accessible seating may be converted to general seating and released to the general public on a season-ticket basis or longer when tickets typically are sold as a season-ticket package or other long-term basis. Several disability rights organizations and individual commenters argued that such a practice should not be permitted, and, if it were, that conditions should be imposed to ensure that individuals with disabilities have future access to those seats.

The Department interprets the fundamental principle of the ADA as a requirement to give individuals with disabilities equal, not better, access to those opportunities available to the general public. Thus, for example, a public accommodation that sells out its facility on a season-ticket only basis is not required to leave unsold its accessible seating if no persons with disabilities purchase those season-ticket seats. Of course, public accommodations may choose to go beyond what is required by reserving accessible seating for individuals with disabilities (or releasing such seats for sale to the general public) on an individual-game basis.

If a covered entity chooses to release unsold accessible seating for sale on a season-ticket or other long-term basis, it must meet at least two conditions. Under § 36.302(f)(5)(iii) of the final rule, public accommodations must leave flexibility for game-day change-outs to accommodate ticket transfers on the secondary market. And public accommodations must modify their ticketing policies so that, in future years, individuals with disabilities will have the ability to purchase accessible seating on the same basis as other patrons (e.g., as season tickets). Put differently, releasing accessible seating to the general public on a season-ticket or other long-term basis cannot result in that seating being lost to individuals with disabilities in perpetuity. If, in future years, season tickets become available and persons with disabilities have reached the top of the waiting list or have met any other eligibility criteria for season ticket purchases, public accommodations must ensure that accessible seating will be made available to the eligible individuals. In order to accomplish this, the Department has added § 36.302(f)(5)(iii)(A) to require public accommodations that release accessible season tickets to individuals who do not have disabilities that require the features of accessible seating to establish a process to prevent the automatic reassignment of such ticket holders to accessible seating. For example, a public accommodation could have in place a system whereby accessible seating that was released because it was not purchased by individuals with disabilities is not in the pool of tickets available for purchase for the following season unless and until the conditions for ticket release have been satisfied in the following season. Alternatively, a public accommodation might release tickets for accessible seating only when a purchaser who does not need its features agrees that he or she has no guarantee of or right to the same seats in the following season, or that if season tickets are guaranteed for the following season, the purchaser agrees that the offer to purchase tickets is limited to non-accessible seats with, to the extent practicable, comparable price, view, and amenities to the accessible seats such individuals held in the prior year. The Department is aware that this rule may require some administrative changes but believes that this process will not create undue financial and administrative burdens. The Department believes that this approach is balanced and beneficial. It will allow public accommodations to sell all of their seats and will leave open the possibility, in future seasons or series of events, that persons who need accessible seating may have access to it.

The Department also has added § 36.302(f)(5)(iii)(B) to address how season tickets or series-of-events tickets that have attached ownership rights should be handled if the ownership right returns to the public accommodation (e.g., when holders forfeit their ownership right by failing to purchase season tickets or sell their ownership right back to a public accommodation). If the ownership right is for accessible seating, the public accommodation is required to adopt a process that allows an eligible individual with a disability who requires the features of such seating to purchase the rights and tickets for such seating.

Nothing in the regulatory text prevents a public accommodation from establishing a process whereby such ticket holders agree to be voluntarily reassigned from accessible seating to another seating area so that individuals with mobility disabilities or disabilities that require the features of accessible seating and who become newly eligible to purchase season tickets have an opportunity to do so. For example, a public accommodation might seek volunteers to relocate to another location that is at least as good in terms of its location, price, and amenities or a public accommodation might use a seat with forfeited ownership rights as an inducement to get a ticket holder to give up accessible seating he or she does not need.

Ticket transfer. The Department received many comments asking whether accessible seating has the same transfer rights as general seats. The proposed regulation at § 36.302(f)(5) required that individuals with disabilities must be allowed to purchase season tickets for accessible seating on the same terms and conditions as individuals purchasing season tickets for general seating, including the right—if it exists for other ticket-holders—to transfer individual tickets to friends or associates. Some commenters pointed out that the NPRM proposed explicitly allowing individuals with disabilities holding season tickets to transfer tickets but did not address the transfer of tickets purchased for individual events. Several commenters representing assembly areas argued that persons with disabilities holding tickets for an individual event should not be allowed to sell or transfer them to third parties because such ticket transfers would increase the risk of fraud or would make unclear the obligation of the entity to accommodate secondary ticket transfers. They argued that individuals holding accessible seating should either be required to transfer their tickets to another individual with a disability or return them to the facility for a refund.

Although the Department is sympathetic to concerns about administrative burden, curtailing transfer rights for accessible seating when other ticket holders are permitted to transfer tickets would be inconsistent with the ADA’s guiding principle that individuals with disabilities must have rights equal to others. Thus, the Department has added language in the final rule in § 36.302(f)(6) that requires that individuals with disabilities holding accessible seating for any event have the same transfer rights accorded other ticket holders for that event. Section 36.302(f)(6) also preserves the rights of individuals with disabilities who hold tickets to accessible seats for a series of events to transfer individual tickets to others, regardless of whether the transferee needs accessible seating. This approach recognizes the common practice of individuals splitting season tickets or other multi-event ticket packages with friends, colleagues, or other spectators to make the purchase of season tickets affordable; individuals with disabilities should not be placed in the burdensome position of having to find another individual with a disability with whom to share the package.

This provision, however, does not require public accommodations to seat an individual who holds a ticket to an accessible seat in such seating if the individual does not need the accessible features of the seat. A public accommodation may reserve the right to switch these individuals to different seats if they are available, but a public accommodation is not required to remove a person without a disability who is using accessible seating from that seating, even if a person who uses a wheelchair shows up with a ticket from the secondary market for a non-accessible seat and wants accessible seating.

Secondary ticket market. Section 36.302(f)(7) is a new provision in the final rule that requires a public accommodation to modify its policies, practices, or procedures to ensure that an individual with a disability, who acquires a ticket in the secondary ticket market, may use that ticket under the same terms and conditions as other ticket holders who acquire a ticket in the secondary market for an event or series of events. This principle was discussed in the NPRM in connection with § 36.302(f)(5), pertaining to season-ticket sales. There, the Department asked for public comment regarding a public accommodation’s proposed obligation to accommodate the transfer of accessible seating tickets on the secondary ticket market to those who do not need accessible seating and vice versa.

The secondary ticket market, for the purposes of this rule, broadly means any transfer of tickets after the public accommodation’s initial sale of tickets to individuals or entities. It thus encompasses a wide variety of transactions, from ticket transfers between friends to transfers using commercial exchange systems. Many commenters noted that the distinction between the primary and secondary ticket market has become blurred as a result of agreements between teams, leagues, and secondary market sellers. These commenters noted that the secondary market may operate independently of the public accommodation, and parts of the secondary market, such as ticket transfers between friends, undoubtedly are outside the direct jurisdiction of the public accommodation. To the extent that venues seat persons who have purchased tickets on the secondary market, they must similarly seat persons with disabilities who have purchased tickets on the secondary market. In addition, some public accommodations may acquire ADA obligations directly by formally entering the secondary ticket market.

The Department’s enforcement experience with assembly areas also has revealed that venues regularly provide for and make last-minute seat transfers. As long as there are vacant wheelchair spaces, requiring venues to provide wheelchair spaces for patrons who acquired inaccessible seats and need wheelchair spaces is an example of a reasonable modification of a policy under title III of the ADA. Similarly, a person who has a ticket for a wheelchair space but who does not require its accessible features could be offered non-accessible seating if such seating is available.

The Department’s longstanding position that title III of the ADA requires venues to make reasonable modifications in their policies to allow individuals with disabilities who acquired non-accessible tickets on the secondary ticket market to be seated in accessible seating, where such seating is vacant, is supported by the only Federal court to address this issue. See Independent Living Resources v. Oregon Arena Corp., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1171 (D. Or. 1998). The Department has incorporated this position into the final rule at § 36.302(f)(7)(ii).

The NPRM contained two questions aimed at gauging concern with the Department’s consideration of secondary ticket market sales. The first question asked whether a secondary purchaser who does not have a disability and who buys an accessible seat should be required to move if the space is needed for someone with a disability.

Many disability rights advocates answered that the individual should move provided that there is a seat of comparable or better quality available for him and his companion. Some venues, however, expressed concerns about this provision, and asked how they are to identify who should be moved and what obligations apply if there are no seats available that are equivalent or better in quality.

The Department’s second question asked whether there are particular concerns about the obligation to provide accessible seating, including a wheelchair space, to an individual with a disability who purchases an inaccessible seat through the secondary market.

Industry commenters contended that this requirement would create a “logistical nightmare,” with venues scrambling to reseat patrons in the short time between the opening of the venues” doors and the commencement of the event. Furthermore, they argued that they might not be able to reseat all individuals and that even if they were able to do so, patrons might be moved to inferior seats (whether in accessible or non-accessible seating). These commenters also were concerned that they would be sued by patrons moved under such circumstances.

These commenters seem to have misconstrued the rule. Covered entities are not required to seat every person who acquires a ticket for inaccessible seating but needs accessible seating, and are not required to move any individual who acquires a ticket for accessible seating but does not need it. Covered entities that allow patrons to buy and sell tickets on the secondary market must make reasonable modifications to their policies to allow persons with disabilities to participate in secondary ticket transfers. The Department believes that there is no one-size-fits-all rule that will suit all assembly areas. In those circumstances where a venue has accessible seating vacant at the time an individual with a disability who needs accessible seating presents his ticket for inaccessible seating at the box office, the venue must allow the individual to exchange his ticket for an accessible seat in a comparable location if such an accessible seat is vacant. Where, however, a venue has sold all of its accessible seating, the venue has no obligation to provide accessible seating to the person with a disability who purchased an inaccessible seat on the secondary market. Venues may encourage individuals with disabilities who hold tickets for inaccessible seating to contact the box office before the event to notify them of their need for accessible seating, even though they may not require ticketholders to provide such notice.

The Department notes that public accommodations are permitted, though not required, to adopt policies regarding moving patrons who do not need the features of an accessible seat. If a public accommodation chooses to do so, it might mitigate administrative concerns by marking tickets for accessible seating as such, and printing on the ticket that individuals who purchase such seats but who do not need accessible seating are subject to being moved to other seats in the facility if the accessible seating is required for an individual with a disability. Such a venue might also develop and publish a ticketing policy to provide transparency to the general public and to put holders of tickets for accessible seating who do not require it on notice that they may be moved.

Prevention of fraud in purchase of accessible seating. Assembly area managers and advocacy groups have informed the Department that the fraudulent purchase of accessible seating is a pressing concern. Curbing fraud is a goal that public accommodations and individuals with disabilities share. Steps taken to prevent fraud, however, must be balanced carefully against the privacy rights of individuals with disabilities. Such measures also must not impose burdensome requirements upon, nor restrict the rights of, individuals with disabilities.

In the NPRM, the Department struck a balance between these competing concerns by proposing § 36.302(f)(8), which prohibited public accommodations from asking for proof of disability before the purchase of accessible seating but provided guidance in two paragraphs on appropriate measures for curbing fraud. Paragraph (i) proposed allowing a public accommodation to ask individuals purchasing single-event tickets for accessible seating whether they are wheelchair users. Paragraph (ii) proposed allowing a public accommodation to require individuals purchasing accessible seating for season tickets or other multi-event ticket packages to attest in writing that the accessible seating is for a wheelchair user. Additionally, the NPRM proposed to permit venues, when they have good cause to believe that an individual has fraudulently purchased accessible seating, to investigate that individual.

Several commenters objected to this rule on the ground that it would require a wheelchair user to be the purchaser of tickets. The Department has reworded this paragraph to reflect that the individual with a disability does not have to be the ticket purchaser. The final rule allows third parties to purchase accessible tickets at the request of an individual with a disability.

Commenters also argued that other individuals with disabilities who do not use wheelchairs should be permitted to purchase accessible seating. Some individuals with disabilities who do not use wheelchairs urged the Department to change the rule, asserting that they, too, need accessible seating. The Department agrees that such seating, although designed for use by a wheelchair user, may be used by non-wheelchair users, if those persons are persons with a disability who need to use accessible seating because of a mobility disability or because their disability requires the use of the features that accessible seating provides (e.g., individuals who cannot bend their legs because of braces, or individuals who, because of their disability, cannot sit in a straight-back chair).

Some commenters raised concerns that allowing venues to ask questions to determine whether individuals purchasing accessible seating are doing so legitimately would burden individuals with disabilities in the purchase of accessible seating. The Department has retained the substance of this provision in § 36.302(f)(8) of the final rule, but emphasizes that such questions should be asked at the initial time of purchase. For example, if the method of purchase is via the Internet, then the question(s) should be answered by clicking a yes or no box during the transaction. The public accommodation may warn purchasers that accessible seating is for individuals with disabilities and that individuals purchasing such tickets fraudulently are subject to relocation.

One commenter argued that face-to-face contact between the venue and the ticket holder should be required in order to prevent fraud and suggested that individuals who purchase accessible seating should be required to pick up their tickets at the box office and then enter the venue immediately. The Department has declined to adopt that suggestion. It would be discriminatory to require individuals with disabilities to pick up tickets at the box office when other spectators are not required to do so. If the assembly area wishes to make face-to-face contact with accessible seating ticket holders to curb fraud, it may do so through its ushers and other customer service personnel located within the seating area.

Some commenters asked whether it is permissible for assembly areas to have voluntary clubs where individuals with disabilities self-identify to the public accommodation in order to become a member of a club that entitles them to purchase accessible seating reserved for club members or otherwise receive priority in purchasing accessible seating. The Department agrees that such clubs are permissible, provided that a reasonable amount of accessible seating remains available at all prices and dispersed at all locations for individuals with disabilities who are non-members.

Section 36.303 Auxiliary Aids and Services

Section 36.303(a) of the 1991 title III regulation requires a public accommodation to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated, or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the public accommodation can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the goods, services, facilities, advantages, or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden. Implicit in this duty to provide auxiliary aids and services is the underlying obligation of a public accommodation to communicate effectively with customers, clients, patients, companions, or participants who have disabilities affecting hearing, vision, or speech. The Department notes that § 36.303(a) does not require public accommodations to provide assistance to individuals with disabilities that is unrelated to effective communication, although requests for such assistance may be otherwise subject to the reasonable modifications or barrier removal requirements.

The Department has investigated hundreds of complaints alleging that public accommodations have failed to provide effective communication, and many of these investigations have resulted in settlement agreements and consent decrees. During the course of these investigations, the Department has determined that public accommodations sometimes misunderstand the scope of their obligations under the statute and the regulation. Section 36.303 in the final rule codifies the Department’s longstanding policies in this area, and includes provisions based on technological advances and breakthroughs in the area of auxiliary aids and services that have occurred since the 1991 title III regulation was published.

Video remote interpreting (VRI). Section 36.303(b)(1) sets out examples of auxiliary aids and services. In the NPRM, the Department proposed adding video remote services (hereafter referred to as “video remote interpreting” or “VRI”) and the exchange of written notes among the examples. The Department also proposed amending the provision to reflect technological advances, such as the wide availability of real-time capability in transcription services and captioning.

VRI is defined in the final rule at § 36.104 as “an interpreting service that uses video conference technology over dedicated lines or wireless technology offering high-speed, wide-bandwidth video connection or wireless connection that delivers high-quality video images as provided in § 36.303(f).” The Department notes that VRI generally consists of a videophone, monitors, cameras, a high-speed video connection, and an interpreter provided by the public accommodation pursuant to a contract for services. The term’s inclusion within the definition of “qualified interpreter” makes clear that a public accommodation’s use of VRI satisfies its title III obligations only where VRI affords effective communication. Comments from advocates and persons with disabilities expressed concern that VRI may not always provide effective communication, especially in hospitals and emergency rooms. Examples were provided of patients who are unable to See the video monitor because they are semi-conscious or unable to focus on the video screen; other examples were given of cases where the video monitor is out of the sightline of the patient or the image is out of focus; still other examples were given of patients who cannot See the screen because the signal is interrupted, causing unnatural pauses in communication, or the image is grainy or otherwise unclear. Many commenters requested more explicit guidelines on the use of VRI, and some recommended requirements for equipment maintenance, dedicated high-speed, wide-bandwidth video connections, and training of staff using VRI, especially in hospital and health care situations. Several major organizations requested a requirement to include the interpreter’s face, head, arms, hands, and eyes in all transmissions.

The Department has determined that VRI can be an effective method of providing interpreting service in certain situations, particularly when a live interpreter cannot be immediately on the scene. To ensure that VRI is effective, the Department has established performance standards for VRI in § 36.303(f).The Department recognizes that reliance on VRI may not be effective in certain situations, such as those involving the exchange of complex information or involving multiple parties, and for some individuals, such as for persons who are deaf-blind, and using VRI in those circumstances would not satisfy a public accommodation’s obligation to provide effective communication.

Comments from several disability advocacy organizations and individuals discouraged the Department from adding the exchange of written notes to the list of available auxiliary aids in § 36.303(b). The Department consistently has recognized that the exchange of written notes may provide effective communication in certain contexts. The NPRM proposed adding an explicit reference to written notes because some title III entities do not understand that exchange of written notes using paper and pencil may be an available option in some circumstances. Advocates and persons with disabilities requested explicit limits on the use of written notes as a form of auxiliary aid because, they argued, most exchanges are not simple, and handwritten notes do not afford effective communication. One major advocacy organization, for example, noted that the speed at which individuals communicate orally or use sign language averages about 200 words per minute or more, and thus, the exchange of notes may provide only truncated or incomplete communication. For persons whose primary language is American Sign Language (ASL), some commenters pointed out, using written English in exchange of notes often is ineffective because ASL syntax and vocabulary is dissimilar from English. By contrast, some commenters from professional medical associations sought more specific guidance on when notes are allowed, especially in the context of medical offices and health care situations.

Exchange of notes likely will be effective in situations that do not involve substantial conversation, for example, when blood is drawn for routine lab tests or regular allergy shots are administered. However, interpreters should be used when the matter involves more complexity, such as in communication of medical history or diagnoses, in conversations about medical procedures and treatment decisions, or in communication of instructions for care at home or elsewhere. The Department discussed in the NPRM the kinds of situations in which use of interpreters or captioning is necessary. Additional guidance on this issue can be found in a number of agreements entered into with health care providers and hospitals that are available on the Department’s Web site at http://www.ada.gov.

In addition, commenters requested that the Department include “real-time” before any mention of “computer-aided” or “captioning” technology to highlight the value of simultaneous translation of any communication. The Department has added to the final rule appropriate references to “real-time” to recognize this aspect of effective communication. Lastly, in this provision and elsewhere in the title III regulation, the Department has replaced the term “telecommunications devices for deaf persons (TDD)” with “text telephones (TTYs).” As noted in the NPRM, TTY has become the commonly accepted term and is consistent with the terminology used by the Access Board in the 2004 ADAAG. Comments from advocates and persons with disabilities expressed approval of the substitution of TTY for TDD in the proposed regulation, but expressed the view that the Department should expand the definition to “voice, text, and video-based telecommunications products and systems, including TTY’s, videophones, and captioned telephones, or equally effective telecommunications systems.” The Department has expanded its definition of ‘auxiliary aids and services” in § 36.303 to include those examples in the final rule. Other additions proposed in the NPRM, and retained in the final rule, include Brailled materials and displays, screen reader software, magnification software, optical readers, secondary auditory programs (SAP), and accessible electronic and information technology.

As the Department noted in the preamble to the NPRM, the list of auxiliary aids in § 36.303(b) is merely illustrative. The Department does not intend that every public accommodation covered by title III must have access to every device or all new technology at all times, as long as the communication provided is effective.

Companions who are individuals with disabilities. The Department has added several new provisions to § 36.303(c), but these provisions do not impose new obligations on places of public accommodation. Rather, these provisions simply codify the Department’s longstanding positions. Section 36.303(c)(1) now states that “[a] public accommodation shall furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to ensure effective communication with individuals with disabilities. This includes an obligation to provide effective communication to companions who are individuals with disabilities.” Section 36.303(c)(1)(i) defines “companion” as “a family member, friend, or associate of an individual seeking access to, or participating in, the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a public accommodation, who, along with such individual, is an appropriate person with whom the public accommodation should communicate.”

This provision makes clear that if the companion is someone with whom the public accommodation normally would or should communicate, then the public accommodation must provide appropriate auxiliary aids and services to that companion to ensure effective communication with the companion. This commonsense rule provides the necessary guidance to public accommodations to implement properly the nondiscrimination requirements of the ADA. Commenters also questioned why, in the NPRM, the Department defined companion as “a family member, friend, or associate of a program participant***,” noting that the scope of a public accommodation’s obligation is not limited to “program participants” but rather includes all individuals seeking access to, or participating in, the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of the public accommodation. 73 FR 34508, 34554 (June 17, 2008). The Department agrees and has amended the regulatory language accordingly. Many commenters supported inclusion of companions in the rule and requested that the Department clarify that a companion with a disability may be entitled to effective communication from the public accommodation, even though the individual seeking access to, or participating in, the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of the public accommodation is not an individual with a disability. Some commenters asked the Department to make clear that if the individual seeking access to or participating in the public accommodation’s program or services is an individual with a disability and the companion is not, the public accommodation may not limit its communication to the companion, instead of communicating directly with the individual with a disability, when it would otherwise be appropriate to communicate with the individual with the disability.

Most entities and individuals from the medical field objected to the Department’s proposal, suggesting that medical and health care providers, and they alone, should determine to whom medical information should be communicated and when auxiliary aids and services should be provided to companions. Others asked that the Department limit the public accommodation’s obligation to communicate effectively with a companion to situations where such communication is necessary to serve the interests of the person who is receiving the public accommodation’s services. It also was suggested that companions should receive auxiliary aids and services only when necessary to ensure effective communication with the person receiving the public accommodation’s services, with an emphasis on the particular needs of the patient requiring assistance, not the patient’s family or guardian. Some in the medical community objected to the inclusion of any regulatory language regarding companions, asserting that such language is overbroad, seeks services for individuals whose presence is neither required by the public accommodation nor necessary for the delivery of the services or good, places additional burdens on the medical community, and represents an uncompensated mandate. One medical association commenter stated that such a mandate was particularly burdensome in situations where a patient is fully and legally capable of participating in the decision-making process and needs little or no assistance in obtaining care and following through on physician’s instructions.

The final rule codifies the Department’s longstanding interpretation of the ADA, and clarifies that public accommodations have effective communication obligations with respect to companions who are individuals with disabilities even where the individual seeking to participate in or benefit from what a public accommodation offers does not have a disability. There are many instances in which such an individual may not be an individual with a disability but his or her companion is an individual with a disability. The effective communication requirement applies equally to that companion.

Effective communication with companions is particularly critical in health care settings where miscommunication may lead to misdiagnosis and improper or delayed medical treatment. The Department has encountered confusion and reluctance by medical care providers regarding the scope of their obligation with respect to such companions. Effective communication with a companion is necessary in a variety of circumstances. For example, a companion may be legally authorized to make health care decisions on behalf of the patient or may need to help the patient with information or instructions given by hospital personnel. In addition, a companion may be the patient’s next of kin or health care surrogate with whom hospital personnel need to communicate concerning the patient’s medical condition. Moreover, a companion could be designated by the patient to communicate with hospital personnel about the patient’s symptoms, needs, condition, or medical history. Furthermore, the companion could be a family member with whom hospital personnel normally would communicate. It has been the Department’s longstanding position that public accommodations are required to provide effective communication to companions when they accompany patients to medical care providers for treatment.

The individual with a disability does not need to be present physically to trigger the public accommodation’s obligation to provide effective communication to a companion. The controlling principle regarding whether appropriate auxiliary aids and services should be provided is whether the companion is an appropriate person with whom the public accommodation should communicate. Examples of such situations include back-to-school night or parent-teacher conferences at a private school. If the faculty writes on the board or otherwise displays information in a visual context during back-to-school night, this information must be communicated effectively to parents or guardians who are blind or have low vision. At a parent-teacher conference, deaf parents or guardians are to be provided with appropriate auxiliary aids and service to communicate effectively with the teacher and administrators. Likewise, when a deaf spouse attempts to communicate with private social service agencies about the services necessary for the hearing spouse, appropriate auxiliary aids and services must be provided to the deaf spouse by the public accommodation to ensure effective communication.

One medical association sought approval to impose a charge against an individual with a disability, either the patient or the companion, where that person had stated he or she needed an interpreter for a scheduled appointment, the medical provider had arranged for an interpreter to appear, and then the individual requiring the interpreter did not show up for the scheduled appointment. Section 36.301(c) of the 1991 title III regulation prohibits the imposition of surcharges to cover the costs of necessary auxiliary aids and services. As such, medical providers cannot pass along to their patients with disabilities the cost of obtaining an interpreter, even in situations where the individual cancels his or her appointment at the last minute or is a “no-show” for the scheduled appointment. The medical provider, however, may charge for the missed appointment if all other patients are subject to such a charge in the same circumstances.

Determining appropriate auxiliary aids. The type of auxiliary aid the public accommodation provides is dependent on which auxiliary aid is appropriate under the particular circumstances. Section 36.303(c)(1)(ii) codifies the Department’s longstanding interpretation that the type of auxiliary aid or service necessary to ensure effective communication will vary in accordance with the method of communication used by the individual; the nature, length, and complexity of the communication involved; and the context in which the communication is taking place. As the Department explained in the NPRM, this provision lists factors the public accommodation should consider in determining which type of auxiliary aids and services are necessary. For example, an individual with a disability who is deaf or hard of hearing may need a qualified interpreter to discuss with hospital personnel a diagnosis, procedures, tests, treatment options, surgery, or prescribed medication (e.g., dosage, side effects, drug interactions, etc.). In comparison, an individual who is deaf or hard of hearing who purchases an item in the hospital gift shop may need only an exchange of written notes to achieve effective communication.

The language in the first sentence of § 36.303(c)(1)(ii) is derived from the Department’s Technical Assistance Manual. See Department of Justice, Americans with Disabilities Act, ADA Title III Technical Assistance Manual Covering Public Accommodations and Commercial Facilities, III–4.3200, available at http://archive.ada.gov/taman3.html. There were few comments regarding inclusion of this policy in the regulation itself, and those received were positive.

Many advocacy groups, particularly those representing blind individuals and those with low vision, urged the Department to add language in the final rule requiring the provision of accessible material in a manner that is timely, accurate, and private. This, they argued, would be especially important with regard to billing information, other time-sensitive material, or confidential information. The Department has added a provision in § 36.303(c)(1)(ii) stating that in “order to be effective, auxiliary aids and services must be provided in accessible formats, in a timely manner, and in such a way so as to protect the privacy and independence of the individual with a disability.”

The second sentence of § 36.303(c)(1)(ii) states that “[a] public accommodation should consult with individuals with disabilities whenever possible to determine what type of auxiliary aid is needed to ensure effective communication, but the ultimate decision as to what measures to take rests with the public accommodation, provided that the method chosen results in effective communication.” Many commenters urged the Department to amend this provision to require public accommodations to give primary consideration to the expressed choice of an individual with a disability. However, as the Department explained when it initially promulgated the 1991 title III regulation, the Department believes that Congress did not intend under title III to impose upon a public accommodation the requirement that it give primary consideration to the request of the individual with a disability. See 28 CFR part 36, app. B at 726 (2009). The legislative history does, however, demonstrate congressional intent to strongly encourage consulting with persons with disabilities. Id. As the Department explained in the 1991 preamble, “the House Education and Labor Committee stated that it ‘expects” that ‘public accommodation(s) will consult with the individual with a disability before providing a particular auxiliary aid or service.” (Education and Labor report at 107).” Id.

The commenters who urged that primary consideration be given to the individual with a disability noted, for example, that a public accommodation would not provide effective communication by using written notes where the individual requiring an auxiliary aid is in severe pain, or by providing a qualified ASL interpreter when an individual needs an oral interpreter instead. Both examples illustrate the importance of consulting with the individual with a disability in order to ensure that the communication provided is effective. When a public accommodation ignores the communication needs of the individual requiring an auxiliary aid or service, it does so at its peril, for if the communication provided is not effective, the public accommodation will have violated title III of the ADA.

Consequently, the regulation strongly encourages the public accommodation to engage in a dialogue with the individual with a disability to determine what auxiliary aids and services are appropriate under the circumstances. This dialogue should include a communication assessment of the individual with a disability initially, regularly, and as needed, because the auxiliary aids and services necessary to provide effective communication to the individual may fluctuate. For example, a deaf individual may go to a private community health center with what is at first believed to be a minor medical emergency, such as a sore knee, and the individual with a disability and the community health center both may believe that exchanging written notes will be effective; however, during that individual’s visit, it may be determined that the individual is, in fact, suffering from an anterior cruciate ligament tear and must have surgery to repair the torn ligament. As the situation develops and the diagnosis and recommended course of action evolve into surgery, an interpreter likely will be necessary. The community health center has a continuing obligation to assess the auxiliary aids and services it is providing, and should consult with individuals with disabilities on a continuing basis to assess what measures are required to ensure effective communication.

Similarly, the Department strongly encourages public accommodations to keep individuals with disabilities apprised of the status of the expected arrival of an interpreter or the delivery of other requested or anticipated auxiliary aids and services. Also, when the public accommodation decides not to provide the auxiliary aids and services requested by an individual with a disability, the public accommodation should provide that individual with the reason for its decision.

Family members and friends as interpreters. Section 36.303(c)(2), which was proposed in the NPRM, has been included in the final rule to make clear that a public accommodation shall not require an individual with a disability to bring another individual to interpret for him or her. The Department has added this regulatory requirement to emphasize that when a public accommodation is interacting with a person with a disability, it is the public accommodation’s responsibility to provide an interpreter to ensure effective communication. It is not appropriate to require the person with a disability to bring another individual to provide such services. any commenters supported inclusion of this language in the new rule. A representative from a cruise line association opined, however, that if a guest chose to cruise without an interpreter or companion, the ship would not be compelled to provide an interpreter for the medical facility. On the contrary, when an individual with a disability goes on a cruise, the cruise ship has an obligation to provide effective communication, including, if necessary, a qualified interpreter as defined in the rule.

Some representatives of pediatricians objected to this provision, stating that parents of children with disabilities often know best how to interpret their children’s needs and health status and relay that information to the child’s physician, and to remove that parent, or add a stranger into the examining room, may frighten children. These commenters requested clarification in the regulation that public accommodations should permit parents, guardians, or caregivers of children with disabilities to accompany them in medical settings to ensure effective communication. The regulation does not prohibit parents, guardians, or caregivers from being present or providing effective communication for children. Rather, it prohibits medical professionals (and other public accommodations) from requiring or forcing individuals with disabilities to bring other individuals with them to facilitate communication so that the public accommodation will not have to provide appropriate auxiliary aids and services. The public accommodation cannot avoid its obligation to provide an interpreter except under the circumstances described in § 36.303(c)(3)–(4).

A State medical association also objected to this provision, opining that medical providers should have the authority to ask patients to bring someone with them to provide interpreting services if the medical provider determines that such a practice would result in effective communication and that patient privacy and confidentiality would be maintained. While the public accommodation has the obligation to determine what type of auxiliary aids and services are necessary to ensure effective communication, it cannot unilaterally determine whether the patient’s privacy and confidentiality would be maintained.

Section 36.303(c)(3) of the final rule codifies the Department’s position that there are certain limited instances when a public accommodation may rely on an accompanying adult to interpret or facilitate communication: (1) In an emergency involving an imminent threat to the safety or welfare of an individual or the public; or (2) If the individual with a disability specifically requests it, the accompanying adult agrees to provide the assistance, and reliance on that adult for this assistance is appropriate under the circumstances. In such instances, the public accommodation should first offer to provide appropriate auxiliary aids and services free of charge.

Commenters requested that the Department make clear that the public accommodation cannot request, rely on, or coerce an accompanying adult to provide effective communication for an individual with a disability, and that only a voluntary offer of assistance is acceptable. The Department states unequivocally that consent of, and for, the accompanying adult to facilitate communication must be provided freely and voluntarily both by the individual with a disability and the accompanying adult— absent an emergency involving an imminent threat to the safety or welfare of an individual or the public. The public accommodation cannot coerce or attempt to persuade another adult to provide effective communication for the individual with a disability.

Several commenters asked that the Department make clear that children are not to be used to provide effective communication for family members and friends and that it is the responsibility of the public accommodation to provide effective communication, stating that interpreters often are needed in settings where it would not be appropriate for children to be interpreting, such as those involving medical issues, domestic violence, or other situations involving the exchange of confidential or adult-related material. Children often are hesitant to decline requests to provide communication services, which puts them in a very difficult position vis-a-vis family members and friends. The Department agrees. It is the Department’s position that a public accommodation shall not rely on a minor child to facilitate communication with a family member, friend, or other individual except in an emergency involving an imminent threat to the safety or welfare of an individual or the public where no interpreter is available. Accordingly, the Department has revised the rule to state that “[a] public accommodation shall not rely on a minor child to interpret or facilitate communication, except in an emergency involving an imminent threat to the safety or welfare of an individual or the public where there is no interpreter available.” § 36.303(c)(4). Sections 36.303(c)(3) and (c)(4) have no application in circumstances where an interpreter would not otherwise be required in order to provide effective communication (e.g., in simple transactions such as purchasing movie tickets at a theater).

The Department stresses that privacy and confidentiality must be maintained but notes that covered entities, such as hospitals, that are subject to the Privacy Rules, 45 CFR parts 160 and 164, of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Public Law 104–191, are permitted to disclose to a patient’s relative, close friend, or any other person identified by the patient (such as an interpreter) relevant patient information if the patient agrees to such disclosures. See 45 CFR parts 160 and 164. The agreement need not be in writing. Covered entities should consult the HIPAA Privacy Rules regarding other ways disclosures may be made to such persons.

With regard to emergency situations, proposed § 36.303(c)(3) permitted reliance on an individual accompanying an individual with a disability to interpret or facilitate communication in an emergency involving a threat to the safety or welfare of an individual or the public. Commenters requested that the Department make clear that often a public accommodation can obtain appropriate auxiliary aids and services in advance of an emergency, particularly in anticipated emergencies, such as predicted dangerous weather, or in certain medical situations, such as pending childbirth, by making necessary pre-arrangements. These commenters did not want public accommodations to be relieved of their responsibilities to provide effective communication in emergency situations noting that the need for effective communication in emergencies is heightened. For the same reason, several commenters requested a separate rule that requires public accommodations to provide timely and effective communication in the event of an emergency.

One group of commenters asked that the Department narrow the regulation permitting reliance on a companion to interpret or facilitate communication in emergency situations so that it is not available to entities with responsibilities for emergency preparedness and response. Some commenters noted that certain exigent circumstances, such as those that exist during and, perhaps, immediately after a major hurricane, temporarily may excuse public accommodations of their responsibilities to provide effective communication. However, they asked that the Department clarify that these obligations are ongoing, and that as soon as such situations begin to abate or become stabilized, the public accommodation must provide effective communication.

The Department recognizes the need for effective communication is critical in emergency situations. After due consideration of all of these concerns raised by commenters, the Department has revised § 36.303(c) to narrow the exception permitting reliance on individuals accompanying the individual with a disability during an emergency to make it clear that it applies only to emergencies involving an “imminent threat to the safety or welfare of an individual or the public***.” § 36.303(c)(3)–(4). The Department wishes to emphasize, however, that application of this exception is narrowly tailored to emergencies involving an imminent threat to the safety or welfare of individuals or the public. Arguably, all visits to an emergency room are by definition emergencies. Likewise, an argument can be made that most situations to which emergency workers respond involve, in one way or another, a threat to the safety or welfare of an individual or the public. The imminent threat exception in § 36.303(c)(3)– (4) is not intended to apply to typical and foreseeable emergency situations that are part of the normal operations of these institutions. As such, a public accommodation may rely on an accompanying individual to interpret or facilitate communication under the § 36.303(c)(3)–(4) imminent threat exception only where there is a true emergency, i.e., where any delay in providing immediate services to the individual could have life-altering or life-ending consequences.

Telecommunications. In addition to the changes discussed in § 36.303(b) regarding telecommunications, telephones, and text telephones, the Department has adopted provisions in § 36.303(d) of the final rule (which also were included in the NPRM) requiring that public accommodations must not disconnect or refuse to take calls from FCC-approved telecommunications relay systems, including Internet-based relay systems. Commenters from some State agencies, many advocacy organizations, and individuals strongly urged the Department to mandate such action because of the high proportion of TTY calls and relay service calls to title III entities that are not completed because of phone systems or employees not taking the calls. This refusal presents a significant obstacle for persons using TTYs who do business with public accommodations and denies persons with disabilities telephone access for business that typically is handled over the telephone.

Section 36.303(d)(1)(ii) of the NPRM added public telephones equipped with volume control mechanisms and hearing aid compatible telephones to the examples of types of telephone equipment to be provided. Commenters from the disability community and from telecommunications relay service providers argued that requirements for these particular features on telephones are obsolete not only because the deaf and hard of hearing community uses video technology more frequently than other types of telecommunication, but also because all public coin phones have been hearing-aid compatible since 1983, pursuant to the Telecommunications for the Disabled Act of 1982, 47 U.S.C. 610. The Hearing Aid Compatibility Act of 1988, 47 U.S.C. 610, extended this requirement to all wireline telephones imported into or manufactured in the United States since 1989. In 1997, the FCC further required that all such phones also be equipped with volume control. See 47 CFR 68.6. Given these existing statutory obligations, the proposed language is unnecessary. Accordingly, the Department has deleted that language from the final rule.

The Department understands that there are many new devices and advances in technology that should be included in the definition of available auxiliary aids and is including many of the telecommunications devices and some new technology. While much of this technology is not expensive and should be available to most title III entities, there may be legitimate reasons why in a particular situation some of these new and developing auxiliary aids may not be available, may be prohibitively costly (thus supporting an undue burden defense), or may otherwise not be suitable given other circumstances related to the particular terrain, situation, or functionality in specialized areas where security, among other things, may be a factor limiting the appropriateness of the use of a particular technology or device. The Department recognizes that the available new technology may provide more effective communication than existing technology and that providing effective communication often will include use of new technology and video relay services, as well as interpreters. However, the Department has not mandated that title III entities make all technology or services available upon demand in all situations. When a public accommodation provides the opportunity to make outgoing phone calls on more than an incidental-convenience basis, it shall make available accessible public telephones, TTYs, or other telecommunications products and systems for use by an individual who is deaf or hard of hearing, or has a speech impairment.

Video remote interpreting (VRI) services. In § 36.303(f) of the NPRM, the Department proposed the inclusion of four performance standards for VRI (which the NPRM termed video interpreting services (VIS)), for effective communication: (1) High-quality, clear, real-time, full-motion video, and audio over a dedicated high-speed Internet connection; (2) a clear, sufficiently large, and sharply delineated picture of the participants” heads, arms, hands, and fingers, regardless of their body position; (3) clear transmission of voices; and (4) persons who are trained to set up and operate the VIS quickly and efficiently.

Commenters generally approved of these proposed performance standards, but recommended that some additional standards be included in the final rule. For persons who are deaf with limited vision, commenters requested that the Department include an explicit requirement that interpreters wear high-contrast clothing with no patterns that might distract from their hands as they are interpreting, so that a person with limited vision could still See the signs made by the interpreter. While the Department reiterates the importance of such practices in the delivery of effective VRI as well as in-person interpreting, the Department declines to adopt such performance standards as part of this rule. In general, professional interpreters already follow such practices, as the Code of Professional Conduct for interpreters the Deaf and the National Association of the Deaf incorporates attire considerations into their standards of professionalism and conduct. Moreover, as a result of this code, many VRI agencies have adopted detailed dress standards that interpreters hired by the agency must follow. Commenters also urged explicit requirement of a clear image of the face and eyes of the interpreter and others. Because the face includes the eyes, the Department has amended § 36.303(f)(2) of the final rule to include a requirement that the interpreter’s face be displayed. Other commenters requested requirement of a wide-bandwidth video connection for the VRI system, and the Department has included this requirement in § 36.303(f)(1) of the final rule.

ATMs. The 2010 Standards set out detailed requirements for ATMs, including communication-related requirements to make ATMs usable by individuals who are blind or have low vision. In the NPRM, the Department discussed the application of a safe harbor to the communication-related elements of ATMs. The NPRM explained that the Department considers the communication-related elements of ATMs to be auxiliary aids and services, to which the safe harbor for elements built in compliance with the 1991 standards does not apply.

The Department received several comments regarding this issue. Several commenters representing banks objected to the exclusion of communication-related aspects of ATMs from the safe harbor provision. They explained that the useful life of ATMs—on average 10 years—was longer than the Department noted; thus, without the safe harbor, banks would be forced to retrofit many ATMs in order to comply with the proposed regulation. Such retrofitting, they noted, would be costly to the industry. A few representatives of the disability community commented that communication-related aspects of ATMs should be excluded from the safe harbor.

The Department consistently has taken the position that the communication-related elements of ATMs are auxiliary aids and services, rather than structural elements. See 28 CFR part 36, app. B at 728 (2009). Thus, the safe harbor provision does not apply to these elements. The Department believes that the limitations on the effective communication requirements, which provide that a covered entity does not have to take measures that would result in a fundamental alteration of its program or would cause undue burdens, provide adequate protection to covered entities that operate ATMs.

Captioning at sporting venues. In § 36.303(g) of the NPRM, the Department proposed that sports stadiums that have a capacity of 25,000 or more shall provide captioning for safety and emergency information on scoreboards and video monitors. In addition, the Department posed four questions about captioning of information, especially safety and emergency information announcements, provided over public address (PA) systems. The Department received many detailed and divergent responses to each of the four questions and the proposed regulatory text. Because comments submitted on the Department’s title II and title III proposals were intertwined, because of the similarity of issues involved for title II entities and title III entities, and in recognition of the fact that many large sports stadiums are covered by both title II and title III as joint operations of State or local government and one or more public accommodations, the Department presents here a single consolidated review and summary of the issues raised in comments.

The Department asked whether requiring captioning of safety and emergency information made over the public address system in stadiums seating fewer than 25,000 would create an undue burden for smaller entities, and whether it would be feasible for small stadiums to provide such captioning, or whether a larger threshold, such as sports stadiums with a capacity of 50,000 or more, would be appropriate.

There was a consensus among the commenters, including disability advocates as well as venue owners and stadium designers and operators, that using the stadium size or seating capacity should not be the exclusive deciding factor for any obligation to provide captioning for safety and emergency information broadcast over the PA system. Most disability advocacy organizations and individuals with disabilities complained that using size or seating capacity as a threshold for captioning safety and emergency information would undermine the “undue burden” defense found in both titles II and III. Many commenters provided examples of facilities such as professional hockey arenas that seat less than 25,000 fans but that, commenters argued, should be able to provide real-time captioning. Other commenters suggested that some high school or college stadiums, for example, may hold 25,000 fans or more and yet lack the resources to provide real-time captioning. Many commenters noted that real-time captioning would require use of trained stenographers, and that most high school and college sports facilities rely upon volunteers to operate scoreboards and PA systems and they would not be qualified stenographers, especially in case of an emergency. One national association noted that the typical stenographer expense for a professional football game in Washington, DC, is about $550 per game. Similarly, one trade association representing venues estimated that the cost for a professional stenographer at a sporting event runs between $500 and $1,000 per game or event, the cost of which, they argued, would be unduly burdensome in many cases. Some commenters posited that schools that do not sell tickets to athletic events would be challenged to meet such expenses, in contrast to major college athletic programs and professional sports teams, which would be less likely to prevail using an “undue burden” defense.

Some venue owners and operators and other covered entities also argued that stadium size should not be the key consideration for whether scoreboard captioning will be required. Instead, these entities suggested that equipment already installed in the stadium, including necessary electrical equipment and backup power supply, should be the determining factor for whether captioning is mandated. Many commenters argued that the requirement to provide captioning should apply only to stadiums with scoreboards that meet the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) National Fire Alarm Code. Commenters reported that NFPA 72 requires at least two independent and reliable power supplies for emergency information systems, including one source that is a generator or a battery sufficient to run the system in the event the primary power fails. Alternatively, some stadium designers and title II entities commented that the requirement should arise when the facility has at least one elevator providing firefighter emergency operation, along with approval of authorities with responsibility for fire safety. An organization concerned with fire safety codes commented that the Department lacks the expertise to regulate on this topic. Other commenters argued for flexibility in the requirements for providing captioning and contended that any requirement should apply only to stadiums constructed after the effective date of the regulation.

In the NPRM, the Department also asked whether the rule should address the specific means of captioning equipment, whether captioning should be provided through any effective means (e.g., scoreboards, line boards, handheld devices, or other means), or whether some means, such as handheld devices, should be eliminated as options. This question elicited many comments from advocates for persons with disabilities as well as from covered entities. Advocacy organizations and individuals with experience using handheld devices argued that such devices do not provide effective communication. These commenters noted that information is often delayed in the transmission to such devices, making them hard to use when following action on the playing field or in the event of an emergency when the crowd is already reacting to aural information provided over the PA system well before it is received on the handheld device.

Several venue owners and operators and others commented that handheld technology offers advantages of flexibility and portability so that it may be used successfully regardless of where in the facility the user is located, even when not in the line of sight of a scoreboard or other captioning system. Still other commenters urged the Department not to regulate in such a way as to limit innovation and use of such technology now and in the future. Cost considerations were included in comments from some stadium designers and venue owners and operators who reported that the cost of providing handheld systems is far less than the cost of providing real-time captioning on scoreboards, especially in facilities that do not currently have the capacity to provide real-time captions on existing equipment. Others noted that handheld technology is not covered by fire and safety model codes, including the NFPA, and thus would be more easily adapted into existing facilities if captioning were required by the Department.

The Department also asked about requiring open captioning of all public address announcements, rather than limiting the captioning requirement to safety and emergency information. A variety of advocates and persons with disabilities argued that all information broadcast over a PA system should be captioned in real time at all facilities in order to provide effective communication, and that a requirement only to provide emergency and safety information would not be sufficient. A few organizations representing persons with disabilities commented that installation of new systems should not be required, but that all systems within existing facilities that are capable of providing captioning should provide captioning of information to the maximum extent possible. Several organizations for persons with disabilities commented that all facilities should include in their safety planning measures a requirement that all aurally provided information for patrons with communication disabilities be captioned. Some advocates suggested that demand for captions will only increase as the number of deaf and hard of hearing persons grows with the aging of the general population and with increasing numbers of veterans returning from war with disabilities. Multiple commenters noted that the captioning would benefit others as well as those with communication disabilities.

By contrast, venue owners and operators and others commented that the action on the sports field is self-explanatory and does not require captioning. These commenters objected to an explicit requirement to provide real-time captioning for all information broadcast on the PA system at a sporting event. Other commenters objected to requiring captioning even for emergency and safety information over the scoreboard rather than through some other means. By contrast, venue operators, State government agencies, and some model code groups, including the NFPA, commented that emergency and safety information must be provided in an accessible format and that public safety is a paramount concern. Other commenters argued that the best method to deliver safety and emergency information would be television monitors showing local TV broadcasts with captions already mandated by the FCC. Some commenters posited that the most reliable information about a major emergency would be provided on the television news broadcasts. They argued that television monitors may be located throughout the facility, improving line of sight for patrons, some of whom might not be able to See the scoreboard from their seats or elsewhere in the facility. Some stadium designers, venue operators, and model code groups pointed out that video monitors are not regulated by the NFPA or other agencies, so that such monitors could be more easily provided. Video monitors may receive transmissions from within the facility and could provide real-time captions if there is the necessary software and equipment to feed the captioning signal to a closed video network within the facility. Several commenters suggested that using monitors would be preferable to requiring captions on the scoreboard if the regulation mandates real-time captioning. Some venue owners and operators argued that retrofitting existing stadiums with new systems could easily cost in the hundreds of thousands of dollars per scoreboard or system. Some stadium designers and others argued that captioning should be required only in stadiums built after the effective date of the regulation. For stadiums with existing systems that allow for real-time captioning, one commenter posited that dedicating the system exclusively to real-time captioning would lead to an annual loss of between two and three million dollars per stadium in revenue from advertising currently running in that space.

After carefully considering the wide range of public comments on this issue, the Department has concluded that the final rule will not provide additional requirements for effective communication or emergency information provided at sports stadiums at this time. The 1991 title II and title III regulations and statutory requirements are not in any way affected by this decision. The decision to postpone rulemaking on this complex issue is based on a number of factors, including the multiple layers of existing regulations by various agencies and levels of government, and the wide array of information, requests, and recommendations related to developing technology offered by the public. The diversity of existing information and communication systems and other characteristics among sports stadiums also complicates the regulation of captioning. The Department has concluded that further consideration and review is prudent before it issues specific regulatory requirements.

Movie captioning. In the NPRM, the Department stated that options were being considered to require movie theater owners and operators to exhibit movies that are captioned for patrons who are deaf or hard of hearing. Captioning makes films accessible to individuals whose hearing is too limited to benefit from assistive listening devices. Both open and closed captioning are examples of auxiliary aids and services required under the Department’s 1991 title III regulation. See 28 CFR 36.303(b)(1). Open captions are similar to subtitles in that the text is visible to everyone in the theater, while closed captioning displays the written text of the audio only to those individuals who request it.

In the NPRM, the Department also stated that options were being considered to require movie theater owners and operators to exhibit movies with video description³ a technology that enables individuals who are blind or have low vision to enjoy movies by providing a spoken interpretation of key visual elements of a movie, such as actions, settings, facial expressions, costumes, and scene changes. The descriptions are narrated and recorded onto an audiotape or disk that can be synchronized with the film as it is projected. An audio recording is an example of an auxiliary aid and service required under the Department’s 1991 title III regulation. See 28 CFR 36.303(b)(2).

The NPRM stated that technological advances since the early 1990s have made open and closed captioning and video description for movies more readily available and effective and noted that the Department was considering options to require captioning and video description for movies exhibited by public accommodations. The NPRM also noted that the Department is aware that the movie industry is transitioning, in whole or in part, to movies in digital format and that movie theater owners and operators are beginning to purchase digital projectors. The Department noted in the NPRM that movie theater owners and operators with digital projectors may have available to them different capabilities than those without digital projectors. The Department sought comment regarding whether and how to require captioning and video description while the film industry makes this transition. In addition, the NPRM stated the Department’s concern about the potential cost to exhibit captioned movies, noting that cost may vary depending upon whether open or closed captioning is used and whether or not digital projectors are used, and stated that the cost of captioning must stay within the parameters of the undue burden requirement in 28 CFR 36.303(a). The Department further noted that it understands the cost of video description equipment to be less than that for closed captioning. The Department then stated that it was considering the possibility of requiring public accommodations to exhibit all new movies in captioned format and with video the subject is movies, not video, and so the Department decided to employ that term.description at every showing. The NPRM stated that the Department would not specify the types of captioning required, leaving such decisions to the discretion of the movie theater owners and operators.

In the NPRM, the Department requested public comment as to whether public accommodations should be required to exhibit all new movies in captioned format at every showing, whether it would be more appropriate to require captioning less frequently, and, if so, with what frequency captioning should be provided. The Department also inquired as to whether the requirement for captioning should be tied to the conversion of movies from film to the use of a digital format. The Department also asked for public comment regarding the exhibition of all new movies with narrative description, whether it would it be more appropriate to require narrative description less frequently, and whether narrative description of movies should be tied to the use of a digital format.

Representatives from the movie industry, a commenter from a non-profit organization, and a disability rights advocacy group provided information in their comments on the status of captioning and video description technology today as well as an update on the transition to digital cinema in the industry. A representative of major movie producers and distributors commented that traditionally open captions were created by “burning” the captions onto a special print of a selected movie, which the studios would make available to the exhibitors (movie theater owners and operators). Releases with open captions typically would be presented at special screenings. More recently, according to this commenter, alternative methods have been developed for presenting movies with open captions, but their common feature is that the captions are visible to all theater-goers. Closed captioning is an innovation in technology that was first made available in a feature film presentation in late 1997. Closed captioning technology currently in use allows viewers to See captions using a clear panel that is mounted in front of the viewer’s seat.⁴ According to commenters from the industry, the panel reflects captions that are shown in reverse on an LED display in the back of the theater, with captions appearing on or near the movie image. Moviegoers may use this technology at any showing at a theater that has been equipped with the technology, so that the theater does not have to arrange limited special screenings.

Video description technology also has existed since 1997, according to a commenter who works with the captioning and video description industry. According to a movie industry commenter, video description requires the creation of a separate script written by specially trained writers called “describers.” As the commenter explained, a describer initially listens to the movie without watching it in order to approximate the experience of an audience member who is blind or has low vision. Using software to map out the pauses in the soundtrack, the describer writes a description in the space available. After an initial script is written for video description, it is edited and checked for timing, continuity, accuracy, and a natural flow. A narrator then records the new script to match the corresponding movie. This same industry commenter said that video description currently is provided in theaters through screens equipped with the same type of technology as that used for closed captioning. As commenters explained, technologies in use today deliver video descriptions via infrared or FM listening systems to headsets worn by individuals who are blind or have low vision.

According to the commenter representing major movie producers and distributors, the percentage of motion pictures produced with closed captioning by its member studios had grown to 88 percent of total releases by 2007; the percentage of motion pictures produced with open captioning by its member studios had grown to 78 percent of total releases by 2007; and the percentage of motion pictures provided with video description has ranged consistently between 50 percent and 60 percent of total releases. It is the movie producers and distributors, not the movie theater owners and operators, who determine what to caption and describe, the type of captioning to use, and the content of the captions and video description script. These same producers and distributors also assume the costs of captioning and describing movies. Movie theater owners and operators simply purchase the equipment to display the captions and play the video description in their auditoria.

The transition to digital cinema, considered by the industry to be one of the most profound advancements in motion picture production and technology of the last 100 years, will provide numerous advantages both for the industry and the audience. According to one commenter, currently there are sufficient standards and interim solutions to support captioning and video description now in digital format. Additionally, movie studios are supporting those efforts by providing accessibility tracks (captioning and video description) in many digital cinema content packages. Moreover, a group of industry commenters composed in pertinent part of members of the motion picture industry, the central standards organizations for this industry, and key digital equipment vendors, noted that they are participating in a joint venture to establish the remaining accessibility specifications and standards for access audio tracks. Access audio tracks are supplemental sound audio tracks for the hard of hearing and narrative audio tracks for individuals who have vision disabilities. According to a commenter and to industry documents, these standards were expected to be in place by spring 2009. According to a commenter, at that time, all of the major digital cinema equipment vendors were expected to have support for a variety of closed caption display and video description products. This same commenter stated that these technologies will be supported by the studios that produce and distribute feature films, by the theaters that show these films to the public, and by the full complement of equipment in the production, distribution, and display chain.

The initial investment for movie theater owners and operators to convert to digital cinema is expensive. One industry commenter estimated that converting theaters to digital projection costs between $70,000 and $100,000 per screen and that maintenance costs for digital projectors are estimated to run between $5,000 and $10,000 a year—approximately five times as expensive as the maintenance costs for film projectors. According to this same commenter, while there has been progress in making the conversion, only approximately 5,000 screens out of 38,794 nationwide have been converted, and the cost to make the remaining conversions involves a total investment of several billion dollars. According to another commenter, predictions as to when more than half of all screens will have been converted to digital projection are 10 years or more, depending on the finances of the movie theater owners and operators, the state of the economy, and the incentives supporting conversion. That said, according to one commenter who represents movie theater owners and operators, the majority of screens in the United States were expected to enter into agreements by the end of 2008 to convert to digital cinema. Most importantly, however, according to a few commenters, the systems in place today for captioning and video description will not become obsolete once a theater has converted to digital cinema but still can be used by the movie theater owner and operator to exhibit captions and video description. The only difference for a movie theater owner or operator will be the way the data is delivered to the captioning and video description equipment in place in an auditorium. Despite the current availability of movies that are captioned and provide video description, movie theater owners and operators rarely exhibit the captions or descriptions. According to several commenters, less than 1 percent of all movies being exhibited in theaters are shown with captions.

Individuals with disabilities, advocacy groups, the representative from a non-profit, and representatives of State governments, including 11 State attorneys general, overwhelmingly supported issuance of a regulation requiring movie theater owners and operators to exhibit captioned and video described movies at all showings unless doing so would result in an undue burden or fundamental alteration of the goods and services offered by the public accommodation. In addition, this same group of commenters urged that any such regulation should be made effective now, and should not be tied to the conversion to digital cinema by the movie theater owners and operators. In support of such arguments, these commenters stated that the technology exists now to display movies with captions and video descriptions, regardless of whether the movie is exhibited on film or using digital cinema. Moreover, since the technology in use for displaying captions and video descriptions on film will be compatible with digital projection systems, they argued, there is no need to postpone implementation of a captioning or video description regulation until the conversion to digital has been made. Furthermore, since the conversion to digital may take years, commenters urged the Department to issue a regulation requiring captioning and video description now, rather than several years from now.

Advocacy groups and the 11 State attorneys general also requested that any regulation include factors describing what constitutes effective captioning and video description. Recommendations included requiring that captioning be within the same line of sight to the screen as the movie so that individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing can watch the movie and read the captions at the same time; that the captioning be accessible from each seat; that the captions be of sufficient size and contrast to the background so as to be readable easily; and that the recent recommendations of the Telecommunications and Electronics and Information Technology Advisory Committee Report to the Access Board that captions be “timely, accurate, complete, and efficient”⁵ also be included.

The State attorneys general supported the Department’s statement in the NPRM that the Department did not anticipate specifying which type of captioning to provide or what type of technology to use to provide video description, but would instead leave that to the discretion of the movie theater owners and operators. These State attorneys general opined that such discretion in the selection of the type of technology was consistent with the statutory and regulatory scheme of the ADA and would permit any new regulation to keep pace with future advancements in captioning and video description technology. These same commenters stated that such discretion may result in a mixed use of both closed captioning and open captioning, affording more choices both for the movie theater owners and operators and for individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing.

The representatives from the movie theater industry strongly urged the Department against issuing a regulation requiring captioning or video description. These commenters argued that the legislative history of the ADA expressly precluded regulating in the area of captioning. (These same commenters were silent with regard to video description on this issue.) The industry commenters also argued that to require movie theater owners and operators to exhibit captioned and video described movies would constitute a fundamental alteration in the nature of the goods and services offered by the movie theater owners and operators. In addition, some industry commenters argued that any such regulation by the Department would be inconsistent with the Access Board’s guidelines. Also, these commenters noted the progress that has been made in the industry in making cinema more accessible even though there is no mandate to caption or describe movies, and they questioned whether any mandate is necessary. Finally, all the industry commenters argued that to require captioning or video description in 100 percent of movie theater screens for all showings would constitute an undue burden.

The comments have provided the Department with significant information on the state of the movie industry with regard to the availability of captioning and video description, the status of closed captioning technology, and the status of the transition to digital cinema. The Department also has given due consideration to the comments it has received from individuals, advocacy groups, governmental entities, and representatives of the movie industry. Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the ADA requires a chain of movie theaters to exhibit movies with closed captioning and video description unless the theaters can show that to do so would amount to a fundamental alteration or undue burden. Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. Harkins Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 603 F.3d 666 (9th Cir. 2010). However, rather than issue specific regulatory text at this time, the Department has determined that it should obtain additional information regarding issues raised by commenters that were not contemplated at the time of the 2008 NPRM, supplemental technical information, and updated information regarding the current and future status of the conversion to digital cinema by movie theater owners and operators. To this end, the Department is planning to engage in rulemaking relating specifically to movie captioning under the ADA in the near future.

§ 36.304 Removal of Barriers

With the adoption of the 2010 Standards, an important issue that the Department must address is the effect that the new (referred to as ‘supplemental”) and revised ADA Standards will have on the continuing obligation of public accommodations to remove architectural, transportation, and communication barriers in existing facilities to the extent that it is readily achievable to do so. See 42 U.S.C. 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). This issue was not addressed in the 2004 ADAAG because it was outside the scope of the Access Board’s statutory authority under the ADA and section 502 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See 29 U.S.C. 792(b)(3)(A)–(B) (authorizing the Access Board to establish and maintain minimum guidelines for the standards issued pursuant to the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968 and titles II and III of the ADA). Responsibility for implementing title III’s requirement that public accommodations eliminate barriers in existing facilities where such removal is readily achievable rests solely with the Department. The term “existing facility” is defined in § 36.104 of the final rule. This definition is discussed in more detail above. See Appendix A discussion of definitions (§ 36.104).

The requirements for barrier removal by public accommodations are established in the Department’s title III regulation. 28 CFR 36.304. Under this regulation, the Department used the 1991 Standards as a guide to identify what constitutes an architectural barrier, as well as the specifications that covered entities must follow in making architectural changes to remove the barrier to the extent that such removal is readily achievable. 28 CFR 36.304(d); 28 CFR part 36, app. A (2009). With adoption of the final rule, public accommodations will now be guided by the 2010 Standards, defined in § 36.104 as the 2004 ADAAG and the requirements contained in subpart D of 28 CFR part 36.

The 2010 Standards include technical and scoping specifications for a number of elements that were not addressed specifically in the 1991 Standards; these new requirements were identified as ‘supplemental requirements” in the NPRM. The 2010 Standards also include revisions to technical or scoping specifications for certain elements that were addressed in the 1991 Standards, i.e., elements for which there already were technical and scoping specifications. Requirements for which there are revised technical or scoping specifications in the 2010 Standards are referred to in the NPRM as “incremental changes.”

The Department expressed concern that requiring barrier removal for incremental changes might place unnecessary cost burdens on businesses that already had removed barriers in existing facilities in compliance with the 1991 Standards. With this rulemaking, the Department sought to strike an appropriate balance between ensuring that individuals with disabilities are provided access to facilities and mitigating potential financial burdens from barrier removal on existing places of public accommodation that satisfied their obligations under the 1991 Standards.

In the NPRM, the Department proposed several potential additions to § 36.304(d) that might reduce such financial burdens. First, the Department proposed a safe harbor for elements in existing facilities that were compliant with the 1991 Standards. Under this approach, an element that is not altered after the effective date of the 2010 Standards and that complies with the scoping and technical requirements for that element in the 1991 Standards would not be required to undergo modification to comply with the 2010 Standards to satisfy the ADA’s barrier removal obligations. The public accommodation would thus be deemed to have met its barrier removal obligation with respect to that element.

The Department received many comments on this issue during the 60-day public comment period. After consideration of all relevant information presented on the issue, it is the Department’s view that this element-by-element safe harbor provision should be retained in the final rule. This issue is discussed further below.

Second, the NPRM proposed several exceptions and exemptions from certain supplemental requirements to mitigate the barrier removal obligations of existing play areas and recreation facilities under the 2004 ADAAG. These proposals elicited many comments from both the business and disability communities. After consideration of all relevant information presented on the issue, it is the Department’s view that these exceptions and exemptions should not be retained in the final rule. The specific proposals and comments, and the Department’s conclusions, are discussed below.

Third, the NPRM proposed a new safe harbor approach to readily achievable barrier removal as applied to qualified small businesses. This proposed small business safe harbor was based on suggestions from small business advocacy groups that requested clearer guidance on the barrier removal obligations for small businesses. According to these groups, the Department’s traditional approach to barrier removal disproportionately affects small businesses. They argued that most small businesses owners neither are equipped to understand the ADA Standards nor can they afford the architects, consultants, and attorneys that might provide some level of assurance of compliance with the ADA. For these same reasons, these commenters contended, small business owners are vulnerable to litigation, particularly lawsuits arising under title III, and often are forced to settle because the ADA Standards” complexity makes inadvertent noncompliance likely, even when a small business owner is acting in good faith, or because the business cannot afford the costs of litigation.

To address these and similar concerns, the NPRM proposed a level of barrier removal expenditures at which qualified small businesses would be deemed to have met their readily achievable barrier removal obligations for certain tax years. This safe harbor would have provided some protection from litigation because compliance could be assessed easily. Such a rule, the Department believed, also could further accessibility, because qualified small businesses would have an incentive to incorporate barrier removal into short- and long-term planning. The Department recognized that a qualified small business safe harbor would be a significant change to the Department’s title III enforcement scheme. Accordingly, the Department sought comment on whether such an approach would further the aims underlying the statute’s barrier removal provisions, and, if so, the appropriate parameters of the provision.

After consideration of the many comments received on this issue, the Department has decided not to include a qualified small business safe harbor in the final rule. This decision is discussed more fully below.

Element-by-element safe harbor for public accommodations. Public accommodations have a continuing obligation to remove certain architectural, communications, and transportation barriers in existing facilities to the extent readily achievable. 42 U.S.C. 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). Because the Department uses the ADA Standards as a guide to identifying what constitutes an architectural barrier, the 2010 Standards, once they become effective, will provide a new reference point for assessing an entity’s barrier removal obligations. The 2010 Standards introduce technical and scoping specifications for many elements that were not included in the 1991 Standards. Accordingly, public accommodations will have to consider these supplemental requirements when evaluating whether there are covered barriers in existing facilities, and, if so, remove them to the extent readily achievable. Also included in the 2010 Standards are revised technical and scoping requirements for elements that were addressed in the 1991 Standards. These incremental changes were made to address technological changes that have occurred since the promulgation of the 1991 Standards, to reflect additional study by the Access Board, and to harmonize ADAAG requirements with the model codes.

In the NPRM, the Department sought input on a safe harbor in proposed § 36.304(d)(2) intended to address concerns about the practical effects of the incremental changes on public accommodations” readily achievable barrier removal obligations. The proposed element-by-element safe harbor provided that in existing facilities elements that are, as of the effective date of the 2010 Standards, fully compliant with the applicable technical and scoping requirements in the 1991 Standards, need not be modified or retrofitted to meet the 2010 Standards, until and unless those elements are altered. The Department posited that it would be an inefficient use of resources to require covered entities that have complied with the 1991 Standards to retrofit already compliant elements when the change might only provide a minimal improvement in accessibility. In addition, the Department was concerned that covered entities would have a strong disincentive for voluntary compliance if every time the applicable standards were revised covered entities would be required once again to modify elements to keep pace with new requirements. The Department recognized that revisions to some elements might confer a significant benefit on some individuals with disabilities and because of the safe harbor these benefits would be unavailable until the facility undergoes alterations.

The Department received many comments on this issue from the business and disability communities. Business owners and operators, industry groups and trade associations, and business advocacy organizations strongly supported the element-by-element safe harbor. By contrast, disability advocacy organizations and individuals commenting on behalf of the disability community were opposed to this safe harbor with near unanimity.

Businesses and business groups agreed with the concerns outlined by the Department in the NPRM, and asserted that the element-by-element safe harbor is integral to ensuring continued good faith compliance efforts by covered entities. These commenters argued that the financial cost and business disruption resulting from retrofitting elements constructed or previously modified to comply with 1991 Standards would be detrimental to nearly all businesses and not readily achievable for most. They contended that it would be fundamentally unfair to place these entities in a position where, despite full compliance with the 1991 Standards, the entities would now, overnight, be vulnerable to barrier removal litigation. They further contended that public accommodations will have little incentive to undertake large barrier removal projects or incorporate barrier removal into long-term planning if there is no assurance that the actions taken and money spent for barrier removal would offer some protection from litigation. One commenter also pointed out that the proposed safe harbor would be consistent with practices under other Federal accessibility standards, including the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards (UFAS) and the ADAAG.

Some business commenters urged the Department to expand the element-by-element safe harbor to include supplemental requirements. These commenters argued that imposing the 2010 Standards on existing facilities will provide a strong incentive for such facilities to eliminate some elements entirely, particularly where the element is not critical to the public accommodation’s business or operations (e.g., play areas in fast food restaurants) or the cost of retrofitting is significant. Some of these same commenters urged the Department to include within the safe harbor those elements not covered by the 1991 Standards, but which an entity had built in compliance with State or local accessibility laws. Other commenters requested safe harbor protection where a business had attempted barrier removal prior to the establishment of technical and scoping requirements for a particular element (e.g., play area equipment) if the business could show that the element now covered by the 2010 Standards was functionally accessible.

Other commenters noted ambiguity in the NPRM as to whether the element-by-element safe harbor applies only to elements that comply fully with the 1991 Standards, or also encompasses elements that comply with the 1991 Standards to the extent readily achievable. Some commenters proposed that the safe harbor should exist in perpetuity— that an element subject to a safe harbor at one point in time also should be afforded the same protection with respect to all future revisions to the ADA Standards (as with many building codes). These groups contended that allowing permanent compliance with the 1991 Standards will ensure readily accessible and usable facilities while also mitigating the need for expensive and time-consuming documentation of changes and maintenance.

A number of commenters inquired about the effect of the element-by-element safe harbor on elements that are not in strict compliance with the 1991 Standards, but conform to the terms of settlement agreements or consent decrees resulting from private litigation or Federal enforcement actions. These commenters noted that litigation or threatened litigation often has resulted in compromise among parties as to what is readily achievable. Business groups argued that facilities that have made modifications subject to those negotiated agreements should not be subject to the risk of further litigation as a result of the 2010 Standards.

Lastly, some business groups that supported the element-by-element safe harbor nevertheless contended that a better approach would be to separate barrier removal altogether from the 2010 Standards, such that the 2010 Standards would not be used to determine whether access to an existing facility is impeded by architectural barriers. These commenters argued that application of the 2010 Standards to barrier removal obligations is contrary to the ADA’s directive that barrier removal is required only where “easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense,” 42 U.S.C. 12181(9).

Nearly all commenters from the disability community objected to the proposed element-by-element safe harbor. These commenters asserted that the adoption of this safe harbor would permit and sanction the retention of outdated access standards even in cases where retrofitting to the 2010 Standards would be readily achievable. They argued that title III’s readily achievable defense is adequate to address businesses” cost concerns, and rejected the premise that requiring businesses to retrofit currently compliant elements would be an inefficient use of resources where readily achievable to do so. The proposed regulations, these commenters asserted, incorporate advances in technology, design, and construction, and reflect congressional and societal understanding that accessibility is not a static concept and that the ADA is a civil rights law intended to maximize accessibility. Additionally, these commenters noted that since the 2004 revision of the ADAAG will not be the last, setting a precedent of safe harbors for compliant elements will have the effect of preserving and protecting layers of increasingly outdated accessibility standards.

Many commenters objected to the Department’s characterization of the requirements subject to the safe harbor as reflecting only incremental changes and asserted that many of these incremental changes will result in significantly enhanced accessibility at little cost. The requirement concerning side-reach ranges was highlighted as an example of such requirements. Commenters from the disability community argued that the revised maximum side-reach range (from 54 inches to 48 inches) will result in a substantial increase in accessibility for many persons with disabilities—particularly individuals of short stature, for whom the revised reach range represents the difference between independent access to many features and dependence—and that the revisions should be made where readily achievable to do so. Business commenters, on the other hand, contended that application of the safe harbor to this requirement is critical because retrofitting items, such as light switches and thermostats often requires work (e.g., rewiring, patching, painting, and re-wallpapering), that would be extremely burdensome for entities to undertake. These commenters argued that such a burden is not justified where many of the affected entities already have retrofitted to meet the 1991 Standards.

Some commenters that were opposed to the element-by-element safe harbor proposed that an entity’s past efforts to comply with the 1991 Standards might appropriately be a factor in the readily achievable analysis. Several commenters proposed a temporary 5- year safe harbor that would provide reassurance and stability to covered entities that have recently taken proactive steps for barrier removal, but would also avoid the problems of preserving access deficits in perpetuity and creating multiple standards as subsequent updates are adopted.

After consideration of all relevant information presented on this issue during the comment period, the Department has decided to retain the proposed element-by-element safe harbor. Title III’s architectural barrier provisions place the most significant requirements of accessibility on new construction and alterations. The aim is to require businesses to make their facilities fully accessible at the time they are first constructing or altering those facilities, when burdens are less and many design elements will necessarily be in flux, and to impose a correspondingly lesser duty on businesses that are not changing their facilities. The Department believes that it would be consistent with this statutory structure not to change the requirements for design elements that were specifically addressed in our prior standards for those facilities that were built or altered in full compliance with those standards. The Department similarly believes it would be consistent with the statutory scheme not to change the requirements for design elements that were specifically addressed in our prior standards for those existing facilities that came into full compliance with those standards. Accordingly, the final rule at § 36.304(d)(2)(i) provides that elements that have not been altered in existing facilities on or after March 15, 2012 and that comply with the corresponding technical and scoping specifications for those elements in the 1991 Standards are not required to be modified in order to comply with the requirements set forth in the 2010 Standards. The safe harbor adopted is consistent in principle with the proposed provision in the NPRM, and reflects the Department’s determination that this approach furthers the statute’s barrier removal provisions and promotes continued good-faith compliance by public accommodations.

The element-by-element safe harbor adopted in this final rule is a narrow one. The Department recognizes that this safe harbor will delay, in some cases, the increased accessibility that the incremental changes would provide and that for some individuals with disabilities the impact may be significant. This safe harbor, however, is not a blanket exemption for every element in existing facilities. Compliance with the 1991 Standards is determined on an element-by-element basis in each existing facility.

Section 36.304(d)(2)(ii)(A) provides that prior to the compliance date of the rule March 15, 2012, noncompliant elements that have not been altered are obligated to be modified to the extent readily achievable to comply with the requirements set forth in the 1991 Standards or the 2010 Standards. Section 36.304(d)(2)(ii)(B) provides that after the date the 2010 Standards take effect (18 months after publication of the rule), noncompliant elements that have not been altered must be modified to the extent readily achievable to comply with the requirements set forth in the 2010 Standards. Noncomplying newly constructed and altered elements may also be subject to the requirements of § 36.406(a)(5).

The Department has not expanded the scope of the element-by-element safe harbor beyond those elements subject to the incremental changes. The Department has added § 36.304(d)(2)(iii), explicitly clarifying that existing elements subject to supplemental requirements for which scoping and technical specifications are provided for the first time in the 2010 Standards (e.g., play area requirements) are not covered by the safe harbor and, therefore, must be modified to comply with the 2010 Standards to the extent readily achievable. Section 36.304(d)(2)(iii) also identifies the elements in the 2010 Standards that are not eligible for the element-by-element safe harbor. The safe harbor also does not apply to the accessible routes not previously scoped in the 1991 standards, such as those required to connect the boundary of each area of sport activity, including soccer fields, basketball courts, baseball fields, running tracks, skating rinks, and areas surrounding a piece of gymnastic equipment. See Advisory note to section F206.2.2 of the 2010 Standards. The resource and fairness concerns underlying the element-by-element safe harbor are not implicated by barrier removal involving supplemental requirements. Public accommodations have not been subject previously to technical and scoping specifications for these supplemental requirements. Thus, with respect to supplemental requirements, the existing readily achievable standard best maximizes accessibility in the built environment without imposing unnecessary burdens on public accommodations.

The Department also has declined to expand the element-by-element safe harbor to cover existing elements subject to supplemental requirements that also may have been built in compliance with State or local accessibility laws. Measures taken to remove barriers under a Federal accessibility provision logically must be considered in regard to Federal standards, in this case the 2010 Standards. This approach is based on the Department’s determination that reference to ADA Standards for barrier removal will promote certainty, safety, and good design while still permitting slight deviations through readily achievable alternative methods. The Department continues to believe that this approach provides an appropriate and workable framework for implementation of title III’s barrier removal provisions. Because compliance with State or local accessibility codes is not a reliable indicator of effective access for purposes of the ADA Standards, the Department has decided not to include reliance on such codes as part of the safe harbor provision.

Only elements compliant with the 1991 Standards are eligible for the safe harbor. Thus, where a public accommodation attempted barrier removal but full compliance with the 1991 Standards was not readily achievable, the modified element does not fall within the scope of the safe harbor provision. A public accommodation at any point in time must remove barriers to the extent readily achievable. For existing elements, for which removal is not readily achievable at any given time, the public accommodation must provide its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations through alternative methods that are readily achievable. See 42 U.S.C. 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv), (v).

One-time evaluation and implementation of the readily achievable standard is not the end of the public accommodation’s barrier-removal obligation. Public accommodations have a continuing obligation to reevaluate barrier removal on a regular basis. For example, if a public accommodation identified barriers under the 1991 Standards but did not remove them because removal was not readily achievable based on cost considerations, it has a continuing obligation to remove these barriers if the economic considerations for the public accommodation change. The fact that the public accommodation has been providing its goods or services through alternative methods does not negate the continuing obligation to assess whether removal of the barrier at issue has become readily achievable. Public accommodations should incorporate consideration of their continuing barrier removal obligations in both short-term and long-term business planning.

The Department notes that commenters across the board expressed concern with recordkeeping burdens implicated by the element-by-element safe harbor. Businesses noted the additional costs and administrative burdens associated with identifying elements that fall within the element-by-element safe harbor, as well as tracking, documenting, and maintaining data on installation dates. Disability advocates expressed concern that varying compliance standards will make enforcement efforts more difficult, and urged the Department to clarify that title III entities bear the burden of proof regarding entitlement to safe harbor protection. The Department emphasizes that public accommodations wishing to benefit from the element-by-element safe harbor must demonstrate their safe harbor eligibility. The Department encourages public accommodations to take appropriate steps to confirm and document the compliance of existing elements with the 1991 Standards. Finally, while the Department has decided not to adopt in this rulemaking the suggestion by some commenters to make the protection afforded by the element-by-element safe harbor temporary, the Department believes this proposal merits further consideration. The Department, therefore, will continue to evaluate the efficacy and appropriateness of a safe harbor expiration or sunset provision.

Application to specific scenarios raised in comments. In response to the NPRM, the Department received a number of comments that raised issues regarding application of the element-by-element safe harbor to particular situations. Business commenters requested guidance on whether the replacement for a broken or malfunctioning element that is covered by the 1991 Standards would have to comply with the 2010 Standards. These commenters expressed concern that in some cases replacement of a broken fixture might necessitate moving a number of other accessible fixtures (such as in a bathroom) in order to comply with the fixture and space requirements of the 2010 Standards. Others questioned the effect of the new standards where an entity replaces an existing element currently protected by the safe harbor provision for water or energy conservation reasons. The Department intends to address these types of scenarios in technical guidance.

Effective date for barrier removal. Several commenters expressed concern that the NPRM did not propose a transition period for applying the 2004 ADAAG to barrier removal in existing facilities in cases where the safe harbors do not apply. These commenters argued that for newly covered elements, they needed time to hire attorneys and consultants to assess the impact of the new requirements, determine whether they need to make additional retrofits, price those retrofits, assess whether the change actually is “readily achievable,” obtain approval for the removal from owners who must pay for the changes, obtain permits, and then do the actual work. The commenters recognized that there may be some barrier removal actions that require little planning, but stated that other actions cost significantly more and require more budgeting, planning, and construction time.

Barrier removal has been an ongoing requirement that has applied to public accommodations since the original regulation took effect on January 26, 1992. The final rule maintains the existing regulatory provision that barrier removal does not have to be undertaken unless it is “readily achievable.” The Department has provided in § 36.304(d)(2)(ii)(B) that public accommodations are not required to apply the 2010 Standards to barrier removal until 18 months after the publication date of this rule. It is the Department’s view that 18 months is a sufficient amount of time for application of the 2010 Standards to barrier removal for those elements not subject to the safe harbor. This is also consistent with the compliance date the Department has specified for applying the 2010 Standards to new construction and alterations.

Reduced scoping for play areas and other recreation facilities.

Play areas. The Access Board published final guidelines for play areas in October 2000. 65 FR 62498 (Oct. 18, 2000). The guidelines include requirements for ground-level and elevated play components, accessible routes connecting the components, accessible ground surfaces, and maintenance of those surfaces. They have been referenced in Federal playground construction and safety guidelines and in some State and local codes and have been used voluntarily when many play areas across the country have been altered or constructed.

In adopting the 2004 ADAAG (which includes the play area guidelines published in 2000), the Department acknowledges both the importance of integrated, full access to play areas for children and parents with disabilities as well as the need to avoid placing an untenable fiscal burden on businesses. Consequently, the Department asked seven questions in the NPRM related to existing play areas. Two questions related to safe harbors: one on the appropriateness of a general safe harbor for existing play areas and another on public accommodations that have complied with State or local standards specific to play areas. The others related to reduced scoping, limited exemptions, and whether there is a “tipping point” at which the costs of compliance with supplemental requirements would be so burdensome that a public accommodation would shut down a program rather than comply with the new requirements. In the nearly 100 comments received on title III play areas, the majority of commenters strongly opposed all safe harbors, exemptions, and reductions in scoping, and questioned the feasibility of determining a tipping point. A smaller number of commenters advocated for a safe harbor from compliance with the 2004 ADAAG play area requirements along with reduced scoping and exemptions for both readily achievable barrier removal and alterations.

Commenters were split as to whether the Department should exempt owners and operators of public accommodations from compliance with the supplemental requirements for play areas and recreation facilities and instead continue to determine accessibility in these facilities on a case-by-case basis under existing law. Many commenters were of the view that the exemption was not necessary because concerns of financial burden are addressed adequately by the defenses inherent in the standard for what constitutes readily achievable barrier removal. A number of commenters found the exemption inappropriate because no standards for play areas previously existed. Commenters also were concerned that a safe harbor applicable only to play areas and recreation facilities (but not to other facilities operated by a public accommodation) would create confusion, significantly limit access for children and parents with disabilities, and perpetuate the discrimination and segregation individuals with disabilities face in the important social arenas of play and recreation—areas where little access has been provided in the absence of specific standards. Many commenters suggested that instead of an exemption, the Department should provide guidance on barrier removal with respect to play areas and other recreation facilities.

Several commenters supported the exemption, mainly on the basis of the cost of barrier removal. More than one commenter noted that the most expensive aspect of barrier removal on existing play areas is the surfaces for the accessible routes and use zones. Several commenters expressed the view that where a play area is ancillary to a public accommodation (e.g., in quick service restaurants or shopping centers), the play area should be exempt from compliance with the supplemental requirements because barrier removal would be too costly, and as a result, the public accommodation might eliminate the area.

The Department has been persuaded that the ADA’s approach to barrier removal, the readily achievable standard, provides the appropriate balance for the application of the 2010 Standards to existing play areas. Thus, in existing playgrounds, public accommodations will be required to remove barriers to access where these barriers can be removed without much difficulty or expense.

The NPRM asked if there are State and local standards specifically regarding play and recreation area accessibility and whether facilities currently governed by, and in compliance with, such State and local standards or codes should be subject to a safe harbor from compliance with similar applicable requirements in the 2004 ADAAG. The Department also requested comments on whether it would be appropriate for the Access Board to consider the implementation of guidelines that would extend such a safe harbor to play and recreation areas undertaking alterations. In response, no comprehensive State or local codes were identified, and commenters generally noted that because the 2004 ADAAG contained comprehensive accessibility requirements for these unique areas, public accommodations should not be afforded a safe harbor from compliance with them when altering play and recreation areas. The Department is persuaded by these comments that there is insufficient basis to apply a safe harbor for readily achievable barrier removal or alterations for play areas built in compliance with State or local laws.

In the NPRM, the Department requested that public accommodations identify a “tipping point” at which the costs of compliance with the supplemental requirements for existing play areas would be so burdensome that the entity simply would shut down the playground. In response, no tipping point was identified. Some commenters noted, however, that the scope of the requirements may create the choice between wholesale replacement of play areas and discontinuance of some play areas, while others speculated that some public accommodations may remove play areas that are merely ancillary amenities rather than incur the cost of barrier removal under the 2010 Standards. The Department has decided that the comments did not establish any clear tipping point and therefore that no regulatory response is appropriate in this area.

The NPRM also asked for comment about the potential effect of exempting existing play areas of less than 1,000 square feet in size from the requirements applicable to play areas. Many trade and business associations favored exempting these small play areas, with some arguing that where the play areas are only ancillary amenities, the cost of barrier removal may dictate that they be closed down. Some commenters sought guidance on the definition of a 1,000-square-foot play area, seeking clarification that seating and bathroom spaces associated with a play area are not included in the size definition. Disability rights advocates, by contrast, overwhelmingly opposed this exemption, arguing that these play areas may be some of the few available in a community; that restaurants and day care facilities are important places for socialization between children with disabilities and those without disabilities; that integrated play is important to the mission of day care centers and that many day care centers and play areas in large cities, such as New York City, have play areas that are less than 1,000 square feet in size; and that 1,000 square feet was an arbitrary size requirement.

The Department agrees that children with disabilities are entitled to access to integrated play opportunities. However, the Department is aware that small public accommodations are concerned about the costs and efforts associated with barrier removal. The Department has given careful consideration as to how best to insulate small entities from overly burdensome costs and undertakings and has concluded that the existing readily achievable standard, not a separate exemption, is an effective and employable method by which to protect these entities. Under the existing readily achievable standard, small public accommodations would be required to comply only with the scoping and technical requirements of the 2010 Standards that are easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense. Thus, concerns about prohibitive costs and efforts clearly are addressed by the existing readily achievable standard. Moreover, as evidenced by comments inquiring as to how 1,000- square-foot play areas are to be measured and complaining that the 1,000-square-foot cutoff is arbitrary, the exemption posited in the NPRM would have been difficult to apply. Finally, a separate exemption would have created confusion as to whether, or when, to apply the exemption or the readily achievable standard. Consequently, the Department has decided that an exemption, separate and apart from the readily achievable standard, is not appropriate or necessary for small private play areas.

In the NPRM, the Department requested public comment as to whether existing play areas should be permitted to substitute additional ground-level play components for the elevated play components that they otherwise would have been required to make accessible. Most commenters opposed this substitution because the guidelines as well as considerations of “readily achievable barrier removal” inherently contain the flexibility necessary for a variety of situations. Such commenters also noted that the Access Board adopted extensive guidelines with ample public input, including significant negotiation and balancing of costs. In addition, commenters advised that including additional ground level play components might result in higher costs because more accessible route surfaces might be required. A limited number of commenters favored substitution. The Department is persuaded by these comments that the proposed substitution of elements may not be beneficial. The current rules applicable to readily achievable barrier removal will be used to determine the number and type of accessible elements appropriate for a specific facility.

In the NPRM, the Department requested public comment on whether it would be appropriate for the Access Board to consider issuing guidelines for alterations to play and recreation facilities that would permit reduced scoping of accessible components or substitution of ground level play components in lieu of elevated play components. The Department received little input on this issue, and most commenters disfavored the suggestion. One commenter that supported this approach conjectured that it would encourage public accommodations to maintain and improve their playgrounds as well as provide more accessibility. The Department is persuaded that it is not necessary to ask the Access Board to revisit this issue.

The NPRM also asked whether only one play area of each type should be required to comply at existing sites with multiple play areas and whether there are other select requirements applicable to play areas in the 2004 ADAAG for which the Department should consider exemptions or reduced scoping. Some commenters were opposed to the concept of requiring compliance at one play area of each type at a site with multiple play areas, citing lack of choice and ongoing segregation of children and adults with disabilities. Other commenters who supported an exemption and reduced scoping for alterations noted that the play equipment industry has adjusted to, and does not take issue with, the provisions of the 2004 ADAAG; however, they asked for some flexibility in the barrier removal requirements as applied to play equipment, arguing that augmentation of the existing equipment and installation of accessible play surfacing equates to wholesale replacement of the play equipment. The Department is persuaded that the current rules applicable to readily achievable barrier removal should be used to decide which play areas must comply with the supplemental requirements presented in the 2010 Standards.

Swimming pools, wading pools, saunas, and steam rooms. Section 36.304(d)(3)(ii) in the NPRM specified that for measures taken to comply with the barrier removal requirements, existing swimming pools with at least 300 linear feet of swimming pool wall would need to provide only one accessible means of entry that complies with section 1009.2 or section 1009.3 of the 2004 ADAAG, instead of the two means required for new construction. Commenters opposed the Department’s reducing the scoping from that required in the 2004 ADAAG. The following were among the factors cited in comments: that swimming is a common therapeutic form of exercise for many individuals with disabilities; that the cost of a swimming pool lift or other options for pool access is readily achievable and can be accomplished without much difficulty or expense; and that the readily achievable standard already provides public accommodations with a means to reduce their scoping requirements. A few commenters cited safety concerns resulting from having just one accessible means of access, and stated that because pools typically have one ladder for every 75 linear feet of pool wall, they should have more than one accessible means of egress. Other commenters either approved or did not oppose providing one accessible means of access for larger pools so long as a lift was used.

Section 36.304(d)(4)(ii) of the NPRM proposed to exempt existing swimming pools with fewer than 300 linear feet of swimming pool wall from the obligation to provide an accessible means of entry. Most commenters strongly opposed this provision, arguing that aquatic activity is a safe and beneficial form of exercise that is particularly appropriate for individuals with disabilities. Many argued that the readily achievable standard for barrier removal is available as a defense and is preferable to creating an exemption for pool operators for whom providing an accessible means of entry would be readily achievable. Commenters who supported this provision apparently assumed that providing an accessible means of entry would be readily achievable and that therefore the exemption is needed so that small pool operators do not have to provide an accessible means of entry.

The Department has carefully considered all the information available to it as well as the comments submitted on these two proposed exemptions for swimming pools owned or operated by title III entities. The Department acknowledges that swimming provides important therapeutic, exercise, and social benefits for many individuals with disabilities and is persuaded that exemption of the vast majority of privately owned or operated pools from the 2010 Standards is neither appropriate nor necessary. The Department agrees with the commenters that title III already contains sufficient limitations on private entities” obligations to remove barriers. In particular, the Department agrees that those public accommodations that can demonstrate that making particular existing swimming pools accessible in accordance with the 2010 Standards is not readily achievable are sufficiently protected from excessive compliance costs. Thus, the Department has eliminated proposed § 36.304(d)(3)(ii) and (d)(4)(ii) from the final rule.

Proposed § 36.304(d)(4)(iii) would have exempted existing saunas and steam rooms that seat only two individuals from the obligation to remove barriers. This provision generated far fewer comments than the provisions for swimming pools. People who commented were split fairly evenly between those who argued that the readily achievable standard for barrier removal should be applied to all existing saunas and steam rooms and those who argued that all existing saunas and steam rooms, regardless of size, should be exempt from any barrier removal obligations. The Department considered these comments and has decided to eliminate the exemption for existing saunas and steam rooms that seat only two people. Such an exemption for saunas and steam rooms that seat only two people is unnecessary because the readily achievable standard provides sufficient protection against barrier removal that is overly expensive or too difficult. Moreover, the Department believes barrier removal likely will not be readily achievable for most of these small saunas because the nature of their prefabricated forms, which include built-in seats, make it either technically infeasible or too difficult or expensive to remove barriers. Consequently a separate exemption for saunas and steam rooms would have been superfluous. Finally, employing the readily achievable standard for small saunas and steam rooms is consistent with the Department’s decisions regarding the proposed exemptions for play areas and swimming pools.

Several commenters also argued in favor of a specific exemption for existing spas. The Department notes that the technically infeasible and readily achievable defenses are applicable equally to existing spas and declines to adopt such an exemption.

The Department also solicited comment on the possibility of exempting existing wading pools from the obligation to remove barriers where readily achievable. Most commenters stated that installing a sloped entry in an existing wading pool is not likely to be feasible. Because covered entities are not required to undertake modifications that are not readily achievable or that would be technically infeasible, the Department believes that the rule as drafted provides sufficient protection from unwarranted expense to the operators of small existing wading pools. Other existing wading pools, particularly those large wading pools found in facilities such as water parks, must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, the Department has not included an exemption for wading pools in its final rule.

The Department received several comments recommending that existing wave pools be exempt from barrier removal requirements. The commenters pointed out that existing wave pools often have a sloped entry, but do not have the handrails, level landings, or edge protection required for accessible entry. Because pool bottom slabs are structural, they could be subject to catastrophic failure if the soil pressure stability or the under slab dewatering are not maintained during the installation of these accessibility features in an already constructed pool. They also argue that the only safe design scenario is to design the wheelchair ramp, pool lift, or transfer access in a side cove where the mean water level largely is unaffected by the wave action, and that this additional construction to an existing wave pool is not readily achievable. If located in the main pool area, the handrails, stanchions, and edge protection for sloped entry will become underwater hazards when the wave action is pushing onto pool users, and the use of a pool lift will not be safe without a means of stabilizing the person against the forces of the waves while using the lift. They also pointed out that a wheelchair would pose a hazard to all wave pool users, in that the wave action might push other pool users into the wheelchair or push the wheelchair into other pool users. The wheelchair would have to be removed from the pool after the user has entered (and has transferred to a flotation device if needed). The commenters did not specify if these two latter concerns are applicable to all wave pools or only to those with more aggressive wave action. The Department has decided that the issue of modifications to wave pools is best addressed on a case-by-case basis, and therefore, this rule does not contain barrier removal exemptions applicable to wave pools.

The Department also received comments suggesting that it is not appropriate to require two accessible means of entry to wave pools, lazy rivers, sand bottom pools, and other water amusements that have only one point of entry. The Department agrees. The 2010 Standards (at section 242.2, Exception 2) provide that only one means of entry is required for wave pools, lazy rivers, sand bottom pools, and other water amusement where user access is limited to one area.

Other recreation facilities. In the NPRM, the Department asked about a number of issues relating to recreation facilities, such as team or player seating areas, areas of sport activity, exercise machines, boating facilities, fishing piers and platforms, golf courses, and miniature golf courses. The Department asked for public comment on the costs and benefits of applying the 2004 ADAAG to these spaces and facilities. The discussion of the comments received by the Department on these issues and the Department’s response to those comments can be found in either the section entitled “Other Issues” of Appendix A to this final rule.

Safe harbor for qualified small businesses. Section 36.304(d)(5) of the NPRM would have provided that a qualified small business would meet its obligation to remove architectural barriers where readily achievable for a given year if, during that tax year, the entity spent at least 1 percent of its gross revenue in the preceding tax year on measures undertaken in compliance with barrier removal requirements. Proposed § 36.304(d)(5) has been omitted from the final rule. The qualified small business safe harbor was proposed in response to small business advocates” requests for clearer guidance on when barrier removal is, and is not, readily achievable. According to these groups, the Department’s approach to readily achievable barrier removal disproportionately affects small business for the following reasons: (1) Small businesses are more likely to operate in older buildings and facilities; (2) the 1991 Standards are too numerous and technical for most small business owners to understand and determine how they relate to State and local building or accessibility codes; and (3) small businesses are vulnerable to title III litigation and often are compelled to settle because they cannot afford the litigation costs involved in proving that an action is not readily achievable.

The 2010 Standards go a long way toward meeting the concern of small businesses with regard to achieving compliance with both Federal and State accessibility requirements, because the Access Board harmonized the 2004 ADAAG with the model codes that form the basis of most State and local accessibility codes. Moreover, the element-by-element safe harbor will ensure that unless and until a small business engages in alteration of affected elements, the small business will not have to retrofit elements that were constructed in compliance with the 1991 Standards or, with respect to elements in an existing facility, that were retrofitted to the 1991 Standards in conjunction with the business’s barrier removal obligation prior to the rule’s compliance date.

In proposing an additional safe harbor for small businesses, the Department had sought to promulgate a rule that would provide small businesses a level of certainty in short-term and long-term planning with respect to barrier removal. This in turn would benefit individuals with disabilities in that it would encourage small businesses to consider and incorporate barrier removal in their yearly budgets. Such a rule also would provide some protection, through diminished litigation risks, to small businesses that undertake significant barrier removal projects.

As proposed in the NPRM, the qualified small business safe harbor would provide that a qualified small business has met its readily achievable barrier removal obligations for a given year if, during that tax year, the entity has spent at least 1 percent of its gross revenue in the preceding tax year on measures undertaken to comply with title III barrier removal requirements. (Several small business advocacy organizations pointed out an inconsistency between the Department’s description of the small business safe harbor in the Section-by- Section Analysis for § 36.304 and the proposed regulatory text for that provision. The proposed regulatory text sets out the correct parameters of the proposed rule. The Department does not believe that the error substantively affected the comments on this issue. Some commenters noted the discrepancy and commented on both; others commented more generally on the proposal, so the discrepancy was not relevant.) The Department noted that the efficacy of any proposal for a small business safe harbor would turn on the following two determinations: (1) The definition of a qualified small business, and (2) the formula for calculating what percentage of revenue is sufficient to satisfy the readily achievable presumption.

As proposed in § 36.104 in the NPRM, a “qualified small business” is a business entity defined as a small business concern under the regulations promulgated by the Small Business Administration (SBA) pursuant to the Small Business Act. See 15 U.S.C. 632; 13 CFR part 121. The Department noted that under section 3(a)(2)(C) of the Small Business Act, Federal departments and agencies are prohibited from prescribing a size standard for categorizing a business concern as a small business unless the department or agency has been authorized specifically to do so or has proposed a size standard in compliance with the criteria set forth in the SBA regulations, has provided an opportunity for public notice and comment on the proposed standard, and has received approval from the Administrator of the SBA to use the standard. See 15 U.S.C. 632(a)(2)(C). The Department further noted that Federal agencies or departments promulgating regulations relating to small businesses usually use SBA size criteria, and they otherwise must be prepared to justify how they arrived at a different standard and why the SBA’s regulations do not satisfy the agency’s program requirements. See 13 CFR 121.903. The ADA does not define ‘small business” or specifically authorize the Department to prescribe size standards.

In the NPRM, the Department indicated its belief that the size standards developed by the SBA are appropriate for determining which businesses subject to the ADA should be eligible for the small business safe harbor provisions, and proposed to adopt the SBA’s size standards to define small businesses for purposes of the qualified small business safe harbor. The SBA’s small business size standards define the maximum size that a concern, together with all of its affiliates, may be if it is to be eligible for Federal small business programs or to be considered a small business for the purpose of other Federal agency programs. Concerns primarily engaged in the same kind of economic activity are classified in the same industry regardless of their types of ownership (such as sole proprietorship, partnership, or corporation). Approximately 1200 industries are described in detail in the North American Industry Classification System—United States, 2007. For most businesses, the SBA has established a size standard based on average annual receipts. The majority of places of public accommodation will be classified as small businesses if their average annual receipts are less than $6.5 million. However, some will qualify with higher annual receipts. The SBA small business size standards should be familiar to many if not most small businesses, and using these standards in the ADA regulation would provide some certainty to owners, operators, and individuals because the SBA’s current size standards can be changed only after notice and comment rulemaking.

The Department explained in the NPRM that the choice of gross revenue as the basis for calculating the safe harbor threshold was intended to avoid the effect of differences in bookkeeping practices and to maximize accessibility consistent with congressional intent. The Department recognized, however, that entities with similar gross revenue could have very different net revenue, and that this difference might affect what is readily achievable for a particular entity. The Department also recognized that adopting a small business safe harbor would effect a marked change to the Department’s current position on barrier removal. Accordingly, the Department sought public comment on whether a presumption should be adopted whereby qualifying small businesses are presumed to have done what is readily achievable for a given year if, during that tax year, the entity spent at least 1 percent of its gross revenue in the preceding tax year on barrier removal, and on whether 1 percent is an appropriate amount or whether gross revenue would be the appropriate measure.

The Department received many comments on the proposed qualified small business safe harbor. From the business community, comments were received from individual business owners and operators, industry and trade groups, and advocacy organizations for business and industry. From the disability community, comments were received from individuals, disability advocacy groups, and nonprofit organizations involved in providing services for persons with disabilities or involved in disability-related fields. The Department has considered all relevant matter submitted on this issue during the 60-day public comment period.

Small businesses and industry groups strongly supported a qualified small business safe harbor of some sort, but none supported the structure proposed by the Department in the NPRM. All felt strongly that clarifications and modifications were needed to strengthen the provision and to provide adequate protection from litigation.

Business commenters” objections to the proposed qualified small business safe harbor fell generally into three categories: (1) That gross revenue is an inappropriate and inaccurate basis for determining what is readily achievable by a small business since it does not take into account expenses that may result in a small business operating at a loss; (2) that courts will interpret the regulation to mean that a small business must spend 1 percent of gross revenue each year on barrier removal, i.e., that expenditure of 1 percent of gross revenue on barrier removal is always “readily achievable”; and (3) that a similar misinterpretation of the 1 percent gross revenue concept, i.e., that 1 percent of gross revenue is always “readily achievable,” will be applied to public accommodations that are not small businesses and that have substantially larger gross revenue. Business groups also expressed significant concern about the recordkeeping burdens they viewed as inherent in the Department’s proposal.

Across the board, business commenters objected to the Department’s proposed use of gross revenue as the basis for calculating whether the small business safe harbor has been met. All contended that 1 percent of gross revenue is too substantial a trigger for safe harbor protection and would result in barrier removal burdens far exceeding what is readily achievable or “easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense.” 42U.S.C. 12181(9). These commenters further pointed out that gross revenue and receipts vary considerably from industry to industry depending on the outputs sold in each industry, and that the use of gross revenue or receipts would therefore result in arbitrary and inequitable burdens on those subject to the rule. These commenters stated that the readily achievable analysis, and thus the safe harbor threshold, should be premised on a business’s net revenue so that operating expenses are offset before determining what amount might be available for barrier removal. Many business commenters contended that barrier removal is not readily achievable if an entity is operating at a loss, and that a spending formula premised on net revenue can reflect more accurately businesses” ability to engage in barrier removal.

There was no consensus among the business commenters as to a formula that would reflect more accurately what is readily achievable for small businesses with respect to barrier removal. Those that proposed alternative formulas offered little in the way of substantive support for their proposals. One advocacy organization representing a large cross-section of small businesses provided some detail on the gross and net revenue of various industry types and sizes in support of its position that for nearly all small businesses, net revenue is a better indicator of a business’s financial ability to spend money on barrier removal. The data also incidentally highlighted the importance and complexity of ensuring that each component in a safe harbor formula accurately informs and contributes to the ultimate question of what is and is not readily achievable for a small business.

Several business groups proposed that a threshold of 0.5 percent (or one-half of 1 percent) of gross revenue, or 2.5 percent of net revenue, spent on ADA compliance might be a workable measure of what is “readily achievable” for small businesses. Other groups proposed 3 to 5 percent of net revenue as a possible measure. Several commenters proposed affording small businesses an option of using gross or net revenue to determine safe harbor eligibility. Another commenter proposed premising the safe harbor threshold on a designated percentage of the amount spent on renovation in a given year. Others proposed averaging gross or net revenue over a number of years to account for cyclical changes in economic and business environments. Additionally, many proposed that an entity should be able to roll over expenditures in excess of the safe harbor for inclusion in safe harbor analysis in subsequent years, to facilitate barrier removal planning and encourage large-scale barrier removal measures.

Another primary concern of many businesses and business groups is that the 1 percent threshold for safe harbor protection would become a de facto “floor” for what is readily achievable for any small business entity. These commenters urged the Department to clarify that readily achievable barrier removal remains the standard, and that in any given case, an entity retains the right to assert that barrier removal expenditures below the 1 percent threshold are not readily achievable. Other business groups worried that courts would apply the 1 percent calculus to questions of barrier removal by businesses too large to qualify for the small business safe harbor. These commenters requested clarification that the rationale underlying the Department’s determination that a percentage of gross revenue can appropriately approximate readily achievable barrier removal for small businesses does not apply outside the small business context.

Small businesses and business groups uniformly requested guidance as to what expenses would be included in barrier removal costs for purposes of determining whether the safe harbor threshold has been met. These commenters contended that any and all expenses associated with ADA compliance— e.g., consultants, architects, engineers, staff training, and recordkeeping— should be included in the calculation. Some proposed that litigation-related expenses, including defensive litigation costs, also should be accounted for in a small business safe harbor. Additionally, several commenters urged the Department to issue a small business compliance guide with detailed guidance and examples regarding application of the readily achievable barrier removal standard and the safe harbor. Some commenters felt that the Department’s regulatory efforts should be focused on clarifying the readily achievable standard rather than on introducing a safe harbor based on a set spending level.

Businesses and business groups expressed concern that the Department’s proposed small business safe harbor would not alleviate small business vulnerability to litigation. Individuals and advocacy groups were equally concerned that the practical effect of the Department’s proposal likely would be to accelerate or advance the initiation of litigation. These commenters pointed out that an individual encountering barriers in small business facilities will not know whether the entity is noncompliant or entitled to safe harbor protection. Safe harbor eligibility can be evaluated only after review of the small business’s barrier removal records and financial records. Individuals and advocacy groups argued that the Department should not promulgate a rule by which individuals must file suit to obtain the information needed to determine whether a lawsuit is appropriate in a particular case, and that, therefore, the rule should clarify that small businesses are required to produce such documentation to any individual upon request.

Several commenters noted that a small business safe harbor based on net, rather than gross, revenue would complicate exponentially its efficacy as an affirmative defense, because accounting practices and asserted expenses would be subject to discovery and dispute. One business advocacy group representing a large cross-section of small businesses noted that some small business owners and operators likely would be uncomfortable with producing detailed financial information, or could be prevented from using the safe harbor because of inadvertent recordkeeping deficiencies.

Individuals, advocacy groups, and nonprofit organizations commenting on behalf of the disability community uniformly and strongly opposed a safe harbor for qualified small businesses, saying it is fundamentally at odds with the intent of Congress and the plain language of the ADA. These commenters contended that the case-specific factors underlying the statute’s readily achievable standard cannot be reconciled with a formulaic accounting approach, and that a blanket formula inherently is less fair, less flexible, and less effective than the current case-by-case determination for whether an action is readily achievable. Moreover, they argued, a small business safe harbor for readily achievable barrier removal is unnecessary because the statutory standard explicitly provides that a business need only spend what is readily achievable—an amount that may be more or less than 1 percent of revenue in any given year.

Several commenters opined that the formulaic approach proposed by the Department overlooks the factors that often prove most conducive and integral to readily achievable barrier removal—planning and prioritization. Many commenters expressed concern that the safe harbor creates an incentive for business entities to forego large-scale barrier removal in favor of smaller, less costly removal projects, regardless of the relative access the measures might provide. Others commented that an emphasis on a formulaic amount rather than readily achievable barrier removal might result in competition among types of disabilities as to which barriers get removed first, or discrimination against particular types of disabilities if barrier removal for those groups is more expensive.

Many commenters opposed to the small business safe harbor proposed clarifications and limiting rules. A substantial number of commenters were strongly opposed to what they perceived as a vastly overbroad and overly complicated definition of “qualified small business” for purposes of eligibility for the safe harbor, and urged the Department to limit the qualified small business safe harbor to those businesses eligible for the ADA small business tax credit under section 44 of the Tax Code. Some commenters from the disability community contended that the spending level that triggers the safe harbor should be cumulative, to reflect the continuing nature of the readily achievable barrier obligation and to preclude a business from erasing years of unjustifiable inaction or insufficient action by spending up to the safe harbor threshold for one year. These commenters also sought explicit clarification that the small business safe harbor is an affirmative defense.

A number of commenters proposed that a business seeking to use the qualified small business safe harbor should be required to have a written barrier removal plan that contains a prioritized list of significant access barriers, a schedule for removal, and a description of the methods used to identify and prioritize barriers. These commenters argued that only spending consistent with the plan should count toward the qualified small business threshold.

After consideration of all relevant matter presented, the Department has concluded that neither the qualified small business safe harbor proposed in the NPRM nor any of the alternatives proposed by commenters will achieve the Department’s intended results. Business and industry commenters uniformly objected to a safe harbor based on gross revenue, argued that 1 percent of gross revenue was out of reach for most, if not all, small businesses, and asserted that a safe harbor based on net revenue would better capture whether and to what extent barrier removal is readily achievable for small businesses. Individuals and disability advocacy groups rejected a set formula as fundamentally inconsistent with the case-specific approach reflected in the statute.

Commenters on both sides noted ambiguity as to which ADA-related costs appropriately should be included in the calculation of the safe harbor threshold, and expressed concern about the practical effect of the proposed safe harbor on litigation. Disability organizations expressed concern that the proposal might increase litigation because individuals with disabilities confronted with barriers in places of public accommodation would not be able to independently assess whether an entity is noncompliant or is, in fact, protected by the small business safe harbor. The Department notes that the concerns about enforcement-related complexity and expense likely would increase exponentially with a small business safe harbor based on net revenue.

The Department continues to believe that promulgation of a small business safe harbor would be within the scope of the Attorney General’s mandate under 42 U.S.C. 12186(b) to issue regulations to carry out the provisions of title III. Title III defines “readily achievable” to mean “easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense,” 42 U.S.C. 12181(9), and sets out factors to consider in determining whether an action is readily achievable. While the statutory factors reflect that whether an action is readily achievable is a fact-based determination, there is no inherent inconsistency with the Department’s proposition that a formula based on revenue and barrier removal expenditure could accurately approximate the high end of the level of expenditure that can be considered readily achievable for a circumscribed subset of title III entities defined, in part, by their maximum annual average receipts. Moreover, the Department’s obligation under the SBREFA to consider alternative means of compliance for small businesses, See 5 U.S.C. 603(c), further supports the Department’s conclusion that a well-targeted formula is a reasonable approach to implementation of the statute’s readily achievable standard. While the Department ultimately has concluded that a small business safe harbor should not be included in the final rule, the Department continues to believe that it is within the Department’s authority to develop and implement such a safe harbor.

As noted above, the business community strongly objected to a safe harbor premised on gross revenue, on the ground that gross revenue is an unreliable indicator of an entity’s ability to remove barriers, and urged the Department to formulate a safe harbor based on net revenue. The Department’s proposed use of gross revenue was intended to offer a measure of certainty for qualified small businesses while ensuring that those businesses continue to meet their ongoing obligation to remove architectural barriers where doing so is readily achievable.

The Department believes that a qualified small business safe harbor based on net revenue would be an unreliable indicator of what is readily achievable and would be unworkable in practice. Evaluation of what is readily achievable for a small business cannot rest solely on a business’s net revenue because many decisions about expenses are inherently subjective, and in some cases a net loss may be more beneficial (in terms of taxes, for example) than a small net profit. The Department does not read the ADA’s readily achievable standard to mean necessarily that architectural barrier removal is to be, or should be, a business’s last concern, or that a business can claim that every barrier removal obligation is not readily achievable. Therefore, if a qualified small business safe harbor were to be premised on net revenue, assertion of the affirmative defense would trigger discovery and examination of the business’s accounting methods and the validity or necessity of offsetting expenses. The practical benefits and legal certainty intended by the NPRM would be lost.

Because there was little to no support for the Department’s proposed use of gross revenue and no workable alternatives are available at this time, the Department will not adopt a small business safe harbor in this final rule. Small business public accommodations are subject to the barrier removal requirements set out in § 36.304 of the final rule. In addition, the Department plans to provide small businesses with more detailed guidance on assessing and meeting their barrier removal obligations in a small business compliance guide.

Section 36.308 Seating in Assembly Areas

In the 1991 rule, § 36.308 covered seating obligations for public accommodations in assembly areas. It was bifurcated into (a) existing facilities and (b) new construction and alterations. The new construction and alterations provision, § 36.308(b), merely stated that assembly areas should be built or altered in accordance with the applicable provisions in the 1991 Standards. Section 36.308(a), by contrast, provided detailed guidelines on what barrier removal was required.

The Department explained in the preamble to the 1991 rule that § 36.308 provided specific rules on assembly areas to ensure that wheelchair users, who typically were relegated to inferior seating in the back of assembly areas separate from their friends and family, would be provided access to seats that were integrated and equal in quality to those provided to the general public. Specific guidance on assembly areas was desirable because they are found in many different types of places of public accommodation, ranging from opera houses (places of exhibition or entertainment) to private university lecture halls (places of education), and include assembly areas that range in size from small movie theaters of 100 or fewer seats to 100,000-seat sports stadiums.

In the NPRM, the Department proposed to update § 36.308(a) by incorporating some of the applicable assembly area provisions from the 2010 Standards. Upon further review, however, the Department has determined that the need to provide special guidance for assembly areas in a separate section no longer exists, except for specialty seating areas, as discussed below. Since enactment of the ADA, the Department has interpreted the 1991 Standards as a guide for determining the existence of barriers. Courts have affirmed this interpretation. See, e.g., Colorado Cross Disability Coalition v. Too, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 2d 707 (D. Colo. 2004); Access Now, Inc. v. AMH CGH, Inc., 2001 WL 1005593 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Pascuiti v. New York Yankees, 87 F. Supp. 2d 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).

The 2010 Standards now establish detailed guidance for newly constructed and altered assembly areas, which is provided in § 36.406(f), and these Standards will serve as a new guide for barrier removal. Accordingly, the former § 36.308(a) has been replaced in the final rule. Assembly areas will benefit from the same safe harbor provisions applicable to barrier removal in all places of public accommodations as provided in § 36.304(d)(2) of the final rule.

The Department has also decided to remove proposed § 36.308(c)(2) from the final rule. This provision would have required assembly areas with more than 5,000 seats to provide five wheelchair spaces with at least three designated companion seats for each of those five wheelchair spaces. The Department agrees with commenters who asserted that group seating already is addressed more appropriately in ticketing under § 36.302(f).

The Department has determined that proposed § 36.308(c)(1), addressing specialty seating in assembly areas, should remain as § 36.308 in the final rule with additional language. This paragraph is designed to ensure that individuals with disabilities have an opportunity to access specialty seating areas that entitle spectators to distinct services or amenities not generally available to others. This provision is not, as several commenters mistakenly thought, designed to cover luxury boxes and suites. Those areas have separate requirements outlined in section 221 of the 2010 Standards.

Section 36.308 requires only that accessible seating be provided in each area with distinct services or amenities. To the extent a covered entity provides multiple seating areas with the same services and amenities, each of those areas would not be distinct and thus all of them would not be required to be accessible. For example, if a facility has similar dining service in two areas, both areas would not need to be made accessible; however, if one dining service area is open to families, while the other is open only to individuals over the age of 21, both areas would need to be made accessible. Factors distinguishing specialty seating areas generally are dictated by the type of facility or event, but may include, for example, such distinct services and amenities as access to wait staff for in-seat food or beverage service; availability of catered food or beverages for pre-game, intermission, or post-game events; restricted access to lounges with special amenities, such as couches or flat-screen televisions; or access to team personnel or facilities for team-sponsored events (e.g., autograph sessions, sideline passes, or facility tours) not otherwise available to other spectators.

The NPRM required public accommodations to locate wheelchair seating spaces and companion seats in each specialty seating area within the assembly area. The Department has added language in the final rule stating that public accommodations that cannot place wheelchair seating spaces and companion seats in each specialty area because it is not readily achievable to do so may meet their obligation by providing specialty services or amenities to individuals with disabilities and their companions at other designated accessible locations at no additional cost. For example, if a theater that only has barrier removal obligations provides wait service to spectators in the mezzanine, and it is not readily achievable to place accessible seating there, it may meet its obligation by providing wait service to patrons with disabilities who use wheelchairs and their companions at other designated accessible locations at no additional cost. This provision does not obviate the obligation to comply with applicable requirements for new construction and alterations, including dispersion of accessible seating.

Section 36.309 Examinations and Courses

Section 36.309(a) sets forth the general rule that any private entity that offers examinations or courses relating to applications, licensing, certification, or credentialing for secondary or postsecondary education, professional, or trade purposes shall offer such examinations or courses in a place and manner accessible to persons with disabilities or offer alternative accessible arrangements for such individuals. In the NPRM preamble and proposed regulatory amendment and in this final rule, the Department relied on its history of enforcement efforts, research, and body of knowledge of testing and modifications, accommodations, and aids in detailing steps testing entities should take to ensure that persons with disabilities receive appropriate modifications, accommodations, or auxiliary aids in examination and course settings as required by the ADA. The Department received comments from disability rights groups, organizations that administer tests, State governments, professional associations, and individuals on the language appearing in the NPRM preamble and amended regulation and has carefully considered these comments.

The Department initially set out the parameters of appropriate documentation requests relating to examinations and courses covered by this section in the 1991 preamble at 28 CFR part 36, stating that “requests for documentation must be reasonable and must be limited to the need for the modification or aid requested.” See 28 CFR part 36, app. B at 735 (2009). Since that time, the Department, through its enforcement efforts pursuant to section 309, has addressed concerns that requests by testing entities for documentation regarding the existence of an individual’s disability and need for a modification or auxiliary aid or service were often inappropriate and burdensome. The Department proposed language stating that while it may be appropriate for a testing entity to request that an applicant provide documentation supporting the existence of a disability and the need for a modification, accommodation, or auxiliary aid or service, the request by the testing entity for such documentation must be reasonable and limited. The NPRM proposed that testing entities should narrowly tailor requests for documentation, limiting those requests to materials that will allow the testing entities to ascertain the nature of the disability and the individual’s need for the requested modification, accommodation, or auxiliary aid or service. This proposal codified the 1991 rule’s preamble language regarding testing entities” requests for information supporting applicants” requests for testing modifications or accommodations.

Overall, most commenters supported this addition to the regulation. These commenters generally agreed that documentation sought by testing entities to support requests for modifications and testing accommodations should be reasonable and tailored. Commenters noted, for example, that the proposal to require reasonable and tailored documentation requests “is not objectionable. Indeed, it largely tracks DOJ’s long-standing informal guidance that ‘requests for documentation must be reasonable and limited to the need for the modification or aid requested.” “ Commenters including disability rights groups, State governments, professional associations, and individuals made it clear that, in addition to the proposed regulatory change, other significant problems remain for individuals with disabilities who seek necessary modifications to examinations and courses. These problems include detailed questions about the nature of documentation materials submitted by candidates, testing entities” questioning of documentation provided by qualified professionals with expertise in the particular disability at issue, and lack of timeliness in determining whether to provide requested accommodations or modifications. Several commenters expressed enthusiasm for the preamble language addressing some of these issues, and some of these commenters recommended the incorporation of portions of this preamble language into the regulatory text. Some testing entities expressed concerns and uncertainty about the language in the preamble and sought clarifications about its meaning. These commenters focused most of their attention on the following language from the NPRM preamble:

Generally, a testing entity should accept without further inquiry documentation provided by a qualified professional who has made an individualized assessment of the applicant. Appropriate documentation may include a letter from a qualified professional or evidence of a prior diagnosis, or accommodation, or classification, such as eligibility for a special education program. When an applicant’s documentation is recent and demonstrates a consistent history of a diagnosis, there is no need for further inquiry into the nature of the disability. A testing entity should consider an applicant’s past use of a particular auxiliary aid or service. 73 FR 34508, 34539 (June 17, 2008).

Professional organizations, State governments, individuals, and disability rights groups fully supported the Department’s preamble language and recommended further modification of the regulations to encompass the issues raised in the preamble. A disability rights group recommended that the Department incorporate the preamble language into the regulations to ensure that “documentation demands are strictly limited in scope and met per se when documentation of previously provided accommodations or aids is provided.” One professional education organization noted that many testing corporations disregard the documented diagnoses of qualified professionals, and instead substitute their own, often unqualified diagnoses of individuals with disabilities. Commenters confirmed that testing entities sometimes ask for unreasonable information that is either impossible, or extremely onerous, to provide. A disability rights organization supported the Department’s proposals and noted that private testing companies impose burdensome documentation requirements upon applicants with disabilities seeking accommodations and that complying with the documentation requests is frequently so difficult, and negotiations over the requests so prolonged, that test applicants ultimately forgo taking the test. Another disability rights group urged the Department to “expand the final regulatory language to ensure that regulations accurately provide guidance and support the comments made about reducing the burden of documenting the diagnosis and existence of a disability.”

Testing entities, although generally supportive of the proposed regulatory amendment, expressed concern regarding the Department’s proposed preamble language. The testing entities provided the Department with lengthy comments in which they suggested that the Department’s rationale delineated in the preamble potentially could limit them from gathering meaningful and necessary documentation to determine whether, in any given circumstance, a disability is presented, whether modifications are warranted, and which modifications would be most appropriate. Some testing entities raised concerns about individuals skewing testing results by falsely claiming or feigning disabilities as an improper means of seeking advantage on an examination. Several testing entities raised concerns about and sought clarification regarding the Department’s use of certain terms and concepts in the preamble, including “without further inquiry,” “appropriate documentation,” “qualified professional,” “individualized assessment,” and “consider.” These entities discussed the preamble language at length, noting that testing entities need to be able to question some aspects of testing applicants” documentation or to request further documentation from some candidates when the initial documentation is unclear or incomplete. One testing entity expressed concern that the Department’s preamble language would require the acceptance of a brief note on a doctor’s prescription pad as adequate documentation of a disability and the need for an accommodation. One medical examination organization stated that the Department’s preamble language would result in persons without disabilities receiving accommodations and passing examinations as part of a broad expansion of unwarranted accommodations, potentially endangering the health and welfare of the general public. Another medical board ‘strenuously objected” to the “without further inquiry” language. Several of the testing entities expressed concern that the Department’s preamble language might require testing companies to accept documentation from persons with temporary or questionable disabilities, making test scores less reliable, harming persons with legitimate entitlements, and resulting in additional expense for testing companies to accommodate more test takers.

It remains the Department’s view that, when testing entities receive documentation provided by a qualified professional who has made an individualized assessment of an applicant that supports the need for the modification, accommodation, or aid requested, they shall generally accept such documentation and provide the accommodation.

Several commenters sought clarifications on what types of documentation are acceptable to demonstrate the existence of a disability and the need for a requested modification, accommodation, or aid. The Department believes that appropriate documentation may vary depending on the nature of the disability and the specific modification or aid requested, and accordingly, testing entities should consider a variety of types of information submitted. Examples of types of information to consider include recommendations of qualified professionals familiar with the individual, results of psycho-educational or other professional evaluations, an applicant’s history of diagnosis, participation in a special education program, observations by educators, or the applicant’s past use of testing accommodations. If an applicant has been granted accommodations post-high school by a standardized testing agency, there is no need for reassessment for a subsequent examination.

Some commenters expressed concern regarding the use of the term “letter” in the proposed preamble sentence regarding appropriate documentation. The NPRM preamble language stated that “[a]ppropriate documentation may include a letter from a qualified professional or evidence of a prior diagnosis, accommodation, or classification, such as eligibility for a special education program.” 73 FR 34508, 34539 (June 17, 2008). Some testing entities posited that the preamble language would require them to accept a brief letter from a doctor or even a doctor’s note on a prescription pad indicating “I”ve been treating (student) for ADHD and he/she is entitled to extend time on the ACT.” The Department’s reference in the NPRM preamble to letters from physicians or other professionals was provided in order to offer examples of some types of acceptable documentation that may be considered by testing entities in evaluating the existence of an applicant’s disability and the need for a certain modification, accommodation, or aid. No one piece of evidence may be dispositive in make a testing accommodation determination. The significance of a letter or other communication from a doctor or other qualified professional would depend on the professional’s relationship with the candidate and the specific content of the communication, as well as how the letter fits in with the totality of the other factors used to determine testing accommodations under this rule. Similarly, an applicant’s failure to provide results from a specific test or evaluation instrument should not of itself preclude approval of requests for modifications, accommodations, or aids if the documentation provided by the applicant, in its entirety, is sufficient to demonstrate that the individual has a disability and requires a requested modification, accommodation, or aid on the relevant examination. This issue is discussed in more detail below.

One disability rights organization noted that requiring a 25-year old who was diagnosed in junior high school with a learning disability and accommodated ever since “to produce elementary school report cards to demonstrate symptomology before the age of seven is unduly burdensome.” The same organization commented that requiring an individual with a long and early history of disability to be assessed within three years of taking the test in question is similarly burdensome, stating that “[t]here is no scientific evidence that learning disabilities abate with time, nor that Attention Deficits abate with time***.” This organization noted that there is no justification for repeatedly subjecting people to expensive testing regimens simply to satisfy a disbelieving industry. This is particularly true for adults with, for example, learning disabilities such as dyslexia, a persistent condition without the need for retesting once the diagnosis has been established and accepted by a standardized testing agency.

Some commenters from testing entities sought clarification regarding who may be considered a “qualified professional.” Qualified professionals are licensed or otherwise properly credentialed and possess expertise in the disability for which modifications or accommodations are sought. For example, a podiatrist would not be considered to be a qualified professional to diagnose a learning disability or support a request for testing accommodations on that basis. Types of professionals who might possess the appropriate credentials and expertise are doctors (including psychiatrists), psychologists, nurses, physical therapists, occupational therapists, speech therapists, vocational rehabilitation specialists, school counselors, and licensed mental health professionals. Additionally, while testing applicants should present documentation from qualified professionals with expertise in the pertinent field, it also is critical that testing entities that review documentation submitted by prospective examinees in support of requests for testing modifications or accommodations ensure that their own reviews are conducted by qualified professionals with similarly relevant expertise.

Commenters also sought clarification of the term individualized assessment. The Department’s intention in using this term is to ensure that documentation provided on behalf of a testing candidate is not only provided by a qualified professional, but also reflects that the qualified professional has individually and personally evaluated the candidate as opposed to simply considering scores from a review of documents. This is particularly important in the learning disabilities context, where proper diagnosis requires face-to-face evaluation. Reports from experts who have personal familiarity with the candidate should take precedence over those from, for example, reviewers for testing agencies, who have never personally met the candidate or conducted the requisite assessments for diagnosis and treatment.

Some testing entities objected to the NPRM preamble’s use of the phrase “without further inquiry.” The Department’s intention here is to address the extent to which testing entities should accept documentation provided by an applicant when the testing entity is determining the need for modifications, accommodations, or auxiliary aids or services. The Department’s view is that applicants who submit appropriate documentation, e.g., documentation that is based on the careful individual consideration of the candidate by a professional with expertise relating to the disability in question, should not be subjected to unreasonably burdensome requests for additional documentation. While some testing commenters objected to this standard, it reflects the Department’s longstanding position. When an applicant’s documentation demonstrates a consistent history of a diagnosis of a disability, and is prepared by a qualified professional who has made an individualized evaluation of the applicant, there is little need for further inquiry into the nature of the disability and generally testing entities should grant the requested modification, accommodation, or aid.

After a careful review of the comments, the Department has decided to maintain the proposed regulatory language on the scope of appropriate documentation in § 36.309(b)(1)(iv). The Department has also added new regulatory language at § 36.309(b)(1)(v) that provides that testing entities shall give considerable weight to documentation of past modifications, accommodations, or auxiliary aids or services received in similar testing situations as well as such modifications, accommodations, or related aids and services provided in response to an Individualized Education Program (IEP) provided under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) or a plan providing services pursuant to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of1973, as amended (often referred to as a Section 504 Plan). These additions to the regulation are necessary because the Department’s position on the bounds of appropriate documentation contained in Appendix B, 28 CFR part 36, app. B (2009), has not been implemented consistently and fully by organizations that administer tests.

The new regulatory language clarifies that an applicant’s past use of a particular modification, accommodation, or auxiliary aid or service in a similar testing setting or pursuant to an IEP or Section 504 Plan provides critical information in determining those examination modifications that would be applicable in a given circumstance. The addition of this language and the appropriate weight to be accorded it is seen as important by the Department because the types of accommodations provided in both these circumstances are typically granted in the context of individual consideration of a student’s needs by a team of qualified and experienced professionals. Even though these accommodations decisions form a common sense and logical basis for testing entities to rely upon, they are often discounted and ignored by testing entities.

For example, considerable weight is warranted when a student with a Section 504 Plan in place since middle school that includes the accommodations of extra time and a quiet room for testing is seeking these same accommodations from a testing entity covered by section 309 of the Act. In this example, a testing entity receiving such documentation should clearly grant the request for accommodations. A history of test accommodations in secondary schools or in post-secondary institutions, particularly when determined through the rigors of a process required and detailed by Federal law, is as useful and instructive for determining whether a specific accommodation is required as accommodations provided in standardized testing situations.

It is important to note, however, that the inclusion of this weight does not suggest that individuals without IEPs or Section 504 Plans are not also entitled to receive testing accommodations. Indeed, it is recommended that testing entities must consider the entirety of an applicant’s history to determine whether that history, even without the context of a IEP or Section 504 Plan, indicates a need for accommodations. In addition, many students with learning disabilities have made use of informal, but effective accommodations. For example, such students often receive undocumented accommodations such as time to complete tests after school or at lunchtime, or being graded on content and not form or spelling of written work. Finally, testing entities shall also consider that because private schools are not subject to the IDEA, students at private schools may have a history of receiving accommodations in similar settings that are not pursuant to an IEP or Section 504 Plan.

Some testing entities sought clarification that they should only be required to consider particular use of past modifications, accommodations, auxiliary aids or services received by testing candidates for prior testing and examination settings. These commenters noted that it would be unhelpful to consider the classroom accommodations for a testing candidate, as those accommodations would not typically apply in a standardized test setting. The Department’s history of enforcement in this area has demonstrated that a recent history of past accommodations is critical to an understanding of the applicant’s disability and the appropriateness of testing accommodations.

The Department also incorporates the NPRM preamble’s “timely manner” concept into the new regulatory language at § 36.309(b)(1)(vi). Under this provision, testing entities are required to respond in a timely manner to requests for testing accommodations in order to ensure equal opportunity for persons with disabilities. Testing entities are to ensure that their established process for securing testing accommodations provides applicants with a reasonable opportunity to supplement the testing entities” requests for additional information, if necessary, and still be able to take the test in the same testing cycle. A disability rights organization commented that testing entities should not subject applicants to unreasonable and intrusive requests for information in a process that should provide persons with disabilities effective modifications in a timely manner, fulfilling the core objective of title III to provide equal access. Echoing this perspective, several disability rights organizations and a State government commenter urged that testing entities should not make unreasonably burdensome demands for documentation, particularly where those demands create impediments to receiving accommodations in a timely manner. Access to examinations should be offered to persons with disabilities in as timely a manner as it is offered to persons without disabilities. Failure by a testing entity to act in a timely manner, coupled with seeking unnecessary documentation, could result in such an extended delay that it constitutes a denial of equal opportunity or equal treatment in an examination setting for persons with disabilities.

Section 36.311 Mobility Devices

Section 36.311 of the NPRM clarified the scope and circumstances under which covered entities are legally obligated to accommodate various “mobility devices.” Section 36.311 set forth specific requirements for the accommodation of mobility devices, including wheelchairs, manually-powered mobility aids, and other power-driven mobility devices.

In both the NPRM and the final rule, § 36.311(a) states the general rule that in any areas open to pedestrians, public accommodations shall permit individuals with mobility disabilities to use wheelchairs and manually-powered mobility aids, including walkers, crutches, canes, braces, or similar devices. Because mobility scooters satisfy the definition of “wheelchair” (i.e., “a manually-operated or power-driven device designed primarily for use by an individual with a mobility disability for the main purpose of indoor, or of both indoor and outdoor locomotion”), the reference to them in § 36.311(a) of the final rule has been omitted to avoid redundancy.

Most business commenters expressed concern that permitting the use of other power-driven mobility devices by individuals with mobility disabilities would make such devices akin to wheelchairs and would require them to make physical changes to their facilities to accommodate their use. This concern is misplaced. If a facility complies with the applicable design requirements in the 1991 Standards or the 2010 Standards, the public accommodation will not be required to exceed those standards to accommodate the use of wheelchairs or other power-driven mobility devices that exceed those requirements.

Legal standard for other power-driven mobility devices. The NPRM version of § 36.311(b) provided that a public accommodation ‘shall make reasonable modifications in its policies, practices, and procedures to permit the use of other power-driven mobility devices by individuals with disabilities, unless the public accommodation can demonstrate that the use of the device is not reasonable or that its use will result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of the public accommodation’s goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations.” 73 FR 34508, 34556 (June 17, 2008). In other words, public accommodations are by default required to permit the use of other power-driven mobility devices; the burden is on them to prove the existence of a valid exception. Most commenters supported the notion of assessing whether the use of a particular device is reasonable in the context of a particular venue. Commenters, however, disagreed about the meaning of the word “reasonable” as it is used in § 36.311(b) of the NPRM. Virtually every business and industry commenter took the use of the word “reasonable” to mean that a general reasonableness standard would be applied in making such an assessment. Advocacy and nonprofit groups almost universally objected to the use of a general reasonableness standard with regard to the assessment of whether a particular device should be allowed at a particular venue. They argued that the assessment should be based on whether reasonable modifications could be made to allow a particular device at a particular venue, and that the only factors that should be part of the calculus that results in the exclusion of a particular device are undue burden, direct threat, and fundamental alteration.

A few commenters opposed the proposed provision requiring public accommodations to assess whether reasonable modifications can be made to allow other power-driven mobility devices, preferring instead that the Department issue guidance materials so that public accommodations would not have to incur the cost of such analyses. Another commenter noted a “fox guarding the hen house”-type of concern with regard to public accommodations developing and enforcing their own modification policy. In response to comments received, the Department has revised § 36.311(b) to provide greater clarity regarding the development of legitimate safety requirements regarding other power-driven mobility devices. The Department has not retained the proposed NPRM language stating that an other power-driven mobility device can be excluded if a public accommodation can demonstrate that the use of the device is not reasonable or that its use fundamentally alters the nature of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations offered by the public accommodation because the Department believes that these exceptions are covered by the general reasonable modification requirement contained in § 36.302.

Assessment factors. Section 36.311(c) of the NPRM required public accommodations to “establish policies to permit the use of other power-driven mobility devices” and articulated four factors upon which public accommodations must base decisions as to whether a modification is reasonable to allow the use of a class of other power-driven mobility devices by individuals with disabilities in specific venues (e.g., doctors” offices, parks, commercial buildings, etc.). 73 FR 34508, 34556 (June 17, 2008).

The Department has relocated and modified the NPRM text that appeared in § 36.311(c) to new paragraph § 36.311(b)(2) to clarify what factors the public accommodation shall use in determining whether a particular other power-driven mobility device can be allowed in a specific facility as a reasonable modification. Section 36.311(b)(2) now states that “[i]n determining whether a particular other power-driven mobility device can be allowed in a specific facility as a reasonable modification under (b)(1), a public accommodation shall consider” certain enumerated factors. The assessment factors are designed to assist public accommodations in determining whether allowing the use of a particular other power-driven mobility device in a specific facility is reasonable. Thus, the focus of the analysis must be on the appropriateness of the use of the device at a specific facility, rather than whether it is necessary for an individual to use a particular device.

The NPRM proposed the following specific assessment factors: (1) The dimensions, weight, and operating speed of the mobility device in relation to a wheelchair; (2) the potential risk of harm to others by the operation of the mobility device; (3) the risk of harm to the environment or natural or cultural resources or conflict with Federal land management laws and regulations; and (4) the ability of the public accommodation to stow the mobility device when not in use, if requested by the user.

Factor 1 was designed to help public accommodations assess whether a particular device was appropriate, given its particular physical features, for a particular location. Virtually all commenters said the physical features of the device affected their view of whether a particular device was appropriate for a particular location. For example, while many commenters supported the use of an other power-driven mobility device if the device were a Segway® PT, because of environmental and health concerns they did not offer the same level of support if the device were an off-highway vehicle, all-terrain vehicle (ATV), golf car, or other device with a fuel-powered or combustion engine. Most commenters noted that indicators such as speed, weight, and dimension really were an assessment of the appropriateness of a particular device in specific venues and suggested that factor 1 say this more specifically.

The term “in relation to a wheelchair” in the NPRM’s factor 1 apparently created some concern that the same legal standards that apply to wheelchairs would be applied to other power-driven mobility devices. The Department has omitted the term “in relation to a wheelchair” from § 36.311(b)(2)(i) to clarify that if a facility that is in compliance with the applicable provisions of the 1991 Standards or the 2010 Standards grants permission for an other power-driven mobility device to go on-site, it is not required to exceed those standards to accommodate the use of other power-driven mobility devices. In response to requests that NPRM factor 1 state more specifically that it requires an assessment of an other power-driven mobility device’s appropriateness under particular circumstances or in particular venues, the Department has added several factors and more specific language. In addition, although the NPRM made reference to the operation of other power-driven mobility devices in ‘specific venues,” the Department’s intent is captured more clearly by referencing ‘specific facility” in paragraph (b)(2). The Department also notes that while speed is included in factor 1, public accommodations should not rely solely on a device’s top speed when assessing whether the device can be accommodated; instead, public accommodations should also consider the minimum speeds at which a device can be operated and whether the development of speed limit policies can be established to address concerns regarding the speed of the device. Finally, since the ability of the public accommodation to stow the mobility device when not in use is an aspect of its design and operational characteristics, the text proposed as factor 4 in the NPRM has been incorporated in paragraph (b)(2)(iii).

The NPRM’s version of factor 2 provided that the “potential risk of harm to others by the operation of the mobility device” is one of the determinants in the assessment of whether other power-driven mobility devices should be excluded from a site. With this language, the Department intended to incorporate the safety standard found in § 36.301(b), which provides that public accommodations may “impose legitimate safety requirements that are necessary for safe operation” into the assessment. However, several commenters indicated that they read this language, particularly the phrase ‘potential risk of harm” to mean that the Department had adopted a concept of risk analysis different from that which is in the existing standards. The Department did not intend to create a new standard and has changed the language in paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2) to clarify the applicable standards, thereby avoiding the introduction of new assessments of risk beyond those necessary for the safe operation of the public accommodation.

While all applicable affirmative defenses are available to public accommodations in the establishment and execution of their policies regarding other power-driven mobility devices, the Department did not explicitly incorporate the direct threat defense into the assessment factors because § 36.301(b) provides public accommodations the appropriate framework with which to assess whether legitimate safety requirements that may preclude the use of certain other power-driven mobility devices are necessary for the safe operation of the public accommodation. In order to be legitimate, the safety requirement must be based on actual risks and not mere speculation regarding the device or how it will be operated. Of course, public accommodations may enforce legitimate safety rules established for the operation of other-power driven mobility devices (e.g., reasonable speed restrictions). Finally, NPRM factor 3 concerning environmental resources and conflicts of law has been relocated to paragraph (b)(2)(v).

As a result of these comments and requests, NPRM factors 1, 2, 3, and 4 have been revised and renumbered within paragraph 36.311(b)(2) in the final rule.

Several commenters requested that the Department provide guidance materials or more explicit concepts of which considerations might be appropriate for inclusion in a policy that allows the use of other power-driven mobility devices. A public accommodation that has determined that reasonable modifications can be made in its policies, practices, or procedures to allow the use of other power-driven mobility devices should develop a policy that clearly states the circumstances under which the use of other power-driven mobility devices by individuals with a mobility disability will be permitted. It also should include clear, concise statements of specific rules governing the operation of such devices. Finally, the public accommodation should endeavor to provide individuals with disabilities who use other power-driven mobility devices with advanced notice of its policy regarding the use of such devices and what rules apply to the operation of these devices.

For example, the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) has developed a policy allowing the use of the Segway® PT and other EPAMDs in all Federal buildings under GSA’s jurisdiction. See General Services Administration, Interim Segway® Personal Transporter Policy (Dec. 3, 2007), available at http://www.gsa.gov/graphics/pbs/Interim_Segway_Policy_121007.pdf (last visited June 24, 2010). The GSA policy defines the policy’s scope of coverage by setting out what devices are and are not covered by the policy. The policy also sets out requirements for safe operation, such as a speed limit, prohibits the use of EPAMDs on escalators, and provides guidance regarding security screening of these devices and their operators.

A public accommodation that determines that it can make reasonable modifications to permit the use of an other power-driven mobility device by an individual with a mobility disability might include in its policy the procedure by which claims that the other power-driven mobility device is being used for a mobility disability will be assessed for legitimacy (i.e., a credible assurance that the device is being used for a mobility disability, including a verbal representation by the person with a disability that is not contradicted by observable fact, or the presentation of a disability parking space placard or card, or State-issued proof of disability); the type or classes of other power-driven mobility devices are permitted to be used by individuals with mobility disabilities; the size, weight, and dimensions of the other power-driven mobility devices that are permitted to be used by individuals with mobility disabilities; the speed limit for the other power-driven mobility devices that are permitted to be used by individuals with mobility disabilities; the places, times, or circumstances under which the use of the other power-driven mobility devices is or will be restricted or prohibited; safety, pedestrian, and other rules concerning the use of the other power-driven mobility devices; whether, and under which circumstances, storage for the other power-driven mobility devices will be made available; and how and where individuals with a mobility disability can obtain a copy of the other power-driven mobility device policy.

Public accommodations also might consider grouping other power-driven mobility devices by type (e.g., EPAMDs, golf cars, gasoline-powered vehicles, and other devices). For example, an amusement park may determine that it is reasonable to allow individuals with disabilities to use EPAMDs in a variety of outdoor programs and activities, but that it would not be reasonable to allow the use of golf cars as mobility devices in similar circumstances. At the same time, the entity may address its concerns about factors such as space limitations by disallowing use of EPAMDs by members of the general public who do not have mobility disabilities.

The Department anticipates that in many circumstances, public accommodations will be able to develop policies that will allow the use of other power-driven mobility devices by individuals with mobility disabilities without resulting in a fundamental alteration of a public accommodation’s goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations. Consider the following examples:

Example 1: Although individuals who do not have mobility disabilities are prohibited from operating EPAMDs at a theme park, the park has developed a policy allowing individuals with mobility disabilities to use EPAMDs as their mobility device at the park. The policy states that EPAMDs are allowed in all areas of the theme park that are open to pedestrians as a reasonable modification to its general policy on EPAMDs. The public accommodation has determined that the facility provides adequate space for a taller device, such as an EPAMD, and that it does not fundamentally alter the nature of the theme park’s goods and services. The theme park’s policies do, however, require that EPAMDs be operated at a safe speed limit. A theme park employee may inquire at the ticket gate whether the device is needed due to the user’s disability or may request the presentation of a valid, State-issued, disability parking placard (though presentation of such a placard is not necessary), or other State-issued proof of disability or a credible assurance that the use of the EPAMD is for the individual’s mobility disability. The park employee also may inform an individual with a disability using an EPAMD that the theme park’s policy requires that it be operated at or below the park’s designated speed limit.

Example 2: A shopping mall has developed a policy whereby EPAMDs may be operated by individuals with mobility disabilities in the common pedestrian areas of the mall if the operator of the device agrees to the following: to operate the device no faster than the speed limit set by the policy; to use the elevator, not the escalator, to transport the EPAMD to different levels; to yield to pedestrian traffic; not to leave the device unattended unless it can stand upright and has a locking system; to refrain from using the device temporarily if the mall manager determines that the volume of pedestrian traffic is such that the operation of the device would interfere with legitimate safety requirements; and to present the mall management office with a valid, State-issued, disability parking placard (though presentation of such a placard is not necessary), or State-issued proof of disability, as a credible assurance that the use of the EPAMD is for the individual’s mobility disability, upon entry to the mall.

Inquiry into the use of other power-driven mobility device. Section 36.311(d) of the NPRM provided that a “public accommodation may ask a person using a power-driven mobility device if the mobility device is required because of the person’s disability. A public accommodation shall not ask a person using a mobility device questions about the nature and extent of the person’s disability.” 73 FR 34508, 34556 (June 17, 2008).

While business commenters did not take issue with applying this standard to individuals who use wheelchairs, they were not satisfied with the application of this standard to other power-driven mobility devices. Business commenters expressed concern about people feigning mobility disabilities to be able to use other power-driven mobility devices in public accommodations in which their use is otherwise restricted. These commenters felt that a mere inquiry into whether the device is being used for a mobility disability was an insufficient mechanism by which to detect fraud by other power-driven mobility device users who do not have mobility disabilities. These commenters believed they should be given more latitude to make inquiries of other power-driven mobility device users claiming a mobility disability than they would be given for wheelchair users. They sought the ability to establish a policy or method by which public accommodations may assess the legitimacy of the mobility disability. They suggested some form of certification, sticker, or other designation. One commenter suggested a requirement that a sticker bearing the international symbol for accessibility be placed on the device or that some other identification be required to signal that the use of the device is for a mobility disability. Other suggestions included displaying a disability parking placard on the device or issuing EPAMDs, like the Segway® PT, a permit that would be similar to permits associated with parking spaces reserved for those with disabilities.

Advocacy, nonprofit, and several individual commenters balked at the notion of allowing any inquiry beyond whether the device is necessary for a mobility disability and encouraged the Department to retain the NPRM’s language on this topic. Other commenters, however, were empathetic with commenters who had concerns about fraud. At least one Segway® PT advocate suggested it would be permissible to seek documentation of the mobility disability in the form of a simple sign or permit.

The Department has sought to find common ground by balancing the needs of businesses and individuals with mobility disabilities wishing to use other power-driven mobility devices with the Department’s longstanding, well-established policy of not allowing public accommodations or establishments to require proof of a mobility disability. There is no question that public accommodations have a legitimate interest in ferreting out fraudulent representations of mobility disabilities, especially given the recreational use of other power-driven mobility devices and the potential safety concerns created by having too many such devices in a specific facility at one time. However, the privacy of individuals with mobility disabilities and respect for those individuals are also vitally important.

Neither § 36.311(d) of the NPRM nor § 36.311(c) of the final rule permits inquiries into the nature of a person’s mobility disability. However, the Department does not believe it is unreasonable or overly intrusive for an individual with a mobility disability seeking to use an other power-driven mobility device to provide a credible assurance to verify that the use of the other power-driven mobility device is for a mobility disability. The Department sought to minimize the amount of discretion and subjectivity exercised by public accommodations in assessing whether an individual has a mobility disability and to allow public accommodations to verify the existence of a mobility disability. The solution was derived from comments made by several individuals who said they have been admitted with their Segway® PTs into public entities and public accommodations that ordinarily do not allow these devices onsite when they have presented or displayed State-issued disability parking placards. In the examples provided by commenters, the parking placards were accepted as verification that the Segway® PTs were being used as mobility devices.

Because many individuals with mobility disabilities avail themselves of State programs that issue disability parking placards or cards and because these programs have penalties for fraudulent representations of identity and disability, utilizing the parking placard system as a means to establish the existence of a mobility disability strikes a balance between the need for privacy of the individual and fraud protection for the public accommodation. Consequently, the Department has decided to include regulatory text in § 36.311(c)(2) of the final rule that requires public accommodations to accept the presentation of a valid, State-issued disability parking placard or card, or State-issued proof of disability, as verification that an individual uses the other power-driven mobility device for his or her mobility disability. A “valid” disability placard or card is one that is presented by the individual to whom it was issued and is otherwise in compliance with the State of issuance’s requirements for disability placards or cards. Public accommodations are required to accept a valid, State-issued disability parking placard or card, or State-issued proof of disability, as a credible assurance, but they cannot demand or require the presentation of a valid disability placard or card, or State-issued proof of disability, as a prerequisite for use of an other power-driven mobility device, because not all persons with mobility disabilities have such means of proof. If an individual with a mobility disability does not have such a placard or card, or State-issued proof of disability, he or she may present other information that would serve as a credible assurance of the existence of a mobility disability.

In lieu of a valid, State-issued disability parking placard or card, or State-issued proof of disability, a verbal representation, not contradicted by observable fact, shall be accepted as a credible assurance that the other power-driven mobility device is being used because of a mobility disability. This does not mean, however, that a mobility disability must be observable as a condition for allowing the use of an other power-driven mobility device by an individual with a mobility disability, but rather that if an individual represents that a device is being used for a mobility disability and that individual is observed thereafter engaging in a physical activity that is contrary to the nature of the represented disability, the assurance given is no longer credible and the individual may be prevented from using the device.

Possession of a valid, State-issued disability parking placard or card or a verbal assurance does not trump a public accommodation’s valid restrictions on the use of other power-driven mobility devices. Accordingly, a credible assurance that the other power-driven mobility device is being used because of a mobility disability is not a guarantee of entry to a public accommodation because notwithstanding such a credible assurance, use of the device in a particular venue may be at odds with the legal standard in § 36.311(b)(1) or with one or more of the § 36.311(b)(2) factors. Only after an individual with a disability has satisfied all of the public accommodation’s policies regarding the use of other power-driven mobility devices does a credible assurance become a factor in allowing the use of the device. For example, if an individual seeking to use an other power-driven mobility device fails to satisfy any of the public accommodation’s stated policies regarding the use of other power-driven mobility devices, the fact that the individual legitimately possesses and presents a valid, State-issued disability parking placard or card, or State-issued proof of disability, does not trump the policy and require the public accommodation to allow the use of the device. In fact, in some instances, the presentation of a legitimately held placard or card, or State-issued proof of disability, will have no relevance or bearing at all on whether the other power-driven mobility device may be used, because the public accommodation’s policy does not permit the device in question on-site under any circumstances (e.g., because its use would create a substantial risk of serious harm to the immediate environment or natural or cultural resources). Thus, an individual with a mobility disability who presents a valid disability placard or card, or State-issued proof of disability, will not be able to use an ATV as an other power-driven mobility device in a mall or a restaurant if the mall or restaurant has adopted a policy banning their use for any or all of the above-mentioned reasons.

However, an individual with a mobility disability who has complied with a public accommodation’s stated policies cannot be refused use of the other power-driven mobility device if he or she has provided a credible assurance that the use of the device is for a mobility disability.

Subpart D—New Construction and Alterations

Subpart D establishes the title I requirements applicable to new construction and alterations. The Department has amended this subpart to adopt the 2004 ADAAG, set forth the effective dates for implementation of the 2010 Standards, and make related revisions as described below.

Section 36.403 Alterations: Path of Travel

In the NPRM, the Department proposed one change to Sec. 36.403 on alterations and path of travel by adding a path of travel safe harbor. Proposed Sec. 36.403(a)(1) stated that if a private entity has constructed or altered required elements of a path of travel in accordance with the 1991 Standards, the private entity is not required to retrofit such elements to reflect incremental changes in the 2010 Standards solely because of an alteration to a primary function area served by that path of travel.

A substantial number of commenters objected to the Department’s creation of a safe harbor for alterations to required elements of a path of travel that comply with the current 1991 Standards. These commenters argued that if a public accommodation already is in the process of altering its facility, there should be a legal requirement that individuals with disabilities are entitled to increased accessibility provided by the 2004 ADAAG for path of travel work. These commenters also stated that they did not believe there was a statutory basis for “grandfathering” facilities that comply with the 1991 Standards. Another commenter argued that the updates incorporated into the 2004 ADAAG provide very substantial improvements for access, and that since there already is a 20 percent cost limit on the amount that can be expended on path of travel alterations, there is no need for a further limitation.

Some commenters supported the safe harbor as lessening the economic costs of implementing the 2004 ADAAG for existing facilities. One commenter also stated that without the safe harbor, entities that already have complied with the 1991 Standards will have to make and pay for compliance twice, as compared to those entities that made no effort to comply in the first place. Another commenter asked that the safe harbor be revised to include pre-ADA facilities that have been made compliant with the 1991 Standards to the extent “readily achievable” or, in the case of alterations, “ to the maximum extent feasible,” but that are not in full compliance with the 1991 Standards.

The final rule retains the safe harbor for required elements of a path of travel to altered primary function areas for private entities that already have complied with the 1991 Standards with respect to those required elements. As discussed with respect to Sec. 36.304, the Department believes that this safe harbor strikes an appropriate balance between ensuring that individuals with disabilities are provided access to buildings and facilities and mitigating potential financial burdens on existing places of public accommodation that are undertaking alterations subject to the 2010 Standards. This safe harbor is not a blanket exemption for facilities. If a private entity undertakes an alteration to a primary function area, only the required elements of a path of travel to that area that already comply with the 1991 Standards are subject to the safe harbor. If a private entity undertakes an alteration to a primary function area and the required elements of a path of travel to the altered area do not comply with the 1991 Standards, then the private entity must bring those elements into compliance with the 2010 Standards.

Section 36.405 Alterations: Historic Preservation

In the 1991 rule, the Department provided guidance on making alterations to buildings or facilities that are eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places under the National Historic Preservation Act or that are designated as historic under State or local law. That provision referenced the 1991 Standards. Because those cross-references to the 1991 Standards are no longer applicable, it is necessary in this final rule to provide new regulatory text. No substantive change in the Department’s approach in this area is intended by this revision.

Section 36.406 Standards for New Construction and Alterations

Applicable standards. Section 306 of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12186, directs the Attorney General to issue regulations to implement title III that are consistent with the guidelines published by the Access Board. As described in greater detail elsewhere in this Appendix, the Department is a statutory member of the Access Board and was involved significantly in the development of the 2004 ADAAG. Nonetheless, the Department has reviewed the standards and has determined that additional regulatory provisions are necessary to clarify how the Department will apply the 2010 Standards to places of lodging, social service center establishments, housing at a place of education, assembly areas, and medical care facilities. Those provisions are contained in Sec. 36.406(c)-(g). Each of these provisions is discussed below.

Section 36.406(a) adopts the 2004 ADAAG as part of the 2010 Standards and establishes the compliance date and triggering events for the application of those standards to both new construction and alterations. Appendix B of this final rule (Analysis and Commentary on the 2010 ADA Standards for Accessible Design) provides a description of the major changes in the 2010 Standards (as compared to the 1991 ADAAG) and a discussion of the public comments that the Department received on specific sections of the 2004 ADAAG. A number of commenters asked the Department to revise certain provisions in the 2004 ADAAG in a manner that would reduce either the required scoping or specific technical accessibility requirements. As previously stated, the ADA requires the Department to adopt standards consistent with the guidelines adopted by the Access Board. The Department will not adopt any standards that provide less accessibility than is provided under the guidelines contained in the 2004 ADAAG because the guidelines adopted by the Access Board are “ minimum guidelines.” 42 U.S.C. 12186(c).

In the NPRM, the Department specifically proposed amending Sec. 36.406(a) by dividing it into two sections. Proposed Sec. 36.406(a)(1) specified that new construction and alterations subject to this part shall comply with the 1991 Standards if physical construction of the property commences less than six months after the effective date of the rule. Proposed Sec. 36.406(a)(2) specified that new construction and alterations subject to this part shall comply with the proposed standards if physical construction of the property commences six months or more after the effective date of the rule. The Department also proposed deleting the advisory information now published in a table at Sec. 36.406(b).

Compliance date. When the ADA was enacted, the compliance dates for various provisions were delayed in order to provide time for covered entities to become familiar with their new obligations. Titles II and III of the ADA generally became effective on January 26, 1992, six months after the regulations were published. See 42 U.S.C. 12131 note; 42 U.S.C. 12181 note. New construction under title II and alterations under either title II or title III had to comply with the design standards on that date. See 42 U.S.C. 12131 note; 42 U.S.C. 12183(a)(2). For new construction under title III, the requirements applied to facilities designed and constructed for first occupancy after January 26, 1993–18 months after the 1991 Standards were published by the Department. See 42 U.S.C. 12183(a)(1).

The Department received numerous comments on the issue of effective date, many of them similar to those received in response to the ANPRM. A substantial number of commenters advocated a minimum of 18 months from publication of the final rule to the effective date for application of the standards to new construction, consistent with the time period used for implementation of the 1991 Standards. Many of these commenters argued that the 18-month period was necessary to minimize the likelihood of having to redesign projects already in the design and permitting stages at the time that the final rule is published. According to these commenters, large projects take several years from design to occupancy, and can be subject to delays from obtaining zoning, site approval, third-party design approval (i.e., architectural review), and governmental permits. To the extent the new standards necessitate changes in any previous submissions or permits already issued, businesses might have to expend significant funds and incur delays due to redesign and resubmission.

Some commenters also expressed concern that a six-month period would be hard to implement given that many renovations are planned around retail selling periods, holidays, and other seasonal concerns. For example, hotels plan renovations during their slow periods, retail establishments avoid renovations during the major holiday selling periods, and businesses in certain parts of the country cannot do any major construction during parts of the winter.

Some commenters argued that chain establishments need additional time to redesign their “master facility” designs for replication at multiple locations, taking into account both the new standards and applicable State and local accessibility requirements.

Other commenters argued for extending the effective date from six months to a minimum of 12 months for many of the same reasons, and one commenter argued that there should be a tolling of the effective date for those businesses that are in the midst of the permitting process if the necessary permits are delayed due to legal challenges or other circumstances outside the business’s control.

Several commenters took issue with the Department’s characterization of the 2004 ADAAG and the 1991 Standards as two similar rules. These commenters argued that many provisions in the 2004 ADAAG represent a ‘substantial and significant” departure from the 1991 Standards and that it will take a great deal of time and money to identify all the changes and implement them. In particular, they were concerned that small businesses lacked the internal resources to respond quickly to the new changes and that they would have to hire outside experts to assist them. One commenter expressed concern that regardless of familiarity with the 2004 ADAAG, since the 2004 ADAAG standards are organized in an entirely different manner from the 1991 Standards, and contain, in the commenter’s view, extensive changes, it will make the shift from the old to the new standards quite complicated.

Several commenters also took issue with the Department’s proffered rationale that by adopting a six-month effective date, the Department was following the precedent of other Federal agencies that have adopted the 2004 ADAAG for facilities whose accessibility they regulate. These commenters argued that the Department’s title III regulation applies to a much broader range and number of facilities and programs than the other Federal agencies (i.e., Department of Transportation and the General Services Administration) and that those agencies regulate accessibility primarily in either governmental facilities or facilities operated by quasi-governmental authorities.

Several commenters representing the travel, vacation, and golf industries argued that the Department should adopt a two-year effective date for new construction. In addition to many of the arguments made by commenters in support of an 18-month effective date, these commenters also argued that a two-year time frame would allow States with DOJ-certified building codes to have the time to amend their codes to meet the 2004 ADAAG so that design professionals can work from compatible codes and standards.

Several commenters recommended treating alterations differently than new construction, arguing for a one-year effective date for alterations. Another commenter representing building officials argued that a minimum of a six-month phase-in for alterations was sufficient, since a very large percentage of alteration projects “are of a scale that they should be able to accommodate the phase-in.”

In contrast, many commenters argued that the proposed six-month effective date should be retained in the final rule.

The Department has been persuaded by concerns raised by some of the commenters that the six month compliance date proposed in the NPRM for application of the 2010 Standards may be too short for certain projects that are already in the midst of the design and permitting process. The Department has determined that for new construction and alterations, compliance with the 2010 Standards will not be required until 18 months from the date the final rule is published. This is consistent with the amount of time given when the 1991 regulation was published. Since many State and local building codes contain provisions that are consistent with 2004 ADAAG, the Department has decided that public accommodations that choose to comply with the 2010 Standards as defined in Sec. 36.104 before the compliance date will still be considered in compliance with the ADA. However, public accommodations that choose to comply with the 2010 Standards in lieu of the 1991 Standards prior to the compliance date described in this rule must choose one or the other standard, and may not rely on some of the requirements contained in one standard and some of the requirements contained in the other standard.

Triggering event. In the NPRM, the Department proposed using the start of physical construction as the triggering event for applying the proposed standards to new construction under title III. This triggering event parallels that for the alterations provisions (i.e., the date on which construction begins), and would apply clearly across all types of covered public accommodations. The Department also proposed that for prefabricated elements, such as modular buildings and amusement park rides and attractions, or installed equipment, such as ATMs, the start of construction means the date on which the site preparation begins. Site preparation includes providing an accessible route to the element.

The Department’s NPRM sought public comment on how to define the start of construction and the practicality of applying commencement of construction as a triggering event. The Department also requested input on whether the proposed definition of the start of construction was sufficiently clear and inclusive of different types of facilities. The Department also sought input about facilities subject to title III for which commencement of construction would be ambiguous or problematic.

The Department received numerous comments recommending that the Department adopt a two-pronged approach to defining the triggering event. In those cases where permits are required, the Department should use “date of permit application” as the effective date triggering event, and if no permit is required, the Department should use ‘start of construction.” A number of these commenters argued that the date of permit application is appropriate because the applicant would have to consider the applicable State and Federal accessibility standards in order to submit the designs usually required with the application. Moreover, the date of permit application is a typical triggering event in other code contexts, such as when jurisdictions introduce an updated building code. Some commenters expressed concern that using the date of “ start of construction” was problematic because the date can be affected by factors that are outside the control of the owner. For example, an owner can plan construction to start before the new standards take effect and therefore use the 1991 Standards in the design. If permits are not issued in a timely manner, then the construction could be delayed until after the effective date, and then the project would have to be redesigned. This problem would be avoided if the permit application date was the triggering event. Two commenters expressed concern that the term ‘start of construction” is ambiguous, because it is unclear whether start of construction means the razing of structures on the site to make way for a new facility or means site preparation, such as regrading or laying the foundation.

One commenter recommended using the ‘signing date of a construction contract,” and an additional commenter recommended that the new standards apply only to “buildings permitted after the effective date of the regulations.”

One commenter stated that for facilities that fall outside the building permit requirements (ATMs, prefabricated saunas, small sheds), the triggering event should be the date of installation, rather than the date the space for the facility is constructed.

The Department is persuaded by the comments to adopt a two-pronged approach to defining the triggering event for new construction and alterations. The final rule states that in those cases where permits are required, the triggering event shall be the date when the last application for a building permit application or permit extension is certified to be complete by a State, county, or local government, or in those jurisdictions where the government does not certify completion of applications, the date when the last application for a building permit or permit extension is received by the State, county, or local government. If no permits are required, then the triggering event shall be the ‘start of physical construction or alterations.” The Department has also added clarifying language related to the term ‘start of physical construction or alterations” to make it clear that ‘start of physical construction or alterations” is not intended to mean the date of ceremonial groundbreaking or the date a structure is razed to make it possible for construction of a facility to take place.

Amusement rides. Section 234 of the 2010 Standards provides accessibility guidelines for newly designed and constructed amusement rides. The amusement ride provisions do not provide a “triggering event” for new construction or alteration of an amusement ride. An industry commenter requested that the triggering event of “first use” as noted in the Advisory note to section 234.1 of the 2004 ADAAG be included in the final rule. The Advisory note provides that “[a] custom designed and constructed ride is new upon its first use, which is the first time amusement park patrons take the ride.” The Department declines to treat amusement rides differently than other types of new construction and alterations and under the final rule, they are subject to Sec. 36.406(a)(3). Thus, newly constructed and altered amusement rides shall comply with the 2010 Standards if the start of physical construction or the alteration is on or after 18 months from the publication date of this rule. The Department also notes that section 234.4.2 of the 2010 Standards only applies where the structural or operational characteristics of an amusement ride are altered. It does not apply in cases where the only change to a ride is the theme.

Noncomplying new construction and alterations. The element-by-element safe harbor referenced in Sec. 36.304(d)(2) has no effect on new or altered elements in existing facilities that were subject to the 1991 Standards on the date that they were constructed or altered, but do not comply with the technical and scoping specifications for those elements in the 1991 Standards. Section 36.406(a)(5) of the final rule sets forth the rules for noncompliant new construction or alterations in facilities that were subject to the requirements of this part. Under those provisions, noncomplying new construction and alterations constructed or altered after the effective date of the applicable ADA requirements and before March 15, 2012 shall, before March 15, 2012, be made accessible in accordance with either the 1991 Standards or the 2010 Standards. Noncomplying new construction and alterations constructed or altered after the effective date of the applicable ADA requirements and before March 15, 2012, shall, on or after March 15, 2012, be made accessible in accordance with the 2010 Standards.

Section 36.406(b) Application of Standards to Fixed Elements

The final rule contains a new Sec. 36.406(b) that clarifies that the requirements established by this section, including those contained in the 2004 ADAAG, prescribe the requirements necessary to ensure that fixed or built-in elements in new or altered facilities are accessible to individuals with disabilities. Once the construction or alteration of a facility has been completed, all other aspects of programs, services, and activities conducted in that facility are subject to the operational requirements established elsewhere in this final rule. Although the Department has often chosen to use the requirements of the 1991 Standards as a guide to determining when and how to make equipment and furnishings accessible, those coverage determinations fall within the discretionary authority of the Department.

The Department is also clarifying that the advisory notes, appendix notes, and figures that accompany the 1991 and 2010 Standards do not establish separately enforceable requirements unless otherwise specified in the text of the standards. This clarification has been made to address concerns expressed by ANPRM commenters who mistakenly believed that the advisory notes in the 2004 ADAAG established requirements beyond those established in the text of the guidelines (e.g., Advisory 504.4 suggests, but does not require, that covered entities provide visual contrast on stair tread nosings to make them more visible to individuals with low vision). The Department received no comments on this provision in the NPRM.

Section 36.406(c) Places of Lodging

In the NPRM, the Department proposed a new definition for public accommodations that are “places of lodging” and a new Sec. 36.406(c) to clarify the scope of coverage for places of public accommodation that meet this definition. For many years the Department has received inquiries from members of the public seeking clarification of ADA coverage of rental accommodations in timeshares, condominium hotels, and mixed-use and corporate hotel facilities that operate as places of public accommodation (as that term is now defined in Sec. 36.104). These facilities, which have attributes of both residential dwellings and transient lodging facilities, have become increasingly popular since the ADA’s enactment in 1990 and make up the majority of new hotel construction in some vacation destinations. The hybrid residential and lodging characteristics of these new types of facilities, as well as their ownership characteristics, complicate determinations of ADA coverage, prompting questions from both industry and individuals with disabilities. While the Department has interpreted the ADA to encompass these hotel-like facilities when they are used to provide transient lodging, the regulation previously has specifically not addressed them. In the NPRM, the Department proposed a new Sec. 36.406(c), entitled “Places of Lodging,” which was intended to clarify that places of lodging, including certain timeshares, condominium hotels, and mixed-use and corporate hotel facilities, shall comply with the provisions of the proposed standards, including, but not limited to, the requirements for transient lodging in sections 224 and 806 of the 2004 ADAAG.

The Department’s NPRM sought public input on this proposal. The Department received a substantial number of comments on these issues from industry representatives, advocates for persons with disabilities, and individuals. A significant focus of these comments was on how the Department should define and regulate vacation rental units in timeshares, vacation communities, and condo-hotels where the units are owned and controlled by individual owners and rented out some portion of time to the public, as compared to traditional hotels and motels that are owned, controlled, and rented to the public by one entity.

Scoping and technical requirements applicable to “places of lodging.” In the NPRM, the Department asked for public comment on its proposal in Sec. 36.406(c) to apply to places of lodging the scoping and technical requirements for transient lodging, rather than the scoping and technical requirements for residential dwelling units.

Commenters generally agreed that the transient lodging requirements should apply to places of lodging. Several commenters stated that the determination as to which requirements apply should be made based on the intention for use at the time of design and construction. According to these commenters, if units are intended for transient rentals, then the transient lodging standards should apply, and if they are intended to be used for residential purposes, the residential standards should apply. Some commenters agreed with the application of transient lodging standards to places of lodging in general, but disagreed about the characterization of certain types of facilities as covered places of lodging.

The Department agrees that the scoping and technical standards applicable to transient lodging should apply to facilities that contain units that meet the definition of “places of lodging.”

Scoping for timeshare or condominium hotels. In the NPRM, the Department sought comment on the appropriate basis for determining scoping for a timeshare or condominium-hotel. A number of commenters indicated that scoping should be based on the usage of the facility. Only those units used for short-term stays should be counted for application of the transient lodging standards, while units sold as residential properties should be treated as residential units not subject to the ADA. One commenter stated that scoping should be based on the maximum number of sleeping units available for public rental. Another commenter pointed out that unlike traditional hotels and motels, the number of units available for rental in a facility or development containing individually owned units is not fixed over time. Owners have the right to participate in a public rental program some, all, or none of the time, and individual owner participation changes from year to year.

The Department believes that the determination for scoping should be based on the number of units in the project that are designed and constructed with the intention that their owners may participate in a transient lodging rental program. The Department cautions that it is not the number of owners that actually exercise their right to participate in the program that determines the scoping. Rather it is the units that could be placed into an on-site or off-site transient lodging rental program. In the final rule, the Department has added a provision to Sec. 36.406(c)(3), which states that units intended to be used exclusively for residential purposes that are contained in facilities that also meet the definition of place of lodging are not covered by the transient lodging standards. Title III of the ADA does not apply to units designed and constructed with the intention that they be rented or sold as exclusively residential units. Such units are covered by the Fair Housing Act (FHAct), which contains requirements for certain features of accessible and adaptable design both for units and for public and common use areas. All units designed and constructed with the intention that they may be used for both residential and transient lodging purposes are covered by the ADA and must be counted for determining the required number of units that must meet the transient lodging standards in the 2010 Standards. Public use and common use areas in facilities containing units subject to the ADA also must meet the 2010 Standards. In some developments, units that may serve as residential units some of the time and rental units some of the time will have to meet both the FHAct and the ADA requirements. For example, all of the units in a vacation condominium facility whose owners choose to rent to the public when they are not using the units themselves would be counted for the purposes of determining the appropriate number of units that must comply with the 2010 Standards. In a newly constructed condominium that has three floors with units dedicated to be sold solely as residential housing and three floors with units that may be used as residences or hotel units, only the units on the three latter floors would be counted for applying the 2010 Standards. In a newly constructed timeshare development containing 100 units, all of which may be made available to the public through an exchange or rental program, all 100 units would be counted for purposes of applying the 2010 Standards.

One commenter also asked the Department for clarification of how to count individually owned “lock-off units.” Lock-off units are units that are multi-bedroom but can be “locked off” into two separate units, each having individual external access. This commenter requested that the Department state in the final rule that individually owned lock-off units do not constitute multiple guest rooms for purposes of calculating compliance with the scoping requirements for accessible units, since for the most part the lock-off units are used as part of a larger accessible unit, and portions of a unit not locked off would constitute both an accessible one-bedroom unit or an accessible two-bedroom unit with the lock-off unit.

It is the Department’s view that lock-off units that are individually owned that can be temporarily converted into two units do not constitute two separate guest rooms for purposes of calculating compliance with the scoping requirements.

One commenter asked the Department how developers should scope units where buildings are constructed in phases over a span of years, recommending that the scoping be based on the total number of units expected to be constructed at the project and not on a building-by-building basis or on a phase-by-phase basis. The Department does not think scoping should be based on planned number of units, which may or may not be actually constructed over a period of years. However, the Department recognizes that resort developments may contain buildings and facilities that are of all sizes from single-unit cottages to facilities with hundreds of units. The Department believes it would be appropriate to allow designers, builders, and developers to aggregate the units in facilities with 50 or fewer units that are subject to a single permit application and that are on a common site or that are constructed at the same time for the purposes of applying the scoping requirements in table 224.2. Facilities with more than 50 units should be scoped individually in accordance with the table. The regulation has been revised to reflect this application of the scoping requirements.

One commenter also asked the Department to use the title III regulation to declare that timeshares subject to the transient lodging standards are exempt from the design and construction requirements of the FHAct. The coverage of the FHAct is set by Congress and interpreted by regulations issued by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. The Department has no authority to exempt anyone from coverage of the FHAct.

Application of ADA to places of lodging that contain individually owned units. The Department believes that regardless of ownership structure for individual units, rental programs (whether they are on- or off-site) that make transient lodging guest rooms available to the public must comply with the general nondiscrimination requirements of the ADA. In addition, as provided in Sec. 36.406(c), newly constructed facilities that contain accommodations intended to be used for transient lodging purposes must comply with the 2010 Standards.

In the NPRM, the Department asked for public comment on several issues related to ensuring the availability of accessible units in a rental program operated by a place of lodging. The Department sought input on how it could address a situation in which a new or converted facility constructs the required number of accessible units, but the owners of those units choose not to participate in the rental program; whether the facility has an obligation to encourage or require owners of accessible units to participate in the rental program; and whether the facility developer, the condominium association, or the hotel operator has an obligation to retain ownership or control over a certain number of accessible units to avoid this problem.

In the NPRM, the Department sought public input on how to regulate scoping for a timeshare or condominium-rental facility that decides, after the sale of units to individual owners, to begin a rental program that qualifies the facility as a place of lodging, and how the condominium association, operator, or developer should determine which units to make accessible.

A number of commenters expressed concerns about the ability of the Department to require owners of accessible units to participate in the rental program, to require developers, condo associations, or homeowners associations to retain ownership of accessible units, and to impose accessibility requirements on individual owners who choose to place inaccessible units into a rental program after purchase. These commenters stated that individuals who purchase accessible vacation units in condominiums, individual vacation homes, and timeshares have ownership rights in their units and may choose lawfully to make their units available to the public some, all, or none of the time. Commenters advised the Department that the Securities and Exchange Commission takes the position that if condominium units are offered in connection with participation in a required rental program for any part of the year, require the use of an exclusive rental agent, or impose conditions otherwise restricting the occupancy or rental of the unit, then that offering will be viewed as an offering of securities in the form of an investment (rather than a real estate offering). SEC Release No. 33-5347, Guidelines as to the Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws to Offers and Sales of Condominiums or Units in a Real Estate Development (Jan. 4, 1973). Consequently, most condominium developers do not impose such restrictions at the time of sale. Moreover, owners who choose to rent their units as a short-term vacation rental can select any rental or management company to lease and manage their unit, or they may rent them out on their own. They also may choose never to lease those units. Thus, there are no guarantees that at any particular time, accessible units will be available for rental by the public. According to this commenter, providing incentives for owners of accessible units to place their units in the rental program will not work, because it does not guarantee the availability of the requisite number of rooms dispersed across the development, and there is not any reasonable, identifiable source of funds to cover the costs of such incentives.

A number of commenters also indicated that it potentially is discriminatory as well as economically infeasible to require that a developer hold back the accessible units so that the units can be maintained in the rental program year-round. One commenter pointed out that if a developer did not sell the accessible condominiums or timeshares in the building inventory, the developer would be subject to a potential ADA or FHAct complaint because persons with disabilities who wanted to buy accessible units rather than rent them each year would not have the option to purchase them. In addition, if a developer held back accessible units, the cost of those units would have to be spread across all the buyers of the inaccessible units, and in many cases would make the project financially infeasible. This would be especially true for smaller projects. Finally, this commenter argued that requiring units to be part of the common elements that are owned by all of the individual unit owners is infeasible because the common ownership would result in pooled rental income, which would transform the owners into participants in a rental pool, and thus turn the sale of the condominiums into the sale of securities under SEC Release 33-5347.

Several commenters noted that requiring the operator of the rental program to own the accessible units is not feasible either because the operator of the rental program would have to have the funds to invest in the purchase of all of the accessible units, and it would not have a means of recouping its investment. One commenter stated that in Texas, it is illegal for on-site rental programs to own condominium units. Another commenter noted that such a requirement might lead to the loss of on-site rental programs, leaving owners to use individual third-party brokers, or rent the units privately. One commenter acknowledged that individual owners cannot be required to place their units in a rental pool simply to offer an accessible unit to the public, since the owners may be purchasing units for their own use. However, this commenter recommended that owners who choose to place their units in a rental pool be required to contribute to a fund that would be used to renovate units that are placed in the rental pool to increase the availability of accessible units. One commenter argued that the legal entity running the place of lodging has an obligation to retain control over the required number of accessible units to ensure that they are available in accordance with title III.

A number of commenters also argued that the Department has no legal authority to require individual owners to engage in barrier removal where an existing development adds a rental program. One commenter stated that Texas law prohibits the operator of on-site rental program from demanding that alterations be made to a particular unit. In addition, under Texas law, condominium declarations may not require some units and not others to make changes, because that would lead to unequal treatment of units and owners, which is not permissible.

One commenter stated that since it was not possible for operators of rental programs offering privately owned condominiums to comply with accessible scoping, the Department should create exemptions from the accessible scoping, especially for existing facilities. In addition, this commenter stated that if an operator of an on-site rental program were to require renovations as a condition of participation in the rental program, unit owners might just rent their units through a different broker or on their own, in which case such requirements would not apply.

A number of commenters argued that if a development decides to create a rental program, it must provide accessible units. Otherwise the development would have to ensure that units are retrofitted. A commenter argued that if an existing building is being converted, the Department should require that if alterations of the units are performed by an owner or developer prior to sale of the units, then the alterations requirements should apply, in order to ensure that there are some accessible units in the rental pool. This commenter stated that because of the proliferation of these type of developments in Hawaii, mandatory alteration is the only way to guarantee the availability of accessible units in the long run. In this commenter’s view, since conversions almost always require makeover of existing buildings, this will not lead to a significant expense.

The Department agrees with the commenters that it would not be feasible to require developers to hold back or purchase accessible units for the purposes of making them available to the public in a transient lodging rental program, nor would it be feasible to require individual owners of accessible units to participate in transient lodging rental programs.

The Department recognizes that places of lodging are developed and financed under myriad ownership and management structures and agrees that there will be circumstances where there are legal barriers to requiring compliance with either the alterations requirements or the requirements related to barrier removal. The Department has added an exception to Sec. 36.406(c), providing that in existing facilities that meet the definition of places of lodging, where the guest rooms are not owned or substantially controlled by the entity that owns, leases, or operates the overall facility and the physical features of the guest room interiors are controlled by their individual owners, the units are not subject to the alterations requirement, even where the owner rents the unit out to the public through a transient lodging rental program. In addition, the Department has added an exception to the barrier removal requirements at Sec. 36.304(g) providing that in existing facilities that meet the definition of places of lodging, where the guest rooms are not owned or substantially controlled by the entity that owns, leases, or operates the overall facility and the physical features of the guest room interiors are controlled by their individual owners, the units are not subject to the barrier removal requirement. The Department notes, however, that there are legal relationships for some timeshares and cooperatives where the ownership interests do not convey control over the physical features of units. In those cases, it may be the case that the facility has an obligation to meet the alterations or barrier removal requirements or to maintain accessible features.

Section 36.406(d) Social Service Center Establishments

In the NPRM, the Department proposed a new Sec. 36.406(d) requiring group homes, halfway houses, shelters, or similar social service center establishments that provide temporary sleeping accommodations or residential dwelling units to comply with the provisions of the 2004 ADAAG that apply to residential facilities, including, but not limited to, the provisions in sections 233 and 809.

The NPRM explained that this proposal was based on two important changes in the 2004 ADAAG. First, for the first time, residential dwelling units are explicitly covered in the 2004 ADAAG in section 233. Second, the 2004 ADAAG eliminates the language contained in the 1991 Standards addressing scoping and technical requirements for homeless shelters, group homes, and similar social service center establishments. Currently, such establishments are covered in section 9.5 of the transient lodging section of the 1991 Standards. The deletion of section 9.5 creates an ambiguity of coverage that must be addressed.

The NPRM explained the Department’s belief that transferring coverage of social service center establishments from the transient lodging standards to the residential facilities standards would alleviate conflicting requirements for social service providers. The Department believes that a substantial percentage of social service providers are recipients of Federal financial assistance from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) also provides financial assistance for the operation of shelters through the Administration for Children and Families programs. As such, they are covered both by the ADA and section 504. UFAS is currently the design standard for new construction and alterations for entities subject to section 504. The two design standards for accessibility–the 1991 Standards and UFAS–have confronted many social service providers with separate, and sometimes conflicting, requirements for design and construction of facilities. To resolve these conflicts, the residential facilities standards in the 2004 ADAAG have been coordinated with the section 504 requirements. The transient lodging standards, however, are not similarly coordinated. The deletion of section 9.5 of the 1991 Standards from the 2004 ADAAG presented two options: (1) Require coverage under the transient lodging standards, and subject such facilities to separate, conflicting requirements for design and construction; or (2) require coverage under the residential facilities standards, which would harmonizes the regulatory requirements under the ADA and section 504. The Department chose the option that harmonizes the regulatory requirements: coverage under the residential facilities standards.

In the NPRM, the Department expressed concern that the residential facilities standards do not include a requirement for clear floor space next to beds similar to the requirement in the transient lodging standards; as a result, the Department proposed adding a provision that would require certain social service center establishments that provide sleeping rooms with more than 25 beds to ensure that a minimum of 5 percent of the beds have clear floor space in accordance with section 806.2.3 of the 2004 ADAAG.

The Department requested information from providers who operate homeless shelters, transient group homes, halfway houses, and other social service center establishments, and from the clients of these facilities who would be affected by this proposed change. In the NPRM, the Department asked to what extent conflicts between the ADA and section 504 have affected these facilities and what the effect would be of applying the residential dwelling unit requirements to these facilities, rather than the requirements for transient lodging guest rooms.

Many of the commenters supported applying the residential facilities requirements to social service center establishments stating that even though the residential facilities requirements are less demanding, in some instances, the existence of one clear standard will result in an overall increased level of accessibility by eliminating the confusion and inaction that are sometimes caused by the current existence of multiple requirements. One commenter stated that the residential facilities guidelines were more appropriate because individuals housed in social service center establishments typically stay for a prolonged period of time, and guests of a transient lodging facility typically are not housed to participate in a program or receive services.

One commenter opposed to the proposed section argued for the application of the transient lodging standards to all social service center establishments except those that were “intended as a person’s place of abode,” referencing the Department’s question related to the definition of place of lodging in the title III NPRM. A second commenter stated that the use of transient lodging guidelines would lead to greater accessibility.

The Department continues to be concerned about alleviating the challenges for social service providers that are also subject to section 504 and that would likely be subject to conflicting requirements if the transient lodging standard were applied. Thus, the Department has retained the requirement that social service center establishments comply with the residential dwelling standards. The Department did not receive comments regarding adding a requirement for bathing options, such as a roll-in shower, in social service center establishments operated by public accommodations. The Department did, however, receive comments in support of adding such a requirement regarding public entities under title II. The Department believes that social service center establishments that provide emergency shelter to large transient populations should be able to provide bathing facilities that are accessible to persons with mobility disabilities who need roll-in showers. Because of the transient nature of the population of these large shelters, it will not be feasible to modify bathing facilities in a timely manner when faced with a need to provide a roll-in shower with a seat when requested by an overnight visitor. As a result, the Department has added a requirement that social service center establishments with sleeping accommodations for more than 50 individuals must provide at least one roll-in shower with a seat that complies with the relevant provisions of section 608 of the 2010 Standards. Transfer-type showers are not permitted in lieu of a roll-in shower with a seat, and the exceptions in sections 608.3 and 608.4 for residential dwelling units are not permitted. When separate shower facilities are provided for men and for women, at least one roll-in shower must be provided for each group. This supplemental requirement to the residential facilities standards is in addition to the supplemental requirement that was proposed in the NPRM for clear floor space in sleeping rooms with more than 25 beds.

The Department also notes that while dwelling units at some social service center establishments are also subject to FHAct design and construction requirements that require certain features of adaptable and accessible design, FHAct units do not provide the same level of accessibility that is required for residential facilities under the 2010 Standards. The FHAct requirements, where also applicable, should not be considered a substitute for the 2010 Standards. Rather, the 2010 Standards must be followed in addition to the FHAct requirements.

The Department also notes that while in the NPRM the Department used the term ‘social service establishment,” the final rule uses the term “ social service center establishment.” The Department has made this editorial change so that the final rule is consistent with the terminology used in the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. 12181(7)(K).

Section 36.406(e) Housing at a Place of Education

The Department of Justice and the Department of Education share responsibility for regulation and enforcement of the ADA in postsecondary educational settings, including architectural features. Housing types in educational settings range from traditional residence halls and dormitories to apartment or townhouse-style residences. In addition to title III of the ADA, universities and schools that are recipients of Federal financial assistance also are subject to section 504, which contains its own accessibility requirements currently through the application of UFAS. Residential housing, including housing in an educational setting, is also covered by the FHAct, which requires newly constructed multifamily housing to include certain features of accessible and adaptable design. Covered entities subject to the ADA must always be aware of, and comply with, any other Federal statutes or regulations that govern the operation of residential properties.

Although the 1991 Standards mention dormitories as a form of transient lodging, they do not specifically address how the ADA applies to dormitories and other types of residential housing provided in an educational setting. The 1991 Standards also do not contain any specific provisions for residential facilities, allowing covered entities to elect to follow the residential standards contained in UFAS. Although the 2004 ADAAG contains provisions for both residential facilities and transient lodging, the guidelines do not indicate which requirements apply to housing provided in an educational setting, leaving it to the adopting agencies to make that choice. After evaluating both sets of standards, the Department concluded that the benefits of applying the transient lodging standards outweighed the benefits of applying the residential facilities standards. Consequently, in the NPRM, the Department proposed a new Sec. 36.406(e) that provided that residence halls or dormitories operated by or on behalf of places of education shall comply with the provisions of the proposed standards for transient lodging, including, but not limited to, the provisions in sections 224 and 806 of the 2004 ADAAG.

Private universities and schools covered by title III as public accommodations are required to make their programs and activities accessible to persons with disabilities. The housing facilities that they provide have varied characteristics. College and university housing facilities typically provide housing for up to one academic year, but may be closed during school vacation periods. In the summer, they often are used for short-term stays of one to three days, a week, or several months. Graduate and faculty housing often is provided year-round in the form of apartments, which may serve individuals or families with children. These housing facilities are diverse in their layout. Some are double-occupancy rooms with a shared toilet and bathing room, which may be inside or outside the unit. Others may contain cluster, suite, or group arrangements where several rooms are located inside a defined unit with bathing, kitchen, and similar common facilities. In some cases, these suites are indistinguishable in features from traditional apartments. Universities may build their own housing facilities or enter into agreements with private developers to build, own, or lease housing to the educational institution or to its students. Academic housing may be located on the campus of the university or may be located in nearby neighborhoods.

Throughout the school year and the summer, academic housing can become program areas in which small groups meet, receptions and educational sessions are held, and social activities occur. The ability to move between rooms–both accessible rooms and standard rooms–in order to socialize, to study, and to use all public use and common use areas is an essential part of having access to these educational programs and activities. Academic housing also is used for short-term transient educational programs during the time students are not in regular residence and may be rented out to transient visitors in a manner similar to a hotel for special university functions.

The Department was concerned that applying the new construction requirements for residential facilities to educational housing facilities could hinder access to educational programs for students with disabilities. Elevators generally are not required under the 2004 ADAAG residential facilities standards unless they are needed to provide an accessible route from accessible units to public use and common use areas, while under the 2004 ADAAG as it applies to other types of facilities, multistory private facilities must have elevators unless they meet very specific exceptions. In addition, the residential facilities standards do not require accessible roll-in showers in bathrooms, while the transient lodging requirements require some of the accessible units to be served by bathrooms with roll-in showers. The transient lodging standards also require that a greater number of units have accessible features for persons with communication disabilities. The transient lodging standards provide for installation of the required accessible features so that they are available immediately, but the residential facilities standards allow for certain features of the unit to be adaptable. For example, only reinforcements for grab bars need to be provided in residential dwellings, but the actual grab bars must be installed under the transient lodging standards. By contrast, the residential facilities standards do require certain features that provide greater accessibility within units, such as usable kitchens and an accessible route throughout the dwelling. The residential facilities standards also require 5 percent of the units to be accessible to persons with mobility disabilities, which is a continuation of the same scoping that is currently required under UFAS and is therefore applicable to any educational institution that is covered by section 504. The transient lodging standards require a lower percentage of accessible sleeping rooms for facilities with large numbers of rooms than is required by UFAS. For example, if a dormitory has 150 rooms, the transient lodging standards would require 7 accessible rooms, while the residential standards would require 8. In a large dormitory with 500 rooms, the transient lodging standards would require 13 accessible rooms, and the residential facilities standards would require 25. There are other differences between the two sets of standards, including requirements for accessible windows, alterations, kitchens, an accessible route throughout a unit, and clear floor space in bathrooms allowing for a side transfer.

In the NPRM, the Department requested public comment on how to scope educational housing facilities, and it asked whether the residential facilities requirements or the transient lodging requirements in the 2004 ADAAG would be more appropriate for housing at places of education and asked how the different requirements would affect the cost of building new dormitories and other student housing. See 73 FR 34508, 34545 (June 17, 2008).

The Department received several comments on this issue under title III. One commenter stated that the Department should adopt the residential facilities standards for housing at a place of education. In the commenter’s view, the residential facilities standards are congruent with overlapping requirements imposed by HUD, and the residential facilities requirements would ensure dispersion of accessible features more effectively. This commenter also argued that while the increased number of required accessible units for residential facilities as compared to transient lodging may increase the cost of construction or alteration, this cost would be offset by a reduced need later to adapt rooms if the demand for accessible rooms exceeds the supply. The commenter also encouraged the Department to impose a visitability (accessible doorways and necessary clear floor space for turning radius) requirement for both the residential facilities and transient lodging requirements to allow students with mobility impairments to interact and socialize in a fully integrated fashion. Another commenter stated that while dormitories should be treated like residences as opposed to transient lodging, the Department should ensure that “all floors are accessible,” thus ensuring community integration and visitability. Another commenter argued that housing at a place of education is comparable to residential housing, and that most of the housing types used by schools do not have the same amenities and services or function like transient lodging and should not be treated as such.

Several commenters focused on the length of stay at this type of housing and suggested that if the facilities are subject to occupancy for greater than 30 days, the residential standards should apply. Another commenter supported the Department’s adoption of the transient lodging standards, arguing this will provide greater accessibility and therefore increase opportunities for students with disabilities to participate. One commenter, while supporting the use of transient lodging standards in this area, argued that the Department also should develop regulations relating to the usability of equipment in housing facilities by persons who are blind or visually impaired. Another commenter argued that the Department should not impose the transient lodging requirements on K-12 schools because the cost of adding elevators can be prohibitive, and because there are safety concerns related to evacuating students in wheelchairs living on floors above the ground floor in emergencies causing elevator failures.

The Department has considered the comments recommending the use of the residential facilities standards and acknowledges that they require certain features that are not included in the transient lodging standards and that should be required for housing provided at a place of education. In addition, the Department notes that since educational institutions often use their academic housing facilities as short-term transient lodging in the summers, it is important that accessible features be installed at the outset. It is not realistic to expect that the educational institution will be able to adapt a unit in a timely manner in order to provide accessible accommodations to someone attending a one-week program during the summer.

The Department has determined that the best approach to this type of housing is to continue to require the application of transient lodging standards but, at the same time, to add several requirements drawn from the residential facilities standards related to accessible turning spaces and work surfaces in kitchens, and the accessible route throughout the unit. This will ensure the maintenance of the transient lodging standard requirements related to access to all floors of the facility, roll-in showers in facilities with more than 50 sleeping rooms, and other important accessibility features not found in the residential facilities standards, but also will ensure usable kitchens and access to all the rooms in a suite or apartment.

The Department has added a new definition to Sec. 36.104, “Housing at a Place of Education,” and has revised Sec. 36.406(e) to reflect the accessible features that now will be required in addition to the requirements set forth under the transient lodging standards. The Department also recognizes that some educational institutions provide some residential housing on a year-round basis to graduate students and staff that is comparable to private rental housing but contains no facilities for educational programming. Section 36.406(e)(3) exempts from the transient lodging standards apartments or townhouse facilities that are provided with a lease on a year-round basis exclusively to graduate students or faculty and that do not contain any public use or common use areas available for educational programming; instead, such housing must comply with the requirements for residential facilities in sections 233 and 809 of the 2010 Standards.

The regulatory text uses the term ‘sleeping room” in lieu of the term “guest room,” which is the term used in the transient lodging standards. The Department is using this term because it believes that for the most part, it provides a better description of the sleeping facilities used in a place of education than “guest room.” The final rule states in Sec. 36.406(e) that the Department intends the terms to be used interchangeably in the application of the transient lodging standards to housing at a place of education.

Section 36.406(f) Assembly Areas

In the NPRM, the Department proposed Sec. 36.406(f) to supplement the assembly area requirements of the 2004 ADAAG, which the Department is adopting as part of the 2010 Standards. The NPRM proposed at Sec. 36.406(f)(1) to require wheelchair spaces and companion seating locations to be dispersed to all levels of the facility that are served by an accessible route. The Department received no significant comments on this paragraph and has decided to adopt the proposed language with minor modifications.

Section 36.406(f)(1) ensures that there is greater dispersion of wheelchair spaces and companion seats throughout stadiums, arenas, and grandstands than would otherwise be required by sections 221 and 802 of the 2004 ADAAG. In some cases, the accessible route may not be the same route that other individuals use to reach their seats. For example, if other patrons reach their seats on the field by an inaccessible route (e.g., by stairs), but there is an accessible route that complies with section 206.3 of the 2004 ADAAG that could be connected to seats on the field, wheelchair spaces and companion seats must be placed on the field even if that route is not generally available to the public.

Regulatory language that was included in the 2004 ADAAG advisory, but that did not appear in the NPRM, has been added by the Department in Sec. 36.406(f)(2). Section 36.406(f)(2) now requires an assembly area that has seating encircling, in whole or in part, a field of play or performance area, such as an arena or stadium, to place wheelchair spaces and companion seats around the entire facility. This rule, which is designed to prevent a public accommodation from placing wheelchair spaces and companion seats on one side of the facility only, is consistent with the Department’s enforcement practices and reflects its interpretation of section 4.33.3 of the 1991 Standards.

In the NPRM, the Department proposed Sec. 36.406(f)(2), which prohibits wheelchair spaces and companion seating locations from being “located on (or obstructed by) temporary platforms***.” 73 FR 34508, 34557 (June 17, 2008). Through its enforcement actions, the Department discovered that some venues place wheelchair spaces and companion seats on temporary platforms that, when removed, reveal conventional seating underneath, or cover the wheelchair spaces and companion seats with temporary platforms on top of which they place risers of conventional seating. These platforms cover groups of conventional seats and are used to provide groups of wheelchair seats and companion seats.

Several commenters requested an exception to the prohibition of the use of temporary platforms for public accommodations that sell most of their tickets on a season-ticket or other multi-event basis. Such commenters argued that they should be able to use temporary platforms because they know, in advance, that the patrons sitting in certain areas for the whole season do not need wheelchair spaces and companion seats. The Department declines to adopt such an exception. As it explained in detail in the NPRM, the Department believes that permitting the use of movable platforms that seat four or more wheelchair users and their companions have the potential to reduce the number of available wheelchair seating spaces below the level required, thus reducing the opportunities for persons who need accessible seating to have the same choice of ticket prices and amenities that are available to other patrons in the facility. In addition, use of removable platforms may result in instances where last minute requests for wheelchair and companion seating cannot be met because entire sections of accessible seating will be lost when a platform is removed. See 73 FR 34508, 34546 (June 17, 2008). Further, use of temporary platforms allows facilities to limit persons who need accessible seating to certain seating areas, and to relegate accessible seating to less desirable locations. The use of temporary platforms has the effect of neutralizing dispersion and other seating requirements (e.g., line of sight) for wheelchair spaces and companion seats. Cf. Independent Living Resources v. Oregon Arena Corp., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1171 (D. Or. 1998) (holding that while a public accommodation may “infill” wheelchair spaces with removable seats when the wheelchair spaces are not needed to accommodate individuals with disabilities, under certain circumstances “[s]uch a practice might well violate the rule that wheelchair spaces must be dispersed throughout the arena in a manner that is roughly proportionate to the overall distribution of seating”). In addition, using temporary platforms to convert unsold wheelchair spaces to conventional seating undermines the flexibility facilities need to accommodate secondary ticket market exchanges as required by Sec. 36.302(f)(7) of the final rule.

As the Department explained in the NPRM, however, this provision was not designed to prohibit temporary seating that increases seating for events (e.g., placing temporary seating on the floor of a basketball court for a concert). Consequently, the final rule, at Sec. 36.406(f)(3), has been amended to clarify that if an entire seating section is on a temporary platform for a particular event, then wheelchair spaces and companion seats may also be in that seating section. However, adding a temporary platform to create wheelchair spaces and companion seats that are otherwise dissimilar from nearby fixed seating and then simply adding a small number of additional seats to the platform would not qualify as an “entire seating section” on the platform. In addition, Sec. 36.406(f)(3) clarifies that facilities may fill in wheelchair spaces with removable seats when the wheelchair spaces are not needed by persons who use wheelchairs.

The Department has been responsive to assembly areas” concerns about reduced revenues due to unused accessible seating. Accordingly, the Department has reduced scoping requirements significantly—by almost half in large assembly areas—and determined that allowing assembly areas to in-fill unsold wheelchair spaces with readily removable temporary individual seats appropriately balances their economic concerns with the rights of individuals with disabilities. See section 221.1 of the 2010 Standards.

For stadium-style movie theaters, in Sec. 36.406(f)(4) of the NPRM the Department proposed requiring placement of wheelchair seating spaces and companion seats on a riser or cross-aisle in the stadium section of the theater that satisfies at least one of the following criteria: (1) It is located within the rear 60 percent of the seats provided in the auditorium; or (2) It is located within the area of the auditorium where the vertical viewing angles are between the 40th and 100th percentile of vertical viewing angles for all seats in that theater as ranked from the first row (1st percentile) to the back row (100th percentile). The vertical viewing angle is the angle between a horizontal line perpendicular to the seated viewer’s eye to the screen and a line from the seated viewer’s eye to the top of the screen.

The Department proposed this bright-line rule for two reasons: (1) the movie theater industry petitioned for such a rule; and (2) the Department has acquired expertise in the design of stadium-style theaters during its litigation with several major movie theater chains. See United States v. AMC Entertainment, Inc., 232 F. Supp.2d 1092 (C.D. Cal. 2002), rev’d in part, 549 F.3d 760 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 348 F.3d 569 (6th Cir. 2003). Two industry commenters—at least one of whom otherwise supported this rule—requested that the Department explicitly state that this rule does not apply retroactively to existing theaters. Although this provision on its face applies to new construction and alterations, these commenters were concerned that the rule could be interpreted to apply retroactively because of the Department’s statements in the NPRM and ANPRM that this bright line rule, although newly articulated, is not a new standard but “merely codifi[es] longstanding Department requirement[s],” 73 FR 34508, 34534 (June 17, 2008), and does not represent a ‘substantive change from the existing line-of-sight requirements” of section 4.33.3 of the 1991 Standards, 69 FR 58768, 58776 (Sept. 30, 2004).

Although the Department intends for Sec. 36.406(f)(4) of this rule to apply prospectively to new construction and alterations, this rule is not a departure from, and is consistent with, the line-of-sight requirements in the 1991 Standards. The Department has always interpreted the line-of-sight requirements in the 1991 Standards to require viewing angles provided to patrons who use wheelchairs to be comparable to those afforded to other spectators. Section 36.406(f)(4) merely represents the application of these requirements to stadium-style movie theaters.

One commenter from a trade association sought clarification whether Sec. 36.406(f)(4) applies to stadium-style theaters with more than 300 seats, and argued that it should not since dispersion requirements apply in those theaters. The Department declines to limit this rule to stadium-style theaters with 300 or fewer seats; stadium-style theaters of all sizes must comply with this rule. So, for example, stadium-style theaters that must vertically disperse wheelchair spaces and companion seats must do so within the parameters of this rule.

The NPRM included a provision that required assembly areas with more than 5,000 seats to provide at least five wheelchair spaces with at least three companion seats for each of those five wheelchair spaces. The Department agrees with commenters who asserted that group seating is better addressed through ticketing policies rather than design and has deleted that provision from this section of the final rule.

Section 36.406(g) Medical Care Facilities

In the 1991 title III regulation, there was no provision addressing the dispersion of accessible sleeping rooms in medical care facilities. The Department is aware, however, of problems that individuals with disabilities face in receiving full and equal medical care when accessible sleeping rooms are not adequately dispersed. When accessible rooms are not fully dispersed, a person with a disability is often placed in an accessible room in an area that is not medically appropriate for his or her condition, and is thus denied quick access to staff with expertise in that medical specialty and specialized equipment. While the Access Board did not establish specific design requirements for dispersion in the 2004 ADAAG, in response to extensive comments in support of dispersion it added an advisory note, Advisory 223.1 General, encouraging dispersion of accessible rooms within the facility so that accessible rooms are more likely to be proximate to appropriate qualified staff and resources.

In the NPRM, the Department sought additional comment on the issue, asking whether it should require medical care facilities, such as hospitals, to disperse their accessible sleeping rooms, and if so, by what method (by specialty area, floor, or other criteria). All of the comments the Department received on this issue supported dispersing accessible sleeping rooms proportionally by specialty area. These comments from individuals, organizations, and a building code association, argued that it would not be difficult for hospitals to disperse rooms by specialty area, given the high level of regulation to which hospitals are subject and the planning that hospitals do based on utilization trends. Further, comments suggest that without a requirement, it is unlikely that hospitals would disperse the rooms. In addition, concentrating accessible rooms in one area perpetuates segregation of individuals with disabilities, which is counter to the purpose of the ADA.

The Department has decided to require medical care facilities to disperse their accessible sleeping rooms in a manner that is proportionate by type of medical specialty. This does not require exact mathematical proportionality, which at times would be impossible. However, it does require that medical care facilities disperse their accessible rooms by medical specialty so that persons with disabilities can, to the extent practical, stay in an accessible room within the wing or ward that is appropriate for their medical needs. The language used in this rule (“in a manner that is proportionate by type of medical specialty”) is more specific than that used in the NPRM (“in a manner that enables patients with disabilities to have access to appropriate specialty services”) and adopts the concept of proportionality proposed by the commenters. Accessible rooms should be dispersed throughout all medical specialties, such as obstetrics, orthopedics, pediatrics, and cardiac care.

Subpart F—Certification of State Laws or Local Building Codes

Subpart F contains procedures implementing section 308(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the ADA, which provides that on the application of a State or local jurisdiction, the Attorney General may certify that a State or local building code or similar ordinance meets or exceeds the minimum accessibility requirements of the Act. In enforcement proceedings, this certification will constitute rebuttable evidence that the law or code meets or exceeds the ADA’s requirements. In its NPRM, the Department proposed three changes in subpart F that would streamline the process for public entities seeking certification, all of which are adopted in this final rule.

First, the Department proposed deleting the existing § 36.603, which establishes the obligations of a submitting authority that is seeking certification of its code, and issue in its place informal regulatory guidance regarding certification submission requirements. Due to the deletion of § 36.603, §§ 36.604 through 36.608 are renumbered, and § 36.603 in the final rule is modified to indicate that the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division (Assistant Attorney General) shall make a preliminary determination of equivalency after “receipt and review of all information relevant to a request filed by a submitting official for certification of a code.” Second, the Department proposed that the requirement in renumbered § 36.604 (previously § 36.605) that an informal hearing be held in Washington, DC, if the Assistant Attorney General makes a preliminary determination of equivalency be changed to a requirement that the hearing be held in the State or local jurisdiction charged with administration and enforcement of the code. Third, the Department proposed adding language to renumbered § 36.606 (previously § 36.607) to explain the effect of the 2010 Standards on the codes of State or local jurisdictions that were determined in the past to meet or exceed the 1991 Standards. Once the 2010 Standards take effect, certifications issued under the 1991 Standards would not have any future effect, and States and local jurisdictions with codes certified under the 1991 Standards would need to reapply for certification under the 2010 Standards. With regard to elements of existing buildings and facilities constructed in compliance with a code when a certification of equivalency was in effect, the final rule requires that in any enforcement action this compliance would be treated as rebuttable evidence of compliance with the standards then in effect. The new provision added to § 36.606 may also have implications in determining an entity’s eligibility for the element-by-element safe harbor.

No substantive comments were received regarding the Department’s proposed changes in subpart F, and no other changes have been made to this subpart in the final rule. The Department did receive several comments addressing other issues raised in the NPRM that are related to subpart F. Because the 2010 Standards include specific design requirements for recreation facilities and play areas that may be new to many title III facilities, the Department sought comments in the NPRM about how the certification review process would be affected if the State or local jurisdiction allocates the authority to implement the new requirements to State or local agencies that are not ordinarily involved in administering building codes. One commenter, an association of building owners and managers, suggested that because of the increased scope of the 2010 Standards, it is likely that parts of covered elements in the new standards will be under the jurisdiction of multiple State or local agencies. In light of these circumstances, the commenter recommended that the Department allow State or local agencies to seek certification even if only one State or local regulatory agency requests certification. For example, if a State agency that regulates buildings seeks certification of its building code, it should be able to do so, even if another State agency that regulates amusement rides and miniature golf courses does not seek certification.

The Department’s discussion of this issue in the NPRM contemplated that all of a State or local government’s accessibility requirements for title III facilities would be the subject of a request for certification. Any other approach would require the Department to certify only part of a State or local government’s accessibility requirements as compared to the entirety of the revised ADA standards. As noted earlier, the Attorney General is authorized by section 308(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the ADA to certify that a State or local building code meets or exceeds the ADA’s minimum accessibility requirements, which are contained in this regulation. The Department has concluded that this is a decision that must be made on a case-by-case basis because of the wide variety of enforcement schemes adopted by the States. Piecemeal certification of laws or codes that do not contain all of the minimum accessibility requirements could fail to satisfy the Attorney General’s responsibility to ensure that a State or local building code meets or exceeds the minimum accessibility requirements of the Act before granting certification. However, the Department wants to permit State and local code administrators to have maximum flexibility, so the Department will leave open the possibility for case-by-case review to determine if a State has successfully met the burden of demonstrating that its accessibility codes or other laws meet or exceed the ADA requirements.

The commenter representing building owners and managers also urged the Department to extend the proposed effective date for the final rule. The commenter explained that a six-month phase-in period is inadequate for States to begin and complete a code amendment process. The commenter asserted that the inadequate phase-in period will place entities undertaking new construction and alterations, particularly in those States with certified codes, in a difficult position because State officials will continue to enforce previously certified State or local accessibility requirements that may be in conflict with the new 2010 Standards. The Department received numerous comments on the issue of the effective date, many of them similar to the concerns expressed above, in response to both the NPRM and the ANPRM. See Appendix A discussion of compliance dates for new construction and alterations (§ 36.406). The Department has been persuaded by the concerns raised by many commenters addressing the time and costs related to the design process for both new construction and alterations, and has determined that for new construction and alterations, compliance with the 2010 Standards will not be required until 18 months from the date the final rule is published. For more information on the issue of the compliance date, refer to subpart D—New Construction and Alterations.

One commenter, an association of theater owners, recommended that the Department establish a training program for State building inspectors for those States that receive certification to ensure more consistent ADA compliance and to facilitate the review of builders” architectural plans. The commenter also recommended that State building inspectors, once trained, review architectural plans, and after completion and inspection of facilities, be authorized to certify that the inspected building or facility meets both the certified State and the Federal accessibility requirements. Although supportive of the idea of additional training for State and local building code officials regarding ADA compliance, the Department believes that the approach suggested by the commenter of allowing State and local code officials to determine if a covered facility is in compliance with Federal accessibility requirements is not consistent with or permissible under the statutory enforcement scheme established by the ADA. As the Department stated in the NPRM, certification of State and local codes serves, to some extent, to mitigate the absence of a Federal mechanism for conducting at the national level a review of all architectural plans and inspecting all covered buildings under construction to ensure compliance with the ADA. In this regard, certification operates as a bridge between the obligation to comply with the 1991 Standards in new construction and alterations, and the administrative schemes of State and local governments that regulate the design and construction process. By ensuring consistency between State or local codes and Federal accessibility standards, certification has the additional benefit of streamlining the regulatory process, thereby making it easier for those in the design and construction industry to satisfy both State and Federal requirements. The Department notes, however, that although certification has the potential to increase compliance with the ADA, this result, however desirable, is not guaranteed. The ADA contemplated that there could be enforcement actions brought even in States with certified codes, and it provided some protection in litigation to builders who adhered to the provisions of the code certified to be ADA-equivalent. The Department’s certification determinations make it clear that to get the benefit of certification, a facility must comply with the applicable code requirements—without relying on waivers or variances. The certified code, however, remains within the authority of the adopting State or local jurisdiction to interpret and enforce: Certification does not transform a State’s building code into Federal law. Nor can certification alone authorize State and local building code officials implementing a certified code to do more than they are authorized to do under State or local law, and these officials cannot acquire authority through certification to render binding interpretations of Federal law. Therefore, the Department, while understanding the interest in obtaining greater assurance of compliance with the ADA through the interpretation and enforcement of a certified code by local code officials, declined in the NPRM to confer on local officials the authority not granted to them under the ADA to certify the compliance of individual facilities. The Department in the final rule finds no reason to alter its position on this issue in response to the comments that were received.

The commenter representing theater owners also urged the Department to provide a safe harbor to facilities constructed in compliance with State or local building codes certified under the 1991 Standards. With regard to elements of facilities constructed in compliance with a certified code prior to the effective date of the 2010 Standards, and during the period when a certification of equivalency was in effect, the Department noted in the NPRM that its approach would be consistent with the approach to the safe harbor discussed in subpart C, § 36.304 of the NPRM, with respect to elements in existing facilities constructed in compliance with the 1991 Standards. For example, elements in existing facilities in States with codes certified under the 1991 Standards would be eligible for a safe harbor if they were constructed in compliance with an ADA-certified code. In this scenario, compliance with the certified code would be treated as evidence of compliance with the 1991 Standards for purposes of determining the application of the safe harbor provision to those elements. For more information on safe harbor, refer to subpart C, § 36.304 of the final rule.

One commenter, an advocacy group for the blind, suggested that, similar to the procedures for certifying a State or local building code, the Department should establish a program to certify an entity’s obligation to make its goods and services accessible to persons with sensory disabilities. The Department believes that this commenter was suggesting that covered entities should be able to request that the Department review their business operations to determine if they have met their ADA obligations. As noted earlier, subpart F contains procedures implementing section 308(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the ADA, which provides that on the application of a State or local jurisdiction, the Attorney General may certify that a State or local building code or similar ordinance meets or exceeds the minimum accessibility requirements of the ADA. The only mechanism through which the Department is authorized to ensure a covered entity’s compliance with the ADA is the enforcement scheme established under section 308(b)(1)(A)(i) of the ADA. The Department notes, however, that title III of the ADA and its implementing regulation, which includes the standards for accessible design, already require existing, altered, and newly constructed places of public accommodation, such as retail stores, hotels, restaurants, movie theaters, and stadiums, to make their facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, which includes individuals with sensory disabilities, so that individuals with disabilities have a full and equal opportunity to enjoy the benefits of a public accommodation’s goods, services, facilities, privileges and advantages.

Other Issues

Questions Posed in the NPRM Regarding Costs and Benefits of Complying With the 2010 Standards

In the NPRM, the Department requested comments on various cost and benefit issues related to eight requirements in the Department’s Initial RIA, that were projected to have incremental costs that exceeded monetized benefits by more than $100 million when using the 1991 Standards as a comparative baseline, i.e., side reach, water closet clearances in single-user toilet rooms with in-swinging doors, stairs, elevators, location of accessible routes to stages, accessible attorney areas and witness stands, assistive listening systems, and accessible teeing grounds, putting greens, and weather shelters at golf courses. 73 FR 34508, 34512 (June 17, 2008). The Department was particularly concerned about how these costs applied to alterations. The Department noted that pursuant to the ADA, the Department does not have statutory authority to modify the 2004 ADAAG and is required instead to issue regulations implementing the ADA that are consistent with the Board’s guidelines. In that regard, the Department also requested comment about whether any of these eight elements in the 2010 Standards should be returned to the Access Board for further consideration, in particular as applied to alterations. Many of the comments received by the Department in response to these questions addressed both titles II and III. As a result, the Department’s discussion of these comments and its response are collectively presented for both titles.

Side reach. The 1991 Standards at section 4.2.6 establish a maximum side-reach height of 54 inches. The 2010 Standards at section 308.3.1 reduce that maximum height to 48 inches. The 2010 Standards also add exceptions for certain elements to the scoping requirement for operable parts. The vast majority of comments the Department received were in support of the lower side-reach maximum of 48 inches in the 2010 Standards. Most of these comments, but not all, were received from individuals of short stature, relatives of individuals of short stature, or organizations representing the interests of persons with disabilities, including individuals of short stature. Comments from individuals with disabilities and disability advocacy groups stated that the 48-inch side reach would permit independence in performing many activities of daily living for individuals with disabilities, including individuals of short stature, persons who use wheelchairs, and persons who have limited upper body strength. In this regard, one commenter who is a business owner pointed out that as a person of short stature there were many occasions when he was unable to exit a public restroom independently because he could not reach the door handle. The commenter said that often elevator control buttons are out of his reach, and, if he is alone, he often must wait for someone else to enter the elevator so that he can ask that person to press a floor button for him. Another commenter, who is also a person of short stature, said that he has on several occasions pulled into a gas station only to find that he was unable to reach the credit card reader on the gas pump. Unlike other customers who can reach the card reader, swipe their credit or debit cards, pump their gas, and leave the station, he must use another method to pay for his gas. Another comment from a person of short stature pointed out that as more businesses take steps to reduce labor costs—a trend expected to continue—staffed booths are being replaced with automatic machines for the sale, for example, of parking tickets and other products. He observed that the “ability to access and operate these machines becomes ever more critical to function in society,” and, on that basis, urged the Department to adopt the 48-inch side-reach requirement. Another individual commented that persons of short stature should not have to carry with them adaptive tools in order to access building or facility elements that are out of their reach, any more than persons in wheelchairs should have to carry ramps with them in order to gain access to facilities.

Many of the commenters who supported the revised side-reach requirement pointed out that lowering the side-reach requirement to 48 inches would avoid a problem sometimes encountered in the built environment when an element was mounted for a parallel approach at 54 inches, only to find afterwards that a parallel approach was not possible. Some commenters also suggested that lowering the maximum unobstructed side-reach to 48 inches would reduce confusion among design professionals by making the unobstructed forward and side-reach maximums the same (the unobstructed forward reach in both the 1991 and 2010 Standards is 48 inches maximum). These commenters also pointed out that the ICC/ANSI A117.1 Standard, which is a private sector model accessibility standard, has included a 48-inch maximum high side-reach requirement since 1998. Many jurisdictions have already incorporated this requirement into their building codes, which these commenters believed would reduce the cost of compliance with the 2010 Standards. Because numerous jurisdictions have already adopted the 48-inch side-reach requirement, the Department’s failure to adopt the 48-inch side-reach requirement in the 2010 Standards, in the view of many commenters, would result in a significant reduction in accessibility, and would frustrate efforts that have been made to harmonize private sector model construction and accessibility codes with Federal accessibility requirements. Given these concerns, they overwhelmingly opposed the idea of returning the revised side-reach requirement to the Access Board for further consideration.

The Department also received comments in support of the 48-inch side-reach requirement from an association of professional commercial property managers and operators and from State governmental entities. The association of property managers pointed out that the revised side-reach requirement provided a reasonable approach to “regulating elevator controls and all other operable parts” in existing facilities in light of the manner in which the safe harbor, barrier removal, and alterations obligations will operate in the 2010 Standards. One governmental entity, while fully supporting the 48-inch side-reach requirement, encouraged the Department to adopt an exception to the lower reach range for existing facilities similar to the exception permitted in the ICC/ANSI A117.1 Standard. In response to this latter concern, the Department notes that under the safe harbor, existing facilities that are in compliance with the 1991 Standards, which required a 54-inch side-reach maximum, would not be required to comply with the lower side-reach requirement, unless there is an alteration. See § 36.304(d)(2)(i).

A number of commenters expressed either concern with, or opposition to, the 48-inch side-reach requirement and suggested that it be returned to the Access Board for further consideration. These commenters included trade and business associations, associations of retail stores, associations of restaurant owners, retail and convenience store chains, and a model code organization. Several businesses expressed the view that the lower side-reach requirement would discourage the use of their products and equipment by most of the general public. In particular, concerns were expressed by a national association of pay phone service providers regarding the possibility that pay telephones mounted at the lower height would not be used as frequently by the public to place calls, which would result in an economic burden on thepay phone industry. The commenter described the lower height required for side reach as creating a new “barrier” to pay phone use, which would reduce revenues collected from pay phones and, consequently, further discourage the installation of new pay telephones. In addition, the commenter expressed concern that phone service providers would simply decide to remove existing pay phones rather than incur the costs of relocating them at the lower height. With regard to this latter concern, the commenter misunderstood the manner in which the safe harbor and barrier removal obligations under § 36.304 willoperate in the revised title III regulation for elements that comply with the 1991 Standards.

The Department does not anticipate that wholesale relocation of pay telephones in existing facilities will be required under the final rule where the telephones in existing facilities already are in compliance with the 1991 Standards. If the pay phones comply with the 1991 Standards, the adoption of the 2010 Standards does not require retrofitting of these elements to reflect incremental changes in the 2010 Standards. See § 36.304(d)(2). However, pay telephones that were required to meet the 1991 Standards as part of new construction or alterations, but do not in fact comply with those standards, will need to be brought into compliance with the 2010 Standards as of 18 months from the publication date of this final rule. See § 36.406(a)(5).

The Department does not agree with the concerns expressed by the commenter about reduced revenues from pay phones mounted at lower heights. The Department believes that while given the choice some individuals may prefer to use a pay phone that is at a higher height, the availability of some phones at a lower height will not deter individuals from making needed calls.

The 2010 Standards will not require every pay phone to be installed or moved to a lowered height. The table accompanying section 217.2 of the 2010 Standards makes clear that where one or more telephones are provided on a floor, level, or an exterior site, only one phone per floor, level, or exterior site must be placed at an accessible height. Similarly, where there is one bank of phones per floor, level, or exterior site, only one phone per floor, level, or exterior site must be accessible. And if there are two or more banks of phones per floor, level, or exterior site, only one phone per bank must be placed at an accessible height.

Another comment in opposition to the lower reach range requirement was submitted on behalf of a chain of convenience stores with fuel stops. The commenter expressed the concern that the 48-inch side reach “will make it uncomfortable for the majority of the public,” including persons of taller stature who would need to stoop to use equipment such as fuel dispensers mounted at the lower height. The commenter offered no objective support for the observation that a majority of the public would be rendered uncomfortable if, as required in the 2010 Standards, at least one of each type of fuel dispenser at a facility was made accessible in compliance with the lower reach range. Indeed, the Department received no comments from any individuals of tall stature expressing concern about accessible elements or equipment being mounted at the 48-inch height.

Several retail, convenience store, restaurant, and amusement park commenters expressed concern about the burden the lower side-reach requirement would place on their businesses in terms of self-service food stations and vending areas if the 48-inch requirement were applied retroactively. The cost of lowering counter height, in combination with the lack of control businesses exercise over certain prefabricated service or vending fixtures, outweighed, they argued, any benefits to persons with disabilities. For this reason, they suggested the lower side-reach requirement be referred back to the Access Board.

These commenters misunderstood the safe harbor and barrier removal obligations that will be in effect under the 2010 Standards. Those existing self-service food stations and vending areas that already are in compliance with the 1991 Standards will not be required to satisfy the 2010 Standards unless they engage in alterations. With regard to prefabricated vending machines and food service components that will be purchased and installed in businesses after the 2010 Standards become effective, the Department expects that companies will design these machines and fixtures to comply with the 2010 Standards in the future, as many have already done in the 10 years since the 48- inch side-reach requirement has been a part of the model codes and standards used by many jurisdictions as the basis for their construction codes.

A model code organization commented that the lower side-reach requirement would create a significant burden if it required entities to lower the mounting height for light switches, environmental controls, and outlets when an alteration did not include the walls where these elements were located, such as when “an area is altered or as a path of travel obligation.” The Department believes that the final rule adequately addresses those situations about which the commenter expressed concern by not requiring the relocation of existing elements, such as light switches, environmental controls, and outlets, unless they are altered. Moreover, under § 36.403 of the 1991 rule, costs for altering the path of travel to an altered area of primary function that exceed 20 percent of the overall costs of the alteration will continue to be deemed disproportionate.

The Department has determined that the revised side-reach requirement should not be returned to the Access Board for further consideration based in large part on the views expressed by a majority of thecommenters regarding the need for, and importance of, the lower side-reach requirement to ensure access for persons with disabilities.

Alterations and water closet clearances in single-user toilet rooms with in-swinging doors. The 1991 Standards allow a lavatory to be placed a minimum of 18 inches from the water closet centerline and a minimum of 36 inches from the side wall adjacent to the water closet, which precludes side transfers. The 1991 Standards do not allow an in-swinging door in a toilet or bathing room to overlap the required clear floor space at any accessible fixture. To allow greater transfer options, section 604.3.2 of the 2010 Standards prohibits lavatories from overlapping the clear floor space at water closets, except in certain residential dwelling units. Section 603.2.3 of the 2010 Standards maintains the prohibition on doors swinging into the clear floor space or clearance required for any fixture, except that they permit the doors of toilet or bathing rooms to swing into the required turning space, provided that there is sufficient clearance space for the wheelchair outside the door swing. In addition, in single-user toilet or bathing rooms, exception 2 of section 603.2.3 of the 2010 Standards permits the door to swing into the clear floor space of an accessible fixture if a clear floor space that measures at least 30 inches by 48 inches is available outside the arc of the door swing.

The majority of commenters believed that this requirement would increase the number of toilet rooms accessible to individuals with disabilities who use wheelchairs or mobility scooters, and will make it easier for them to transfer. A number of commenters stated thatthere was no reason to return this provision to the Access Board. Numerous commenters noted that this requirement is already included in other model accessibility standards and many State and local building codes and that the adoption of the 2010 Standards is an important part of harmonization efforts.

Other commenters, mostly trade associations, opposed this requirement, arguing that the added cost to the industry outweighs any increase in accessibility. Two commenters stated that these proposed requirements would add two feet to the width of an accessible single-user toilet room; however, another commenter said the drawings in the proposed regulation demonstrated that there would be no substantial increase in the size of the toilet room. Several commenters stated that this requirement would require moving plumbing fixtures, walls, or doors at significant additional expense. Two commenters wanted the permissible overlap between the door swing and clearance around any fixture eliminated. One commenter stated that these new requirements will result in fewer alterations to toilet rooms to avoid triggering the requirement for increased clearances, and suggested that the Department specify that repairs, maintenance, or minor alterations would not trigger the need to provide increased clearances. Another commenter requested that the Department exempt existing guest room bathrooms and single-user toilet rooms that comply with the 1991 Standards from complying with the increased clearances in alterations.

After careful consideration of these comments, the Department believes that the revised clearances for single-user toilet rooms will allow safer and easier transfers for individuals with disabilities, and will enable a caregiver, aide, or other person to accompany an individual with a disability into the toilet room to provide assistance. The illustrations in Appendix B to this final rule, “Analysis and Commentary on the 2010 ADA Standards for Accessible Design,”describe several ways for public entities and public accommodations to make alterations while minimizing additional costs or loss of space. Further, in any isolated instances where existing structural limitations may entail loss of space, the public entity and public accommodation may have a technical infeasibility defense for that alteration. The Department has, therefore, decided not to return this requirement to the Access Board.

Alterations to stairs. The 1991 Standards only require interior and exterior stairs to be accessible when they provide access to levels that are not connected by an elevator, ramp, or other accessible means of vertical access.In contrast, section 210.1 of the 2010 Standards requires all newly constructed stairs that are part of a means of egress to be accessible. However, exception 2 of section 210.1 of the 2010 Standards provides that in alterations, stairs between levels connected by an accessible route need not be accessible, except that handrails shall be provided. Most commenters were in favor of this requirement for handrails in alterations, and stated that adding handrails to stairs during alterations was not only feasible and not cost prohibitive, but also provided important safety benefits. One commenter stated that making all points of egress accessible increased the number of people who could use the stairs in an emergency. A majority of the commenters did not want this requirement returned to the Access Board for further consideration. The International Building Code (IBC), which is a private sector model construction code, contains a similar provision, and most jurisdictions enforce a version of the IBC as their building code, thereby minimizing the impact of this provision on public entities and public accommodations. The Department believes that by requiring only the addition of handrails to altered stairs where levels are connected by an accessible route, the costs of compliance for public entities and public accommodations are minimized, while safe egress for individuals with disabilities is increased. Therefore, the Department has decided not to return this requirement to the Access Board.

Alterations to elevators. Under the 1991 Standards, if an existing elevator is altered, only that altered elevator must comply with the new construction requirements for accessible elevators to the maximum extent feasible. It is therefore possible that a bank of elevators controlled by a single call system may contain just one accessible elevator, leaving an individual with a disability with no way to call an accessible elevator and thus having to wait indefinitely until an accessible elevator happens to respond to the call system. In the 2010 Standards, when an element in one elevator is altered, section 206.6.1 will require the same element to be altered in all elevators that are programmed to respond to the same call button as the altered elevator. Almost all commenters favored the proposed requirement. This requirement, according to these commenters, is necessary so a person with a disability need not wait until an accessible elevator responds to his or her call. One commenter suggested that elevator owners also could comply by modifying the call system so the accessible elevator could be summoned independently. One commenter suggested that this requirement would be difficult for small businesses located in older buildings,and one commenter suggested that this requirement be sent back to the Access Board.

After considering the comments, the Department agrees that this requirement is necessary to ensure that when an individual with a disability presses a call button, an accessible elevator will arrive. The IBC contains a similar provision, and most jurisdictions enforce a version of the IBC as their building code, minimizing the impact of this provision on public entities and public accommodations. Public entities and small businesses located in older buildings need not comply with this requirement where it is technically infeasible to do so. Further, as pointed out by one commenter, modifying the call system so the accessible elevator can be summoned independently is another means of complying with this requirement in lieu of altering all other elevators programmed to respond to the same call button. Therefore, the Department has decided not to return this requirement to the Access Board.

Location of accessible routes to stages. The 1991 Standards, at section 4.33.5, require an accessible route to connect the accessible seating and the stage, as well as other ancillary spaces used by performers. The 2010 Standards, at section 206.2.6, provide in addition that where a circulation path directly connects the seating area and the stage, the accessible route must connect directly the accessible seating and the stage, and, like the 1991 Standards, an accessible route must connect the stage with the ancillary spaces used by performers.

In the NPRM, the Department asked operators of auditoria about the extent to which auditoria already provide direct access to stages and whether there were planned alterations over the next 15 years that included accessible direct routes to stages. The Department also asked how to quantify the benefits of this requirement for persons with disabilities, and invited commenters to provide illustrative anecdotal experiences about the requirement’s benefits.

The Department received many comments regarding the costs and benefits of this requirement. Although little detail was provided, many industry and governmental entity commenters anticipated that the costs of this requirement would be great and that it would be difficult to implement. They noted that premium seats may have to be removed and that load-bearing walls may have to be relocated. These commenters suggested that the significant costs would deter alterations to the stage area for a great many auditoria. Some commenters suggested that ramps to the front of the stage may interfere with means of egress and emergency exits. Several commenters requested that the requirement apply to new construction only, and one industry commenter requested an exemption for stages used in arenas or amusement parks where there is no audience participation or where the stage is a work area for performers only. One commenter requested that the requirement not apply to temporary stages.

The final rule does not require a direct accessible route to be constructed where a direct circulation path from the seating area to the stage does not exist. Consequently, those commenters who expressed concern about the burden imposed by the revised requirement (i.e., where the stage is constructed with no direct circulation path connecting the general seating and performing area) should note that the final rule will not require the provision of a direct accessible route under these circumstances. The final rule applies to permanent stages, as well as “temporary stages,” if there is a direct circulation path from the seating area to the stage. However, the Department recognizes that in some circumstances, such as an alteration to a primary function area, the ability to provide a direct accessible route to a stage may be costly or technically infeasible, and the auditorium owner is not precluded by the revised requirement from asserting defenses available under the regulation. In addition, the Department notes that since section 4.33.5 of the 1991 Standards requires an accessible route to a stage, the safe harbor will apply to existing facilities whose stages comply with the 1991 Standards.

Several governmental entities supported accessible auditoria and the revised requirement. One governmental entity noted that its State building code already required direct access, that it was possible to provide direct access, and that creative solutions had been found to do so.

Many advocacy groups and individual commenters strongly supported the revised requirement, discussing the acute need for direct access to stages, as such access has an impact on a great number of people at important life events, such as graduations and awards ceremonies, at collegiate and competitive performances and other school events, and at entertainment events that include audience participation. Many commenters expressed the belief that direct access is essential for integration mandates to be satisfied, and that separate routes are stigmatizing and unequal. The Department agrees with these concerns.

Commenters described the impact felt by persons in wheelchairs who are unable to access the stage at all when others are able to do so. Some of these commenters also discussed the need for the performers and production staff who use wheelchairs to have direct access to the stage, and they provided a number of examples that illustrated the importance of the rule proposed in the NPRM. Personal anecdotes were provided in comments and at the Department’s public hearing on the NPRM. One mother spoke passionately and eloquently about the unequal treatment experienced by her daughter, who uses a wheelchair, at awards ceremonies and band concerts. Her daughter was embarrassed and ashamed to be carried by her father onto a stage at one band concert. When the venue had to be changed for another concert to an accessible auditorium, the band director made sure to comment that he was unhappy with the switch. Rather than endure the embarrassment and indignities, her child dropped out of band the following year.

Another father commented about how he was unable to speak from the stage at a PTA meeting at his child’s school. Speaking from the floor limited his line of sight and his participation. Several examples were provided of children who could not participate on stage during graduation, awards programs, or special school events, such as plays and festivities. One student did not attend his college graduation because he would not be able to get on stage. Anotherstudent was unable to participate in the class Christmas programs or end-of-year parties unless her father could attend and lift her onto the stage. These commenters did not provide a method to quantify the benefits that would accrue by having direct access to stages. One commenter stated, however, that”the cost of dignity and respect is without measure.”

Many industry commenters and governmental entities suggested that the requirement be sent back to the Access Board for further consideration. One industry commenter mistakenly noted that some international building codes do not incorporate the requirement and that, therefore, there is a need for further consideration. However, the Department notes that both the 2003 and 2006 editions of the IBC include scoping provisions that are almost identical to this requirement and that these editions of the model code are the most frequently used. Many individuals and advocacy group commenters requested that the requirement be adopted without further delay. These commenters spoke of the acute need for direct access to stages and the amount of time it would take to resubmit the requirement to the Access Board. Several commenters noted that the 2004 ADAAG tracks recent model codes, and that there is thus no need for further consideration. The Department agrees that no further delay is necessary and therefore has decided it will not return the requirement to the Access Board for further consideration.

Assistive listening systems. The 1991 Standards at sections 4.33.6 and 4.33.7 require assistive listening systems (ALS) in assembly areas and prescribe general performance standards for ALS systems. In the NPRM, the Department proposed adopting the technical specifications in the 2004 ADAAG for ALS that are intended to ensure better quality and effective delivery of sound and information for persons with hearing impairments, especially those using hearing aids. The Department noted in the NPRM that since 1991, advancements in ALS and the advent of digital technology have made these systems more amenable to uniform standards, which, among other things, should ensure that a certain percentage of required ALS systems arehearing-aid compatible. 73 FR 34508, 34513 (June 17, 2008). The 2010 Standards at section 219 provide scoping requirements and at section 706 address receiver jacks, hearing aid compatibility, sound pressure level, signal-to-noise ratio, and peak clipping level. The Department requested comments specifically from arena and assembly area administrators on the cost and maintenance issues associated with ALS, and asked generally about the costs and benefits of ALS, and asked whether, based upon the expected costs of ALS, the issue should be returned to the Access Board for further consideration.

Commenters from advocacy organizations noted that persons who develop significant hearing loss often discontinue their normal routines and activities, including meetings, entertainment, and large group events, due to a sense of isolation caused by the hearing loss or embarrassment. Individuals with longstanding hearing loss may never have participated in group activities for many of the same reasons. Requiring ALS may allow individuals with disabilities to contribute to the community by joining in government and public events, and through increased economic activity associated with community activities and entertainment. Making public events and entertainment accessible to persons with hearing loss also brings families and other groups that include persons with hearing loss into more community events and activities, thus exponentially increasing the benefit from ALS.

Many commenters noted that when a person has significant hearing loss, that person may be able to hear and understand information in a quiet situation with the use of hearing aids or cochlear implants; however, as background noise increases and the distance between the source of the sound and the listener grows, and especially where there is distortion in the sound, an ALS becomes essential for basic comprehension and understanding. Commenters noted that among the 31 million Americans with hearing loss, and with a projected increase to over 78 million Americans with hearing loss by 2030, the benefit from ALS is huge and growing. Advocates for persons with disabilities and individuals commented that they appreciated the improvements in the 2004 ADAAG standards for ALS, including specifications for the ALS systems and performance standards. They noted that providing neckloops that translate the signal from the ALS transmitter to a frequency that can be heard on a hearing aid or cochlear implant are much more effective than separate ALS system headsets, which sometimes create feedback, often malfunction, and may create distractions for others seated nearby. Comments from advocates and users of ALS systems consistently noted that the Department’s regulation should, at a minimum, be consistent with the 2004 ADAAG. Although there were requests for adjustments in the scoping requirements from advocates seeking increased scoping requirements, and from large venue operators seeking fewer requirements, there was no significant concern expressed by commenters about the technical specifications for ALS in the 2004 ADAAG.

Some commenters from trade associations and large venue owners criticized the scoping requirements as too onerous, and one commenter asked for a remand to the Access Board for new scoping rules. However, one State agency commented that the 2004 ADAAG largely duplicates the requirements in the 2006 IBC and the 2003 ANSI codes,which means that entities that comply with those standards would not incur additional costs associated with ADA compliance.

According to one State office of the courts, the costs to install either an infrared system or an FM system at average-sized facilities, including most courtrooms covered by title II, would be between $500 and $2,000, which the agency viewed as a small price in comparison to the benefits of inclusion. Advocacy organizations estimated wholesale costs of ALS systems at about $250 each, and individual neckloops to link the signal from the ALS transmitter to hearing aids or cochlear implants at less than $50 per unit.Many commenters pointed out that if a facility already is using induction neckloops, it would already be in compliance already and would not have any additional installation costs. One major city commented that annual maintenance is about $2,000 for the entire system of performance venues in the city. A trade association representing very large venues estimated annual maintenance and upkeep expenses, including labor and replacement parts, to be at most about $25,000 for a very large professional sports stadium.

One commenter suggested that the scoping requirements for ALS in the 2004 ADAAG were too stringent and that the Department should refer them back to the Access Board for further review and consideration. Others commented that the requirement for new ALS systems should mandate multichannel receivers capable of receiving audio description for persons who are blind, in addition to a channel for amplification for persons who are hard of hearing. Some commenters suggested that the Department should require a set schedule and protocol of mandatory maintenance. Department regulations already require maintenance of accessible features at § 36.211(a) of the title III regulation, which obligates a title III entity to maintain ALS in good working order. The Department recognizes that maintenance of ALS is key to its usability. Necessary maintenance will vary dramatically from venue to venue based upon a variety of factors including frequency of use, number of units, quality of equipment, and other items. Accordingly, the Department has determined that it is not appropriate to mandate details of maintenance, but notes that failure to maintain ALS would violate § 36.211(a) of this rule.

The NPRM asked whether the Department should return the issue of ALS requirements to the Access Board for further review. The Department has received substantial feedback on the technical and scoping requirements for ALS and is convinced that these requirements are reasonable—especially in light of the fact that the requirements largely duplicate those in the 2006 IBC and the 2003 ANSI codes already adopted in many States—and that the benefits justify the requirements. In addition, the Department believes that the new specifications will make ALS work more effectively for more persons with disabilities, which, together with a growing population of new users, will increase demand for ALS, thus mooting criticism from some large venue operators about insufficient demand. Thus, the Department has determined that it is unnecessary to refer this issue back to the Access Board for reconsideration.

Accessible teeing grounds, putting greens, and weather shelters. The Department’s NPRM sought public input on the proposed requirements for accessible golf courses. These requirements specifically relate to accessible routes within the boundaries of the courses, as well as the accessibility of golfing elements (e.g., teeing grounds, putting greens, weather shelters).

In the NPRM, the Department sought information from the owners and operators of golf courses, both public and private, on the extent to which their courses already have golf car passages, and, if so, whether they intended to avail themselves of the proposed accessible route exception for golf car passages. 73 FR 34508, 34513 (June 17, 2008).

Most commenters expressed support for the adoption of an accessible route requirement that includes an exception permitting golf car passage as all or part of an accessible route. Comments in favor of the proposed standard came from golf course owners and operators, individuals, organizations, and disability rights groups, golf course requirements generally came from golf courses and organizations representing the golf course industry.

The majority of commenters expressed the general viewpoint that nearly all golf courses provide golf cars and have either well-defined paths or permit golf cars to drive on the course where paths are not present—and thus meet the accessible route requirement. Several commenters disagreed with the assumption in the Initial RIA that virtually every tee and putting green on an existing course would need to be regraded in order to provide compliant accessible routes. According to one commenter, many golf courses are relatively flat with little slope, especially those heavily used by recreational golfers. This commenter concurred with the Department that it is likely that most existing golf courses have a golf car passage to tees and greens, thereby substantially minimizing the cost of bringing an existing golf course into compliance with the proposed standards. One commenter reported that golf course access audits found that the vast majority of public golf courses would have little difficulty in meeting the proposed golf course requirements. In the view of some commenters, providing access to golf courses would increase golf participation by individuals with disabilities.

The Department also received many comments requesting clarification of the term “golf car passage.” For example, one commenter requesting clarification of the term “golf car passage” argued that golf courses typically do not provide golf car paths or pedestrian paths onto the actual teeing grounds or greens, many of which are higher or lower than the car path. This commenter argued that if golf car passages were required to extend onto teeing grounds and greens in order to qualify for an exception, then some golf courses would have to substantially regrade teeing grounds and greens at a high cost.

After careful consideration of the comments, the Department has decided to adopt the 2010 Standards specific to golf facilities. The Department believes that in order for individuals with mobility disabilities to have an opportunity to play golf that is equal to golfers without disabilities, it is essential that golf courses provide an accessible route or accessible golf car passage to connect accessible elements and spaces within the boundary of the golf course, including teeing grounds, putting greens, and weather shelters.

Public Comments on Other NPRM Issues

Equipment and furniture. Equipment and furniture are covered under the Department’s ADA regulations, including under the provision requiring modifications in policies, practices, and procedures and the provision requiring barrier removal. See 28 CFR 36.302,36.304. The Department has not issued specific regulatory guidance on equipment and furniture, but proposed such regulations in 1991. The Department decided not to establish specific equipment requirements at that time because the requirements could be addressed under other sections of the regulation and because there were no appropriate accessibility standards applicable to many types of equipment at that time. See 28 CFR part 36, app. B (2009) (“Proposed Section 36.309 Purchase of Furniture and Equipment”).

In the NPRM, the Department announced its intention not to regulate equipment, proposing instead to continue with the current approach. The Department received numerous comments objecting to this decision and urging the Department to issue equipment and furniture regulations. Based on these comments, the Department has decided that it needs to revisit the issuance of equipment and furniture regulations, and it intends to do so in future rulemaking.

Among the commenters” key concerns, many from the disability community objected to the Department’s earlier decision not to issue equipment regulations, especially for medical equipment. These groups recommended that the Department list by name certain types of medical equipment that must be accessible, including exam tables (that lower to 15 inches above the floor or lower), scales, medical and dental chairs, and radiologic equipment (including mammography equipment). These commenters emphasized that the provision of medically-related equipment and furniture also should be specifically regulated since they are not included in the 2004 ADAAG (while depositories, change machines, fuel dispensers, and ATMs are) and because of their crucial role in the provision of healthcare. Commenters described how the lack of accessible medical equipment negatively affects the health of individuals with disabilities. For example, some individuals with mobility disabilities do not get thorough medical care because their health providers do not have accessible examination tables or scales.

Commenters also said that the Department’s stated plan to assess the financial impact of free-standing equipment on businesses was not necessary, as any regulations could include a financial balancing test. Other commenters representing persons who are blind or have low vision urged the Department to mandate accessibility for a wide range of equipment— including household appliances (stoves, washers, microwaves, and coffee makers), audiovisual equipment (stereos and DVD players), exercise machines, vending equipment, ATMs, computers at Internet cafes or hotel business centers, reservations kiosks at hotels, and point-of-sale devices— through speech output and tactile labels and controls. They argued that modern technology allows such equipment to be made accessible at minimal cost. According to these commenters, the lack of such accessibility in point-of-sale devices is particularly problematic because it forces blind individuals to provide personal or sensitive information (such as personal identification numbers) to third parties, which exposes them to identity fraud. Because the ADA does not apply directly to the manufacture of products, the Department lacks the authority to issue design requirements for equipment designed exclusively for use in private homes. See Department of Justice, Americans with Disabilities Act, ADA Title III Technical Assistance Manual Covering Public Accommodations and Commercial Facilities, III–4.4200, available at http://archive.ada.gov/taman3.html. To the extent that equipment intended for such use is used by a covered entity to facilitate a covered service or activity, that covered entity must make the equipment accessible to the extent that it can. See id.: 28 CFR part 36, app. B (2009) (“Proposed Section 36.309 Purchase of Furniture and Equipment”).

Some commenters urged the Department to require swimming pool operators to provide aquatic wheelchairs for the use of persons with disabilities when the swimming pool has a sloped entry. If there is a sloped entry, a person who uses a wheelchair would require a wheelchair designed for use in the water in order to gain access to the pool since taking a personal wheelchair into water would rust and corrode the metal on the chair and damage any electrical components of a power wheelchair. Providing an aquatic wheelchair made of non-corrosive materials and designed for access into the water will protect the water from contamination and avoid damage to personal wheelchairs or other mobility aids.

Additionally, many commenters urged the Department to regulate the height of beds in accessible hotel guest rooms and to ensure that such beds have clearance at the floor to accommodate a mechanical lift. These commenters noted that in recent years, hotel beds have become higher as hotels use thicker mattresses, thereby making it difficult or impossible for many individuals who use wheelchairs to transfer onto hotel beds. In addition, many hotel beds use a solid-sided platform base with no clearance at the floor,which prevents the use of a portable lift to transfer an individual onto the bed. Consequently, individuals who bring their own lift to transfer onto the bed cannot independently get themselves onto the bed. Some commenters suggested various design options that might avoid these situations.

The Department intends to provide specific guidance relating to both hotel beds and aquatic wheelchairs in a future rulemaking. For the present, the Department reminds covered entities that they have the obligation to undertake reasonable modifications to their current policies and procedures and to undertake barrier removal or provide alternatives to barrier removal to make their facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. In many cases, providing aquatic wheelchairs or adjusting hotel bed heights may be necessary to comply with those requirements.

Commenters from the business community objected to the lack of clarity from the NPRM as to which equipment must be accessible and how to make it accessible. Several commenters urged the Department to clarify that equipment located in a public accommodation need not meet the technical specifications of ADAAG so long as the service provided by the equipment can be provided by alternative means, such as an employee. For example, the commenters suggested that a self-service check-in kiosk in a hotel need not comply with the reach range requirement so long as a guest can check in at the front desk nearby. Several commenters argued that the Department should not require that point-of-sale devices be accessible to individuals who are blind or have low vision (although complying with accessible route and reach range was acceptable), especially until the Department adopts specific standards governing such access.

The Department has decided not to add specific scoping or technical requirements for equipment and furniture in this final rule. Other provisions of the regulation, including those requiring reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or procedures, readily achievable barrier removal, and effective communication will require the provision of accessible equipment in appropriate circumstances. Because it is clear that many commenters want the Department to provide additional specific requirements for accessible equipment, the Department plans to initiate a rulemaking to address these issues in the near future.

Accessible golf cars. An accessible golf car means a device that is designed and manufactured to be driven on all areas of a golf course, is independently usable by individuals with mobility disabilities, has a hand-operated brake and accelerator, carries golf clubs in an accessible location, and has a seat that both swivels and raises to put the golfer in a standing or semi-standing position. The 1991 regulation contained no language specifically referencing accessible golf cars. After considering the comments addressing the ANPRM’s proposed requirement that golf courses make at least one specialized golf car available for the use of individuals with disabilities, and the safety of accessible golf cars and their use on golf course greens, the Department stated in the NPRM that it would not issue regulations specific to golf cars.

The Department received many comments in response to its decision to propose no new regulation specific to accessible golf cars. The majority of commenters urged the Department to require golf courses to provide accessible golf cars. These comments came from individuals, disability advocacy and recreation groups, a manufacturer of accessible golf cars, and representatives of local government. Comments supporting the Department’s decision not to propose a new regulation came from golf course owners, associations, and individuals.

Many commenters argued that while the existing title III regulation covered the issue, the Department should nonetheless adopt specific regulatory language requiring golf courses to provide accessible golf cars. Some commenters noted that many local governments and park authorities that operate public golf courses have already provided accessible golf cars. Experience indicates that such golf cars may be used without damaging courses. Some argued that having accessible golf cars would increase golf course revenue by enabling more golfers with disabilities to play the game. Several commenters requested that the Department adopt a regulation specifically requiring each golf course to provide one or more accessible golf cars. Other commenters recommended allowing golf courses to make “pooling” arrangements to meet demands for such cars. A few commenters expressed support for using accessible golf cars to accommodate golfers with and without disabilities. Commenters also pointed out that the Departments of the Interior and Defense have already mandated that golf courses under their jurisdictional control must make accessible golf cars available unless it can be demonstrated that doing so would change the fundamental nature of the game.

While an industry association argued that at least two models of accessible golf cars meet the specifications recognized in the field, and that accessible golf cars cause no more damage to greens or other parts of golf courses than players standing or walking across the course, other commenters expressed concerns about the potential for damage associated with the use of accessible golf cars. Citing safety concerns, golf organizations recommended that an industry safety standard be developed.

Although the Department declines to add specific scoping or technical requirements for golf cars to this final rule, the Department expects to address requirements for accessible golf cars in future rulemaking. In the meantime, the Department believes that golfers with disabilities who need accessible golf cars are protected by other existing provisions in the title III regulation, including those requiring reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or procedures, and readily achievable barrier removal.

Web site accessibility. Many commenters expressed disappointment that the NPRM did not specifically require title III-covered entities to make their Web sites, through which they offer goods and services, accessible to individuals with disabilities. Commenters urged the Department to require specifically that entities that provide goods or services on the Internet make their Websites accessible, regardless of whether or not these entities also have a “bricks and mortar” location. The commenters explained that such clarification was needed because of the current ambiguity caused by court decisions as to whether web-only businesses are covered under title III. Commenters argued that the cost of making Web sites accessible through Web site design is minimal, yet critical, to enabling individuals with disabilities to benefit from the goods and services an entity offers through its Web site. The Internet has become an essential tool for many Americans and, when accessible, provides individuals with disabilities great independence. Commenters recommended that, at a minimum, the Department require covered entities to meet the Electronic and Information Technology Accessibility Standards issued pursuant to section 508. Under section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Federal agencies are required to make their Web sites accessible. 29 U.S.C. 794(d); 36 CFR Part 1194.

The Department agrees that the ability to access the goods and services offered on the Internet through the Web sites of public accommodations is of great importance to individuals with disabilities, particularly those who are blind or who have low vision. When the ADA was enacted in 1990, the Internet was unknown to most of the public. Today, the Internet plays a critical role in daily life for personal, civic, commercial, and business purposes. In light of the growing importance of eBcommerce, ensuring nondiscriminatory access to the goods and services offered through the Web sites of covered entities can play a significant role in fulfilling the goals of the ADA.

Although the language of the ADA does not explicitly mention the Internet, the Department has taken the position that title III covers access to Web sites of public accommodations. The Department has issued guidance on the ADA as applied to the Web sites of public entities, which includes the availability of standards for Web site accessibility. See Accessibility of State and Local Government Websites to People with Disabilities (June 2003), available at archive.ada.gov/websites2.htm. As the Department stated in that publication, an agency (and similarly a public accommodation) with an inaccessible Web site also may meet its legal obligations by providing an accessible alternative for individuals to enjoy its goods or services, such as a staffed telephone information line. However, such an alternative must provide an equal degree of access in terms of hours of operation and range of options and programs available. For example, if retail goods or bank services are posted on an inaccessible Web site that is available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week to individuals without disabilities, then the alternative accessible method must also be available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Additional guidance is available in the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG), available at http://www.w3.org/TR/WAIWEBCONTENT (last visited June 24, 2010), which are developed and maintained by the Web Accessibility Initiative, a subgroup of the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C®).

The Department did not issue proposed regulations as part of its NPRM, and thus is unable to issue specific regulatory language on Web site accessibility at this time. However, the Department expects to engage in rulemaking relating to Web site accessibility under the ADA in the near future.

Multiple chemical sensitivities. The Department received comments from a number of individuals asking the Department to add specific language to the final rule addressing the needs of individuals with chemical sensitivities. These commenters expressed concern that the presence of chemicals interferes with their ability to participate in a wide range of activities. These commenters also urged the Department to add multiple chemical sensitivities to the definition of a disability.

The Department has determined not to include specific provisions addressing multiple chemical sensitivities in the final rule. In order to be viewed as a disability under the ADA, an impairment must substantially limit one or more major life activities. An individual’s major life activities of respiratory or neurological functioning may be substantially limited by allergies or sensitivity to a degree that he or she is a person with a disability. When a person has this type of disability, a covered entity may have to make reasonable modifications in its policies and practices for that person. However, this determination is an individual assessment and must be made on a case-by-case basis.

1991 Preamble and Section-by-Section Analysis

APPENDIX C TO PART 36 — GUIDANCE ON ADA REGULATION ON NONDISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF DISABILITY BY PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS AND IN COMMERCIAL FACILITIES ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED ON JULY 26, 1991

Note: For the convenience of the reader, this appendix contains the text of the preamble to the final regulation on nondiscrimination on the basis of disability by public accommodations and in commercial facilities beginning at the heading “Section-by-Section Analysis and Response to Comments” and ending before “List of Subjects in 28 CFR part 36” (56 FR 35546, July 26, 1991).

Section-By-Section Analysis and Response to Comments

Subpart A – General

Section 36.101 Purpose

Section 36.101 states the purpose of the rule, which is to effectuate title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. This title prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability by public accommodations, requires places of public accommodation and commercial facilities to be designed, constructed, and altered in compliance with the accessibility standards established by this part, and requires that examinations or courses related to licensing or certification for professional or trade purposes be accessible to persons with disabilities.

Section 36.102 Application

Section 36.102 specifies the range of entities and facilities that have obligations under the final rule. The rule applies to any public accommodation or commercial facility as those terms are defined in Sec.36.104. It also applies, in accordance with section 309 of the ADA, to private entities that offer examinations or courses related to applications, licensing, certification, or credentialing for secondary or postsecondary education, professional, or trade purposes. Except as provided in Sec.36.206, “Retaliation or coercion,” this part does not apply to individuals other than public accommodations or to public entities. Coverage of private individuals and public entities is discussed in the preamble to Sec.36.206.

As defined in Sec.36.104, a public accommodation is a private entity that owns, leases or leases to, or operates a place of public accommodation. Section 36.102(b)(2) emphasizes that the general and specific public accommodations requirements of subparts B and C obligate a public accommodation only with respect to the operations of a place of public accommodation. This distinction is drawn in recognition of the fact that a private entity that meets the regulatory definition of public accommodation could also own, lease or lease to, or operate facilities that are not places of public accommodation. The rule would exceed the reach of the ADA if it were to apply the public accommodations requirements of subparts B and C to the operations of a private entity that do not involve a place of public accommodation. Similarly, Sec.36.102(b)(3) provides that the new construction and alterations requirements of subpart D obligate a public accommodation only with respect to facilities used as, or designed or constructed for use as, places of public accommodation or commercial facilities.

On the other hand, as mandated by the ADA and reflected in Sec.36.102(c), the new construction and alterations requirements of subpart D apply to a commercial facility whether or not the facility is a place of public accommodation, or is owned, leased, leased to, or operated by a public accommodation.

Section 36.102(e) states that the rule does not apply to any private club, religious entity, or public entity. Each of these terms is defined in Sec.36.104. The exclusion of private clubs and religious entities is derived from section 307 of the ADA; and the exclusion of public entities is based on the statutory definition of public accommodation in section 301(7) of the ADA, which excludes entities other than private entities from coverage under title III of the ADA.

Section 36.103 Relationship to Other Laws

Section 36.103 is derived from sections 501 (a) and (b) of the ADA. Paragraph (a) provides that, except as otherwise specifically provided by this part, the ADA is not intended to apply lesser standards than are required under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended (29 U.S.C. 790 – 794), or the regulations implementing that title. The standards of title V of the Rehabilitation Act apply for purposes of the ADA to the extent that the ADA has not explicitly adopted a different standard from title V. Where the ADA explicitly provides a different standard from section 504, the ADA standard applies to the ADA, but not to section 504. For example, section 504 requires that all federally assisted programs and activities be readily accessible to and usable by individuals with handicaps, even if major structural alterations are necessary to make a program accessible. Title III of the ADA, in contrast, only requires alterations to existing facilities if the modifications are “readily achievable,” that is, able to be accomplished easily and without much difficulty or expense. A public accommodation that is covered under both section 504 and the ADA is still required to meet the “program accessibility” standard in order to comply with section 504, but would not be in violation of the ADA unless it failed to make “readily achievable” modifications. On the other hand, an entity covered by the ADA is required to make “readily achievable” modifications, even if the program can be made accessible without any architectural modifications. Thus, an entity covered by both section 504 and title III of the ADA must meet both the “program accessibility” requirement and the “readily achievable” requirement.

Paragraph (b) makes explicit that the rule does not affect the obligation of recipients of Federal financial assistance to comply with the requirements imposed under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.

Paragraph (c) makes clear that Congress did not intend to displace any of the rights or remedies provided by other Federal laws or other State or local laws (including State common law) that provide greater or equal protection to individuals with disabilities. A plaintiff may choose to pursue claims under a State law that does not confer greater substantive rights, or even confers fewer substantive rights, if the alleged violation is protected under the alternative law and the remedies are greater. For example, assume that a person with a physical disability seeks damages under a State law that allows compensatory and punitive damages for discrimination on the basis of physical disability, but does not allow them on the basis of mental disability. In that situation, the State law would provide narrower coverage, by excluding mental disabilities, but broader remedies, and an individual covered by both laws could choose to bring an action under both laws. Moreover, State tort claims confer greater remedies and are not preempted by the ADA. A plaintiff may join a State tort claim to a case brought under the ADA. In such a case, the plaintiff must, of course, prove all the elements of the State tort claim in order to prevail under that cause of action.

A commenter had concerns about privacy requirements for banking transactions using telephone relay services. Title IV of the Act provides adequate protections for ensuring the confidentiality of communications using the relay services. This issue is more appropriately addressed by the Federal Communications Commission in its regulation implementing title IV of the Act.

Section 36.104 Definitions

“Act.” The word “Act” is used in the regulation to refer to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101 – 336, which is also referred to as the “ADA.”

“Commerce.” The definition of “commerce” is identical to the statutory definition provided in section 301(l) of the ADA. It means travel, trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several States, between any foreign country or any territory or possession and any State, or between points in the same State but through another State or foreign country. Commerce is defined in the same manner as in title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits racial discrimination in public accommodations.

The term “commerce” is used in the definition of “place of public accommodation.” According to that definition, one of the criteria that an entity must meet before it can be considered a place of public accommodation is that its operations affect commerce. The term “commerce” is similarly used in the definition of “commercial facility.”

The use of the phrase “operations affect commerce” applies the full scope of coverage of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution in enforcing the ADA. The Constitution gives Congress broad authority to regulate interstate commerce, including the activities of local business enterprises (e.g., a physician’s office, a neighborhood restaurant, a laundromat, or a bakery) that affect interstate commerce through the purchase or sale of products manufactured in other States, or by providing services to individuals from other States. Because of the integrated nature of the national economy, the ADA and this final rule will have extremely broad application.

“Commercial facilities” are those facilities that are intended for nonresidential use by a private entity and whose operations affect commerce. As explained under Sec.36.401, “New construction,” the new construction and alteration requirements of subpart D of the rule apply to all commercial facilities, whether or not they are places of public accommodation. Those commercial facilities that are not places of public accommodation are not subject to the requirements of subparts B and C (e.g., those requirements concerning auxiliary aids and general nondiscrimination provisions).

Congress recognized that the employees within commercial facilities would generally be protected under title I (employment) of the Act. However, as the House Committee on Education and Labor pointed out, “[t]o the extent that new facilities are built in a manner that make[s] them accessible to all individuals, including potential employees, there will be less of a need for individual employers to engage in reasonable accommodations for particular employees.” H.R. Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 117 (1990) [hereinafter “Education and Labor report”]. While employers of fewer than 15 employees are not covered by title I’s employment discrimination provisions, there is no such limitation with respect to new construction covered under title III. Congress chose not to so limit the new construction provisions because of its desire for a uniform requirement of accessibility in new construction, because accessibility can be accomplished easily in the design and construction stage, and because future expansion of a business or sale or lease of the property to a larger employer or to a business that is a place of public accommodation is always a possibility.

The term “commercial facilities” is not intended to be defined by dictionary or common industry definitions. Included in this category are factories, warehouses, office buildings, and other buildings in which employment may occur. The phrase, “whose operations affect commerce,” is to be read broadly, to include all types of activities reached under the commerce clause of the Constitution.

Privately operated airports are also included in the category of commercial facilities. They are not, however, places of public accommodation because they are not terminals used for “specified public transportation.” (Transportation by aircraft is specifically excluded from the statutory definition of “specified public transportation.”) Thus, privately operated airports are subject to the new construction and alteration requirements of this rule (subpart D) but not to subparts B and C. (Airports operated by public entities are covered by title II of the Act.) Places of public accommodation located within airports, such as restaurants, shops, lounges, or conference centers, however, are covered by subparts B and C of this part.

The statute’s definition of “commercial facilities” specifically includes only facilities “that are intended for nonresidential use” and specifically exempts those facilities that are covered or expressly exempted from coverage under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, as amended (42 U.S.C. 3601 – 3631). The interplay between the Fair Housing Act and the ADA with respect to those facilities that are “places of public accommodation” was the subject of many comments and is addressed in the preamble discussion of the definition of “place of public accommodation.”

“Current illegal use of drugs.” The phrase “current illegal use of drugs” is used in Sec.36.209. Its meaning is discussed in the preamble for that section.

“Disability.” The definition of the term “disability” is comparable to the definition of the term “individual with handicaps” in section 7(8)(B) of the Rehabilitation Act and section 802(h) of the Fair Housing Act. The Education and Labor Committee report makes clear that the analysis of the term “individual with handicaps” by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in its regulations implementing section 504 (42 FR 22685 (May 4, 1977)) and the analysis by the Department of Housing and Urban Development in its regulation implementing the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (54 FR 3232 (Jan. 23, 1989)) should also apply fully to the term “disability” (Education and Labor report at 50).

The use of the term “disability” instead of “handicap” and the term “individual with a disability” instead of “individual with handicaps” represents an effort by the Congress to make use of up-to-date, currently accepted terminology. The terminology applied to individuals with disabilities is a very significant and sensitive issue. As with racial and ethnic terms, the choice of words to describe a person with a disability is overlaid with stereotypes, patronizing attitudes, and other emotional connotations. Many individuals with disabilities, and organizations representing such individuals, object to the use of such terms as “handicapped person” or “the handicapped.” In other recent legislation, Congress also recognized this shift in terminology, e.g., by changing the name of the National Council on the Handicapped to the National Council on Disability (Pub. L. 100 – 630).

In enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act, Congress concluded that it was important for the current legislation to use terminology most in line with the sensibilities of most Americans with disabilities. No change in definition or substance is intended nor should be attributed to this change in phraseology.

The term “disability” means, with respect to an individual –

• (A) A physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;
• (B) A record of such an impairment; or
• (C) Being regarded as having such an impairment.

If an individual meets any one of these three tests, he or she is considered to be an individual with a disability for purposes of coverage under the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Congress adopted this same basic definition of “disability,” first used in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and in the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, for a number of reasons. It has worked well since it was adopted in 1974. There is a substantial body of administrative interpretation and judicial precedent on this definition. Finally, it would not be possible to guarantee comprehensiveness by providing a list of specific disabilities, especially because new disorders may be recognized in the future, as they have since the definition was first established in 1974.

Test A – A Physical or Mental Impairment That Substantially Limits One or More of the Major Life Activities of Such Individual

Physical or mental impairment. Under the first test, an individual must have a physical or mental impairment. As explained in paragraph (1) (i) of the definition, “impairment” means any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: Neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs (including speech organs that are not respiratory, such as vocal cords, soft palate, and tongue); respiratory, including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive; digestive; genitourinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine. It also means any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities. This list closely tracks the one used in the regulations for section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (see, e.g., 45 CFR 84.3(j)(2)(i)).

Many commenters asked that “traumatic brain injury” be added to the list in paragraph (1)(i). Traumatic brain injury is already included because it is a physiological condition affecting one of the listed body systems, i.e., “neurological.” Therefore, it was unnecessary for the Department to add the term to the regulation.

It is not possible to include a list of all the specific conditions, contagious and noncontagious diseases, or infections that would constitute physical or mental impairments because of the difficulty of ensuring the comprehensiveness of such a list, particularly in light of the fact that other conditions or disorders may be identified in the future. However, the list of examples in paragraph (1)(iii) of the definition includes: Orthopedic, visual, speech and hearing impairments; cerebral palsy; epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation, emotional illness, specific learning disabilities, HIV disease (symptomatic or asymptomatic), tuberculosis, drug addiction, and alcoholism.

The examples of “physical or mental impairments” in paragraph (1)(iii) are the same as those contained in many section 504 regulations, except for the addition of the phrase “contagious and noncontagious” to describe the types of diseases and conditions included, and the addition of “HIV disease (symptomatic or asymptomatic)” and “tuberculosis” to the list of examples. These additions are based on the ADA committee reports, caselaw, and official legal opinions interpreting section 504. In School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), a case involving an individual with tuberculosis, the Supreme Court held that people with contagious diseases are entitled to the protections afforded by section 504. Following the Arline decision, this Department’s Office of Legal Counsel issued a legal opinion that concluded that symptomatic HIV disease is an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity; therefore it has been included in the definition of disability under this part. The opinion also concluded that asymptomatic HIV disease is an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, either because of its actual effect on the individual with HIV disease or because the reactions of other people to individuals with HIV disease cause such individuals to be treated as though they are disabled. See Memorandum from Douglas W. Kmiec, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, to Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr., Counsel to the President (Sept. 27, 1988), reprinted in Hearings on S. 933, the Americans with Disabilities Act, Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 346 (1989). The phrase “symptomatic or asymptomatic” was inserted in the final rule after “HIV disease” in response to commenters who suggested that the clarification was necessary to give full meaning to the Department’s opinion.

Paragraph (1)(iv) of the definition states that the phrase “physical or mental impairment” does not include homosexuality or bisexuality. These conditions were never considered impairments under other Federal disability laws. Section 511(a) of the statute makes clear that they are likewise not to be considered impairments under the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Physical or mental impairment does not include simple physical characteristics, such as blue eyes or black hair. Nor does it include environmental, cultural, economic, or other disadvantages, such as having a prison record, or being poor. Nor is age a disability. Similarly, the definition does not include common personality traits such as poor judgment or a quick temper where these are not symptoms of a mental or psychological disorder. However, a person who has these characteristics and also has a physical or mental impairment may be considered as having a disability for purposes of the Americans with Disabilities Act based on the impairment.

Substantial limitation of a major life activity. Under Test A, the impairment must be one that “substantially limits a major life activity.” Major life activities include such things as caring for one’s self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. For example, a person who is paraplegic is substantially limited in the major life activity of walking, a person who is blind is substantially limited in the major life activity of seeing, and a person who is mentally retarded is substantially limited in the major life activity of learning. A person with traumatic brain injury is substantially limited in the major life activities of caring for one’s self, learning, and working because of memory deficit, confusion, contextual difficulties, and inability to reason appropriately.

A person is considered an individual with a disability for purposes of Test A, the first prong of the definition, when the individual’s important life activities are restricted as to the conditions, manner, or duration under which they can be performed in comparison to most people. A person with a minor, trivial impairment, such as a simple infected finger, is not impaired in a major life activity. A person who can walk for 10 miles continuously is not substantially limited in walking merely because, on the eleventh mile, he or she begins to experience pain, because most people would not be able to walk eleven miles without experiencing some discomfort.

The Department received many comments on the proposed rule’s inclusion of the word “temporary” in the definition of “disability.” The preamble indicated that impairments are not necessarily excluded from the definition of “disability” simply because they are temporary, but that the duration, or expected duration, of an impairment is one factor that may properly be considered in determining whether the impairment substantially limits a major life activity. The preamble recognized, however, that temporary impairments, such as a broken leg, are not commonly regarded as disabilities, and only in rare circumstances would the degree of the limitation and its expected duration be substantial: Nevertheless, many commenters objected to inclusion of the word “temporary” both because it is not in the statute and because it is not contained in the definition of “disability” set forth in the title I regulations of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The word “temporary” has been deleted from the final rule to conform with the statutory language. The question of whether a temporary impairment is a disability must be resolved on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration both the duration (or expected duration) of the impairment and the extent to which it actually limits a major life activity of the affected individual.

The question of whether a person has a disability should be assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating measures, such as reasonable modifications or auxiliary aids and services. For example, a person with hearing loss is substantially limited in the major life activity of hearing, even though the loss may be improved through the use of a hearing aid. Likewise, persons with impairments, such as epilepsy or diabetes, that substantially limit a major life activity, are covered under the first prong of the definition of disability, even if the effects of the impairment are controlled by medication.

Many commenters asked that environmental illness (also known as multiple chemical sensitivity) as well as allergy to cigarette smoke be recognized as disabilities. The Department, however, declines to state categorically that these types of allergies or sensitivities are disabilities, because the determination as to whether an impairment is a disability depends on whether, given the particular circumstances at issue, the impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities (or has a history of, or is regarded as having such an effect).

Sometimes respiratory or neurological functioning is so severely affected that an individual will satisfy the requirements to be considered disabled under the regulation. Such an individual would be entitled to all of the protections afforded by the Act and this part. In other cases, individuals may be sensitive to environmental elements or to smoke but their sensitivity will not rise to the level needed to constitute a disability. For example, their major life activity of breathing may be somewhat, but not substantially, impaired. In such circumstances, the individuals are not disabled and are not entitled to the protections of the statute despite their sensitivity to environmental agents.

In sum, the determination as to whether allergies to cigarette smoke, or allergies or sensitivities characterized by the commenters as environmental illness are disabilities covered by the regulation must be made using the same case-by-case analysis that is applied to all other physical or mental impairments. Moreover, the addition of specific regulatory provisions relating to environmental illness in the final rule would be inappropriate at this time pending future consideration of the issue by the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration of the Department of Labor.

Test B – A Record of Such an Impairment

This test is intended to cover those who have a record of an impairment. As explained in paragraph (3) of the rule’s definition of disability, this includes a person who has a history of an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity, such as someone who has recovered from an impairment. It also includes persons who have been misclassified as having an impairment.

This provision is included in the definition in part to protect individuals who have recovered from a physical or mental impairment that previously substantially limited them in a major life activity. Discrimination on the basis of such a past impairment is prohibited. Frequently occurring examples of the first group (those who have a history of an impairment) are persons with histories of mental or emotional illness, heart disease, or cancer; examples of the second group (those who have been misclassified as having an impairment) are persons who have been misclassified as having mental retardation or mental illness.

Test C – Being Regarded as Having Such an Impairment

This test, as contained in paragraph (4) of the definition, is intended to cover persons who are treated by a private entity or public accommodation as having a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. It applies when a person is treated as if he or she has an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, regardless of whether that person has an impairment.

The Americans with Disabilities Act uses the same “regarded as” test set forth in the regulations implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See , e.g., 28 CFR 42.540(k)(2)(iv), which provides:

(iv) “Is regarded as having an impairment” means (A) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but that is treated by a recipient as constituting such a limitation; (B) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or (C) Has none of the impairments defined in paragraph (k)(2)(i) of this section but is treated by a recipient as having such an impairment.

The perception of the private entity or public accommodation is a key element of this test. A person who perceives himself or herself to have an impairment, but does not have an impairment, and is not treated as if he or she has an impairment, is not protected under this test. A person would be covered under this test if a restaurant refused to serve that person because of a fear of “negative reactions” of others to that person. A person would also be covered if a public accommodation refused to serve a patron because it perceived that the patron had an impairment that limited his or her enjoyment of the goods or services being offered.

For example, persons with severe burns often encounter discrimination in community activities, resulting in substantial limitation of major life activities. These persons would be covered under this test based on the attitudes of others towards the impairment, even if they did not view themselves as “impaired.”

The rationale for this third test, as used in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, was articulated by the Supreme Court in Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987). The Court noted that, although an individual may have an impairment that does not in fact substantially limit a major life activity, the reaction of others may prove just as disabling. “Such an impairment might not diminish a person’s physical or mental capabilities, but could nevertheless substantially limit that person’s ability to work as a result of the negative reactions of others to the impairment.” Id. at 283. The Court concluded that, by including this test in the Rehabilitation Act’s definition, “Congress acknowledged that society’s accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment.” Id. at 284.

Thus, a person who is not allowed into a public accommodation because of the myths, fears, and stereotypes associated with disabilities would be covered under this third test whether or not the person’s physical or mental condition would be considered a disability under the first or second test in the definition.

If a person is refused admittance on the basis of an actual or perceived physical or mental condition, and the public accommodation can articulate no legitimate reason for the refusal (such as failure to meet eligibility criteria), a perceived concern about admitting persons with disabilities could be inferred and the individual would qualify for coverage under the “regarded as” test. A person who is covered because of being regarded as having an impairment is not required to show that the public accommodation’s perception is inaccurate (e.g., that he will be accepted by others, or that insurance rates will not increase) in order to be admitted to the public accommodation.

Paragraph (5) of the definition lists certain conditions that are not included within the definition of “disability.” The excluded conditions are: transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments, other sexual behavior disorders, compulsive gambling, kleptomania, pyromania, and psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from current illegal use of drugs. Unlike homosexuality and bisexuality, which are not considered impairments under either the Americans with Disabilities Act (see the definition of “disability,” paragraph (1)(iv)) or section 504, the conditions listed in paragraph (5), except for transvestism, are not necessarily excluded as impairments under section 504. (Transvestism was excluded from the definition of disability for section 504 by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100 – 430, Sec.6(b).) The phrase “current illegal use of drugs” used in this definition is explained in the preamble to Sec.36.209.

“Drug.” The definition of the term “drug” is taken from section 510(d)(2) of the ADA.

“Facility.” “Facility” means all or any portion of buildings, structures, sites, complexes, equipment, rolling stock or other conveyances, roads, walks, passageways, parking lots, or other real or personal property, including the site where the building, property, structure, or equipment is located. Committee reports made clear that the definition of facility was drawn from the definition of facility in current Federal regulations (see, e.g., Education and Labor report at 114). It includes both indoor and outdoor areas where human-constructed improvements, structures, equipment, or property have been added to the natural environment.

The term “rolling stock or other conveyances” was not included in the definition of facility in the proposed rule. However, commenters raised questions about the applicability of this part to places of public accommodation operated in mobile facilities (such as cruise ships, floating restaurants, or mobile health units). Those places of public accommodation are covered under this part, and would be included in the definition of “facility.” Thus the requirements of subparts B and C would apply to those places of public accommodation. For example, a covered entity could not discriminate on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the facilities (Sec.36.201). Similarly, a cruise line could not apply eligibility criteria to potential passengers in a manner that would screen out individuals with disabilities, unless the criteria are “necessary,” as provided in Sec.36.301.

However, standards for new construction and alterations of such facilities are not yet included in the Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities (ADAAG) adopted by Sec.36.406 and incorporated in appendix A. The Department therefore will not interpret the new construction and alterations provisions of subpart D to apply to the types of facilities discussed here, pending further development of specific requirements.

Requirements pertaining to accessible transportation services provided by public accommodations are included in Sec.36.310 of this part; standards pertaining to accessible vehicles will be issued by the Secretary of Transportation pursuant to section 306 of the Act, and will be codified at 49 CFR part 37.

A public accommodation has obligations under this rule with respect to a cruise ship to the extent that its operations are subject to the laws of the United States.

The definition of “facility” only includes the site over which the private entity may exercise control or on which a place of public accommodation or a commercial facility is located. It does not include, for example, adjacent roads or walks controlled by a public entity that is not subject to this part. Public entities are subject to the requirements of title II of the Act. The Department’s regulation implementing title II, which will be codified at 28 CFR part 35, addresses the obligations of public entities to ensure accessibility by providing curb ramps at pedestrian walkways.

“Illegal use of drugs.” The definition of “illegal use of drugs” is taken from section 510(d)(1) of the Act and clarifies that the term includes the illegal use of one or more drugs.

“Individual with a disability” means a person who has a disability but does not include an individual who is currently illegally using drugs, when the public accommodation acts on the basis of such use. The phrase “current illegal use of drugs” is explained in the preamble to Sec.36.209.

“Place of public accommodation.” The term “place of public accommodation” is an adaptation of the statutory definition of “public accommodation” in section 301(7) of the ADA and appears as an element of the regulatory definition of public accommodation. The final rule defines “place of public accommodation” as a facility, operated by a private entity, whose operations affect commerce and fall within at least one of 12 specified categories. The term “public accommodation,” on the other hand, is reserved by the final rule for the private entity that owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. It is the public accommodation, and not the place of public accommodation, that is subject to the regulation’s nondiscrimination requirements. Placing the obligation not to discriminate on the public accommodation, as defined in the rule, is consistent with section 302(a) of the ADA, which places the obligation not to discriminate on any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.

Facilities operated by government agencies or other public entities as defined in this section do not qualify as places of public accommodation. The actions of public entities are governed by title II of the ADA and will be subject to regulations issued by the Department of Justice under that title. The receipt of government assistance by a private entity does not by itself preclude a facility from being considered as a place of public accommodation.

The definition of place of public accommodation incorporates the 12 categories of facilities represented in the statutory definition of public accommodation in section 301(7) of the ADA:

1. Places of lodging.
2. Establishments serving food or drink.
3. Places of exhibition or entertainment.
4. Places of public gathering.
5. Sales or rental establishments.
6. Service establishments.
7. Stations used for specified public transportation.
8. Places of public display or collection.
9. Places of recreation.
10. Places of education.
11. Social service center establishments.
12. Places of exercise or recreation.

In order to be a place of public accommodation, a facility must be operated by a private entity, its operations must affect commerce, and it must fall within one of these 12 categories. While the list of categories is exhaustive, the representative examples of facilities within each category are not. Within each category only a few examples are given. The category of social service center establishments would include not only the types of establishments listed, day care centers, senior citizen centers, homeless shelters, food banks, adoption agencies, but also establishments such as substance abuse treatment centers, rape crisis centers, and halfway houses. As another example, the category of sales or rental establishments would include an innumerable array of facilities that would sweep far beyond the few examples given in the regulation. For example, other retail or wholesale establishments selling or renting items, such as bookstores, videotape rental stores, car rental establishment, pet stores, and jewelry stores would also be covered under this category, even though they are not specifically listed.

Several commenters requested clarification as to the coverage of wholesale establishments under the category of “sales or rental establishments.” The Department intends for wholesale establishments to be covered under this category as places of public accommodation except in cases where they sell exclusively to other businesses and not to individuals. For example, a company that grows food produce and supplies its crops exclusively to food processing corporations on a wholesale basis does not become a public accommodation because of these transactions. If this company operates a road side stand where its crops are sold to the public, the road side stand would be a sales establishment covered by the ADA. Conversely, a sales establishment that markets its goods as “wholesale to the public” and sells to individuals would not be exempt from ADA coverage despite its use of the word “wholesale” as a marketing technique.

Of course, a company that operates a place of public accommodation is subject to this part only in the operation of that place of public accommodation. In the example given above, the wholesale produce company that operates a road side stand would be a public accommodation only for the purposes of the operation of that stand. The company would be prohibited from discriminating on the basis of disability in the operation of the road side stand, and it would be required to remove barriers to physical access to the extent that it is readily achievable to do so (see Sec.36.304); however, in the event that it is not readily achievable to remove barriers, for example, by replacing a gravel surface or regrading the area around the stand to permit access by persons with mobility impairments, the company could meet its obligations through alternative methods of making its goods available, such as delivering produce to a customer in his or her car (see Sec.36.305). The concepts of readily achievable barrier removal and alternatives to barrier removal are discussed further in the preamble discussion of Sec. 36.304 and 36.305.

Even if a facility does not fall within one of the 12 categories, and therefore does not qualify as a place of public accommodation, it still may be a commercial facility as defined in Sec.36.104 and be subject to the new construction and alterations requirements of subpart D.

A number of commenters questioned the treatment of residential hotels and other residential facilities in the Department’s proposed rule. These commenters were essentially seeking resolution of the relationship between the Fair Housing Act and the ADA concerning facilities that are both residential in nature and engage in activities that would cause them to be classified as “places of public accommodation” under the ADA. The ADA’s express exemption relating to the Fair Housing Act applies only to “commercial facilities” and not to “places of public accommodation.”

A facility whose operations affect interstate commerce is a place of public accommodation for purposes of the ADA to the extent that its operations include those types of activities engaged in or services provided by the facilities contained on the list of 12 categories in section 301(7) of the ADA. Thus, a facility that provides social services would be considered a “social service center establishment.” Similarly, the category “places of lodging” would exclude solely residential facilities because the nature of a place of lodging contemplates the use of the facility for short-term stays.

Many facilities, however, are mixed use facilities. For example, in a large hotel that has a separate residential apartment wing, the residential wing would not be covered by the ADA because of the nature of the occupancy of that part of the facility. This residential wing would, however, be covered by the Fair Housing Act. The separate nonresidential accommodations in the rest of the hotel would be a place of lodging, and thus a public accommodation subject to the requirements of this final rule. If a hotel allows both residential and short-term stays, but does not allocate space for these different uses in separate, discrete units, both the ADA and the Fair Housing Act may apply to the facility. Such determinations will need to be made on a case-by-case basis. Any place of lodging of the type described in paragraph (1) of the definition of place of public accommodation and that is an establishment located within a building that contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and is actually occupied by the proprietor of the establishment as his or her residence is not covered by the ADA. (This exclusion from coverage does not apply to other categories of public accommodations, for example, professional offices or homeless shelters, that are located in a building that is also occupied as a private residence.)

A number of commenters noted that the term “residential hotel” may also apply to a type of hotel commonly known as a “single room occupancy hotel.” Although such hotels or portions of such hotels may fall under the Fair Housing Act when operated or used as long-term residences, they are also considered “places of lodging” under the ADA when guests of such hotels are free to use them on a short-term basis. In addition, “single room occupancy hotels” may provide social services to their guests, often through the operation of Federal or State grant programs. In such a situation, the facility would be considered a “social service center establishment” and thus covered by the ADA as a place of public accommodation, regardless of the length of stay of the occupants.

A similar analysis would also be applied to other residential facilities that provide social services, including homeless shelters, shelters for people seeking refuge from domestic violence, nursing homes, residential care facilities, and other facilities where persons may reside for varying lengths of time. Such facilities should be analyzed under the Fair Housing Act to determine the application of that statute. The ADA, however, requires a separate and independent analysis. For example, if the facility, or a portion of the facility, is intended for or permits short-term stays, or if it can appropriately be categorized as a service establishment or as a social service establishment, then the facility or that portion of the facility used for the covered purpose is a place of public accommodation under the ADA. For example, a homeless shelter that is intended and used only for long-term residential stays and that does not provide social services to its residents would not be covered as a place of public accommodation. However, if this facility permitted short-term stays or provided social services to its residents, it would be covered under the ADA either as a “place of lodging” or as a “social service center establishment,” or as both.

A private home, by itself, does not fall within any of the 12 categories. However, it can be covered as a place of public accommodation to the extent that it is used as a facility that would fall within one of the 12 categories. For example, if a professional office of a dentist, doctor, or psychologist is located in a private home, the portion of the home dedicated to office use (including areas used both for the residence and the office, e.g., the entrance to the home that is also used as the entrance to the professional office) would be considered a place of public accommodation. Places of public accommodation located in residential facilities are specifically addressed in Sec.36.207.

If a tour of a commercial facility that is not otherwise a place of public accommodation, such as, for example, a factory or a movie studio production set, is open to the general public, the route followed by the tour is a place of public accommodation and the tour must be operated in accordance with the rule’s requirements for public accommodations. The place of public accommodation defined by the tour does not include those portions of the commercial facility that are merely viewed from the tour route. Hence, the barrier removal requirements of Sec.36.304 only apply to the physical route followed by the tour participants and not to work stations or other areas that are merely adjacent to, or within view of, the tour route. If the tour is not open to the general public, but rather is conducted, for example, for selected business colleagues, partners, customers, or consultants, the tour route is not a place of public accommodation and the tour is not subject to the requirements for public accommodations.

Public accommodations that receive Federal financial assistance are subject to the requirements of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act as well as the requirements of the ADA.

Private schools, including elementary and secondary schools, are covered by the rule as places of public accommodation. The rule itself, however, does not require a private school to provide a free appropriate education or develop an individualized education program in accordance with regulations of the Department of Education implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended (34 CFR part 104), and regulations implementing the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (34 CFR part 300). The receipt of Federal assistance by a private school, however, would trigger application of the Department of Education’s regulations to the extent mandated by the particular type of assistance received.

“Private club.” The term “private club” is defined in accordance with section 307 of the ADA as a private club or establishment exempted from coverage under title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title II of the 1964 Act exempts any “private club or other establishment not in fact open to the public, except to the extent that the facilities of such establishment are made available to the customers or patrons of [a place of public accommodation as defined in title II].” The rule, therefore, as reflected in Sec.36.102(e) of the application section, limits the coverage of private clubs accordingly. The obligations of a private club that rents space to any other private entity for the operation of a place of public accommodation are discussed further in connection with Sec.36.201.

In determining whether a private entity qualifies as a private club under title II, courts have considered such factors as the degree of member control of club operations, the selectivity of the membership selection process, whether substantial membership fees are charged, whether the entity is operated on a nonprofit basis, the extent to which the facilities are open to the public, the degree of public funding, and whether the club was created specifically to avoid compliance with the Civil Rights Act. See e.g., Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass’n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969); Olzman v. Lake Hills Swim Club, Inc., 495 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1974); Anderson v. Pass Christian Isles Golf Club, Inc., 488 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1974); Smith v. YMCA, 462 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1972); Stout v. YMCA, 404 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Richberg, 398 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1968); Nesmith v. YMCA, 397 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Durham v. Red Lake Fishing and Hunting Club, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 954 (W.D. Tex. 1987); New York v. Ocean Club, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 489 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Brown v. Loudoun Golf and Country Club, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 399 (E.D. Va. 1983); United States v. Trustees of Fraternal Order of Eagles, 472 F. Supp. 1174 (E.D. Wis. 1979); Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182 (D. Conn. 1974).

“Private entity.” The term “private entity” is defined as any individual or entity other than a public entity. It is used as part of the definition of “public accommodation” in this section.

The definition adds “individual” to the statutory definition of private entity (see section 301(6) of the ADA). This addition clarifies that an individual may be a private entity and, therefore, may be considered a public accommodation if he or she owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. The explicit inclusion of individuals under the definition of private entity is consistent with section 302(a) of the ADA, which broadly prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.

“Public accommodation.” The term “public accommodation” means a private entity that owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. The regulatory term, “public accommodation,” corresponds to the statutory term, “person,” in section 302(a) of the ADA. The ADA prohibits discrimination “by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” The text of the regulation consequently places the ADA’s nondiscrimination obligations on “public accommodations” rather than on “persons” or on “places of public accommodation.”

As stated in Sec.36.102(b)(2), the requirements of subparts B and C obligate a public accommodation only with respect to the operations of a place of public accommodation. A public accommodation must also meet the requirements of subpart D with respect to facilities used as, or designed or constructed for use as, places of public accommodation or commercial facilities.

“Public entity.” The term “public entity” is defined in accordance with section 201(1) of the ADA as any State or local government; any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government; and the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority (as defined in section 103(8) of the Rail Passenger Service Act). It is used in the definition of “private entity” in Sec.36.104. Public entities are excluded from the definition of private entity and therefore cannot qualify as public accommodations under this regulation. However, the actions of public entities are covered by title II of the ADA and by the Department’s title II regulations codified at 28 CFR part 35.

“Qualified interpreter.” The Department received substantial comment regarding the lack of a definition of “qualified interpreter.” The proposed rule defined auxiliary aids and services to include the statutory term, “qualified interpreters” (Sec.36.303(b)), but did not define that term. Section 36.303 requires the use of a qualified interpreter where necessary to achieve effective communication, unless an undue burden or fundamental alteration would result. Commenters stated that a lack of guidance on what the term means would create confusion among those trying to secure interpreting services and often result in less than effective communication.

Many commenters were concerned that, without clear guidance on the issue of “qualified” interpreter, the rule would be interpreted to mean “available, rather than qualified” interpreters. Some claimed that few public accommodations would understand the difference between a qualified interpreter and a person who simply knows a few signs or how to fingerspell.

In order to clarify what is meant by “qualified interpreter” the Department has added a definition of the term to the final rule. A qualified interpreter means an interpreter who is able to interpret effectively, accurately, and impartially both receptively and expressively, using any necessary specialized vocabulary. This definition focuses on the actual ability of the interpreter in a particular interpreting context to facilitate effective communication between the public accommodation and the individual with disabilities.

Public comment also revealed that public accommodations have at times asked persons who are deaf to provide family members or friends to interpret. In certain circumstances, notwithstanding that the family member or friend is able to interpret or is a certified interpreter, the family member or friend may not be qualified to render the necessary interpretation because of factors such as emotional or personal involvement or considerations of confidentiality that may adversely affect the ability to interpret “effectively, accurately, and impartially.”

“Readily achievable.” The definition of “readily achievable” follows the statutory definition of that term in section 301(9) of the ADA. Readily achievable means easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense. The term is used as a limitation on the obligation to remove barriers under Sec. 36.304(a), 36.305(a), 36.308(a), and 36.310(b). Further discussion of the meaning and application of the term “readily achievable” may be found in the preamble section for Sec.36.304.

The definition lists factors to be considered in determining whether barrier removal is readily achievable in any particular circumstance. A significant number of commenters objected to Sec.36.306 of the proposed rule, which listed identical factors to be considered for determining “readily achievable” and “undue burden” together in one section. They asserted that providing a consolidated section blurred the distinction between the level of effort required by a public accommodation under the two standards. The readily achievable standard is a “lower” standard than the “undue burden” standard in terms of the level of effort required, but the factors used in determining whether an action is readily achievable or would result in an undue burden are identical (See Education and Labor report at 109). Although the preamble to the proposed rule clearly delineated the relationship between the two standards, to eliminate any confusion the Department has deleted Sec.36.306 of the proposed rule. That section, in any event, as other commenters noted, had merely repeated the lists of factors contained in the definitions of readily achievable and undue burden.

The list of factors included in the definition is derived from section 301(9) of the ADA. It reflects the congressional intention that a wide range of factors be considered in determining whether an action is readily achievable. It also takes into account that many local facilities are owned or operated by parent corporations or entities that conduct operations at many different sites. This section makes clear that, in some instances, resources beyond those of the local facility where the barrier must be removed may be relevant in determining whether an action is readily achievable. One must also evaluate the degree to which any parent entity has resources that may be allocated to the local facility.

The statutory list of factors in section 301(9) of the Act uses the term “covered entity” to refer to the larger entity of which a particular facility may be a part. “Covered entity” is not a defined term in the ADA and is not used consistently throughout the Act. The definition, therefore, substitutes the term “parent entity” in place of “covered entity” in paragraphs (3), (4), and (5) when referring to the larger private entity whose overall resources may be taken into account. This usage is consistent with the House Judiciary Committee’s use of the term “parent company” to describe the larger entity of which the local facility is a part (H.R. Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 40 – 41, 54 – 55 (1990) (hereinafter “Judiciary report”)).

A number of commenters asked for more specific guidance as to when and how the resources of a parent corporation or entity are to be taken into account in determining what is readily achievable. The Department believes that this complex issue is most appropriately resolved on a case-by-case basis. As the comments reflect, there is a wide variety of possible relationships between the site in question and any parent corporation or other entity. It would be unwise to posit legal ramifications under the ADA of even generic relationships (e.g., banks involved in foreclosures or insurance companies operating as trustees or in other similar fiduciary relationships), because any analysis will depend so completely on the detailed fact situations and the exact nature of the legal relationships involved. The final rule does, however, reorder the factors to be considered. This shift and the addition of the phrase “if applicable” make clear that the line of inquiry concerning factors will start at the site involved in the action itself. This change emphasizes that the overall resources, size, and operations of the parent corporation or entity should be considered to the extent appropriate in light of “the geographic separateness, and the administrative or fiscal relationship of the site or sites in question to any parent corporation or entity.”

Although some commenters sought more specific numerical guidance on the definition of readily achievable, the Department has declined to establish in the final rule any kind of numerical formula for determining whether an action is readily achievable. It would be difficult to devise a specific ceiling on compliance costs that would take into account the vast diversity of enterprises covered by the ADA’s public accommodations requirements and the economic situation that any particular entity would find itself in at any moment. The final rule, therefore, implements the flexible case-by-case approach chosen by Congress.

A number of commenters requested that security considerations be explicitly recognized as a factor in determining whether a barrier removal action is readily achievable. The Department believes that legitimate safety requirements, including crime prevention measures, may be taken into account so long as they are based on actual risks and are necessary for safe operation of the public accommodation. This point has been included in the definition.

Some commenters urged the Department not to consider acts of barrier removal in complete isolation from each other in determining whether they are readily achievable. The Department believes that it is appropriate to consider the cost of other barrier removal actions as one factor in determining whether a measure is readily achievable.

“Religious entity.” The term “religious entity” is defined in accordance with section 307 of the ADA as a religious organization or entity controlled by a religious organization, including a place of worship. Section 36.102(e) of the rule states that the rule does not apply to any religious entity.

The ADA’s exemption of religious organizations and religious entities controlled by religious organizations is very broad, encompassing a wide variety of situations. Religious organizations and entities controlled by religious organizations have no obligations under the ADA. Even when a religious organization carries out activities that would othervise make it a public accommodation, the religious organization is exempt from ADA coverage. Thus, if a church itself operates a day care center, a nursing home, a private school, or a diocesan school system, the operations of the center, home, school, or schools would not be subject to the requirements of the ADA or this part. The religious entity would not lose its exemption merely because the services provided were open to the general public. The test is whether the church or other religious organization operates the public accommodation, not which individuals receive the public accommodation’s services.

Religious entities that are controlled by religious organizations are also exempt from the ADA’s requirements. Many religious organizations in the United States use lay boards and other secular or corporate mechanisms to operate schools and an array of social services. The use of a lay board or other mechanism does not itself remove the ADA’s religious exemption. Thus, a parochial school, having religious doctrine in its curriculum and sponsored by a religious order, could be exempt either as a religious organization or as an entity controlled by a religious organization, even if it has a lay board. The test remains a factual one – whether the church or other religious organization controls the operations of the school or of the service or whether the school or service is itself a religious organization.

Although a religious organization or a religious entity that is controlled by a religious organization has no obligations under the rule, a public accommodation that is not itself a religious organization, but that operates a place of public accommodation in leased space on the property of a religious entity, which is not a place of worship, is subject to the rule’s requirements if it is not under control of a religious organization. When a church rents meeting space, which is not a place of worship, to a local community group or to a private, independent day care center, the ADA applies to the activities of the local community group and day care center if a lease exists and consideration is paid.

“Service animal.” The term “service animal” encompasses any guide dog, signal dog, or other animal individually trained to provide assistance to an individual with a disability. The term is used in Sec.36.302(c), which requires public accommodations generally to modify policies, practices, and procedures to accommodate the use of service animals in places of public accommodation.

“Specified public transportation.” The definition of “specified public transportation” is identical to the statutory definition in section 301(10) of the ADA. The term means transportation by bus, rail, or any other conveyance (other than by aircraft) that provides the general public with general or special service (including charter service) on a regular and continuing basis. It is used in category (7) of the definition of “place of public accommodation,” which includes stations used for specified public transportation.

The effect of this definition, which excludes transportation by aircraft, is that it excludes privately operated airports from coverage as places of public accommodation. However, places of public accommodation located within airports would be covered by this part. Airports that are operated by public entities are covered by title II of the ADA and, if they are operated as part of a program receiving Federal financial assistance, by section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Privately operated airports are similarly covered by section 504 if they are operated as part of a program receiving Federal financial assistance. The operations of any portion of any airport that are under the control of an air carrier are covered by the Air Carrier Access Act. In addition, airports are covered as commercial facilities under this rule.

“State.” The definition of “State” is identical to the statutory definition in section 3(3) of the ADA. The term is used in the definitions of “commerce” and “public entity” in Sec.36.104.

“Undue burden.” The definition of “undue burden” is analogous to the statutory definition of “undue hardship” in employment under section 101(10) of the ADA. The term undue burden means “significant difficulty or expense” and serves as a limitation on the obligation to provide auxiliary aids and services under Sec.36.303 and Sec. 36.309 (b)(3) and (c)(3). Further discussion of the meaning and application of the term undue burden may be found in the preamble discussion of Sec.36.303.

The definition lists factors considered in determining whether provision of an auxiliary aid or service in any particular circumstance would result in an undue burden. The factors to be considered in determining whether an action would result in an undue burden are identical to those to be considered in determining whether an action is readily achievable. However, “readily achievable” is a lower standard than “undue burden” in that it requires a lower level of effort on the part of the public accommodation (see Education and Labor report at 109).

Further analysis of the factors to be considered in determining undue burden may be found in the preamble discussion of the definition of the term “readily achievable.”

Subpart B – General Requirements

Subpart B includes general prohibitions restricting a public accommodation from discriminating against people with disabilities by denying them the opportunity to benefit from goods or services, by giving them unequal goods or services, or by giving them different or separate goods or services. These general prohibitions are patterned after the basic, general prohibitions that exist in other civil rights laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, sex, color, religion, or national origin.

Section 36.201 General

Section 36.201(a) contains the general rule that prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation.

Full and equal enjoyment means the right to participate and to have an equal opportunity to obtain the same results as others to the extent possible with such accommodations as may be required by the Act and these regulations. It does not mean that an individual with a disability must achieve an identical result or level of achievement as persons without a disability. For example, an exercise class cannot exclude a person who uses a wheelchair because he or she cannot do all of the exercises and derive the same result from the class as persons without a disability.

Section 302(a) of the ADA states that the prohibition against discrimination applies to “any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation,” and this language is reflected in Sec.36.201(a). The coverage is quite extensive and would include sublessees, management companies, and any other entity that owns, leases, leases to, or operates a place of public accommodation, even if the operation is only for a short time.

The first sentence of paragraph (b) of Sec.36.201 reiterates the general principle that both the landlord that owns the building that houses the place of public accommodation, as well as the tenant that owns or operates the place of public accommodation, are public accommodations subject to the requirements of this part. Although the statutory language could be interpreted as placing equal responsibility on all private entities, whether lessor, lessee, or operator of a public accommodation, the committee reports suggest that liability may be allocated. Section 36.201(b) of that section of the proposed rule attempted to allocate liability in the regulation itself. Paragraph (b)(2) of that section made a specific allocation of liability for the obligation to take readily achievable measures to remove barriers, and paragraph (b)(3) made a specific allocation for the obligation to provide auxiliary aids.

Numerous commenters pointed out that these allocations would not apply in all situations. Some asserted that paragraph (b)(2) of the proposed rule only addressed the situation when a lease gave the tenant the right to make alterations with permission of the landlord, but failed to address other types of leases, e.g., those that are silent on the right to make alterations, or those in which the landlord is not permitted to enter a tenant’s premises to make alterations. Several commenters noted that many leases contain other clauses more relevant to the ADA than the alterations clause. For example, many leases contain a “compliance clause,” a clause which allocates responsibility to a particular party for compliance with all relevant Federal, State, and local laws. Many commenters pointed out various types of relationships that were left unaddressed by the regulation, e.g., sale and leaseback arrangements where the landlord is a financial institution with no control or responsibility for the building; franchises; subleases; and management companies which, at least in the hotel industry, often have control over operations but are unable to make modifications to the premises.

Some commenters raised specific questions as to how the barrier removal allocation would work as a practical matter. Paragraph (b)(2) of the proposed rule provided that the burden of making readily achievable modifications within the tenant’s place of public accommodation would shift to the landlord when the modifications were not readily achievable for the tenant or when the landlord denied a tenant’s request for permission to make such modifications. Commenters noted that the rule did not specify exactly when the burden would actually shift from tenant to landlord and whether the landlord would have to accept a tenant’s word that a particular action is not readily achievable. Others questioned if the tenant should be obligated to use alternative methods of barrier removal before the burden shifts. In light of the fact that readily achievable removal of barriers can include such actions as moving of racks and displays, some commenters doubted the appropriateness of requiring a landlord to become involved in day-to-day operations of its tenants” businesses.

The Department received widely differing comments in response to the preamble question asking whether landlord and tenant obligations should vary depending on the length of time remaining on an existing lease. Many suggested that tenants should have no responsibilities in “shorter leases,” which commenters defined as ranging anywhere from 90 days to three years. Other commenters pointed out that the time remaining on the lease should not be a factor in the rule’s allocation of responsibilities, but is relevant in determining what is readily achievable for the tenant. The Department agrees with this latter approach and will interpret the rule in that manner.

In recognition of the somewhat limited applicability of the allocation scheme contained in the proposed rule, paragraphs (b)(2) and (b)(3) have been deleted from the final rule. The Department has substituted instead a statement that allocation of responsibility as between the parties for taking readily achievable measures to remove barriers and to provide auxiliary aids and services both in common areas and within places of public accommodation may be determined by the lease or other contractual relationships between the parties. The ADA was not intended to change existing landlord/tenant responsibilities as set forth in the lease. By deleting specific provisions from the rule, the Department gives full recognition to this principle. As between the landlord and tenant, the extent of responsibility for particular obligations may be, and in many cases probably will be, determined by contract.

The suggested allocation of responsibilities contained in the proposed rule may be used if appropriate in a particular situation. Thus, the landlord would generally be held responsible for making readily achievable changes and providing auxiliary aids and services in common areas and for modifying policies, practices, or procedures applicable to all tenants, and the tenant would generally be responsible for readily achievable changes, provision of auxiliary aids, and modification of policies within its own place of public accommodation.

Many commenters objected to the proposed rule’s allocation of responsibility for providing auxiliary aids and services solely to the tenant, pointing out that this exclusive allocation may not be appropriate in the case of larger public accommodations that operate their businesses by renting space out to smaller public accommodations. For example, large theaters often rent to smaller traveling companies and hospitals often rely on independent contractors to provide childbirth classes. Groups representing persons with disabilities objected to the proposed rule because, in their view, it permitted the large theater or hospital to evade ADA responsibilities by leasing to independent smaller entities. They suggested that these types of public accommodations are not really landlords because they are in the business of providing a service, rather than renting space, as in the case of a shopping center or office building landlord. These commenters believed that responsibility for providing auxiliary aids should shift to the landlord, if the landlord relies on a smaller public accommodation or independent contractor to provide services closely related to those of the larger public accommodation, and if the needed auxiliary aids prove to be an undue burden for the smaller public accommodation. The final rule no longer lists specific allocations to specific parties but, rather, leaves allocation of responsibilities to the lease negotiations. Parties are, therefore, free to allocate the responsibility for auxiliary aids.

Section 36.201(b)(4) of the proposed rule, which provided that alterations by a tenant on its own premises do not trigger a path of travel obligation on the landlord, has been moved to Sec.36.403(d) of the final rule.

An entity that is not in and of itself a public accommodation, such as a trade association or performing artist, may become a public accommodation when it leases space for a conference or performance at a hotel, convention center, or stadium. For an entity to become a public accommodation when it is the lessee of space, however, the Department believes that consideration in some form must be given. Thus, a Boy Scout troop that accepts donated space does not become a public accommodation because the troop has not “leased” space, as required by the ADA.

As a public accommodation, the trade association or performing artist will be responsible for compliance with this part. Specific responsibilities should be allocated by contract, but, generally, the lessee should be responsible for providing auxiliary aids and services (which could include interpreters, Braille programs, etc.) for the participants in its conference or performance as well as for assuring that displays are accessible to individuals with disabilities.

Some commenters suggested that the rule should allocate responsibilities for areas other than removal of barriers and auxiliary aids. The final rule leaves allocation of all areas to the lease negotiations. However, in general landlords should not be given responsibility for policies a tenant applies in operating its business, if such policies are solely those of the tenant. Thus, if a restaurant tenant discriminates by refusing to seat a patron, it would be the tenant, and not the landlord, who would be responsible, because the discriminatory policy is imposed solely by the tenant and not by the landlord. If, however, a tenant refuses to modify a “no pets” rule to allow service animals in its restaurant because the landlord mandates such a rule, then both the landlord and the tenant would be liable for violation of the ADA when a person with a service dog is refused entrance. The Department wishes to emphasize, however, that the parties are free to allocate responsibilities in any way they choose.

Private clubs are also exempt from the ADA. However, consistent with title II of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. 2000a(e), a private club is considered a public accommodation to the extent that “the facilities of such establishment are made available to the customers or patrons” of a place of public accommodation. Thus, if a private club runs a day care center that is open exclusively to its own members, the club, like the church in the example above, would have no responsibility for compliance with the ADA. Nor would the day care center have any responsibilities because it is part of the private club exempt from the ADA.

On the other hand, if the private club rents to a day care center that is open to the public, then the private club would have the same obligations as any other public accommodation that functions as a landlord with respect to compliance with title III within the day care center. In such a situation, both the private club that “leases to” a public accommodation and the public accommodation lessee (the day care center) would be subject to the ADA. This same principle would apply if the private club were to rent to, for example, a bar association, which is not generally a public accommodation but which, as explained above, becomes a public accommodation when it leases space for a conference.

Section 36.202 Activities

Section 36.202 sets out the general forms of discrimination prohibited by title III of the ADA. These general prohibitions are further refined by the specific prohibitions in subpart C. Section 36.213 makes clear that the limitations on the ADA’s requirements contained in subpart C, such as “necessity” (Sec.36.301(a)) and “safety” (Sec.36.301(b)), are applicable to the prohibitions in Sec.36.202. Thus, it is unnecessary to add these limitations to Sec.36.202 as has been requested by some commenters. In addition, the language of Sec.36.202 very closely tracks the language of section 302(b)(1)(A) of the Act, and that statutory provision does not expressly contain these limitations.

Deny participation – Section 36.202(a) provides that it is discriminatory to deny a person with a disability the right to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a place of public accommodation.

A public accommodation may not exclude persons with disabilities on the basis of disability for reasons other than those specifically set forth in this part. For example, a public accommodation cannot refuse to serve a person with a disability because its insurance company conditions coverage or rates on the absence of persons with disabilities. This is a frequent basis of exclusion from a variety of community activities and is prohibited by this part.

Unequal benefit – Section 36.202(b) prohibits services or accommodations that are not equal to those provided others. For example, persons with disabilities must not be limited to certain performances at a theater.

Separate benefit – Section 36.202(c) permits different or separate benefits or services only when necessary to provide persons with disabilities opportunities as effective as those provided others. This paragraph permitting separate benefits “when necessary” should be read together with Sec.36.203(a), which requires integration in “the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of the individual.” The preamble to that section provides further guidance on separate programs. Thus, this section would not prohibit the designation of parking spaces for persons with disabilities.

Each of the three paragraphs (a) – (c) prohibits discrimination against an individual or class of individuals “either directly or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements.” The intent of the contractual prohibitions of these paragraphs is to prohibit a public accommodation from doing indirectly, through a contractual relationship, what it may not do directly. Thus, the “individual or class of individuals” referenced in the three paragraphs is intended to refer to the clients and customers of the public accommodation that entered into a contractual arrangement. It is not intended to encompass the clients or customers of other entities. A public accommodation, therefore, is not liable under this provision for discrimination that may be practiced by those with whom it has a contractual relationship, when that discrimination is not directed against its own clients or customers. For example, if an amusement park contracts with a food service company to operate its restaurants at the park, the amusement park is not responsible for other operations of the food service company that do not involve clients or customers of the amusement park. Section 36.202(d) makes this clear by providing that the term “individual or class of individuals” refers to the clients or customers of the public accommodation that enters into the contractual, licensing, or other arrangement.

Section 36.203 Integrated Settings

Section 36.203 addresses the integration of persons with disabilities. The ADA recognizes that the provision of goods and services in an integrated manner is a fundamental tenet of nondiscrimination on the basis of disability. Providing segregated accommodations and services relegates persons with disabilities to the status of second-class citizens. For example, it would be a violation of this provision to require persons with mental disabilities to eat in the back room of a restaurant or to refuse to allow a person with a disability the full use of a health spa because of stereotypes about the person’s ability to participate. Section 36.203(a) states that a public accommodation shall afford goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations to an individual with a disability in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of the individual. Section 36.203(b) specifies that, notwithstanding the existence of separate or different programs or activities provided in accordance with this section, an individual with a disability shall not be denied the opportunity to participate in such programs or activities that are not separate or different. Section 306.203(c), which is derived from section 501(d) of the Americans with Disabilities Act, states that nothing in this part shall be construed to require an individual with a disability to accept an accommodation, aid, service, opportunity, or benefit that he or she chooses not to accept.

Taken together, these provisions are intended to prohibit exclusion and segregation of individuals with disabilities and the denial of equal opportunities enjoyed by others, based on, among other things, presumptions, patronizing attitudes, fears, and stereotypes about individuals with disabilities. Consistent with these standards, public accommodations are required to make decisions based on facts applicable to individuals and not on the basis of presumptions as to what a class of individuals with disabilities can or cannot do.

Sections 36.203 (b) and (c) make clear that individuals with disabilities cannot be denied the opportunity to participate in programs that are not separate or different. This is an important and overarching principle of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Separate, special, or different programs that are designed to provide a benefit to persons with disabilities cannot be used to restrict the participation of persons with disabilities in general, integrated activities.

For example, a person who is blind may wish to decline participating in a special museum tour that allows persons to touch sculptures in an exhibit and instead tour the exhibit at his or her own pace with the museum’s recorded tour. It is not the intent of this section to require the person who is blind to avail himself or herself of the special tour. Modified participation for persons with disabilities must be a choice, not a requirement.

Further, it would not be a violation of this section for an establishment to offer recreational programs specially designed for children with mobility impairments in those limited circumstances. However, it would be a violation of this section if the entity then excluded these children from other recreational services made available to nondisabled children, or required children with disabilities to attend only designated programs.

Many commenters asked that the Department clarify a public accommodation’s obligations within the integrated program when it offers a separate program, but an individual with a disability chooses not to participate in the separate program. It is impossible to make a blanket statement as to what level of auxiliary aids or modifications are required in the integrated program. Rather, each situation must be assessed individually. Assuming the integrated program would be appropriate for a particular individual, the extent to which that individual must be provided with modifications will depend not only on what the individual needs but also on the limitations set forth in subpart C. For example, it may constitute an undue burden for a particular public accommodation, which provides a full-time interpreter in its special guided tour for individuals with hearing impairments, to hire an additional interpreter for those individuals who choose to attend the integrated program. The Department cannot identify categorically the level of assistance or aid required in the integrated program.

The preamble to the proposed rule contained a statement that some interpreted as encouraging the continuation of separate schools, sheltered workshops, special recreational programs, and other similar programs. It is important to emphasize that Sec.36.202(c) only calls for separate programs when such programs are “necessary” to provide as effective an opportunity to individuals with disabilities as to other individuals. Likewise, Sec.36.203(a) only permits separate programs when a more integrated setting would not be “appropriate.” Separate programs are permitted, then, in only limited circumstances. The sentence at issue has been deleted from the preamble because it was too broadly stated and had been erroneously interpreted as Departmental encouragement of separate programs without qualification.

The proposed rule’s reference in Sec.36.203(b) to separate programs or activities provided in accordance with “this section” has been changed to “this subpart” in recognition of the fact that separate programs or activities may, in some limited circumstances, be permitted not only by Sec.36.203(a) but also by Sec.36.202(c).

In addition, some commenters suggested that the individual with the disability is the only one who can decide whether a setting is “appropriate” and what the “needs” are. Others suggested that only the public accommodation can make these determinations. The regulation does not give exclusive responsibility to either party. Rather, the determinations are to be made based on an objective view, presumably one which would take into account views of both parties.

Some commenters expressed concern that Sec.36.203(c), which states that nothing in the rule requires an individual with a disability to accept special accommodations and services provided under the ADA, could be interpreted to allow guardians of infants or older people with disabilities to refuse medical treatment for their wards. Section 36.203(c) has been revised to make it clear that paragraph (c) is inapplicable to the concern of the commenters. A new paragraph (c)(2) has been added stating that nothing in the regulation authorizes the representative or guardian of an individual with a disability to decline food, water, medical treatment, or medical services for that individual. New paragraph (c) clarifies that neither the ADA nor the regulation alters current Federal law ensuring the rights of incompetent individuals with disabilities to receive food, water, and medical treatment. See , e.g., Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 5106a(b)(10), 5106g(10)); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended (29 U.S.C 794); Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act (42 U.S.C. 6042).

Sections 36.203(c) (1) and (2) are based on section 501(d) of the ADA. Section Sec.501(d) was designed to clarify that nothing in the ADA requires individuals with disabilities to accept special accommodations and services for individuals with disabilities that may segregate them:

The Committee added this section (501(d)) to clarify that nothing in the ADA is intended to permit discriminatory treatment on the basis of disability, even when such treatment is rendered under the guise of providing an accommodation, service, aid or benefit to the individual with disability. For example, a blind individual may choose not to avail himself or herself of the right to go to the front of a line, even if a particular public accommodation has chosen to offer such a modification of a policy for blind individuals. Or, a blind individual may choose to decline to participate in a special museum tour that allows persons to touch sculptures in an exhibit and instead tour the exhibits at his or her own pace with the museum’s recorded tour.

(Judiciary report at 71 – 72.) The Act is not to be construed to mean that an individual with disabilities must accept special accommodations and services for individuals with disabilities when that individual chooses to participate in the regular services already offered. Because medical treatment, including treatment for particular conditions, is not a special accommodation or service for individuals with disabilities under section 501(d), neither the Act nor this part provides affirmative authority to suspend such treatment. Section 501(d) is intended to clarify that the Act is not designed to foster discrimination through mandatory acceptance of special services when other alternatives are provided; this concern does not reach to the provision of medical treatment for the disabling condition itself.

Section 36.213 makes clear that the limitations contained in subpart C are to be read into subpart B. Thus, the integration requirement is subject to the various defenses contained in subpart C, such as safety, if eligibility criteria are at issue (Sec.36.301(b)), or fundamental alteration and undue burden, if the concern is provision of auxiliary aids (Sec.36.303(a)).

Section 36.204 Administrative Methods

Section 36.204 specifies that an individual or entity shall not, directly, or through contractual or other arrangements, utilize standards or criteria or methods of administration that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability or that perpetuate the discrimination of others who are subject to common administrative control. The preamble discussion of Sec.36.301 addresses eligibility criteria in detail.

Section 36.204 is derived from section 302(b)(1)(D) of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and it uses the same language used in the employment section of the ADA (section 102(b)(3)). Both sections incorporate a disparate impact standard to ensure the effectiveness of the legislative mandate to end discrimination. This standard is consistent with the interpretation of section 504 by the U.S. Supreme Court in Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985). The Court in Choate explained that members of Congress made numerous statements during passage of section 504 regarding eliminating architectural barriers, providing access to transportation, and eliminating discriminatory effects of job qualification procedures. The Court then noted: “These statements would ring hollow if the resulting legislation could not rectify the harms resulting from action that discriminated by effect as well as by design.” Id at 297 (footnote omitted).

Of course, Sec.36.204 is subject to the various limitations contained in subpart C including, for example, necessity (Sec.36.301(a)), safety (Sec.36.301(b)), fundamental alteration (Sec.36.302(a)), readily achievable (Sec.36.304(a)), and undue burden (Sec.36.303(a)).

Section 36.205 Association

Section 36.205 implements section 302(b)(1)(E) of the Act, which provides that a public accommodation shall not exclude or otherwise deny equal goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, accommodations, or other opportunities to an individual or entity because of the known disability of an individual with whom the individual or entity is known to have a relationship or association. This section is unchanged from the proposed rule.

The individuals covered under this section include any individuals who are discriminated against because of their known association with an individual with a disability. For example, it would be a violation of this part for a day care center to refuse admission to a child because his or her brother has HIV disease.

This protection is not limited to those who have a familial relationship with the individual who has a disability. If a place of public accommodation refuses admission to a person with cerebral palsy and his or her companions, the companions have an independent right of action under the ADA and this section.

During the legislative process, the term “entity” was added to section 302(b)(1)(E) to clarify that the scope of the provision is intended to encompass not only persons who have a known association with a person with a disability, but also entities that provide services to or are otherwise associated with such individuals. This provision was intended to ensure that entities such as health care providers, employees of social service agencies, and others who provide professional services to persons with disabilities are not subjected to discrimination because of their professional association with persons with disabilities. For example, it would be a violation of this section to terminate the lease of a entity operating an independent living center for persons with disabilities, or to seek to evict a health care provider because that individual or entity provides services to persons with mental impairments.

Section 36.206 Retaliation or Coercion

Section 36.206 implements section 503 of the ADA, which prohibits retaliation against any individual who exercises his or her rights under the Act. This section is unchanged from the proposed rule. Paragraph (a) of Sec.36.206 provides that no private entity or public entity shall discriminate against any individual because that individual has exercised his or her right to oppose any act or practice made unlawful by this part, or because that individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under the Act or this part.

Paragraph (b) provides that no private entity or public entity shall coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise of his or her rights under this part or because that individual aided or encouraged any other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of any right granted or protected by the Act or this part.

Illustrations of practices prohibited by this section are contained in paragraph (c), which is modeled on a similar provision in the regulations issued by the Department of Housing and Urban Development to implement the Fair Housing Act (see 24 CFR 100.400(c)(l)). Prohibited actions may include:

• (1) Coercing an individual to deny or limit the benefits, services, or advantages to which he or she is entitled under the Act or this part;
• (2) Threatening, intimidating, or interfering with an individual who is seeking to obtain or use the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a public accommodation;
• (3) Intimidating or threatening any person because that person is assisting or encouraging an individual or group entitled to claim the rights granted or protected by the Act or this part to exercise those rights; or
• (4) Retaliating against any person because that person has participated in any investigation or action to enforce the Act or this part.

This section protects not only individuals who allege a violation of the Act or this part, but also any individuals who support or assist them. This section applies to all investigations or proceedings initiated under the Act or this part without regard to the ultimate resolution of the underlying allegations. Because this section prohibits any act of retaliation or coercion in response to an individual’s effort to exercise rights established by the Act and this part (or to support the efforts of another individual), the section applies not only to public accommodations that are otherwise subject to this part, but also to individuals other than public accommodations or to public entities. For example, it would be a violation of the Act and this part for a private individual, e.g., a restaurant customer, to harass or intimidate an individual with a disability in an effort to prevent that individual from patronizing the restaurant. It would, likewise, be a violation of the Act and this part for a public entity to take adverse action against an employee who appeared as a witness on behalf of an individual who sought to enforce the Act.

Section 36.207 Places of Public Accommodation Located in Private Residences

A private home used exclusively as a residence is not covered by title III because it is neither a “commercial facility” nor a “place of public accommodation.” In some situations, however, a private home is not used exclusively as a residence, but houses a place of public accommodation in all or part of a home (e.g., an accountant who meets with his or her clients at his or her residence). Section 36.207(a) provides that those portions of the private residence used in the operation of the place of public accommodation are covered by this part.

For instance, a home or a portion of a home may be used as a day care center during the day and a residence at night. If all parts of the house are used for the day care center, then the entire residence is a place of public accommodation because no part of the house is used exclusively as a residence. If an accountant uses one room in the house solely as his or her professional office, then a portion of the house is used exclusively as a place of public accommodation and a portion is used exclusively as a residence. Section 36.207 provides that when a portion of a residence is used exclusively as a residence, that portion is not covered by this part. Thus, the portions of the accountant’s house, other than the professional office and areas and spaces leading to it, are not covered by this part. All of the requirements of this rule apply to the covered portions, including requirements to make reasonable modifications in policies, eliminate discriminatory eligibility criteria, take readily achievable measures to remove barriers or provide readily achievable alternatives (e.g., making house calls), provide auxiliary aids and services and undertake only accessible new construction and alterations.

Paragraph (b) was added in response to comments that sought clarification on the extent of coverage of the private residence used as the place of public accommodation. The final rule makes clear that the place of accommodation extends to all areas of the home used by clients and customers of the place of public accommodation. Thus, the ADA would apply to any door or entry way, hallways, a restroom, if used by customers and clients; and any other portion of the residence, interior or exterior, used by customers or clients of the public accommodation. This interpretation is simply an application of the general rule for all public accommodations, which extends statutory requirements to all portions of the facility used by customers and clients, including, if applicable, restrooms, hallways, and approaches to the public accommodation. As with other public accommodations, barriers at the entrance and on the sidewalk leading up to the public accommodation, if the sidewalk is under the control of the public accommodation, must be removed if doing so is readily achievable.

The Department recognizes that many businesses that operate out of personal residences are quite small, often employing only the homeowner and having limited total revenues. In these circumstances the effect of ADA coverage would likely be quite minimal. For example, because the obligation to remove existing architectural barriers is limited to those that are easily accomplishable without much difficulty or expense (see Sec.36.304), the range of required actions would be quite modest. It might not be readily achievable for such a place of public accommodation to remove any existing barriers. If it is not readily achievable to remove existing architectural barriers, a public accommodation located in a private residence may meet its obligations under the Act and this part by providing its goods or services to clients or customers with disabilities through the use of alternative measures, including delivery of goods or services in the home of the customer or client, to the extent that such alternative measures are readily achievable (See Sec.36.305).

Some commenters asked for clarification as to how the new construction and alteration standards of subpart D will apply to residences. The new construction standards only apply to the extent that the residence or portion of the residence was designed or intended for use as a public accommodation. Thus, for example, if a portion of a home is designed or constructed for use exclusively as a lawyer’s office or for use both as a lawyer’s office and for residential purposes, then it must be designed in accordance with the new construction standards in the appendix. Likewise, if a homeowner is undertaking alterations to convert all or part of his residence to a place of public accommodation, that work must be done in compliance with the alterations standards in the appendix.

The preamble to the proposed rule addressed the applicable requirements when a commercial facility is located in a private residence. That situation is now addressed in Sec.36.401(b) of subpart D.

Section 36.208 Direct Threat

Section 36.208(a) implements section 302(b)(3) of the Act by providing that this part does not require a public accommodation to permit an individual to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations of the public accommodation, if that individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others. This section is unchanged from the proposed rule.

The Department received a significant number of comments on this section. Commenters representing individuals with disabilities generally supported this provision, but suggested revisions to further limit its application. Commenters representing public accommodations generally endorsed modifications that would permit a public accommodation to exercise its own judgment in determining whether an individual poses a direct threat.

The inclusion of this provision is not intended to imply that persons with disabilities pose risks to others. It is intended to address concerns that may arise in this area. It establishes a strict standard that must be met before denying service to an individual with a disability or excluding that individual from participation.

Paragraph (b) of this section explains that a “direct threat” is a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures, or by the provision of auxiliary aids and services. This paragraph codifies the standard first applied by the Supreme Court in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), in which the Court held that an individual with a contagious disease may be an “individual with handicaps” under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. In Arline, the Supreme Court recognized that there is a need to balance the interests of people with disabilities against legitimate concerns for public safety. Although persons with disabilities are generally entitled to the protection of this part, a person who poses a significant risk to others may be excluded if reasonable modifications to the public accommodation’s policies, practices, or procedures will not eliminate that risk. The determination that a person poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others may not be based on generalizations or stereotypes about the effects of a particular disability; it must be based on an individual assessment that conforms to the requirements of paragraph (c) of this section.

Paragraph (c) establishes the test to use in determining whether an individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others. A public accommodation is required to make an individualized assessment, based on reasonable judgment that relies on current medical evidence or on the best available objective evidence, to determine: The nature, duration, and severity of the risk; the probability that the potential injury will actually occur; and whether reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or procedures will mitigate the risk. This is the test established by the Supreme Court in Arline. Such an inquiry is essential if the law is to achieve its goal of protecting disabled individuals from discrimination based on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear, while giving appropriate weight to legitimate concerns, such as the need to avoid exposing others to significant health and safety risks. Making this assessment will not usually require the services of a physician. Sources for medical knowledge include guidance from public health authorities, such as the U.S. Public Health Service, the Centers for Disease Control, and the National Institutes of Health, including the National Institute of Mental Health.

Many of the commenters sought clarification of the inquiry requirement. Some suggested that public accommodations should be prohibited from making any inquiries to determine if an individual with a disability would pose a direct threat to other persons. The Department believes that to preclude all such inquiries would be inappropriate. Under Sec.36.301 of this part, a public accommodation is permitted to establish eligibility criteria necessary for the safe operation of the place of public accommodation. Implicit in that right is the right to ask if an individual meets the criteria. However, any eligibility or safety standard established by a public accommodation must be based on actual risk, not on speculation or stereotypes; it must be applied to all clients or customers of the place of public accommodation; and inquiries must be limited to matters necessary to the application of the standard.

Some commenters suggested that the test established in the Arline decision, which was developed in the context of an employment case, is too stringent to apply in a public accommodations context where interaction between the public accommodation and its client or customer is often very brief. One suggested alternative was to permit public accommodations to exercise “good faith” judgment in determining whether an individual poses a direct threat, particularly when a public accommodation is dealing with a client or customer engaged in disorderly or disruptive behavior.

The Department believes that the ADA clearly requires that any determination to exclude an individual from participation must be based on an objective standard. A public accommodation may establish neutral eligibility criteria as a condition of receiving its goods or services. As long as these criteria are necessary for the safe provision of the public accommodation’s goods and services and applied neutrally to all clients or customers, regardless of whether they are individuals with disabilities, a person who is unable to meet the criteria may be excluded from participation without inquiry into the underlying reason for the inability to comply. In places of public accommodation such as restaurants, theaters, or hotels, where the contact between the public accommodation and its clients is transitory, the uniform application of an eligibility standard precluding violent or disruptive behavior by any client or customer should be sufficient to enable a public accommodation to conduct its business in an orderly manner.

Some other commenters asked for clarification of the application of this provision to persons, particularly children, who have short-term, contagious illnesses, such as fevers, influenza, or the common cold. It is common practice in schools and day care settings to exclude persons with such illnesses until the symptoms subside. The Department believes that these commenters misunderstand the scope of this rule. The ADA only prohibits discrimination against an individual with a disability. Under the ADA and this part, a “disability” is defined as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities. Common, short-term illnesses that predictably resolve themselves within a matter of days do not “substantially limit” a major life activity; therefore, it is not a violation of this part to exclude an individual from receiving the services of a public accommodation because of such transitory illness. However, this part does apply to persons who have long-term illnesses. Any determination with respect to a person who has a chronic or long-term illness must be made in compliance with the requirements of this section.

Section 36.209 Illegal Use of Drugs

Section 36.209 effectuates section 510 of the ADA, which clarifies the Act’s application to people who use drugs illegally. Paragraph (a) provides that this part does not prohibit discrimination based on an individual’s current illegal use of drugs.

The Act and the regulation distinguish between illegal use of drugs and the legal use of substances, whether or not those substances are “controlled substances,” as defined in the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 812). Some controlled substances are prescription drugs that have legitimate medical uses. Section 36.209 does not affect use of controlled substances pursuant to a valid prescription, under supervision by a licensed health care professional, or other use that is authorized by the Controlled Substances Act or any other provision of Federal law. It does apply to illegal use of those substances, as well as to illegal use of controlled substances that are not prescription drugs. The key question is whether the individual’s use of the substance is illegal, not whether the substance has recognized legal uses. Alcohol is not a controlled substance, so use of alcohol is not addressed by Sec.36.209. Alcoholics are individuals with disabilities, subject to the protections of the statute.

A distinction is also made between the use of a substance and the status of being addicted to that substance. Addiction is a disability, and addicts are individuals with disabilities protected by the Act. The protection, however, does not extend to actions based on the illegal use of the substance. In other words, an addict cannot use the fact of his or her addiction as a defense to an action based on illegal use of drugs. This distinction is not artificial. Congress intended to deny protection to people who engage in the illegal use of drugs, whether or not they are addicted, but to provide protection to addicts so long as they are not currently using drugs.

A third distinction is the difficult one between current use and former use. The definition of “current illegal use of drugs” in Sec.36.104, which is based on the report of the Conference Committee, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 596, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1990), is “illegal use of drugs that occurred recently enough to justify a reasonable belief that a person’s drug use is current or that continuing use is a real and ongoing problem.”

Paragraph (a)(2)(i) specifies that an individual who has successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation program or has otherwise been rehabilitated successfully and who is not engaging in current illegal use of drugs is protected. Paragraph (a)(2)(ii) clarifies that an individual who is currently participating in a supervised rehabilitation program and is not engaging in current illegal use of drugs is protected. Paragraph (a)(2)(iii) provides that a person who is erroneously regarded as engaging in current illegal use of drugs, but who is not engaging in such use, is protected.

Paragraph (b) provides a limited exception to the exclusion of current illegal users of drugs from the protections of the Act. It prohibits denial of health services, or services provided in connection with drug rehabilitation, to an individual on the basis of current illegal use of drugs, if the individual is otherwise entitled to such services. As explained further in the discussion of Sec.36.302, a health care facility that specializes in a particular type of treatment, such as care of burn victims, is not required to provide drug rehabilitation services, but it cannot refuse to treat an individual’s burns on the grounds that the individual is illegally using drugs.

A commenter argued that health care providers should be permitted to use their medical judgment to postpone discretionary medical treatment of individuals under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The regulation permits a medical practitioner to take into account an individual’s use of drugs in determining appropriate medical treatment. Section 36.209 provides that the prohibitions on discrimination in this part do not apply when the public accommodation acts on the basis of current illegal use of drugs. Although those prohibitions do apply under paragraph (b), the limitations established under this part also apply. Thus, under Sec.36.208, a health care provider or other public accommodation covered under Sec.36.209(b) may exclude an individual whose current illegal use of drugs poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others, and, under Sec.36.301, a public accommodation may impose or apply eligibility criteria that are necessary for the provision of the services being offered, and may impose legitimate safety requirements that are necessary for safe operation. These same limitations also apply to individuals with disabilities who use alcohol or prescription drugs. The Department believes that these provisions address this commenter’s concerns.

Other commenters pointed out that abstention from the use of drugs is an essential condition for participation in some drug rehabilitation programs, and may be a necessary requirement in inpatient or residential settings. The Department believes that this comment is well-founded. Congress clearly did not intend to exclude from drug treatment programs the very individuals who need such programs because of their use of drugs. In such a situation, however, once an individual has been admitted to a program, abstention may be a necessary and appropriate condition to continued participation. The final rule therefore provides that a drug rehabilitation or treatment program may deny participation to individuals who use drugs while they are in the program.

Paragraph (c) expresses Congress” intention that the Act be neutral with respect to testing for illegal use of drugs. This paragraph implements the provision in section 510(b) of the Act that allows entities “to adopt or administer reasonable policies or procedures, including but not limited to drug testing,” that ensure an individual who is participating in a supervised rehabilitation program, or who has completed such a program or otherwise been rehabilitated successfully, is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs. Paragraph (c) is not to be construed to encourage, prohibit, restrict, or authorize the conducting of testing for the illegal use of drugs.

Paragraph (c) of Sec.36.209 clarifies that it is not a violation of this part to adopt or administer reasonable policies or procedures to ensure that an individual who formerly engaged in the illegal use of drugs is not currently engaging in illegal use of drugs. Any such policies or procedures must, of course, be reasonable, and must be designed to identify accurately the illegal use of drugs. This paragraph does not authorize inquiries, tests, or other procedures that would disclose use of substances that are not controlled substances or are taken under supervision by a licensed health care professional, or other uses authorized by the Controlled Substances Act or other provisions of Federal law, because such uses are not included in the definition of “illegal use of drugs.”

One commenter argued that the rule should permit testing for lawful use of prescription drugs, but most favored the explanation that tests must be limited to unlawful use in order to avoid revealing the use of prescription medicine used to treat disabilities. Tests revealing legal use of prescription drugs might violate the prohibition in Sec.36.301 of attempts to unnecessarily identify the existence of a disability.

Section 36.210 Smoking

Section 36.210 restates the clarification in section 501(b) of the Act that the Act does not preclude the prohibition of, or imposition of restrictions on, smoking. Some commenters argued that Sec.36.210 does not go far enough, and that the regulation should prohibit smoking in all places of public accommodation. The reference to smoking in section 501 merely clarifies that the Act does not require public accommodations to accommodate smokers by permitting them to smoke in places of public accommodations.

Section 36.211 Maintenance of Accessible Features

Section 36.211 provides that a public accommodation shall maintain in operable working condition those features of facilities and equipment that are required to be readily accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities by the Act or this part. The Act requires that, to the maximum extent feasible, facilities must be accessible to, and usable by, individuals with disabilities. This section recognizes that it is not sufficient to provide features such as accessible routes, elevators, or ramps, if those features are not maintained in a manner that enables individuals with disabilities to use them. Inoperable elevators, locked accessible doors, or “accessible” routes that are obstructed by furniture, filing cabinets, or potted plants are neither “accessible to” nor “usable by” individuals with disabilities.

Some commenters objected that this section appeared to establish an absolute requirement and suggested that language from the preamble be included in the text of the regulation. It is, of course, impossible to guarantee that mechanical devices will never fail to operate. Paragraph (b) of the final regulation provides that this section does not prohibit isolated or temporary interruptions in service or access due to maintenance or repairs. This paragraph is intended to clarify that temporary obstructions or isolated instances of mechanical failure would not be considered violations of the Act or this part. However, allowing obstructions or “out of service” equipment to persist beyond a reasonable period of time would violate this part, as would repeated mechanical failures due to improper or inadequate maintenance. Failure of the public accommodation to ensure that accessible routes are properly maintained and free of obstructions, or failure to arrange prompt repair of inoperable elevators or other equipment intended to provide access, would also violate this part.

Other commenters requested that this section be expanded to include specific requirements for inspection and maintenance of equipment, for training staff in the proper operation of equipment, and for maintenance of specific items. The Department believes that this section properly establishes the general requirement for maintaining access and that further, more detailed requirements are not necessary.

Section 36.212 Insurance

The Department received numerous comments on proposed Sec.36.212. Most supported the proposed regulation but felt that it did not go far enough in protecting individuals with disabilities and persons associated with them from discrimination. Many commenters argued that language from the preamble to the proposed regulation should be included in the text of the final regulation. Other commenters argued that even that language was not strong enough, and that more stringent standards should be established. Only a few commenters argued that the Act does not apply to insurance underwriting practices or the terms of insurance contracts. These commenters cited language from the Senate committee report (S. Rep. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., at 84 – 86 (1989) (hereinafter “Senate report”)), indicating that Congress did not intend to affect existing insurance practices.

The Department has decided to adopt the language of the proposed rule without change. Sections 36.212 (a) and (b) restate section 501(c) of the Act, which provides that the Act shall not be construed to restrict certain insurance practices on the part of insurance companies and employers, as long as such practices are not used to evade the purposes of the Act. Section 36.212(c) is a specific application of Sec.36.202(a), which prohibits denial of participation on the basis of disability. It provides that a public accommodation may not refuse to serve an individual with a disability because of limitations on coverage or rates in its insurance policies (see Judiciary report at 56).

Many commenters supported the requirements of Sec.36.212(c) in the proposed rule because it addressed an important reason for denial of services by public accommodations. One commenter argued that services could be denied if the insurance coverage required exclusion of people whose disabilities were reasonably related to the risks involved in that particular place of public accommodation. Sections 36.208 and 36.301 establish criteria for denial of participation on the basis of legitimate safety concerns. This paragraph does not prohibit consideration of such concerns in insurance policies, but provides that any exclusion on the basis of disability must be based on the permissible criteria, rather than on the terms of the insurance contract.

Language in the committee reports indicates that Congress intended to reach insurance practices by prohibiting differential treatment of individuals with disabilities in insurance offered by public accommodations unless the differences are justified. “Under the ADA, a person with a disability cannot be denied insurance or be subject to different terms or conditions of insurance based on disability alone, if the disability does not pose increased risks” (Senate report at 84; Education and Labor report at 136). Section 501(c) (1) of the Act was intended to emphasize that “insurers may continue to sell to and underwrite individuals applying for life, health, or other insurance on an individually underwritten basis, or to service such insurance products, so long as the standards used are based on sound actuarial data and not on speculation” (Judiciary report at 70 (emphasis added); See also Senate report at 85; Education and Labor report at 137).

The committee reports indicate that underwriting and classification of risks must be “based on sound actuarial principles or be related to actual or reasonably anticipated experience” (see, e.g., Judiciary report at 71). Moreover, “while a plan which limits certain kinds of coverage based on classification of risk would be allowed, the plan may not refuse to insure, or refuse to continue to insure, or limit the amount, extent, or kind of coverage available to an individual, or charge a different rate for the same coverage solely because of a physical or mental impairment, except where the refusal, limitation, or rate differential is based on sound actuarial principles or is related to actual or reasonably anticipated experience” (Senate report at 85; Education and Labor report at 136 – 37; Judiciary report at 71). The ADA, therefore, does not prohibit use of legitimate actuarial considerations to justify differential treatment of individuals with disabilities in insurance.

The committee reports provide some guidance on how nondiscrimination principles in the disability rights area relate to insurance practices. For example, a person who is blind may not be denied coverage based on blindness independent of actuarial risk classification. With respect to group health insurance coverage, an individual with a pre-existing condition may be denied coverage for that condition for the period specified in the policy, but cannot be denied coverage for illness or injuries unrelated to the pre-existing condition. Also, a public accommodation may offer insurance policies that limit coverage for certain procedures or treatments, but may not entirely deny coverage to a person with a disability.

The Department requested comment on the extent to which data that would establish statistically sound correlations are available. Numerous commenters cited pervasive problems in the availability and cost of insurance for individuals with disabilities and parents of children with disabilities. No commenters cited specific data, or sources of data, to support specific exclusionary practices. Several commenters reported that, even when statistics are available, they are often outdated and do not reflect current medical technology and treatment methods. Concern was expressed that adequate efforts are not made to distinguish those individuals who are high users of health care from individuals in the same diagnostic groups who may be low users of health care. One insurer reported that “hard data and actuarial statistics are not available to provide precise numerical justifications for every underwriting determination,” but argued that decisions may be based on “logical principles generally accepted by actuarial science and fully consistent with state insurance laws.” The commenter urged that the Department recognize the validity of information other than statistical data as a basis for insurance determinations.

The most frequent comment was a recommendation that the final regulation should require the insurance company to provide a copy of the actuarial data on which its actions are based when requested by the applicant. Such a requirement would be beyond anything contemplated by the Act or by Congress and has therefore not been included in the Department’s final rule. Because the legislative history of the ADA clarifies that different treatment of individuals with disabilities in insurance may be justified by sound actuarial data, such actuarial data will be critical to any potential litigation on this issue. This information would presumably be obtainable in a court proceeding where the insurer’s actuarial data was the basis for different treatment of persons with disabilities. In addition, under some State regulatory schemes, insurers may have to file such actuarial information with the State regulatory agency and this information may be obtainable at the State level.

A few commenters representing the insurance industry conceded that underwriting practices in life and health insurance are clearly covered, but argued that property and casualty insurance are not covered. The Department sees no reason for this distinction. Although life and health insurance are the areas where the regulation will have its greatest application, the Act applies equally to unjustified discrimination in all types of insurance provided by public accommodations. A number of commenters, for example, reported difficulties in obtaining automobile insurance because of their disabilities, despite their having good driving records.

Section 36.213 Relationship of Subpart 8 to Subparts C and D

This section explains that subpart B sets forth the general principles of nondiscrimination applicable to all entities subject to this regulation, while subparts C and D provide guidance on the application of this part to specific situations. The specific provisions in subparts C and D, including the limitations on those provisions, control over the general provisions in circumstances where both specific and general provisions apply. Resort to the general provisions of subpart B is only appropriate where there are no applicable specific rules of guidance in subparts C or D. This interaction between the specific requirements and the general requirements operates with regard to contractual obligations as well.

One illustration of this principle is its application to the obligation of a public accommodation to provide access to services by removal of architectural barriers or by alternatives to barrier removal. The general requirement, established in subpart B by Sec.36.203, is that a public accommodation must provide its services to individuals with disabilities in the most integrated setting appropriate. This general requirement would appear to categorically prohibit “segregated” seating for persons in wheelchairs. Section 36.304, however, only requires removal of architectural barriers to the extent that removal is “readily achievable.” If providing access to all areas of a restaurant, for example, would not be “readily achievable,” a public accommodation may provide access to selected areas only. Also, Sec.36.305 provides that, where barrier removal is not readily achievable, a public accommodation may use alternative, readily achievable methods of making services available, such as curbside service or home delivery. Thus, in this manner, the specific requirements of Sec. 36.304 and 36.305 control over the general requirement of Sec.36.203.

Subpart C – Specific Requirements

In general, subpart C implements the “specific prohibitions” that comprise section 302(b)(2) of the ADA. It also addresses the requirements of section 309 of the ADA regarding examinations and courses.

Section 36.301 Eligibility Criteria

Section 36.301 of the rule prohibits the imposition or application of eligibility criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or any class of individuals with disabilities from fully and equally enjoying any goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations, unless such criteria can be shown to be necessary for the provision of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations being offered. This prohibition is based on section 302(b)(2)(A)(i) of the ADA.

It would violate this section to establish exclusive or segregative eligibility criteria that would bar, for example, all persons who are deaf from playing on a golf course or all individuals with cerebral palsy from attending a movie theater, or limit the seating of individuals with Down’s syndrome to only particular areas of a restaurant. The wishes, tastes, or preferences of other customers may not be asserted to justify criteria that would exclude or segregate individuals with disabilities.

Section 36.301 also prohibits attempts by a public accommodation to unnecessarily identify the existence of a disability; for example, it would be a violation of this section for a retail store to require an individual to state on a credit application whether the applicant has epilepsy, mental illness, or any other disability, or to inquire unnecessarily whether an individual has HIV disease.

Section 36.301 also prohibits policies that unnecessarily impose requirements or burdens on individuals with disabilities that are not placed on others. For example, public accommodations may not require that an individual with a disability be accompanied by an attendant. As provided by Sec.36.306, however, a public accommodation is not required to provide services of a personal nature including assistance in toileting, eating, or dressing.

Paragraph (c) of Sec.36.301 provides that public accommodations may not place a surcharge on a particular individual with a disability or any group of individuals with disabilities to cover the costs of measures, such as the provision of auxiliary aids and services, barrier removal, alternatives to barrier removal, and reasonable modifications in policies, practices, and procedures, that are required to provide that individual or group with the nondiscriminatory treatment required by the Act or this part.

A number of commenters inquired as to whether deposits required for the use of auxiliary aids, such as assistive listening devices, are prohibited surcharges. It is the Department’s view that reasonable, completely refundable, deposits are not to be considered surcharges prohibited by this section. Requiring deposits is an important means of ensuring the availability of equipment necessary to ensure compliance with the ADA.

Other commenters sought clarification as to whether Sec.36.301(c) prohibits professionals from charging for the additional time that it may take in certain cases to provide services to an individual with disabilities. The Department does not intend Sec.36.301(c) to prohibit professionals who bill on the basis of time from charging individuals with disabilities on that basis. However, fees may not be charged for the provision of auxiliary aids and services, barrier removal, alternatives to barrier removal, reasonable modifications in policies, practices, and procedures, or any other measures necessary to ensure compliance with the ADA.

Other commenters inquired as to whether day care centers may charge for extra services provided to individuals with disabilities. As stated above, Sec.36.302(c) is intended only to prohibit charges for measures necessary to achieve compliance with the ADA.

Another commenter asserted that charges may be assessed for home delivery provided as an alternative to barrier removal under Sec.36.305, when home delivery is provided to all customers for a fee. Charges for home delivery are permissible if home delivery is not considered an alternative to barrier removal. If the public accommodation offers an alternative, such as curb, carry-out, or sidewalk service for which no surcharge is assessed, then it may charge for home delivery in accordance with its standard pricing for home delivery.

In addition, Sec.36.301 prohibits the imposition of criteria that “tend to” screen out an individual with a disability. This concept, which is derived from current regulations under section 504 (see, e.g., 45 CFR 84.13), makes it discriminatory to impose policies or criteria that, while not creating a direct bar to individuals with disabilities, indirectly prevent or limit their ability to participate. For example, requiring presentation of a driver’s license as the sole means of identification for purposes of paying by check would violate this section in situations where, for example, individuals with severe vision impairments or developmental disabilities or epilepsy are ineligible to receive a driver’s license and the use of an alternative means of identification, such as another photo I.D. or credit card, is feasible.

A public accommodation may, however, impose neutral rules and criteria that screen out, or tend to screen out, individuals with disabilities, if the criteria are necessary for the safe operation of the public accommodation. Examples of safety qualifications that would be justifiable in appropriate circumstances would include height requirements for certain amusement park rides or a requirement that all participants in a recreational rafting expedition be able to meet a necessary level of swimming proficiency. Safety requirements must be based on actual risks and not on speculation, stereotypes, or generalizations about individuals with disabilities.

Section 36.302 Modifications in Policies, Practices, or Procedures

Section 36.302 of the rule prohibits the failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, and procedures when such modifications may be necessary to afford any goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations. This prohibition is based on section 302(b)(2)(A)(ii) of the ADA.

For example, a parking facility would be required to modify a rule barring all vans or all vans with raised roofs, if an individual who uses a wheelchair-accessible van wishes to park in that facility, and if overhead structures are high enough to accommodate the height of the van. A department store may need to modify a policy of only permitting one person at a time in a dressing room, if an individual with mental retardation needs and requests assistance in dressing from a companion. Public accommodations may need to revise operational policies to ensure that services are available to individuals with disabilities. For instance, a hotel may need to adopt a policy of keeping an accessible room unoccupied until an individual with a disability arrives at the hotel, assuming the individual has properly reserved the room.

One example of application of this principle is specifically included in a new Sec.36.302(d) on check-out aisles. That paragraph provides that a store with check-out aisles must ensure that an adequate number of accessible check-out aisles is kept open during store hours, or must otherwise modify its policies and practices, in order to ensure that an equivalent level of convenient service is provided to individuals with disabilities as is provided to others. For example, if only one check-out aisle is accessible, and it is generally used for express service, one way of providing equivalent service is to allow persons with mobility impairments to make all of their purchases at that aisle. This principle also applies with respect to other accessible elements and services. For example, a particular bank may be in compliance with the accessibility guidelines for new construction incorporated in appendix A with respect to automated teller machines (ATM) at a new branch office by providing one accessible walk-up machine at that location, even though an adjacent walk-up ATM is not accessible and the drive-up ATM is not accessible. However, the bank would be in violation of this section if the accessible ATM was located in a lobby that was locked during evening hours while the drive-up ATM was available to customers without disabilities during those same hours. The bank would need to ensure that the accessible ATM was available to customers during the hours that any of the other ATM’s was available.

A number of commenters inquired as to the relationship between this section and Sec.36.307, “Accessible or special goods.” Under Sec.36.307, a public accommodation is not required to alter its inventory to include accessible or special goods that are designed for, or facilitate use by, individuals with disabilities. The rule enunciated in Sec.36.307 is consistent with the “fundamental alteration” defense to the reasonable modifications requirement of Sec.36.302. Therefore, Sec.36.302 would not require the inventory of goods provided by a public accommodation to be altered to include goods with accessibility features. For example, Sec.36.302 would not require a bookstore to stock Brailled books or order Brailled books, if it does not do so in the normal course of its business.

The rule does not require modifications to the legitimate areas of specialization of service providers. Section 36.302(b) provides that a public accommodation may refer an individual with a disability to another public accommodation, if that individual is seeking, or requires, treatment or services outside of the referring public accommodation’s area of specialization, and if, in the normal course of its operations, the referring public accommodation would make a similar referral for an individual without a disability who seeks or requires the same treatment or services.

For example, it would not be discriminatory for a physician who specializes only in burn treatment to refer an individual who is deaf to another physician for treatment of an injury other than a burn injury. To require a physician to accept patients outside of his or her specialty would fundamentally alter the nature of the medical practice and, therefore, not be required by this section.

A clinic specializing exclusively in drug rehabilitation could similarly refuse to treat a person who is not a drug addict, but could not refuse to treat a person who is a drug addict simply because the patient tests positive for HIV. Conversely, a clinic that specializes in the treatment of individuals with HIV could refuse to treat an individual that does not have HIV, but could not refuse to treat a person for HIV infection simply because that person is also a drug addict.

Some commenters requested clarification as to how this provision would apply to situations where manifestations of the disability in question, itself, would raise complications requiring the expertise of a different practitioner. It is not the Department’s intention in Sec.36.302(b) to prohibit a physician from referring an individual with a disability to another physician, if the disability itself creates specialized complications for the patient’s health that the physician lacks the experience or knowledge to address (see Education and Labor report at 106).

Section 36.302(c)(1) requires that a public accommodation modify its policies, practices, or procedures to permit the use of a service animal by an individual with a disability in any area open to the general public. The term “service animal” is defined in Sec.36.104 to include guide dogs, signal dogs, or any other animal individually trained to provide assistance to an individual with a disability.

A number of commenters pointed to the difficulty of making the distinction required by the proposed rule between areas open to the general public and those that are not. The ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding these provisions has led the Department to adopt a single standard for all public accommodations.

Section 36.302(c)(1) of the final rule now provides that “[g]enerally, a public accommodation shall modify policies, practices, and procedures to permit the use of a service animal by an individual with a disability.” This formulation reflects the general intent of Congress that public accommodations take the necessary steps to accommodate service animals and to ensure that individuals with disabilities are not separated from their service animals. It is intended that the broadest feasible access be provided to service animals in all places of public accommodation, including movie theaters, restaurants, hotels, retail stores, hospitals, and nursing homes (see Education and Labor report at 106; Judiciary report at 59). The section also acknowledges, however, that, in rare circumstances, accommodation of service animals may not be required because a fundamental alteration would result in the nature of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, or accommodations offered or provided, or the safe operation of the public accommodation would be jeopardized.

As specified in Sec.36.302(c)(2), the rule does not require a public accommodation to supervise or care for any service animal. If a service animal must be separated from an individual with a disability in order to avoid a fundamental alteration or a threat to safety, it is the responsibility of the individual with the disability to arrange for the care and supervision of the animal during the period of separation.

A museum would not be required by Sec.36.302 to modify a policy barring the touching of delicate works of art in order to enhance the participation of individuals who are blind, if the touching threatened the integrity of the work. Damage to a museum piece would clearly be a fundamental alteration that is not required by this section.

Section 36.303 Auxiliary Aids and Services.

Section 36.303 of the final rule requires a public accommodation to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the public accommodation can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the goods, services, facilities, advantages, or accommodations being offered or would result in an undue burden. This requirement is based on section 302(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the ADA.

Implicit in this duty to provide auxiliary aids and services is the underlying obligation of a public accommodation to communicate effectively with its customers, clients, patients, or participants who have disabilities affecting hearing, vision, or speech. To give emphasis to this underlying obligation, Sec.36.303(c) of the rule incorporates language derived from section 504 regulations for federally conducted programs (see e.g., 28 CFR 39.160(a)) that requires that appropriate auxiliary aids and services be furnished to ensure that communication with persons with disabilities is as effective as communication with others.

Auxiliary aids and services include a wide range of services and devices for ensuring effective communication. Use of the most advanced technology is not required so long as effective communication is ensured. The Department’s proposed Sec.36.303(b) provided a list of examples of auxiliary aids and services that was taken from the definition of auxiliary aids and services in section 3(1) of the ADA and was supplemented by examples from regulations implementing section 504 in federally conducted programs (see e.g., 28 CFR 39.103). A substantial number of commenters suggested that additional examples be added to this list. The Department has added several items to this list but wishes to clarify that the list is not an all-inclusive or exhaustive catalogue of possible or available auxiliary aids or services. It is not possible to provide an exhaustive list, and such an attempt would omit new devices that will become available with emerging technology.

The Department has added videotext displays, computer-aided transcription services, and open and closed captioning to the list of examples. Videotext displays have become an important means of accessing auditory communications through a public address system. Transcription services are used to relay aurally delivered material almost simultaneously in written form to persons who are deaf or hard of hearing. This technology is often used at conferences, conventions, and hearings. While the proposed rule expressly included television decoder equipment as an auxiliary aid or service, it did not mention captioning itself. The final rule rectifies this omission by mentioning both closed and open captioning.

In this section, the Department has changed the proposed rule’s phrase, “orally delivered materials,” to the phrase, “aurally delivered materials.” This new phrase tracks the language in the definition of “auxiliary aids and services” in section 3 of the ADA and is meant to include nonverbal sounds and alarms and computer-generated speech.

Several persons and organizations requested that the Department replace the term “telecommunications devices for deaf persons” or “TDD’s” with the term “text telephone.” The Department has declined to do so. The Department is aware that the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board has used the phrase “text telephone” in lieu of the statutory term “TDD” in its final accessibility guidelines. Title IV of the ADA, however, uses the term “Telecommunications Device for the Deaf,” and the Department believes it would be inappropriate to abandon this statutory term at this time.

Paragraph (b)(2) lists examples of aids and services for making visually delivered materials accessible to persons with visual impairments. Many commenters proposed additional examples such as signage or mapping, audio description services, secondary auditory programs (SAP), telebraillers, and reading machines. While the Department declines to add these items to the list in the regulation, they may be considered appropriate auxiliary aids and services.

Paragraph (b)(3) refers to the acquisition or modification of equipment or devices. For example, tape players used for an audio-guided tour of a museum exhibit may require the addition of Brailled adhesive labels to the buttons on a reasonable number of the tape players to facilitate their use by individuals who are blind. Similarly, permanent or portable assistive listening systems for persons with hearing impairments may be required at a hotel conference center.

Several commenters suggested the addition of current technological innovations in microelectronics and computerized control systems (e.g., voice recognition systems, automatic dialing telephones, and infrared elevator and light control systems) to the list of auxiliary aids and services. The Department interprets auxiliary aids and services as those aids and services designed to provide effective communications, i. e., making aurally and visually delivered information available to persons with hearing, speech, and vision impairments. Methods of making services, programs, or activities accessible to, or usable by, individuals with mobility or manual dexterity impairments are addressed by other sections of this part, including the requirements for modifications in policies, practices, or procedures (Sec.36.302), the elimination of existing architectural barriers (Sec.36.304), and the provision of alternatives to barriers removal (Sec.36.305).

Paragraph (b)(4) refers to other similar services and actions. Several commenters asked for clarification that “similar services and actions” include retrieving items from shelves, assistance in reaching a marginally accessible seat, pushing a barrier aside in order to provide an accessible route, or assistance in removing a sweater or coat. While retrieving an item from a shelf might be an “auxiliary aid or service” for a blind person who could not locate the item without assistance, it might be a readily achievable alternative to barrier removal for a person using a wheelchair who could not reach the shelf, or a reasonable modification to a self-service policy for an individual who lacked the ability to grasp the item. (Of course, a store would not be required to provide a personal shopper.) As explained above, auxiliary aids and services are those aids and services required to provide effective communications. Other forms of assistance are more appropriately addressed by other provisions of the final rule.

The auxiliary aid requirement is a flexible one. A public accommodation can choose among various alternatives as long as the result is effective communication. For example, a restaurant would not be required to provide menus in Braille for patrons who are blind, if the waiters in the restaurant are made available to read the menu. Similarly, a clothing boutique would not be required to have Brailled price tags if sales personnel provide price information orally upon request; and a bookstore would not be required to make available a sign language interpreter, because effective communication can be conducted by notepad.

A critical determination is what constitutes an effective auxiliary aid or service. The Department’s proposed rule recommended that, in determining what auxiliary aid to use, the public accommodation consult with an individual before providing him or her with a particular auxiliary aid or service. This suggestion sparked a significant volume of public comment. Many persons with disabilities, particularly persons who are deaf or hard of hearing, recommended that the rule should require that public accommodations give “primary consideration” to the “expressed choice” of an individual with a disability. These commenters asserted that the proposed rule was inconsistent with congressional intent of the ADA, with the Department’s proposed rule implementing title II of the ADA, and with longstanding interpretations of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

Based upon a careful review of the ADA legislative history, the Department believes that Congress did not intend under title III to impose upon a public accommodation the requirement that it give primary consideration to the request of the individual with a disability. To the contrary, the legislative history demonstrates congressional intent to strongly encourage consulting with persons with disabilities. In its analysis of the ADA’s auxiliary aids requirement for public accommodations, the House Education and Labor Committee stated that it “expects” that “public accommodation(s) will consult with the individual with a disability before providing a particular auxiliary aid or service” (Education and Labor report at 107). Some commenters also cited a different committee statement that used mandatory language as evidence of legislative intent to require primary consideration. However, this statement was made in the context of reasonable accommodations required by title I with respect to employment (Education and Labor report at 67). Thus, the Department finds that strongly encouraging consultation with persons with disabilities, in lieu of mandating primary consideration of their expressed choice, is consistent with congressional intent.

The Department wishes to emphasize that public accommodations must take steps necessary to ensure that an individual with a disability will not be excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently from other individuals because of the use of inappropriate or ineffective auxiliary aids. In those situations requiring an interpreter, the public accommodations must secure the services of a qualified interpreter, unless an undue burden would result.

In the analysis of Sec.36.303(c) in the proposed rule, the Department gave as an example the situation where a note pad and written materials were insufficient to permit effective communication in a doctor’s office when the matter to be decided was whether major surgery was necessary. Many commenters objected to this statement, asserting that it gave the impression that only decisions about major surgery would merit the provision of a sign language interpreter. The statement would, as the commenters also claimed, convey the impression to other public accommodations that written communications would meet the regulatory requirements in all but the most extreme situations. The Department, when using the example of major surgery, did not intend to limit the provision of interpreter services to the most extreme situations.

Other situations may also require the use of interpreters to ensure effective communication depending on the facts of the particular case. It is not difficult to imagine a wide range of communications involving areas such as health, legal matters, and finances that would be sufficiently lengthy or complex to require an interpreter for effective communication. In some situations, an effective alternative to use of a notepad or an interpreter may be the use of a computer terminal upon which the representative of the public accommodation and the customer or client can exchange typewritten messages.

Section 36.303(d) specifically addresses requirements for TDD’s. Partly because of the availability of telecommunications relay services to be established under title IV of the ADA, Sec.36.303(d)(2) provides that a public accommodation is not required to use a telecommunication device for the deaf (TDD) in receiving or making telephone calls incident to its operations. Several commenters were concerned that relay services would not be sufficient to provide effective access in a number of situations. Commenters argued that relay systems (1) do not provide effective access to the automated systems that require the caller to respond by pushing a button on a touch tone phone, (2) cannot operate fast enough to convey messages on answering machines, or to permit a TDD user to leave a recorded message, and (3) are not appropriate for calling crisis lines relating to such matters as rape, domestic violence, child abuse, and drugs where confidentiality is a concern. The Department believes that it is more appropriate for the Federal Communications Commission to address these issues in its rulemaking under title IV.

A public accommodation is, however, required to make a TDD available to an individual with impaired hearing or speech, if it customarily offers telephone service to its customers, clients, patients, or participants on more than an incidental convenience basis. Where entry to a place of public accommodation requires use of a security entrance telephone, a TDD or other effective means of communication must be provided for use by an individual with impaired hearing or speech.

In other words, individual retail stores, doctors” offices, restaurants, or similar establishments are not required by this section to have TDD’s, because TDD users will be able to make inquiries, appointments, or reservations with such establishments through the relay system established under title IV of the ADA. The public accommodation will likewise be able to contact TDD users through the relay system. On the other hand, hotels, hospitals, and other similar establishments that offer nondisabled individuals the opportunity to make outgoing telephone calls on more than an incidental convenience basis must provide a TDD on request.

Section 36.303(e) requires places of lodging that provide televisions in five or more guest rooms and hospitals to provide, upon request, a means for decoding closed captions for use by an individual with impaired hearing. Hotels should also provide a TDD or similar device at the front desk in order to take calls from guests who use TDD’s in their rooms. In this way guests with hearing impairments can avail themselves of such hotel services as making inquiries of the front desk and ordering room service. The term “hospital” is used in its general sense and should be interpreted broadly.

Movie theaters are not required by Sec.36.303 to present open-captioned films. However, other public accommodations that impart verbal information through soundtracks on films, video tapes, or slide shows are required to make such information accessible to persons with hearing impairments. Captioning is one means to make the information accessible to individuals with disabilities.

The rule specifies that auxiliary aids and services include the acquisition or modification of equipment or devices. For example, tape players used for an audio-guided tour of a museum exhibit may require the addition of Brailled adhesive labels to the buttons on a reasonable number of the tape players to facilitate their use by individuals who are blind. Similarly, a hotel conference center may need to provide permanent or portable assistive listening systems for persons with hearing impairments.

As provided in Sec.36.303(f), a public accommodation is not required to provide any particular aid or service that would result either in a fundamental alteration in the nature of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations offered or in an undue burden. Both of these statutory limitations are derived from existing regulations and caselaw under section 504 and are to be applied on a case-by-case basis (see, e.g., 28 CFR 39.160(d) and Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979)). Congress intended that “undue burden” under Sec.36.303 and “undue hardship,” which is used in the employment provisions of title I of the ADA, should be determined on a case-by-case basis under the same standards and in light of the same factors (Judiciary report at 59). The rule, therefore, in accordance with the definition of undue hardship in section 101(10) of the ADA, defines undue burden as “significant difficulty or expense” (see Sec. 36.104 and 36.303(a)) and requires that undue burden be determined in light of the factors listed in the definition in 36.104.

Consistent with regulations implementing section 504 in federally conducted programs (see, e.g., 28 CFR 39.160(d)), Sec.36.303(f) provides that the fact that the provision of a particular auxiliary aid or service would result in an undue burden does not relieve a public accommodation from the duty to furnish an alternative auxiliary aid or service, if available, that would not result in such a burden.

Section 36.303(g) of the proposed rule has been deleted from this section and included in a new Sec.36.306. That new section continues to make clear that the auxiliary aids requirement does not mandate the provision of individually prescribed devices, such as prescription eyeglasses or hearing aids.

The costs of compliance with the requirements of this section may not be financed by surcharges limited to particular individuals with disabilities or any group of individuals with disabilities (Sec.36.301(c)).

Section 36.304 Removal of Barriers

Section 36.304 requires the removal of architectural barriers and communication barriers that are structural in nature in existing facilities, where such removal is readily achievable, i.e., easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense. This requirement is based on section 302(b)(2)(A)(iv) of the ADA.

A number of commenters interpreted the phrase “communication barriers that are structural in nature” broadly to encompass the provision of communications devices such as TDD’s, telephone handset amplifiers, assistive listening devices, and digital check-out displays. The statute, however, as read by the Department, limits the application of the phrase “communications barriers that are structural in nature” to those barriers that are an integral part of the physical structure of a facility. In addition to the communications barriers posed by permanent signage and alarm systems noted by Congress (see Education and Labor report at 110), the Department would also include among the communications barriers covered by Sec.36.304 the failure to provide adequate sound buffers, and the presence of physical partitions that hamper the passage of sound waves between employees and customers. Given that Sec.36.304’s proper focus is on the removal of physical barriers, the Department believes that the obligation to provide communications equipment and devices such as TDD’s, telephone handset amplifiers, assistive listening devices, and digital check-out displays is more appropriately determined by the requirements for auxiliary aids and services under Sec.36.303 (see Education and Labor report at 107 – 108). The obligation to remove communications barriers that are structural in nature under Sec.36.304, of course, is independent of any obligation to provide auxiliary aids and services under Sec.36.303.

The statutory provision also requires the readily achievable removal of certain barriers in existing vehicles and rail passenger cars. This transportation requirement is not included in Sec.36.304, but rather in Sec.36.310(b) of the rule.

In striking a balance between guaranteeing access to individuals with disabilities and recognizing the legitimate cost concerns of businesses and other private entities, the ADA establishes different standards for existing facilities and new construction. In existing facilities, which are the subject of Sec.36.304, where retrofitting may prove costly, a less rigorous degree of accessibility is required than in the case of new construction and alterations (see Sec. 36.401 – 36.406) where accessibility can be more conveniently and economically incorporated in the initial stages of design and construction.

For example, a bank with existing automatic teller machines (ATM’s) would have to remove barriers to the use of the ATM’s, if it is readily achievable to do so. Whether or not it is necessary to take actions such as ramping a few steps or raising or lowering an ATM would be determined by whether the actions can be accomplished easily and without much difficulty or expense.

On the other hand, a newly constructed bank with ATM’s would be required by Sec.36.401 to have an ATM that is “readily accessible to and usable by” persons with disabilities in accordance with accessibility guidelines incorporated under Sec.36.406.

The requirement to remove architectural barriers includes the removal of physical barriers of any kind. For example, Sec.36.304 requires the removal, when readily achievable, of barriers caused by the location of temporary or movable structures, such as furniture, equipment, and display racks. In order to provide access to individuals who use wheelchairs, for example, restaurants may need to rearrange tables and chairs, and department stores may need to reconfigure display racks and shelves. As stated in Sec.36.304(f), such actions are not readily achievable to the extent that they would result in a significant loss of selling or serving space. If the widening of all aisles in selling or serving areas is not readily achievable, then selected widening should be undertaken to maximize the amount of merchandise or the number of tables accessible to individuals who use wheelchairs. Access to goods and services provided in any remaining inaccessible areas must be made available through alternative methods to barrier removal, as required by Sec.36.305.

Because the purpose of title III of the ADA is to ensure that public accommodations are accessible to their customers, clients, or patrons (as opposed to their employees, who are the focus of title I), the obligation to remove barriers under Sec.36.304 does not extend to areas of a facility that are used exclusively as employee work areas.

Section 36.304(b) provides a wide-ranging list of the types of modest measures that may be taken to remove barriers and that are likely to be readily achievable. The list includes examples of measures, such as adding raised letter markings on elevator control buttons and installing flashing alarm lights, that would be used to remove communications barriers that are structural in nature. It is not an exhaustive list, but merely an illustrative one. Moreover, the inclusion of a measure on this list does not mean that it is readily achievable in all cases. Whether or not any of these measures is readily achievable is to be determined on a case-by-case basis in light of the particular circumstances presented and the factors listed in the definition of readily achievable (Sec.36.104).

A public accommodation generally would not be required to remove a barrier to physical access posed by a flight of steps, if removal would require extensive ramping or an elevator. Ramping a single step, however, will likely be readily achievable, and ramping several steps will in many circumstances also be readily achievable. The readily achievable standard does not require barrier removal that requires extensive restructuring or burdensome expense. Thus, where it is not readily achievable to do, the ADA would not require a restaurant to provide access to a restroom reachable only by a flight of stairs.

Like Sec.36.405, this section permits deference to the national interest in preserving significant historic structures. Barrier removal would not be considered “readily achievable” if it would threaten or destroy the historic significance of a building or facility that is eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places under the National Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. 470, et seq.), or is designated as historic under State or local law.

The readily achievable defense requires a less demanding level of exertion by a public accommodation than does the undue burden defense to the auxiliary aids requirements of Sec.36.303. In that sense, it can be characterized as a “lower” standard than the undue burden standard. The readily achievable defense is also less demanding than the undue hardship defense in section 102(b)(5) of the ADA, which limits the obligation to make reasonable accommodation in employment. Barrier removal measures that are not easily accomplishable and are not able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense are not required under the readily achievable standard, even if they do not impose an undue burden or an undue hardship.

Section 36.304(f)(1) of the proposed rule, which stated that “barrier removal is not readily achievable if it would result in significant loss of profit or significant loss of efficiency of operation,” has been deleted from the final rule. Many commenters objected to this provision because it impermissibly introduced the notion of profit into a statutory standard that did not include it. Concern was expressed that, in order for an action not to be considered readily achievable, a public accommodation would inappropriately have to show, for example, not only that the action could not be done without “much difficulty or expense”, but that a significant loss of profit would result as well. In addition, some commenters asserted use of the word “significant,” which is used in the definition of undue hardship under title I (the standard for interpreting the meaning of undue burden as a defense to title III’s auxiliary aids requirements) (see Sec. 36.104, 36.303(f)), blurs the fact that the readily achievable standard requires a lower level of effort on the part of a public accommodation than does the undue burden standard.

The obligation to engage in readily achievable barrier removal is a continuing one. Over time, barrier removal that initially was not readily achievable may later be required because of changed circumstances. Many commenters expressed support for the Department’s position that the obligation to comply with Sec.36.304 is continuing in nature. Some urged that the rule require public accommodations to assess their compliance on at least an annual basis in light of changes in resources and other factors that would be relevant to determining what barrier removal measures would be readily achievable.

Although the obligation to engage in readily achievable barrier removal is clearly a continuing duty, the Department has declined to establish any independent requirement for an annual assessment or self-evaluation. It is best left to the public accommodations subject to Sec.36.304 to establish policies to assess compliance that are appropriate to the particular circumstances faced by the wide range of public accommodations covered by the ADA. However, even in the absence of an explicit regulatory requirement for periodic self-evaluations, the Department still urges public accommodations to establish procedures for an ongoing assessment of their compliance with the ADA’s barrier removal requirements. The Department recommends that this process include appropriate consultation with individuals with disabilities or organizations representing them. A serious effort at self-assessment and consultation can diminish the threat of litigation and save resources by identifying the most efficient means of providing required access.

The Department has been asked for guidance on the best means for public accommodations to comply voluntarily with this section. Such information is more appropriately part of the Department’s technical assistance effort and will be forthcoming over the next several months. The Department recommends, however, the development of an implementation plan designed to achieve compliance with the ADA’s barrier removal requirements before they become effective on January 26, 1992. Such a plan, if appropriately designed and diligently executed, could serve as evidence of a good faith effort to comply with the requirements of Sec.36.104. In developing an implementation plan for readily achievable barrier removal, a public accommodation should consult with local organizations representing persons with disabilities and solicit their suggestions for cost-effective means of making individual places of public accommodation accessible. Such organizations may also be helpful in allocating scarce resources and establishing priorities. Local associations of businesses may want to encourage this process and serve as the forum for discussions on the local level between disability rights organizations and local businesses.

Section 36.304(c) recommends priorities for public accommodations in removing barriers in existing facilities. Because the resources available for barrier removal may not be adequate to remove all existing barriers at any given time, Sec.36.304(c) suggests priorities for determining which types of barriers should be mitigated or eliminated first. The purpose of these priorities is to facilitate long-term business planning and to maximize, in light of limited resources, the degree of effective access that will result from any given level of expenditure.

Although many commenters expressed support for the concept of establishing priorities, a significant number objected to their mandatory nature in the proposed rule. The Department shares the concern of these commenters that mandatory priorities would increase the likelihood of litigation and inappropriately reduce the discretion of public accommodations to determine the most effective mix of barrier removal measures to undertake in particular circumstances. Therefore, in the final rule the priorities are no longer mandatory.

In response to comments that the priorities failed to address communications issues, the Department wishes to emphasize that the priorities encompass the removal of communications barriers that are structural in nature. It would be counter to the ADA’s carefully wrought statutory scheme to include in this provision the wide range of communication devices that are required by the ADA’s provisions on auxiliary aids and services. The final rule explicitly includes Brailled and raised letter signage and visual alarms among the examples of steps to remove barriers provided in Sec.36.304(c)(2).

Section 36.304(c)(1) places the highest priority on measures that will enable individuals with disabilities to physically enter a place of public accommodation. This priority on “getting through the door” recognizes that providing actual physical access to a facility from public sidewalks, public transportation, or parking is generally preferable to any alternative arrangements in terms of both business efficiency and the dignity of individuals with disabilities.

The next priority, which is established in Sec.36.304(c)(2), is for measures that provide access to those areas of a place of public accommodation where goods and services are made available to the public. For example, in a hardware store, to the extent that it is readily achievable to do so, individuals with disabilities should be given access not only to assistance at the front desk, but also access, like that available to other customers, to the retail display areas of the store.

The Department agrees with those commenters who argued that access to the areas where goods and services are provided is generally more important than the provision of restrooms. Therefore, the final rule reverses priorities two and three of the proposed rule in order to give lower priority to accessible restrooms. Consequently, the third priority in the final rule (Sec.36.304(c)(3)) is for measures to provide access to restroom facilities and the last priority is placed on any remaining measures required to remove barriers.

Section 36.304(d) requires that measures taken to remove barriers under Sec.36.304 be subject to subpart D’s requirements for alterations (except for the path of travel requirements in Sec.36.403). It only permits deviations from the subpart D requirements when compliance with those requirements is not readily achievable. In such cases, Sec.36.304(d) permits measures to be taken that do not fully comply with the subpart D requirements, so long as the measures do not pose a significant risk to the health or safety of individuals with disabilities or others.

This approach represents a change from the proposed rule which stated that “readily achievable” measures taken solely to remove barriers under Sec.36.304 are exempt from the alterations requirements of subpart D. The intent of the proposed rule was to maximize the flexibility of public accommodations in undertaking barrier removal by allowing deviations from the technical standards of subpart D. It was thought that allowing slight deviations would provide access and release additional resources for expanding the amount of barrier removal that could be obtained under the readily achievable standard.

Many commenters, however, representing both businesses and individuals with disabilities, questioned this approach because of the likelihood that unsafe or ineffective measures would be taken in the absence of the subpart D standards for alterations as a reference point. Some advocated a rule requiring strict compliance with the subpart D standard.

The Department in the final rule has adopted the view of many commenters that (1) public accommodations should in the first instance be required to comply with the subpart D standards for alterations where it is readily achievable to do so and (2) safe, readily achievable measures must be taken when compliance with the subpart D standards is not readily achievable. Reference to the subpart D standards in this manner will promote certainty and good design at the same time that permitting slight deviations will expand the amount of barrier removal that may be achieved under Sec.36.304.

Because of the inconvenience to individuals with disabilities and the safety problems involved in the use of portable ramps, Sec.36.304(e) permits the use of a portable ramp to comply with Sec.36.304(a) only when installation of a permanent ramp is not readily achievable. In order to promote safety, Sec.36.304(e) requires that due consideration be given to the incorporation of features such as nonslip surfaces, railings, anchoring, and strength of materials in any portable ramp that is used.

Temporary facilities brought in for use at the site of a natural disaster are subject to the barrier removal requirements of Sec.36.304.

A number of commenters requested clarification regarding how to determine when a public accommodation has discharged its obligation to remove barriers in existing facilities. For example, is a hotel required by Sec.36.304 to remove barriers in all of its guest rooms? Or is some lesser percentage adequate? A new paragraph (g) has been added to Sec.36.304 to address this issue. The Department believes that the degree of barrier removal required under Sec.36.304 may be less, but certainly would not be required to exceed, the standards for alterations under the ADA Accessibility Guidelines incorporated by subpart D of this part (ADAAG). The ADA’s requirements for readily achievable barrier removal in existing facilities are intended to be substantially less rigorous than those for new construction and alterations. It, therefore, would be obviously inappropriate to require actions under Sec.36.304 that would exceed the ADAAG requirements. Hotels, then, in order to satisfy the requirements of Sec.36.304, would not be required to remove barriers in a higher percentage of rooms than required by ADAAG. If relevant standards for alterations are not provided in ADAAG, then reference should be made to the standards for new construction.

Section 36.305 Alternatives to Barrier Removal

Section 36.305 specifies that where a public accommodation can demonstrate that removal of a barrier is not readily achievable, the public accommodation must make its goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations available through alternative methods, if such methods are readily achievable. This requirement is based on section 302(b)(2)(A)(v) of the ADA.

For example, if it is not readily achievable for a retail store to raise, lower, or remove shelves or to rearrange display racks to provide accessible aisles, the store must, if readily achievable, provide a clerk or take other alternative measures to retrieve inaccessible merchandise. Similarly, if it is not readily achievable to ramp a long flight of stairs leading to the front door of a restaurant or a pharmacy, the restaurant or the pharmacy must take alternative measures, if readily achievable, such as providing curb service or home delivery. If, within a restaurant, it is not readily achievable to remove physical barriers to a certain section of a restaurant, the restaurant must, where it is readily achievable to do so, offer the same menu in an accessible area of the restaurant.

Where alternative methods are used to provide access, a public accommodation may not charge an individual with a disability for the costs associated with the alternative method (see Sec.36.301(c)). Further analysis of the issue of charging for alternative measures may be found in the preamble discussion of Sec.36.301(c).

In some circumstances, because of security considerations, some alternative methods may not be readily achievable. The rule does not require a cashier to leave his or her post to retrieve items for individuals with disabilities, if there are no other employees on duty.

Section 36.305(c) of the proposed rule has been deleted and the requirements have been included in a new Sec.36.306. That section makes clear that the alternative methods requirement does not mandate the provision of personal devices, such as wheelchairs, or services of a personal nature.

In the final rule, Sec.36.305(c) provides specific requirements regarding alternatives to barrier removal in multiscreen cinemas. In some situations, it may not be readily achievable to remove enough barriers to provide access to all of the theaters of a multiscreen cinema. If that is the case, Sec.36.305(c) requires the cinema to establish a film rotation schedule that provides reasonable access for individuals who use wheelchairs to films being presented by the cinema. It further requires that reasonable notice be provided to the public as to the location and time of accessible showings. Methods for providing notice include appropriate use of the international accessibility symbol in a cinema’s print advertising and the addition of accessibility information to a cinema’s recorded telephone information line.

Section 36.306 Personal Devices and Services

The final rule includes a new Sec.36.306, entitled “Personal devices and services.” Section 36.306 of the proposed rule, “Readily achievable and undue burden: Factors to be considered,” was deleted for the reasons described in the preamble discussion of the definition of the term “readily achievable” in Sec.36.104. In place of Sec. 36.303(g) and 36.305(c) of the proposed rule, which addressed the issue of personal devices and services in the contexts of auxiliary aids and alternatives to barrier removal, Sec.36.306 provides a general statement that the regulation does not require the provision of personal devices and services. This section states that a public accommodation is not required to provide its customers, clients, or participants with personal devices, such as wheelchairs; individually prescribed devices, such as prescription eyeglasses or hearing aids; or services of a personal nature including assistance in eating, toileting, or dressing.

This statement serves as a limitation on all the requirements of the regulation. The personal devices and services limitation was intended to have general application in the proposed rule in all contexts where it was relevant. The final rule, therefore, clarifies, this point by including a general provision that will explicitly apply not just to auxiliary aids and services and alternatives to barrier removal, but across-the-board to include such relevant areas as modifications in policies, practices, and procedures (Sec.36.302) and examinations and courses (Sec.36.309), as well.

The Department wishes to clarify that measures taken as alternatives to barrier removal, such as retrieving items from shelves or providing curb service or home delivery, are not to be considered personal services. Similarly, minimal actions that may be required as modifications in policies, practices, or procedures under Sec.36.302, such as a waiter’s removing the cover from a customer’s straw, a kitchen’s cutting up food into smaller pieces, or a bank’s filling out a deposit slip, are not services of a personal nature within the meaning of Sec.36.306. (Of course, such modifications may be required under Sec.36.302 only if they are “reasonable.”) Similarly, this section does not preclude the short-term loan of personal receivers that are part of an assistive listening system.

Of course, if personal services are customarily provided to the customers or clients of a public accommodation, e.g., in a hospital or senior citizen center, then these personal services should also be provided to persons with disabilities using the public accommodation.

Section 36.307 Accessible or Special Goods.

Section 36.307 establishes that the rule does not require a public accommodation to alter its inventory to include accessible or special goods with accessibility features that are designed for, or facilitate use by, individuals with disabilities. As specified in Sec.36.307(c), accessible or special goods include such items as Brailled versions of books, books on audio-cassettes, closed captioned video tapes, special sizes or lines of clothing, and special foods to meet particular dietary needs.

The purpose of the ADA’s public accommodations requirements is to ensure accessibility to the goods offered by a public accommodation, not to alter the nature or mix of goods that the public accommodation has typically provided. In other words, a bookstore, for example, must make its facilities and sales operations accessible to individuals with disabilities, but is not required to stock Brailled or large print books. Similarly, a video store must make its facilities and rental operations accessible, but is not required to stock closed-captioned video tapes. The Department has been made aware, however, that the most recent titles in video-tape rental establishments are, in fact, closed captioned.

Although a public accommodation is not required by Sec.36.307(a) to modify its inventory, it is required by Sec.36.307(b), at the request of an individual with disabilities, to order accessible or special goods that it does not customarily maintain in stock if, in the normal course of its operation, it makes special orders for unstocked goods, and if the accessible or special goods can be obtained from a supplier with whom the public accommodation customarily does business. For example, a clothing store would be required to order specially-sized clothing at the request of an individual with a disability, if it customarily makes special orders for clothing that it does not keep in stock, and if the clothing can be obtained from one of the store’s customary suppliers.

One commenter asserted that the proposed rule could be interpreted to require a store to special order accessible or special goods of all types, even if only one type is specially ordered in the normal course of its business. The Department, however, intends for Sec.36.307(b) to require special orders only of those particular types of goods for which a public accommodation normally makes special orders. For example, a book and recording store would not have to specially order Brailled books if, in the normal course of its business, it only specially orders recordings and not books.

Section 36.308 Seating in Assembly Areas.

Section 36.308 establishes specific requirements for removing barriers to physical access in assembly areas, which include such facilities as theaters, concert halls, auditoriums, lecture halls, and conference rooms. This section does not address the provision of auxiliary aids or the removal of communications barriers that are structural in nature. These communications requirements are the focus of other provisions of the regulation (see Sec. 36.303 – 36.304).

Individuals who use wheelchairs historically have been relegated to inferior seating in the back of assembly areas separate from accompanying family members and friends. The provisions of Sec.36.308 are intended to promote integration and equality in seating.

In some instances it may not be readily achievable for auditoriums or theaters to remove seats to allow individuals with wheelchairs to sit next to accompanying family members or friends. In these situations, the final rule retains the requirement that the public accommodation provide portable chairs or other means to allow the accompanying individuals to sit with the persons in wheelchairs. Persons in wheelchairs should have the same opportunity to enjoy movies, plays, and similar events with their families and friends, just as other patrons do. The final rule specifies that portable chairs or other means to permit family members or companions to sit with individuals who use wheelchairs must be provided only when it is readily achievable to do so.

In order to facilitate seating of wheelchair users who wish to transfer to existing seating, paragraph (a)(1) of the final rule adds a requirement that, to the extent readily achievable, a reasonable number of seats with removable aisle-side armrests must be provided. Many persons in wheelchairs are able to transfer to existing seating with this relatively minor modification. This solution avoids the potential safety hazard created by the use of portable chairs and fosters integration. The final ADA Accessibility Guidelines incorporated by subpart D (ADAAG) also add a requirement regarding aisle seating that was not in the proposed guidelines. In situations when a person in a wheelchair transfers to existing seating, the public accommodation shall provide assistance in handling the wheelchair of the patron with the disability.

Likewise, consistent vith ADAAG, the final rule adds in Sec.36.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) a requirement that, to the extent readily achievable, wheelchair seating provide lines of sight and choice of admission prices comparable to those for members of the general public.

Finally, because Congress intended that the requirements for barrier removal in existing facilities be substantially less rigorous than those required for new construction and alterations, the final rule clarifies in Sec.36.308(a)(3) that in no event can the requirements for existing facilities be interpreted to exceed the standards for alterations under ADAAG. For example, Sec.4.33 of ADAAG only requires wheelchair spaces to be provided in more than one location when the seating capacity of the assembly area exceeds 300. Therefore, paragraph (a) of Sec.36.308 may not be interpreted to require readily achievable dispersal of wheelchair seating in assembly areas with 300 or fewer seats. Similarly, Sec.4.1.3(19) of ADAAG requires six accessible wheelchair locations in an assembly area with 301 to 500 seats. The reasonable number of wheelchair locations required by paragraph (a), therefore, may be less than six, but may not be interpreted to exceed six.

Proposed Section 36.309 Purchase of Furniture and Equipment

Section 36.309 of the proposed rule would have required that newly purchased furniture or equipment made available for use at a place of public accommodation be accessible, to the extent such furniture or equipment is available, unless this requirement would fundamentally alter the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations offered, or would not be readily achievable. Proposed Sec.36.309 has been omitted from the final rule because the Department has determined that its requirements are more properly addressed under other sections, and because there are currently no appropriate accessibility standards addressing many types of furniture and equipment.

Some types of equipment will be required to meet the accessibility requirements of subpart D. For example, ADAAG establishes technical and scoping requirements in new construction and alterations for automated teller machines and telephones. Purchase or modification of equipment is required in certain instances by the provisions in Sec. 36.201 and 36.202. For example, an arcade may need to provide accessible video machines in order to ensure full and equal enjoyment of the facilities and to provide an opportunity to participate in the services and facilities it provides. The barrier removal requirements of Sec.36.304 will apply as well to furniture and equipment (lowering shelves, rearranging furniture, adding Braille labels to a vending machine).

Section 36.309 Examinations and Courses

Section 36.309(a) sets forth the general rule that any private entity that offers examinations or courses related to applications, licensing, certification, or credentialing for secondary or postsecondary education, professional, or trade purposes shall offer such examinations or courses in a place and manner accessible to persons with disabilities or offer alternative accessible arrangements for such individuals.

Paragraph (a) restates section 309 of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Section 309 is intended to fill the gap that is created when licensing, certification, and other testing authorities are not covered by section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act or title II of the ADA. Any such authority that is covered by section 504, because of the receipt of Federal money, or by title II, because it is a function of a State or local government, must make all of its programs accessible to persons with disabilities, which includes physical access as well as modifications in the way the test is administered, e.g., extended time, written instructions, or assistance of a reader.

Many licensing, certification, and testing authorities are not covered by section 504, because no Federal money is received; nor are they covered by title II of the ADA because they are not State or local agencies. However, States often require the licenses provided by such authorities in order for an individual to practice a particular profession or trade. Thus, the provision was included in the ADA in order to assure that persons with disabilities are not foreclosed from educational, professional, or trade opportunities because an examination or course is conducted in an inaccessible site or without needed modifications.

As indicated in the “Application” section of this part (Sec.36.102), Sec.36.309 applies to any private entity that offers the specified types of examinations or courses. This is consistent with section 309 of the Americans with Disabilities Act, which states that the requirements apply to “any person” offering examinations or courses.

The Department received a large number of comments on this section, reflecting the importance of ensuring that the key gateways to education and employment are open to individuals with disabilities. The most frequent comments were objections to the fundamental alteration and undue burden provisions in Sec. 36.309 (b)(3) and (c)(3) and to allowing courses and examinations to be provided through alternative accessible arrangements, rather than in an integrated setting.

Although section 309 of the Act does not refer to a fundamental alteration or undue burden limitation, those limitations do appear in section 302(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the Act, which establishes the obligation of public accommodations to provide auxiliary aids and services. The Department, therefore, included it in the paragraphs of Sec.36.309 requiring the provision of auxiliary aids. One commenter argued that similar limitations should apply to all of the requirements of Sec.36.309, but the Department did not consider this extension appropriate.

Commenters who objected to permitting “alternative accessible arrangements” argued that such arrangements allow segregation and should not be permitted, unless they are the least restrictive available alternative, for example, for someone who cannot leave home. Some commenters made a distinction between courses, where interaction is an important part of the educational experience, and examinations, where it may be less important. Because the statute specifically authorizes alternative accessible arrangements as a method of meeting the requirements of section 309, the Department has not adopted this suggestion. The Department notes, however, that, while examinations of the type covered by Sec.36.309 may not be covered elsewhere in the regulation, courses will generally be offered in a “place of education,” which is included in the definition of “place of public accommodation” in Sec.36.104, and, therefore, will be subject to the integrated setting requirement of Sec.36.203.

Section 36.309(b) sets forth specific requirements for examinations. Examinations covered by this section would include a bar exam or the Scholastic Aptitude Test prepared by the Educational Testing Service. Paragraph (b)(1) is adopted from the Department of Education’s section 504 regulation on admission tests to postsecondary educational programs (34 CFR 104.42(b)(3)). Paragraph (b)(1)(i) requires that a private entity offering an examination covered by the section must assure that the examination is selected and administered so as to best ensure that the examination accurately reflects an individual’s aptitude or achievement level or other factor the examination purports to measure, rather than reflecting the individual’s impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills (except where those skills are the factors that the examination purports to measure).

Paragraph (b)(1)(ii) requires that any examination specially designed for individuals with disabilities be offered as often and in as timely a manner as other examinations. Some commenters noted that persons with disabilities may be required to travel long distances when the locations for examinations for individuals with disabilities are limited, for example, to only one city in a State instead of a variety of cities. The Department has therefore revised this paragraph to add a requirement that such examinations be offered at locations that are as convenient as the location of other examinations.

Commenters representing organizations that administer tests wanted to be able to require individuals with disabilities to provide advance notice and appropriate documentation, at the applicants” expense, of their disabilities and of any modifications or aids that would be required. The Department agrees that such requirements are permissible, provided that they are not unreasonable and that the deadline for such notice is no earlier than the deadline for others applying to take the examination. Requiring individuals with disabilities to file earlier applications would violate the requirement that examinations designed for individuals with disabilities be offered in as timely a manner as other examinations.

Examiners may require evidence that an applicant is entitled to modifications or aids as required by this section, but requests for documentation must be reasonable and must be limited to the need for the modification or aid requested. Appropriate documentation might include a letter from a physician or other professional, or evidence of a prior diagnosis or accommodation, such as eligibility for a special education program. The applicant may be required to bear the cost of providing such documentation, but the entity administering the examination cannot charge the applicant for the cost of any modifications or auxiliary aids, such as interpreters, provided for the examination.

Paragraph (b)(1)(iii) requires that examinations be administered in facilities that are accessible to individuals with disabilities or alternative accessible arrangements are made.

Paragraph (b)(2) gives examples of modifications to examinations that may be necessary in order to comply with this section. These may include providing more time for completion of the examination or a change in the manner of giving the examination, e.g., reading the examination to the individual.

Paragraph (b)(3) requires the provision of auxiliary aids and services, unless the private entity offering the examination can demonstrate that offering a particular auxiliary aid would fundamentally alter the examination or result in an undue burden. Examples of auxiliary aids include taped examinations, interpreters or other effective methods of making aurally delivered materials available to individuals with hearing impairments, readers for individuals with visual impairments or learning disabilities, and other similar services and actions. The suggestion that individuals with learning disabilities may need readers is included, although it does not appear in the Department of Education regulation, because, in fact, some individuals with learning disabilities have visual perception problems and would benefit from a reader.

Many commenters pointed out the importance of ensuring that modifications provide the individual with a disability an equal opportunity to demonstrate his or her knowledge or ability. For example, a reader who is unskilled or lacks knowledge of specific terminology used in the examination may be unable to convey the information in the questions or to follow the applicant’s instructions effectively. Commenters pointed out that, for persons with visual impairments who read Braille, Braille provides the closest functional equivalent to a printed test. The Department has, therefore, added Brailled examinations to the examples of auxiliary aids and services that may be required. For similar reasons, the Department also added to the list of examples of auxiliary aids and services large print examinations and answer sheets; “qualified” readers; and transcribers to write answers.

A commenter suggested that the phrase “fundamentally alter the examination” in this paragraph of the proposed rule be revised to more accurately reflect the function affected. In the final rule the Department has substituted the phrase “fundamentally alter the measurement of the skills or knowledge the examination is intended to test.”

Paragraph (b)(4) gives examples of alternative accessible arrangements. For instance, the private entity might be required to provide the examination at an individual’s home with a proctor. Alternative arrangements must provide conditions for individuals with disabilities that are comparable to the conditions under which other individuals take the examinations. In other words, an examination cannot be offered to an individual with a disability in a cold, poorly lit basement, if other individuals are given the examination in a warm, well lit classroom.

Some commenters who provide examinations for licensing or certification for particular occupations or professions urged that they be permitted to refuse to provide modifications or aids for persons seeking to take the examinations if those individuals, because of their disabilities, would be unable to perform the essential functions of the profession or occupation for which the examination is given, or unless the disability is reasonably determined in advance as not being an obstacle to certification. The Department has not changed its rule based on this comment. An examination is one stage of a licensing or certification process. An individual should not be barred from attempting to pass that stage of the process merely because he or she might be unable to meet other requirements of the process. If the examination is not the first stage of the qualification process, an applicant may be required to complete the earlier stages prior to being admitted to the examination. On the other hand, the applicant may not be denied admission to the examination on the basis of doubts about his or her abilities to meet requirements that the examination is not designed to test.

Paragraph (c) sets forth specific requirements for courses. Paragraph (c)(1) contains the general rule that any course covered by this section must be modified to ensure that the place and manner in which the course is given is accessible. Paragraph (c)(2) gives examples of possible modifications that might be required, including extending the time permitted for completion of the course, permitting oral rather than written delivery of an assignment by a person with a visual impairment, or adapting the manner in which the course is conducted (i.e., providing cassettes of class handouts to an individual with a visual impairment). In response to comments, the Department has added to the examples in paragraph (c)(2) specific reference to distribution of course materials. If course materials are published and available from other sources, the entity offering the course may give advance notice of what materials will be used so as to allow an individual to obtain them in Braille or on tape but materials provided by the course offerer must be made available in alternative formats for individuals with disabilities.

In language similar to that of paragraph (b), paragraph (c)(3) requires auxiliary aids and services, unless a fundamental alteration or undue burden would result, and paragraph (c)(4) requires that courses be administered in accessible facilities. Paragraph (c)(5) gives examples of alternative accessible arrangements. These may include provision of the course through videotape, cassettes, or prepared notes. Alternative arrangements must provide comparable conditions to those provided to others, including similar lighting, room temperature, and the like. An entity offering a variety of courses, to fulfill continuing education requirements for a profession, for example, may not limit the selection or choice of courses available to individuals with disabilities.

Section 36.310 Transportation Provided by Public Accommodations

Section 36.310 contains specific provisions relating to public accommodations that provide transportation to their clients or customers. This section has been substantially revised in order to coordinate the requirements of this section with the requirements applicable to these transportation systems that will be contained in the regulations issued by the Secretary of Transportation pursuant to section 306 of the ADA, to be codified at 49 CFR part 37. The Department notes that, although the responsibility for issuing regulations applicable to transportation systems operated by public accommodations is divided between this Department and the Department of – Transportation, enforcement authority is assigned only to the Department of Justice.

The Department received relatively few comments on this section of the proposed rule. Most of the comments addressed issues that are not specifically addressed in this part, such as the standards for accessible vehicles and the procedure for determining whether equivalent service is provided. Those standards will be contained in the regulation issued by the Department of Transportation. Other commenters raised questions about the types of transportation that will be subject to this section. In response to these inquiries, the Department has revised the list of examples contained in the regulation.

Paragraph (a)(1) states the general rule that covered public accommodations are subject to all of the specific provisions of subparts B, C, and D, except as provided in Sec.36.310. Examples of operations covered by the requirements are listed in paragraph (a)(2). The stated examples include hotel and motel airport shuttle services, customer shuttle bus services operated by private companies and shopping centers, student transportation, and shuttle operations of recreational facilities such as stadiums, zoos, amusement parks, and ski resorts. This brief list is not exhaustive. The section applies to any fixed route or demand responsive transportation system operated by a public accommodation for the benefit of its clients or customers. The section does not apply to transportation services provided only to employees. Employee transportation will be subject to the regulations issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to implement title I of the Act. However, if employees and customers or clients are served by the same transportation system, the provisions of this section will apply.

Paragraph (b) specifically provides that a public accommodation shall remove transportation barriers in existing vehicles to the extent that it is readily achievable to do so, but that the installation of hydraulic or other lifts is not required.

Paragraph (c) provides that public accommodations subject to this section shall comply with the requirements for transportation vehicles and systems contained in the regulations issued by the Secretary of Transportation.

Subpart D – New Construction and Alterations

Subpart D implements section 303 of the Act, which requires that newly constructed or altered places of public accommodation or commercial facilities be readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities. This requirement contemplates a high degree of convenient access. It is intended to ensure that patrons and employees of places of public accommodation and employees of commercial facilities are able to get to, enter, and use the facility.

Potential patrons of places of public accommodation, such as retail establishments, should be able to get to a store, get into the store, and get to the areas where goods are being provided. Employees should have the same types of access, although those individuals require access to and around the employment area as well as to the area in which goods and services are provided.

The ADA is geared to the future – its goal being that, over time, access will be the rule, rather than the exception. Thus, the Act only requires modest expenditures, of the type addressed in Sec.36.304 of this part, to provide access to existing facilities not otherwise being altered, but requires all new construction and alterations to be accessible.

The Act does not require new construction or alterations; it simply requires that, when a public accommodation or other private entity undertakes the construction or alteration of a facility subject to the Act, the newly constructed or altered facility must be made accessible. This subpart establishes the requirements for new construction and alterations.

As explained under the discussion of the definition of “facility,” Sec.36.104, pending development of specific requirements, the Department will not apply this subpart to places of public accommodation located in mobile units, boats, or other conveyances.

Section 36.401 New Construction

General

Section 36.401 implements the new construction requirements of the ADA. Section 303 (a)(1) of the Act provides that discrimination for purposes of section 302(a) of the Act includes a failure to design and construct facilities for first occupancy later than 30 months after the date of enactment (i.e., after January 26, 1993) that are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.

Paragraph 36.401(a)(1) restates the general requirement for accessible new construction. The proposed rule stated that “any public accommodation or other private entity responsible for design and construction” must ensure that facilities conform to this requirement. Various commenters suggested that the proposed language was not consistent with the statute because it substituted “private entity responsible for design and construction” for the statutory language; because it did not address liability on the part of architects, contractors, developers, tenants, owners, and other entities; and because it limited the liability of entities responsible for commercial facilities. In response, the Department has revised this paragraph to repeat the language of section 303(a) of the ADA. The Department will interpret this section in a manner consistent with the intent of the statute and with the nature of the responsibilities of the various entities for design, for construction, or for both.

Designed and Constructed for First Occupancy

According to paragraph (a)(2), a facility is subject to the new construction requirements only if a completed application for a building permit or permit extension is filed after January 26, 1992, and the facility is occupied after January 26, 1993.

The proposed rule set forth for comment two alternative ways by which to determine what facilities are subject to the Act and what standards apply. Paragraph (a)(2) of the final rule is a slight variation on Option One in the proposed rule. The reasons for the Department’s choice of Option One are discussed later in this section.

Paragraph (a)(2) acknowledges that Congress did not contemplate having actual occupancy be the sole trigger for the accessibility requirements, because the statute prohibits a failure to “design and construct for first occupancy,” rather than requiring accessibility in facilities actually occupied after a particular date.

The commenters overwhelmingly agreed with the Department’s proposal to use a date certain; many cited the reasons given in the preamble to the proposed rule. First, it is helpful for designers and builders to have a fixed date for accessible design, so that they can determine accessibility requirements early in the planning and design stage. It is difficult to determine accessibility requirements in anticipation of the actual date of first occupancy because of unpredictable and uncontrollable events (e.g., strikes affecting suppliers or labor, or natural disasters) that may delay occupancy. To redesign or reconstruct portions of a facility if it begins to appear that occupancy will be later than anticipated would be quite costly. A fixed date also assists those responsible for enforcing, or monitoring compliance with, the statute, and those protected by it.

The Department considered using as a trigger date for application of the accessibility standards the date on which a permit is granted. The Department chose instead the date on which a complete permit application is certified as received by the appropriate government entity. Almost all commenters agreed with this choice of a trigger date. This decision is based partly on information that several months or even years can pass between application for a permit and receipt of a permit. Design is virtually complete at the time an application is complete (i.e., certified to contain all the information required by the State, county, or local government). After an application is filed, delays may occur before the permit is granted due to numerous factors (not necessarily relating to accessibility): for example, hazardous waste discovered on the property, flood plain requirements, zoning disputes, or opposition to the project from various groups. These factors should not require redesign for accessibility if the application was completed before January 26, 1992. However, if the facility must be redesigned for other reasons, such as a change in density or environmental preservation, and the final permit is based on a new application, the rule would require accessibility if that application was certified complete after January 26, 1992.

The certification of receipt of a complete application for a building permit is an appropriate point in the process because certifications are issued in writing by governmental authorities. In addition, this approach presents a clear and objective standard.

However, a few commenters pointed out that in some jurisdictions it is not possible to receive a “certification” that an application is complete, and suggested that in those cases the fixed date should be the date on which an application for a permit is received by the government agency. The Department has included such a provision in Sec.36.401(a)(2)(i).

The date of January 26, 1992, is relevant only with respect to the last application for a permit or permit extension for a facility. Thus, if an entity has applied for only a “foundation” permit, the date of that permit application has no effect, because the entity must also apply for and receive a permit at a later date for the actual superstructure. In this case, it is the date of the later application that would control, unless construction is not completed within the time allowed by the permit, in which case a third permit would be issued and the date of the application for that permit would be determinative for purposes of the rule.

Choice of Option One for Defining “Designed and Constructed for First Occupancy”

Under the option the Department has chosen for determining applicability of the new construction standards, a building would be considered to be “for first occupancy” after January 26, 1993, only (1) if the last application for a building permit or permit extension for the facility is certified to be complete (or, in some jurisdictions, received) by a State, county, or local government after January 26, 1992, and (2) if the first certificate of occupancy is issued after January 26, 1993. The Department also asked for comment on an Option Two, which would have imposed new construction requirements if a completed application for a building permit or permit extension was filed after the enactment of the ADA (July 26, 1990), and the facility was occupied after January 26, 1993.

The request for comment on this issue drew a large number of comments expressing a wide range of views. Most business groups and some disability rights groups favored Option One, and some business groups and most disability rights groups favored Option Two. Individuals and government entities were equally divided; several commenters proposed other options.

Those favoring Option One pointed out that it is more reasonable in that it allows time for those subject to the new construction requirements to anticipate those requirements and to receive technical assistance pursuant to the Act. Numerous commenters said that time frames for designing and constructing some types of facilities (for example, health care facilities) can range from two to four years or more. They expressed concerns that Option Two, which would apply to some facilities already under design or construction as of the date the Act was signed, and to some on which construction began shortly after enactment, could result in costly redesign or reconstruction of those facilities. In the same vein, some Option One supporters found Option Two objectionable on due process grounds. In their view, Option Two would mean that in July 1991 (upon issuance of the final DOJ rule) the responsible entities would learn that ADA standards had been in effect since July 26, 1990, and this would amount to retroactive application of standards. Numerous commenters characterized Option Two as having no support in the statute and Option One as being more consistent with congressional intent.

Those who favored Option Two pointed out that it would include more facilities within the coverage of the new construction standards. They argued that because similar accessibility requirements are in effect under State laws, no hardship would be imposed by this option. Numerous commenters said that hardship would also be eliminated in light of their view that the ADA requires compliance with the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards (UFAS) until issuance of DOJ standards. Those supporting Option Two claimed that it was more consistent with the statute and its legislative history.

The Department has chosen Option One rather than Option Two, primarily on the basis of the language of three relevant sections of the statute. First, section 303(a) requires compliance with accessibility standards set forth, or incorporated by reference in, regulations to be issued by the Department of Justice. Standing alone, this section cannot be read to require compliance with the Department’s standards before those standards are issued (through this rulemaking). Second, according to section 310 of the statute, section 303 becomes effective on January 26, 1992. Thus, section 303 cannot impose requirements on the design of buildings before that date. Third, while section 306(d) of the Act requires compliance with UFAS if final regulations have not been issued, that provision cannot reasonably be read to take effect until July 26, 1991, the date by which the Department of Justice must issue final regulations under title III.

Option Two was based on the premise that the interim standards in section 306(d) take effect as of the ADA’s enactment (July 26, 1990), rather than on the date by which the Department of Justice regulations are due to be issued (July 26, 1991). The initial clause of section 306(d)(1) itself is silent on this question:

If final regulations have not been issued pursuant to this section, for new construction for which a building permit is obtained prior to the issuance of final regulations (interim standards apply).

The approach in Option Two relies partly on the language of section 310 of the Act, which provides that section 306, the interim standards provision, takes effect on the date of enactment. Under this interpretation the interim standards provision would prevail over the operative provision, section 303, which requires that new construction be accessible and which becomes effective January 26, 1992. This approach would also require construing the language of section 306(d)(1) to take effect before the Department’s standards are due to be issued. The preferred reading of section 306 is that it would require that, if the Department’s final standards had not been issued by July 26, 1991, UFAS would apply to certain buildings until such time as the Department’s standards were issued.

General Substantive Requirements of the New Construction Provisions

The rule requires, as does the statute, that covered newly constructed facilities be readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities. The phrase “readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities” is a term that, in slightly varied formulations, has been used in the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, the Fair Housing Act, the regulations implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and current accessibility standards. It means, with respect to a facility or a portion of a facility, that it can be approached, entered, and used by individuals with disabilities (including mobility, sensory, and cognitive impairments) easily and conveniently. A facility that is constructed to meet the requirements of the rule’s accessibility standards will be considered readily accessible and usable with respect to construction. To the extent that a particular type or element of a facility is not specifically addressed by the standards, the language of this section is the safest guide.

A private entity that renders an “accessible” building inaccessible in its operation, through policies or practices, may be in violation of section 302 of the Act. For example, a private entity can render an entrance to a facility inaccessible by keeping an accessible entrance open only during certain hours (whereas the facility is available to others for a greater length of time). A facility could similarly be rendered inaccessible if a person with disabilities is significantly limited in her or his choice of a range of accommodations.

Ensuring access to a newly constructed facility will include providing access to the facility from the street or parking lot, to the extent the responsible entity has control over the route from those locations. In some cases, the private entity will have no control over access at the point where streets, curbs, or sidewalks already exist, and in those instances the entity is encouraged to request modifications to a sidewalk, including installation of curb cuts, from a public entity responsible for them. However, as some commenters pointed out, there is no obligation for a private entity subject to title III of the ADA to seek or ensure compliance by a public entity with title II. Thus, although a locality may have an obligation under title II of the Act to install curb cuts at a particular location, that responsibility is separate from the private entity’s title III obligation, and any involvement by a private entity in seeking cooperation from a public entity is purely voluntary in this context.

Work Areas

Proposed paragraph 36.401(b) addressed access to employment areas, rather than to the areas where goods or services are being provided. The preamble noted that the proposed paragraph provided guidance for new construction and alterations until more specific guidance was issued by the ATBCB and reflected in this Department’s regulation. The entire paragraph has been deleted from this section in the final rule. The concepts of paragraphs (b) (1), (2), and (5) of the proposed rule are included, with modifications and expansion, in ADAAG. Paragraphs (3) and (4) of the proposed rule, concerning fixtures and equipment, are not included in the rule or in ADAAG.

Some commenters asserted that questions relating to new construction and alterations of work areas should be addressed by the EEOC under title I, as employment concerns. However, the legislative history of the statute clearly indicates that the new construction and alterations requirements of title III were intended to ensure accessibility of new facilities to all individuals, including employees. The language of section 303 sweeps broadly in its application to all public accommodations and commercial facilities. EEOC’s title I regulations will address accessibility requirements that come into play when “reasonable accommodation” to individual employees or applicants with disabilities is mandated under title I.

The issues dealt with in proposed Sec.36.401(b) (1) and (2) are now addressed in ADAAG section 4.1.1(3). The Department’s proposed paragraphs would have required that areas that will be used only by employees as work stations be constructed so that individuals with disabilities could approach, enter, and exit the areas. They would not have required that all individual work stations be constructed or equipped (for example, with shelves that are accessible or adaptable) to be accessible. This approach was based on the theory that, as long as an employee with disabilities could enter the building and get to and around the employment area, modifications in a particular work station could be instituted as a “reasonable accommodation” to that employee if the modifications were necessary and they did not constitute an undue hardship.

Almost all of the commenters agreed with the proposal to require access to a work area but not to require accessibility of each individual work station. This principle is included in ADAAG 4.1.1(3). Several of the comments related to the requirements of the proposed ADAAG and have been addressed in the accessibility standards.

Proposed paragraphs (b) (3) and (4) would have required that consideration be given to placing fixtures and equipment at accessible heights in the first instance, and to purchasing new equipment and fixtures that are adjustable. These paragraphs have not been included in the final rule because the rule in most instances does not establish accessibility standards for purchased equipment. (See discussion elsewhere in the preamble of proposed Sec.36.309.) While the Department encourages entities to consider providing accessible or adjustable fixtures and equipment for employees, this rule does not require them to do so.

Paragraph (b)(5) of proposed Sec.36.401 clarified that proposed paragraph (b) did not limit the requirement that employee areas other than individual work stations must be accessible. For example, areas that are employee “common use” areas and are not solely used as work stations (e.g., employee lounges, cafeterias, health units, exercise facilities) are treated no differently under this regulation than other parts of a building; they must be constructed or altered in compliance with the accessibility standards. This principle is not stated in Sec.36.401 but is implicit in the requirements of this section and ADAAG.

Commercial Facilities in Private Residences

Section 36.401(b) of the final rule is a new provision relating to commercial facilities located in private residences. The proposed rule addressed these requirements in the preamble to Sec.36.207, “Places of public accommodation located in private residences.” The preamble stated that the approach for commercial facilities would be the same as that for places of public accommodation, i.e., those portions used exclusively as a commercial facility or used as both a commercial facility and for residential purposes would be covered. Because commercial facilities are only subject to new construction and alterations requirements, however, the covered portions would only be subject to subpart D. This approach is reflected in Sec.36.401(b)(1).

The Department is aware that the statutory definition of “commercial facility” excludes private residences because they are “expressly exempted from coverage under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, as amended.” However, the Department interprets that exemption as applying only to facilities that are exclusively residential. When a facility is used as both a residence and a commercial facility, the exemption does not apply.

Paragraph (b)(2) is similar to the new paragraph (b) under Sec.36.207, “Places of public accommodation located in private residences.” The paragraph clarifies that the covered portion includes not only the space used as a commercial facility, but also the elements used to enter the commercial facility, e.g., the homeowner’s front sidewalk, if any; the doorway; the hallways; the restroom, if used by employees or visitors of the commercial facility; and any other portion of the residence, interior or exterior, used by employees or visitors of the commercial facility.

As in the case of public accommodations located in private residences, the new construction standards only apply to the extent that a portion of the residence is designed or intended for use as a commercial facility. Likewise, if a homeowner alters a portion of his home to convert it to a commercial facility, that work must be done in compliance with the alterations standards in appendix A.

Structural Impracticability

Proposed Sec.36.401(c) is included in the final rule with minor changes. It details a statutory exception to the new construction requirement: the requirement that new construction be accessible does not apply where an entity can demonstrate that it is structurally impracticable to meet the requirements of the regulation. This provision is also included in ADAAG, at section 4.1.1(5)(a).

Consistent with the legislative history of the ADA, this narrow exception will apply only in rare and unusual circumstances where unique characteristics of terrain make accessibility unusually difficult. Such limitations for topographical problems are analogous to an acknowledged limitation in the application of the accessibility requirements of the Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA) of 1988.

Almost all commenters supported this interpretation. Two commenters argued that the DOJ requirement is too limiting and would not exempt some buildings that should be exempted because of soil conditions, terrain, and other unusual site conditions. These commenters suggested consistency with HUD’s Fair Housing Accessibility Guidelines (56 FR 9472 (1991)), which generally would allow exceptions from accessibility requirements, or allow compliance with less stringent requirements, on sites with slopes exceeding 10%.

The Department is aware of the provisions in HUD’s guidelines, which were issued on March 6, 1991, after passage of the ADA and publication of the Department’s proposed rule. The approach taken in these guidelines, which apply to different types of construction and implement different statutory requirements for new construction, does not bind this Department in regulating under the ADA. The Department has included in the final rule the substance of the proposed provision, which is faithful to the intent of the statute, as expressed in the legislative history. (See Senate report at 70 – 71; Education and Labor report at 120.)

The limited structural impracticability exception means that it is acceptable to deviate from accessibility requirements only where unique characteristics of terrain prevent the incorporation of accessibility features and where providing accessibility would destroy the physical integrity of a facility. A situation in which a building must be built on stilts because of its location in marshlands or over water is an example of one of the few situations in which the exception for structural impracticability would apply.

This exception to accessibility requirements should not be applied to situations in which a facility is located in “hilly” terrain or on a plot of land upon which there are steep grades. In such circumstances, accessibility can be achieved without destroying the physical integrity of a structure, and is required in the construction of new facilities.

Some commenters asked for clarification concerning when and how to apply the ADA rules or the Fair Housing Accessibility Guidelines, especially when a facility may be subject to both because of mixed use. Guidance on this question is provided in the discussion of the definitions of place of public accommodation and commercial facility. With respect to the structural impracticability exception, a mixed-use facility could not take advantage of the Fair Housing exemption, to the extent that it is less stringent than the ADA exemption, except for those portions of the facility that are subject only to the Fair Housing Act.

As explained in the preamble to the proposed rule, in those rare circumstances in which it is structurally impracticable to achieve full compliance with accessibility retirements under the ADA, places of public accommodation and commercial facilities should still be designed and constructed to incorporate accessibility features to the extent that the features are structurally practicable. The accessibility requirements should not be viewed as an all-or-nothing proposition in such circumstances.

If it is structurally impracticable for a facility in its entirety to be readily accessible to and usable by people with disabilities, then those portions that can be made accessible should be made accessible. If a building cannot be constructed in compliance with the full range of accessibility requirements because of structural impracticability, then it should still incorporate those features that are structurally practicable. If it is structurally impracticable to make a particular facility accessible to persons who have particular types of disabilities, it is still appropriate to require it to be made accessible to persons with other types of disabilities. For example, a facility that is of necessity built on stilts and cannot be made accessible to persons who use wheelchairs because it is structurally impracticable to do so, must be made accessible for individuals with vision or hearing impairments or other kinds of disabilities.

Elevator Exemption

Section 36.401(d) implements the “elevator exemption” for new construction in section 303(b) of the ADA. The elevator exemption is an exception to the general requirement that new facilities be readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities. Generally, an elevator is the most common way to provide individuals who use wheelchairs “ready access” to floor levels above or below the ground floor of a multi-story building. Congress, however, chose not to require elevators in new small buildings, that is, those with less than three stories or less than 3,000 square feet per story. In buildings eligible for the exemption, therefore, “ready access” from the building entrance to a floor above or below the ground floor is not required, because the statute does not require that an elevator be installed in such buildings. The elevator exemption does not apply, however, to a facility housing a shopping center, a shopping mall, or the professional office of a health care provider, or other categories of facilities as determined by the Attorney General. For example, a new office building that will have only two stories, with no elevator planned, will not be required to have an elevator, even if each story has 20,000 square feet. In other words, having either less than 3000 square feet per story or less than three stories qualifies a facility for the exemption; it need not qualify for the exemption on both counts. Similarly, a facility that has five stories of 2800 square feet each qualifies for the exemption. If a facility has three or more stories at any point, it is not eligible for the elevator exemption unless all the stories are less than 3000 square feet.

The terms “shopping center or shopping mall” and “professional office of a health care provider” are defined in this section. They are substantively identical to the definitions included in the proposed rule in Sec.36.104, “Definitions.” They have been moved to this section because, as commenters pointed out, they are relevant only for the purposes of the elevator exemption, and inclusion in the general definitions section could give the incorrect impression that an office of a health care provider is not covered as a place of public accommodation under other sections of the rule, unless the office falls within the definition.

For purposes of Sec.36.401, a “shopping center or shopping mall” is (1) a building housing five or more sales or rental establishments, or (2) a series of buildings on a common site, either under common ownership or common control or developed either as one project or as a series of related projects, housing five or more sales or rental establishments. The term “shopping center or shopping mall” only includes floor levels containing at least one sales or rental establishment, or any floor level that was designed or intended for use by at least one sales or rental establishment.

Any sales or rental establishment of the type that is included in paragraph (5) of the definition of “place of public accommodation” (for example, a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, or hardware store) is considered a sales or rental establishment for purposes of this definition; the other types of public accommodations (e.g., restaurants, laundromats, banks, travel services, health spas) are not.

In the preamble to the proposed rule, the Department sought comment on whether the definition of “shopping center or mall” should be expanded to include any of these other types of public accommodations. The Department also sought comment on whether a series of buildings should fall within the definition only if they are physically connected.

Most of those responding to the first question (overwhelmingly groups representing people with disabilities, or individual commenters) urged that the definition encompass more places of public accommodation, such as restaurants, motion picture houses, laundromats, dry cleaners, and banks. They pointed out that often it is not known what types of establishments will be tenants in a new facility. In addition, they noted that malls are advertised as entities, that their appeal is in the “package” of services offered to the public, and that this package often includes the additional types of establishments mentioned.

Commenters representing business groups sought to exempt banks, travel services, grocery stores, drug stores, and freestanding retail stores from the elevator requirement. They based this request on the desire to continue the practice in some locations of incorporating mezzanines housing administrative offices, raised pharmacist areas, and raised areas in the front of supermarkets that house safes and are used by managers to oversee operations of check-out aisles and other functions. Many of these concerns are adequately addressed by ADAAG. Apart from those addressed by ADAAG, the Department sees no reason to treat a particular type of sales or rental establishment differently from any other. Although banks and travel services are not included as “sales or rental establishments,” because they do not fall under paragraph (5) of the definition of place of public accommodation, grocery stores and drug stores are included.

The Department has declined to include places of public accommodation other than sales or rental establishments in the definition. The statutory definition of “public accommodation” (section 301(7)) lists 12 types of establishments that are considered public accommodations. Category (E) includes “a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center, or other sales or rental establishment.” This arrangement suggests that it is only these types of establishments that would make up a shopping center for purposes of the statute. To include all types of places of public accommodation, or those from 6 or 7 of the categories, as commenters suggest, would overly limit the elevator exemption; the universe of facilities covered by the definition of “shopping center” could well exceed the number of multitenant facilities not covered, which would render the exemption almost meaningless.

For similar reasons, the Department is retaining the requirement that a building or series of buildings must house five or more sales or rental establishments before it falls within the definition of “shopping center.” Numerous commenters objected to the number and requested that the number be lowered from five to three or four. Lowering the number in this manner would include an inordinately large number of two-story multitenant buildings within the category of those required to have elevators.

The responses to the question concerning whether a series of buildings should be connected in order to be covered were varied. Generally, disability rights groups and some government agencies said a series of buildings should not have to be connected, and pointed to a trend in some areas to build shopping centers in a garden or village setting. The Department agrees that this design choice should not negate the elevator requirement for new construction. Some business groups answered the question in the affirmative, and some suggested a different definition of shopping center. For example, one commenter recommended the addition of a requirement that the five or more establishments be physically connected on the non-ground floors by a common pedestrian walkway or pathway, because otherwise a series of stand-alone facilities would have to comply with the elevator requirement, which would be unduly burdensome and perhaps infeasible. Another suggested use of what it characterized as the standard industry definition: “A group of retail stores and related business facilities, the whole planned, developed, operated and managed as a unit.” While the rule’s definition would reach a series of related projects that are under common control but were not developed as a single project, the Department considers such a facility to be a shopping center within the meaning of the statute. However, in light of the hardship that could confront a series of existing small stand-alone buildings if elevators were required in alterations, the Department has included a common access route in the definition of shopping center or shopping mall for purposes of Sec.36.404.

Some commenters suggested that access to restrooms and other shared facilities open to the public should be required even if those facilities were not on a shopping floor. Such a provision with respect to toilet or bathing facilities is included in the elevator exception in final ADAAG 4.1.3(5).

For purposes of this subpart, the rule does not distinguish between a “shopping mall” (usually a building with a roofed-over common pedestrian area serving more than one tenant in which a majority of the tenants have a main entrance from the common pedestrian area) and a “shopping center” (e.g., a “shopping strip”). Any facility housing five or more of the types of sales or rental establishments described, regardless of the number of other types of places of public accommodation housed there (e.g., offices, movie theatres, restaurants), is a shopping center or shopping mall.

For example, a two-story facility built for mixed-use occupancy on both floors (e.g., by sales and rental establishments, a movie theater, restaurants, and general office space) is a shopping center or shopping mall if it houses five or more sales or rental establishments. If none of these establishments is located on the second floor, then only the ground floor, which contains the sales or rental establishments, would be a “shopping center or shopping mall,” unless the second floor was designed or intended for use by at least one sales or rental establishment. In determining whether a floor was intended for such use, factors to be considered include the types of establishments that first occupied the floor, the nature of the developer’s marketing strategy, i.e., what types of establishments were sought, and inclusion of any design features particular to rental and sales establishments.

A “professional office of a health care provider” is defined as a location where a person or entity regulated by a State to provide professional services related to the physical or mental health of an individual makes such services available to the public. In a two-story development that houses health care providers only on the ground floor, the “professional office of a health care provider” is limited to the ground floor unless the second floor was designed or intended for use by a health care provider. In determining if a floor was intended for such use, factors to be considered include whether the facility was constructed with special plumbing, electrical, or other features needed by health care providers, whether the developer marketed the facility as a medical office center, and whether any of the establishments that first occupied the floor was, in fact, a health care provider.

In addition to requiring that a building that is a shopping center, shopping mall, or the professional office of a health care provider have an elevator regardless of square footage or number of floors, the ADA (section 303(b)) provides that the Attorney General may determine that a particular category of facilities requires the installation of elevators based on the usage of the facilities. The Department, as it proposed to do, has added to the nonexempt categories terminals, depots, or other stations used for specified public transportation, and airport passenger terminals. Numerous commenters in all categories endorsed this proposal; none opposed it. It is not uncommon for an airport passenger terminal or train station, for example, to have only two floors, with gates on both floors. Because of the significance of transportation, because a person with disabilities could be arriving or departing at any gate, and because inaccessible facilities could result in a total denial of transportation services, it is reasonable to require that newly constructed transit facilities be accessible, regardless of square footage or number of floors. One comment suggested an amendment that would treat terminals and stations similarly to shopping centers, by requiring an accessible route only to those areas used for passenger loading and unloading and for other passenger services. Paragraph (d)(2)(ii) has been modified accordingly.

Some commenters suggested that other types of facilities (e.g., educational facilities, libraries, museums, commercial facilities, and social service facilities) should be included in the category of nonexempt facilities. The Department has not found adequate justification for including any other types of facilities in the nonexempt category at this time.

Section 36.401(d)(2) establishes the operative requirements concerning the elevator exemption and its application to shopping centers and malls, professional offices of health care providers, transit stations, and airport passenger terminals. Under the rule’s framework, it is necessary first to determine if a new facility (including one or more buildings) houses places of public accommodation or commercial facilities that are in the categories for which elevators are required. If so, and the facility is a shopping center or shopping mall, or a professional office of a health care provider, then any area housing such an office or a sales or rental establishment or the professional office of a health care provider is not entitled to the elevator exemption.

The following examples illustrate the application of these principles:

1. A shopping mall has an upper and a lower level. There are two “anchor stores” (in this case, major department stores at either end of the mall, both with exterior entrances and an entrance on each level from the common area). In addition, there are 30 stores (sales or rental establishments) on the upper level, all of which have entrances from a common central area. There are 30 stores on the lower level, all of which have entrances from a common central area. According to the rule, elevator access must be provided to each store and to each level of the anchor stores. This requirement could be satisfied with respect to the 60 stores through elevators connecting the two pedestrian levels, provided that an individual could travel from the elevator to any other point on that level (i.e., into any store through a common pedestrian area) on an accessible path.
2. A commercial (nonresidential) “townhouse” development is composed of 20 two-story attached buildings. The facility is developed as one project, with common ownership, and the space will be leased to retailers. Each building has one accessible entrance from a pedestrian walk to the first floor. From that point, one can enter a store on the first floor, or walk up a flight of stairs to a store on the second floor. All 40 stores must be accessible at ground floor level or by accessible vertical access from that level. This does not mean, however, that 20 elevators must be installed. Access could be provided to the second floor by an elevator from the pedestrian area on the lower level to an upper walkway connecting all the areas on the second floor.
3. In the same type of development, it is planned that retail stores will be housed exclusively on the ground floor, with only office space (not professional offices of health care providers) on the second. Elevator access need not be provided to the second floor because all the sales or rental establishments (the entities that make the facility a shopping center) are located on an accessible ground floor.
4. In the same type of development, the space is designed and marketed as medical or office suites, or as a medical office facility. Accessible vertical access must be provided to all areas, as described in example 2.

Some commenters suggested that building owners who knowingly lease or rent space to nonexempt places of public accommodation would violate Sec.36.401. However, the Department does not consider leasing or renting inaccessible space in itself to constitute a violation of this part. Nor does a change in use of a facility, with no accompanying alterations (e.g., if a psychiatrist replaces an attorney as a tenant in a second-floor office, but no alterations are made to the office) trigger accessibility requirements.

Entities cannot evade the requirements of this section by constructing facilities in such a way that no story is intended to constitute a “ground floor.” For example, if a private entity constructs a building whose main entrance leads only to stairways or escalators that connect with upper or lower floors, the Department would consider at least one level of the facility a ground story.

The rule requires in Sec.36.401(d)(3), consistent with the proposed rule, that, even if a building falls within the elevator exemption, the floor or floors other than the ground floor must nonetheless be accessible, except for elevator access, to individuals with disabilities, including people who use wheelchairs. This requirement applies to buildings that do not house sales or rental establishments or the professional offices of a health care provider as well as to those in which such establishments or offices are all located on the ground floor. In such a situation, little added cost is entailed in making the second floor accessible, because it is similar in structure and floor plan to the ground floor.

There are several reasons for this provision. First, some individuals who are mobility impaired may work on a building’s second floor, which they can reach by stairs and the use of crutches; however, the same individuals, once they reach the second floor, may then use a wheelchair that is kept in the office. Secondly, because the first floor will be accessible, there will be little additional cost entailed in making the second floor, with the same structure and generally the same floor plan, accessible. In addition, the second floor must be accessible to those persons with disabilities who do not need elevators for level changes (for example, persons with sight or hearing impairments and those with certain mobility impairments). Finally, if an elevator is installed in the future for any reason, full access to the floor will be facilitated.

One commenter asserted that this provision goes beyond the Department’s authority under the Act, and disagreed with the Department’s claim that little additional cost would be entailed in compliance. However, the provision is taken directly from the legislative history (see Education and Labor report at 114).

One commenter said that where an elevator is not required, platform lifts should be required. Two commenters pointed out that the elevator exemption is really an exemption from the requirement for providing an accessible route to a second floor not served by an elevator. The Department agrees with the latter comment. Lifts to provide access between floors are not required in buildings that are not required to have elevators. This point is specifically addressed in the appendix to ADAAG (Sec.4.1.3(5)). ADAAG also addresses in detail the situations in which lifts are permitted or required.

Section 36.402 Alterations

Sections 36.402 – 36.405 implement section 303(a)(2) of the Act, which requires that alterations to existing facilities be made in a way that ensures that the altered portion is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities. This part does not require alterations; it simply provides that when alterations are undertaken, they must be made in a manner that provides access.

Section 36.402(a)(1) provides that any alteration to a place of public accommodation or a commercial facility, after January 26, 1992, shall be made so as to ensure that, to the maximum extent feasible, the altered portions of the facility are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs.

The proposed rule provided that an alteration would be deemed to be undertaken after January 26, 1992, if the physical alteration of the property is in progress after that date. Commenters pointed out that this provision would, in some cases, produce an unjust result by requiring the redesign or retrofitting of projects initiated before this part established the ADA accessibility standards. The Department agrees that the proposed rule would, in some instances, unfairly penalize projects that were substantially completed before the effective date. Therefore, paragraph (a)(2) has been revised to specify that an alteration will be deemed to be undertaken after January 26, 1992, if the physical alteration of the property begins after that date. As a matter of interpretation, the Department will construe this provision to apply to alterations that require a permit from a State, County or local government, if physical alterations pursuant to the terms of the permit begin after January 26, 1992. The Department recognizes that this application of the effective date may require redesign of some facilities that were planned prior to the publication of this part, but no retrofitting will be required of facilities on which the physical alterations were initiated prior to the effective date of the Act. Of course, nothing in this section in any way alters the obligation of any facility to remove architectural barriers in existing facilities to the extent that such barrier removal is readily achievable.

Paragraph (b) provides that, for the purposes of this part, an “alteration” is a change to a place of public accommodation or a commercial facility that affects or could affect the usability of the building or facility or any part thereof. One commenter suggested that the concept of usability should apply only to those changes that affect access by persons with disabilities. The Department remains convinced that the Act requires the concept of “usability” to be read broadly to include any change that affects the usability of the facility, not simply changes that relate directly to access by individuals with disabilities.

The Department received a significant number of comments on the examples provided in paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2) of the proposed rule. Some commenters urged the Department to limit the application of this provision to major structural modifications, while others asserted that it should be expanded to include cosmetic changes such as painting and wallpapering. The Department believes that neither approach is consistent with the legislative history, which requires this Department’s regulation to be consistent with the accessibility guidelines (ADAAG) developed by the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (ATBCB). Although the legislative history contemplates that, in some instances, the ADA accessibility standards will exceed the current MGRAD requirements, it also clearly indicates the view of the drafters that “minor changes such as painting or papering walls*** do not affect usability” (Education and Labor report at 111, Judiciary report at 64), and, therefore, are not alterations. The proposed rule was based on the existing MGRAD definition of “alteration.” The language of the final rule has been revised to be consistent with ADAAG, incorporated as appendix A to this part.

Some commenters sought clarification of the intended scope of this section. The proposed rule contained illustrations of changes that affect usability and those that do not. The intent of the illustrations was to explain the scope of the alterations requirement; the effect was to obscure it. As a result of the illustrations, some commenters concluded that any alteration to a facility, even a minor alteration such as relocating an electrical outlet, would trigger an extensive obligation to provide access throughout an entire facility. That result was never contemplated.

Therefore, in this final rule paragraph (b)(1) has been revised to include the major provisions of paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2) of the proposed rule. The examples in the proposed rule have been deleted. Paragraph (b)(1) now provides that alterations include, but are not limited to, remodeling, renovation, rehabilitation, reconstruction, historic restoration, changes or rearrangement in structural parts or elements, and changes or rearrangement in the plan configuration of walls and full-height partitions. Normal maintenance, reroofing, painting or wallpapering, asbestos removal, or changes to mechanical and electrical systems are not alterations unless they affect the usability of building or facility.

Paragraph (b)(2) of this final rule was added to clarify the scope of the alterations requirement. Paragraph (b)(2) provides that if existing elements, spaces, or common areas are altered, then each such altered element, space, or area shall comply with the applicable provisions of appendix A (ADAAG). As provided in Sec.36.403, if an altered space or area is an area of the facility that contains a primary function, then the requirements of that section apply.

Therefore, when an entity undertakes a minor alteration to a place of public accommodation or commercial facility, such as moving an electrical outlet, the new outlet must be installed in compliance with ADAAG. (Alteration of the elements listed in Sec.36.403(c)(2) cannot trigger a path of travel obligation.) If the alteration is to an area, such as an employee lounge or locker room, that is not an area of the facility that contains a primary function, that area must comply with ADAAG. It is only when an alteration affects access to or usability of an area containing a primary function, as opposed to other areas or the elements listed in Sec.36.403(c)(2), that the path of travel to the altered area must be made accessible.

The Department received relatively few comments on paragraph (c), which explains the statutory phrase “to the maximum extent feasible.” Some commenters suggested that the regulation should specify that cost is a factor in determining whether it is feasible to make an altered area accessible. The legislative history of the ADA indicates that the concept of feasibility only reaches the question of whether it is possible to make the alteration accessible in compliance with this part. Costs are to be considered only when an alteration to an area containing a primary function triggers an additional requirement to make the path of travel to the altered area accessible.

Section 36.402(c) is, therefore, essentially unchanged from the proposed rule. At the recommendation of a commenter, the Department has inserted the word “virtually” to modify “impossible” to conform to the language of the legislative history. It explains that the phrase “to the maximum extent feasible” as used in this section applies to the occasional case where the nature of an existing facility makes it virtually impossible to comply fully with applicable accessibility standards through a planned alteration. In the occasional cases in which full compliance is impossible, alterations shall provide the maximum physical accessibility feasible. Any features of the facility that are being altered shall be made accessible unless it is technically infeasible to do so. If providing accessibility in conformance with this section to individuals with certain disabilities (e.g., those who use wheelchairs) would not be feasible, the facility shall be made accessible to persons with other types of disabilities (e.g., those who use crutches or who have impaired vision or hearing, or those who have other types of impairments).

Section 36.403 Alterations: Path of Travel

Section 36.403 implements the statutory requirement that any alteration that affects or could affect the usability of or access to an area of a facility that contains a primary function shall be made so as to ensure that, to the maximum extent feasible, the path of travel to the altered area, and the restrooms, telephones, and drinking fountains serving the altered area, are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use wheelchairs, unless the cost and scope of such alterations is disproportionate to the cost of the overall alteration. Paragraph (a) restates this statutory requirement.

Paragraph (b) defines a “primary function” as a major activity for which the facility is intended. This paragraph is unchanged from the proposed rule. Areas that contain a primary function include, but are not limited to, the customer services lobby of a bank, the dining area of a cafeteria, the meeting rooms in a conference center, as well as offices and all other work areas in which the activities of the public accommodation or other private entities using the facility are carried out. The concept of “areas containing a primary function” is analogous to the concept of “functional spaces” in Sec.3.5 of the existing Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards, which defines “functional spaces” as “[t]he rooms and spaces in a building or facility that house the major activities for which the building or facility is intended.”

Paragraph (b) provides that areas such as mechanical rooms, boiler rooms, supply storage rooms, employee lounges and locker rooms, janitorial closets, entrances, corridors, and restrooms are not areas containing a primary function. There may be exceptions to this general rule. For example, the availability of public restrooms at a place of public accommodation at a roadside rest stop may be a major factor affecting customers” decisions to patronize the public accommodation. In that case, a restroom would be considered to be an “area containing a primary function” of the facility.

Most of the commenters who addressed this issue supported the approach taken by the Department; but a few commenters suggested that areas not open to the general public or those used exclusively by employees should be excluded from the definition of primary function. The preamble to the proposed rule noted that the Department considered an alternative approach to the definition of “primary function,” under which a primary function of a commercial facility would be defined as a major activity for which the facility was intended, while a primary function of a place of public accommodation would be defined as an activity which involves providing significant goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations. However, the Department concluded that, although portions of the legislative history of the ADA support this alternative, the better view is that the language now contained in Sec.36.403(b) most accurately reflects congressional intent. No commenter made a persuasive argument that the Department’s interpretation of the legislative history is incorrect.

When the ADA was introduced, the requirement to make alterations accessible was included in section 302 of the Act, which identifies the practices that constitute discrimination by a public accommodation. Because section 302 applies only to the operation of a place of public accommodation, the alterations requirement was intended only to provide access to clients and customers of a public accommodation. It was anticipated that access would be provided to employees with disabilities under the “reasonable accommodation” requirements of title I. However, during its consideration of the ADA, the House Judiciary Committee amended the bill to move the alterations provision from section 302 to section 303, which applies to commercial facilities as well as public accommodations. The Committee report accompanying the bill explains that:

New construction and alterations of both public accommodations and commercial facilities must be made readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities ***. Essentially, [this requirement] is designed to ensure that patrons and employees of public accommodations and commercial facilities are able to get to, enter and use the facility ***. The rationale for making new construction accessible applies with equal force to alterations. Judiciary report at 62 – 63 (emphasis added).

The ADA, as enacted, contains the language of section 303 as it was reported out of the Judiciary Committee. Therefore, the Department has concluded that the concept of “primary function” should be applied in the same manner to places of public accommodation and to commercial facilities, thereby including employee work areas in places of public accommodation within the scope of this section.

Paragraph (c) provides examples of alterations that affect the usability of or access to an area containing a primary function. The examples include: Remodeling a merchandise display area or employee work areas in a department store; installing a new floor surface to replace an inaccessible surface in the customer service area or employee work areas of a bank; redesigning the assembly line area of a factory; and installing a computer center in an accounting firm. This list is illustrative, not exhaustive. Any change that affects the usability of or access to an area containing a primary function triggers the statutory obligation to make the path of travel to the altered area accessible.

When the proposed rule was drafted, the Department believed that the rule made it clear that the ADA would require alterations to the path of travel only when such alterations are not disproportionate to the alteration to the primary function area. However, the comments that the Department received indicated that many commenters believe that even minor alterations to individual elements would require additional alterations to the path of travel. To address the concern of these commenters, a new paragraph (c)(2) has been added to the final rule to provide that alterations to such elements as windows, hardware, controls (e.g. light switches or thermostats), electrical outlets, or signage will not be deemed to be alterations that affect the usability of or access to an area containing a primary function. Of course, each element that is altered must comply with ADAAG (appendix A) . The cost of alterations to individual elements would be included in the overall cost of an alteration for purposes of determining disproportionality and would be counted when determining the aggregate cost of a series of small alterations in accordance with Sec.36.401(h) if the area is altered in a manner that affects access to or usability of an area containing a primary function.

Paragraph (d) concerns the respective obligations of landlords and tenants in the cases of alterations that trigger the path of travel requirement under Sec.36.403. This paragraph was contained in the landlord/tenant section of the proposed rule, Sec.36.201(b). If a tenant is making alterations upon its premises pursuant to terms of a lease that grant it the authority to do so (even if they constitute alterations that trigger the path of travel requirement), and the landlord is not making alterations to other parts of the facility, then the alterations by the tenant on its own premises do not trigger a path of travel obligation upon the landlord in areas of the facility under the landlord’s authority that are not otherwise being altered. The legislative history makes clear that the path of travel requirement applies only to the entity that is already making the alteration, and thus the Department has not changed the final rule despite numerous comments suggesting that the tenant be required to provide a path of travel.

Paragraph (e) defines a “path of travel” as a continuous, unobstructed way of pedestrian passage by means of which an altered area may be approached, entered, and exited; and which connects the altered area with an exterior approach (including sidewalks, streets, and parking areas), an entrance to the facility, and other parts of the facility. This concept of an accessible path of travel is analogous to the concepts of “accessible route” and “circulation path” contained in section 3.5 of the current UFAS. Some commenters suggested that this paragraph should address emergency egress. The Department disagrees. “Path of travel” as it is used in this section is a term of art under the ADA that relates only to the obligation of the public accommodation or commercial facility to provide additional accessible elements when an area containing a primary function is altered. The Department recognizes that emergency egress is an important issue, but believes that it is appropriately addressed in ADAAG (appendix A), not in this paragraph. Furthermore, ADAAG does not require changes to emergency egress areas in alterations.

Paragraph (e)(2) is drawn from section 3.5 of UFAS. It provides that an accessible path of travel may consist of walks and sidewalks, curb ramps and other interior or exterior pedestrian ramps; clear floor paths through lobbies, corridors, rooms, and other improved areas; parking access aisles; elevators and lifts; or a combination of such elements. Paragraph (e)(3) provides that, for the purposes of this part, the term “path of travel” also includes the restrooms, telephones, and drinking fountains serving an altered area.

Although the Act establishes an expectation that an accessible path of travel should generally be included when alterations are made to an area containing a primary function, Congress recognized that, in some circumstances, providing an accessible path of travel to an altered area may be sufficiently burdensome in comparison to the alteration being undertaken to the area containing a primary function as to render this requirement unreasonable. Therefore, Congress provided, in section 303(a)(2) of the Act, that alterations to the path of travel that are disproportionate in cost and scope to the overall alteration are not required.

The Act requires the Attorney General to determine at what point the cost of providing an accessible path of travel becomes disproportionate. The proposed rule provided three options for making this determination.

Two committees of Congress specifically addressed this issue: the House Committee on Education and Labor and the House Committee on the Judiciary. The reports issued by each committee suggested that accessibility alterations to a path of travel might be “disproportionate” if they exceed 30% of the alteration costs (Education and Labor report at 113; Judiciary report at 64). Because the Department believed that smaller percentage rates might be appropriate, the proposed rule sought comments on three options: 10%, 20%, or 30%.

The Department received a significant number of comments on this section. Commenters representing individuals with disabilities generally supported the use of 30% (or more); commenters representing covered entities supported a figure of 10% (or less). The Department believes that alterations made to provide an accessible path of travel to the altered area should be deemed disproportionate to the overall alteration when the cost exceeds 20% of the cost of the alteration to the primary function area. This approach appropriately reflects the intent of Congress to provide access for individuals with disabilities without causing economic hardship for the covered public accommodations and commercial facilities.

The Department has determined that the basis for this cost calculation shall be the cost of the alterations to the area containing the primary function. This approach will enable the public accommodation or other private entity that is making the alteration to calculate its obligation as a percentage of a clearly ascertainable base cost, rather than as a percentage of the “total” cost, an amount that will change as accessibility alterations to the path of travel are made.

Paragraph (f)(2) (paragraph (e)(2) in the proposed rule) is unchanged. It provides examples of costs that may be counted as expenditures required to provide an accessible path of travel. They include:

• Costs associated with providing an accessible entrance and an accessible route to the altered area, for example, the cost of widening doorways or installing ramps;
• Costs associated with making restrooms accessible, such as installing grab bars, enlarging toilet stalls, insulating pipes, or installing accessible faucet controls;
• Costs associated with providing accessible telephones, such as relocating telephones to an accessible height, installing amplification devices, or installing telecommunications devices for deaf persons (TDD’s);
• Costs associated with relocating an inaccessible drinking fountain.

Paragraph (f)(1) of the proposed rule provided that when the cost of alterations necessary to make the path of travel serving an altered area fully accessible is disproportionate to the cost of the overall alteration, the path of travel shall be made accessible to the maximum extent feasible. In response to the suggestion of a commenter, the Department has made an editorial change in the final rule (paragraph (g)(1)) to clarify that if the cost of providing a fully accessible path of travel is disproportionate, the path of travel shall be made accessible “to the extent that it can be made accessible without incurring disproportionate costs.”

Paragraph (g)(2) (paragraph (f)(2) in the NPRM) establishes that priority should be given to those elements that will provide the greatest access, in the following order: An accessible entrance; an accessible route to the altered area; at least one accessible restroom for each sex or a single unisex restroom; accessible telephones; accessible drinking fountains; and, whenever possible, additional accessible elements such as parking, storage, and alarms. This paragraph is unchanged from the proposed rule.

Paragraph (h) (paragraph (g) in the proposed rule) provides that the obligation to provide an accessible path of travel may not be evaded by performing a series of small alterations to the area served by a single path of travel if those alterations could have been performed as a single undertaking. If an area containing a primary function has been altered without providing an accessible path of travel to serve that area, and subsequent alterations of that area, or a different area on the same path of travel, are undertaken within three years of the original alteration, the total cost of alterations to primary function areas on that path of travel during the preceding three year period shall be considered in determining whether the cost of making the path of travel serving that area accessible is disproportionate. Only alterations undertaken after January 26, 1992, shall be considered in determining if the cost of providing accessible features is disproportionate to the overall cost of the alterations.

Section 36.404 Alterations: Elevator Exemption

Section 36.404 implements the elevator exemption in section 303(b) of the Act as it applies to altered facilities. The provisions of section 303(b) are discussed in the preamble to Sec.36.401(d) above. The statute applies the same exemption to both new construction and alterations. The principal difference between the requirements of Sec.36.401(d) and Sec.36.404 is that, in altering an existing facility that is not eligible for the statutory exemption, the public accommodation or other private entity responsible for the alteration is not required to install an elevator if the installation of an elevator would be disproportionate in cost and scope to the cost of the overall alteration as provided in Sec.36.403(f)(1). In addition, the standards referenced in Sec.36.406 (ADAAG) provide that installation of an elevator in an altered facility is not required if it is “technically infeasible.”

This section has been revised to define the terms “professional office of a health care provider” and “shopping center or shopping mall” for the purposes of this section. The definition of “professional office of a health care provider” is identical to the definition included in Sec.36.401(d).

It has been brought to the attention of the Department that there is some misunderstanding about the scope of the elevator exemption as it applies to the professional office of a health care provider. A public accommodation, such as the professional office of a health care provider, is required to remove architectural barriers to its facility to the extent that such barrier removal is readily achievable (see Sec.36.304), but it is not otherwise required by this part to undertake new construction or alterations. This part does not require that an existing two story building that houses the professional office of a health care provider be altered for the purpose of providing elevator access. If, however, alterations to the area housing the office of the health care provider are undertaken for other purposes, the installation of an elevator might be required, but only if the cost of the elevator is not disproportionate to the cost of the overall alteration. Neither the Act nor this part prohibits a health care provider from locating his or her professional office in an existing facility that does not have an elevator.

Because of the unique challenges presented in altering existing facilities, the Department has adopted a definition of “shopping center or shopping mall” for the purposes of this section that is slightly different from the definition adopted under Sec.36.401(d). For the purposes of this section, a “shopping center or shopping mall” is (1) a building housing five or more sales or rental establishments, or (2) a series of buildings on a common site, connected by a common pedestrian access route above or below the ground floor, either under common ownership or common control or developed either as one project or as a series of related projects, housing five or more sales or rental establishments. As is the case with new construction, the term “shopping center or shopping mall” only includes floor levels housing at least one sales or rental establishment, or any floor level that was designed or intended for use by at least one sales or rental establishment.

The Department believes that it is appropriate to use a different definition of “shopping center or shopping mall” for this section than for Sec.36.401, in order to make it clear that a series of existing buildings on a common site that is altered for the use of sales or rental establishments does not become a “shopping center or shopping mall” required to install an elevator, unless there is a common means of pedestrian access above or below the ground floor. Without this exemption, separate, but adjacent, buildings that were initially designed and constructed independently of each other could be required to be retrofitted with elevators, if they were later renovated for a purpose not contemplated at the time of construction.

Like Sec.36.401(d), Sec.36.404 provides that the exemptions in this paragraph do not obviate or limit in any way the obligation to comply with the other accessibility requirements established in this subpart. For example, alterations to floors above or below the ground floor must be accessible regardless of whether the altered facility has an elevator. If a facility that is not required to install an elevator nonetheless has an elevator, that elevator shall meet, to the maximum extent feasible, the accessibility requirements of this section.

Section 36.405 Alterations: Historic Preservation

Section 36.405 gives effect to the intent of Congress, expressed in section 504(c) of the Act, that this part recognize the national interest in preserving significant historic structures. Commenters criticized the Department’s use of descriptive terms in the proposed rule that are different from those used in the ADA to describe eligible historic properties. In addition, some commenters criticized the Department’s decision to use the concept of “substantially impairing” the historic features of a property, which is a concept employed in regulations implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Those commenters recommended that the Department adopt the criteria of “adverse effect” published by the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation under the National Historic Preservation Act (36 CFR 800.9) as the standard for determining whether an historic property may be altered.

The Department agrees with these comments to the extent that they suggest that the language of the rule should conform to the language employed by Congress in the ADA. Therefore, the language of this section has been revised to make it clear that this provision applies to buildings or facilities that are eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places under the National Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. 470 et seq.) and to buildings or facilities that are designated as historic under State or local law. The Department believes, however, that the criteria of adverse effect employed under the National Historic Preservation Act are inappropriate for this rule because section 504(c) of the ADA specifies that special alterations provisions shall apply only when an alteration would “threaten or destroy the historic significance of qualified historic buildings and facilities.”

The Department intends that the exception created by this section be applied only in those very rare situations in which it is not possible to provide access to an historic property using the special access provisions in ADAAG. Therefore, paragraph (a) of Sec.36.405 has been revised to provide that alterations to historic properties shall comply, to the maximum extent feasible, with section 4.1.7 of ADAAG. Paragraph (b) of this section has been revised to provide that if it has been determined, under the procedures established in ADAAG, that it is not feasible to provide physical access to an historic property that is a place of public accommodation in a manner that will not threaten or destroy the historic significance of the property, alternative methods of access shall be provided pursuant to the requirements of Subpart C.

Section 36.406 Standards for New Construction and Alterations

Section 36.406 implements the requirements of sections 306(b) and 306(c) of the Act, which require the Attorney General to promulgate standards for accessible design for buildings and facilities subject to the Act and this part that are consistent with the supplemental minimum guidelines and requirements for accessible design published by the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (ATBCB or Board) pursuant to section 504 of the Act. This section of the rule provides that new construction and alterations subject to this part shall comply with the standards for accessible design published as appendix A to this part.

Appendix A contains the Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities (ADAAG) which is being published by the ATBCB as a final rule elsewhere in this issue of the Federal Register. As proposed in this Department’s proposed rule, Sec.36.406(a) adopts ADAAG as the accessibility standard applicable under this rule.

Paragraph (b) was not included in the proposed rule. It provides, in chart form, guidance for using ADAAG together with subparts A through D of this part when determining requirements for a particular facility. This chart is intended solely as guidance for the user; it has no effect for purposes of compliance or enforcement. It does not necessarily provide complete or mandatory information.

Proposed Sec.36.406(b) is not included in the final rule. That provision, which would have taken effect only if the final rule had followed the proposed Option Two for Sec.36.401(a), is unnecessary because the Department has chosen Option One, as explained in the preamble for that section.

Section 504(a) of the ADA requires the ATBCB to issue minimum guidelines to supplement the existing Minimum Guidelines and Requirements for Accessible Design (MGRAD) (36 CFR part 1190) for purposes of title III. According to section 504(b) of the Act, the guidelines are to establish additional requirements, consistent with the Act, “to ensure that buildings and facilities are accessible, in terms of architecture and design, …and communication, to individuals with disabilities.” Section 306(c) of the Act requires that the accessibility standards included in the Department’s regulations be consistent with the minimum guidelines, in this case ADAAG.

As explained in the ATBCB’s preamble to ADAAG, the substance and form of the guidelines are drawn from several sources. They use as their model the 1984 Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards (UFAS) (41 CFR part 101, subpart 101 -19.6, appendix), which are the standards implementing the Architectural Barriers Act. UFAS is based on the Board’s 1982 MGRAD. ADAAG follows the numbering system and format of the private sector American National Standard Institute’s ANSI A117.1 standards. (American National Specifications for Making Buildings and Facilities Accessible to and Usable by Physically Handicapped People (ANSI A117 – 1980) and American National Standard for Buildings and Facilities – Providing Accessibility and Usability for Physically Handicapped People (ANSI A117.1 – 1986).) ADAAG supplements MGRAD. In developing ADAAG, the Board made every effort to be consistent with MGRAD and the current and proposed ANSI Standards, to the extent consistent with the ADA.

ADAAG consists of nine main sections and a separate appendix. Sections 1 through 3 contain general provisions and definitions. Section 4 contains scoping provisions and technical specifications applicable to all covered buildings and facilities. The scoping provisions are listed separately for new construction of sites and exterior facilities; new construction of buildings; additions; alterations; and alterations to historic properties. The technical specifications generally reprint the text and illustrations of the ANSI A117.1 standard, except where differences are noted by italics. Sections 5 through 9 of the guidelines are special application sections and contain additional requirements for restaurants and cafeterias, medical care facilities, business and mercantile facilities, libraries, and transient lodging. The appendix to the guidelines contains additional information to aid in understanding the technical specifications. The section numbers in the appendix correspond to the sections of the guidelines to which they relate. An asterisk after a section number indicates that additional information appears in the appendix.

ADAAG’s provisions are further explained under Summary of ADAAG below.

General Comments

One commenter urged the Department to move all or portions of subpart D, New Construction and Alterations, to the appendix (ADAAG) or to duplicate portions of subpart D in the appendix. The commenter correctly pointed out that subpart D is inherently linked to ADAAG, and that a self-contained set of rules would be helpful to users. The Department has attempted to simplify use of the two documents by deleting some paragraphs from subpart D (e.g., those relating to work areas), because they are included in ADAAG. However, the Department has retained in subpart D those sections that are taken directly from the statute or that give meaning to specific statutory concepts (e.g., structural impracticability, path of travel). While some of the subpart D provisions are duplicated in ADAAG, others are not. For example, issues relating to path of travel and disproportionality in alterations are not addressed in detail in ADAAG. (The structure and contents of the two documents are addressed below under Summary of ADAAG.) While the Department agrees that it would be useful to have one self-contained document, the different focuses of this rule and ADAAG do not permit this result at this time. However, the chart included in Sec.36.406(b) should assist users in applying the provisions of subparts A through D, and ADAAG together.

Numerous business groups have urged the Department not to adopt the proposed ADAAG as the accessibility standards, because the requirements established are too high, reflect the “state of the art,” and are inflexible, rigid, and impractical. Many of these objections have been lodged on the basis that ADAAG exceeds the statutory mandate to establish “minimum” guidelines. In the view of the Department, these commenters have misconstrued the meaning of the term “minimum guidelines.” The statute clearly contemplates that the guidelines establish a level of access – a minimum – that the standards must meet or exceed. The guidelines are not to be “minimal” in the sense that they would provide for a low level of access. To the contrary, Congress emphasized that the ADA requires a “high degree of convenient access.” Education and Labor report at 117 – 18. The legislative history explains that the guidelines may not “reduce, weaken, narrow or set less accessibility standards than those included in existing MGRAD” and should provide greater guidance in communication accessibility for individuals with hearing and vision impairments. Id. at 139. Nor did Congress contemplate a set of guidelines less detailed than ADAAG; the statute requires that the ADA guidelines supplement the existing MGRAD. When it established the statutory scheme, Congress was aware of the content and purpose of the 1982 MGRAD; as ADAAG does with respect to ADA, MGRAD establishes a minimum level of access that the Architectural Barriers Act standards (i.e., UFAS) must meet or exceed, and includes a high level of detail.

Many of the same commenters urged the Department to incorporate as its accessibility standards the ANSI standard’s technical provisions and to adopt the proposed scoping provisions under development by the Council of American Building Officials” Board for the Coordination of Model Codes (BCMC). They contended that the ANSI standard is familiar to and accepted by professionals, and that both documents are developed through consensus. They suggested that ADAAG will not stay current, because it does not follow an established cyclical review process, and that it is not likely to be adopted by nonfederal jurisdictions in State and local codes. They urged the Department and the Board to coordinate the ADAAG provisions and any substantive changes to them with the ANSI A117 committee in order to maintain a consistent and uniform set of accessibility standards that can be efficiently and effectively implemented at the State and local level through the existing building regulatory processes.

The Department shares the commenters” goal of coordination between the private sector and Federal standards, to the extent that coordination can lead to substantive requirements consistent with the ADA. A single accessibility standard, or consistent accessibility standards, that can be used for ADA purposes and that can be incorporated or referenced by State and local governments, would help to ensure that the ADA requirements are routinely implemented at the design stage. The Department plans to work toward this goal.

The Department, however, must comply with the requirements of the ADA, the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C app. 1 et seq.) and the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C 551 et seq.). Neither the Department nor the Board can adopt private requirements wholesale. Furthermore, neither the 1991 ANSI A117 Standard revision nor the BCMC process is complete. Although the ANSI and BCMC provisions are not final, the Board has carefully considered both the draft BCMC scoping provisions and draft ANSI technical standards and included their language in ADAAG wherever consistent with the ADA.

Some commenters requested that, if the Department did not adopt ANSI by reference, the Department declare compliance with ANSI/BCMC to constitute equivalency with the ADA standards. The Department has not adopted this recommendation but has instead worked as a member of the ATBCB to ensure that its accessibility standards are practical and usable. In addition, as explained under subpart F, Certification of State Laws or Local Building Codes, the proper forum for further evaluation of this suggested approach would be in conjunction with the certification process.

Some commenters urged the Department to allow an additional comment period after the Board published its guidelines in final form, for purposes of affording the public a further opportunity to evaluate the appropriateness of including them as the Departments accessibility standards. Such an additional comment period is unnecessary and would unduly delay the issuance of final regulations. The Department put the public on notice, through the proposed rule, of its intention to adopt the proposed ADAAG, with any changes made by the Board, as the accessibility standards. As a member of the Board and of its ADA Task Force, the Department participated actively in the public hearings held on the proposed guidelines and in preparation of both the proposed and final versions of ADAAG. Many individuals and groups commented directly to the Department’s docket, or at its public hearings, about ADAAG. The comments received on ADAAG, whether by the Board or by this Department, were thoroughly analyzed and considered by the Department in the context of whether the proposed ADAAG was consistent with the ADA and suitable for adoption as both guidelines and standards. The Department is convinced that ADAAG as adopted in its final form is appropriate for these purposes. The final guidelines, adopted here as standards, will ensure the high level of access contemplated by Congress, consistent with the ADA’s balance between the interests of people with disabilities and the business community.

A few commenters, citing the Senate report (at 70) and the Education and Labor report (at 119), asked the Department to include in the regulations a provision stating that departures from particular technical and scoping requirements of the accessibility standards will be permitted so long as the alternative methods used will provide substantially equivalent or greater access to and utilization of the facility. Such a provision is found in ADAAG 2.2 and by virtue of that fact is included in these regulations.

Comments on specific provisions of proposed ADAAG

During the course of accepting comments on its proposed rule, the Department received numerous comments on ADAAG. Those areas that elicited the heaviest response included assistive listening systems, automated teller machines, work areas, parking, areas of refuge, telephones (scoping for TDD’s and volume controls) and visual alarms. Strenuous objections were raised by some business commenters to the proposed provisions of the guidelines concerning check-out aisles, counters, and scoping for hotels and nursing facilities. All these comments were considered in the same manner as other comments on the Department’s proposed rule and, in the Department’s view, have been addressed adequately in the final ADAAG.

Largely in response to comments, the Board made numerous changes from its proposal, including the following:

• Generally, at least 50% of public entrances to new buildings must be accessible, rather than all entrances, as would often have resulted from the proposed approach.
• Not all check-out aisles are required to be accessible.
• The final guidelines provide greater flexibility in providing access to sales counters, and no longer require a portion of every counter to be accessible.
• Scoping for TDD’s or text telephones was increased. One TDD or text telephone, for speech and hearing impaired persons, must be provided at locations with 4, rather than 6, pay phones, and in hospitals and shopping malls. Use of portable (less expensive) TDD’s is allowed.
• Dispersal of wheelchair seating areas in theaters will be required only where there are more than 300 seats, rather than in all cases. Seats with removable armrests (i.e., seats into which persons with mobility impairments can transfer) will also be required.
• Areas of refuge (areas with direct access to a stairway, and where people who cannot use stairs may await assistance during a emergency evacuation) will be required, as proposed, but the final provisions are based on the Uniform Building Code. Such areas are not required in alterations.
• Rather than requiring 5% of new hotel rooms to be accessible to people with mobility impairments, between 2 and 4% accessibility (depending on total number of rooms) is required. In addition, 1% of the rooms must have roll-in showers.
• The proposed rule reserved the provisions on alterations to homeless shelters. The final guidelines apply alterations requirements to homeless shelters, but the requirements are less stringent than those applied to other types of facilities.
• Parking spaces that can be used by people in vans (with lifts) will be required.
• As mandated by the ADA, the Board has established a procedure to be followed with respect to alterations to historic facilities.

Summary of ADAAG

This section of the preamble summarizes the structure of ADAAG, and highlights the more important portions.

• Sections 1 Through 3

Sections 1 through 3 contain general requirements, including definitions.

• Section 4.1.1, Application

Section 4 contains scoping requirements. Section 4.1.1, Application, provides that all areas of newly designed or newly constructed buildings and facilities and altered portions of existing buildings and facilities required to be accessible by Sec.4.1.6 must comply with the guidelines unless otherwise provided in Sec.4.1.1 or a special application section. It addresses areas used only by employees as work areas, temporary structures, and general exceptions.

Section 4.1.1(3) preserves the basic principle of the proposed rule: Areas that may be used by employees with disabilities shall be designed and constructed so that an individual with a disability can approach, enter, and exit the area. The language has been clarified to provide that it applies to any area used only as a work area (not just to areas “that may be used by employees with disabilities”), and that the guidelines do not require that any area used as an individual work station be designed with maneuvering space or equipped to be accessible. The appendix to ADAAG explains that work areas must meet the guidelines” requirements for doors and accessible routes, and recommends, but does not require, that 5% of individual work stations be designed to permit a person using a wheelchair to maneuver within the space.

Further discussion of work areas is found in the preamble concerning proposed Sec.36.401(b).

Section 4.1.1(5)(a) includes an exception for structural impracticability that corresponds to the one found in Sec.36.401(c) and discussed in that portion of the preamble.

• Section 4.1.2, Accessible Sites and Exterior Facilities: New Construction

This section addresses exterior features, elements, or spaces such as parking, portable toilets, and exterior signage, in new construction. Interior elements and spaces are covered by Sec.4.1.3.

The final rule retains the UFAS scoping for parking but also requires that at least one of every eight accessible parking spaces be designed with adequate adjacent space to deploy a lift used with a van. These spaces must have a sign indicating that they are van-accessible, but they are not to be reserved exclusively for van users.

• Section 4.1.3, Accessible Buildings: New Construction

This section establishes scoping requirements for new construction of buildings and facilities.

Sections 4.1.3 (1) through (4) cover accessible routes, protruding objects, ground and floor surfaces, and stairs.

Section 4.1.3(5) generally requires elevators to serve each level in a newly constructed building, with four exceptions included in the subsection. Exception 1 is the “elevator exception” established in Sec.36.401(d), which must be read with this section. Exception 4 allows the use of platform lifts under certain conditions.

Section 4.1.3(6), Windows, is reserved. Section 4.1.3(7) applies to doors.

Under Sec.4.1.3(8), at least 50% of all public entrances must be accessible. In addition, if a building is designed to provide access to enclosed parking, pedestrian tunnels, or elevated walkways, at least one entrance that serves each such function must be accessible. Each tenancy in a building must be served by an accessible entrance. Where local regulations (e.g., fire codes) require that a minimum number of exits be provided, an equivalent number of accessible entrances must be provided. (The latter provision does not require a greater number of entrances than otherwise planned.)

ADAAG Section 4.1.3(9), with accompanying technical requirements in Section 4.3, requires an area of rescue assistance (i.e., an area with direct access to an exit stairway and where people who are unable to use stairs may await assistance during an emergency evacuation) to be established on each floor of a multi-story building. This was one of the most controversial provisions in the guidelines. The final ADAAG is based on current Uniform Building Code requirements and retains the requirement that areas of refuge (renamed “areas of rescue assistance”) be provided, but specifies that this requirement does not apply to buildings that have a supervised automatic sprinkler system. Areas of refuge are not required in alterations.

The next seven subsections deal with drinking fountains (Sec.4.1.3(10)); toilet facilities (Sec.4.1.3(11)); storage, shelving, and display units (Sec.4.1.3(12)), controls and operating mechanisms (Sec.4.1.3(13)), emergency warning systems (Sec.4.1.3(14)), detectable warnings (Sec.4.1.3(15)), and building signage (Sec.4.1.3(16)). Paragraph 11 requires that toilet facilities comply with Sec.4.22, which requires one accessible toilet stall (600A60) in each newly constructed restroom. In response to public comments, the final rule requires that a second accessible stall (360A60) be provided in restrooms that have six or more stalls.

ADAAG Section 4.1.3(17) establishes requirements for accessibility of pay phones to persons with mobility impairments, hearing impairments (requiring some phones with volume controls), and those who cannot use voice telephones. It requires one interior “text telephone” to be provided at any facility that has a total of four or more public pay phones. (The term “text telephone” has been adopted to reflect current terminology and changes in technology.) In addition, text telephones will be required in specific locations, such as covered shopping malls, hospitals (in emergency rooms, waiting rooms, and recovery areas), and convention centers.

Paragraph 18 of Section 4.1.3 generally requires that at least five percent of fixed or built-in seating or tables be accessible.

Paragraph 19, covering assembly areas, specifies the number of wheelchair seating spaces and types and numbers of assistive listening systems required. It requires dispersal of wheelchair seating locations in facilities where there are more than 300 seats. The guidelines also require that at least one percent of all fixed seats be aisle seats without armrests (or with moveable armrests) on the aisle side to increase accessibility for persons with mobility impairments who prefer to transfer from their wheelchairs to fixed seating. In addition, the final ADAAG requires that fixed seating for a companion be located adjacent to each wheelchair location.

Paragraph 20 requires that where automated teller machines are provided, at least one must comply with section 4.34, which, among other things, requires accessible controls, and instructions and other information that are accessible to persons with sight impairments.

Under paragraph 21, where dressing rooms are provided, five percent or at least one must comply with section 4.35.

• Section 4.1.5, Additions

Each addition to an existing building or facility is regarded as an alteration subject to Sec. 36.402 through 36.406 of subpart D, including the date established in Sec.36.402(a). But additions also have attributes of new construction, and to the extent that a space or element in the addition is newly constructed, each new space or element must comply with the applicable scoping provisions of sections 4.1.1 to 4.1.3 for new construction, the applicable technical specifications of sections 4.2 through 4.34, and any applicable special provisions in sections 5 through 10. For instance, if a restroom is provided in the addition, it must comply with the requirements for new construction. Construction of an addition does not, however, create an obligation to retrofit the entire existing building or facility to meet requirements for new construction. Rather, the addition is to be regarded as an alteration and to the extent that it affects or could affect the usability of or access to an area containing a primary function, the requirements in section 4.1.6(2) are triggered with respect to providing an accessible path of travel to the altered area and making the restrooms, telephones, and drinking fountains serving the altered area accessible. For example, if a museum adds a new wing that does not have a separate entrance as part of the addition, an accessible path of travel would have to be provided through the existing building or facility unless it is disproportionate to the overall cost and scope of the addition as established in Sec.36.403(f).

• Section 4.1.6, Alterations

An alteration is a change to a building or facility that affects or could affect the usability of or access to the building or facility or any part thereof. There are three general principles for alterations. First, if any existing element or space is altered, the altered element or space must meet new construction requirements (section 4.1.6(1)(b)). Second, if alterations to the elements in a space when considered together amount to an alteration of the space, the entire space must meet new construction requirements (section 4.1.6(1)(c)). Third, if the alteration affects or could affect the usability of or access to an area containing a primary function, the path of travel to the altered area and the restrooms, drinking fountains, and telephones serving the altered area must be made accessible unless it is disproportionate to the overall alterations in terms of cost and scope as determined under criteria established by the Attorney General (Sec.4.1.6(2)).

Section 4.1.6 should be read with Sec. 36.402 through 36.405. Requirements concerning alterations to an area serving a primary function are addressed with greater detail in the latter sections than in section 4.1.6(2). Section 4.1.6(1)(j) deals with technical infeasibility. Section 4.1.6(3) contains special technical provisions for alterations to existing buildings and facilities.

• Section 4.1.7, Historic Preservation

This section contains scoping provisions and alternative requirements for alterations to qualified historic buildings and facilities. It clarifies the procedures under the National Historic Preservation Act and their application to alterations covered by the ADA. An individual seeking to alter a facility that is subject to the ADA guidelines and to State or local historic preservation statutes shall consult with the State Historic Preservation Officer to determine if the planned alteration would threaten or destroy the historic significance of the facility.

• Sections 4.2 Through 4.35

Sections 4.2 through 4.35 contain the technical specifications for elements and spaces required to be accessible by the scoping provisions (sections 4.1 through 4.1.7) and special application sections (sections 5 through 10). The technical specifications are the same as the 1980 version of ANSI A117.1 standard, except as noted in the text by italics.

• Sections 5 Through 9

These are special application sections and contain additional requirements for restaurants and cafeterias, medical care facilities, business and mercantile facilities, libraries, and transient lodging. For example, at least 5 percent, but not less than one, of the fixed tables in a restaurant must be accessible.

In section 7, Business and Mercantile, paragraph 7.2 (Sales and Service Counters, Teller Windows, Information Counters) has been revised to provide greater flexibility in new construction than did the proposed rule. At least one of each type of sales or service counter where a cash register is located shall be made accessible. Accessible counters shall be dispersed throughout the facility. At counters such as bank teller windows or ticketing counters, alternative methods of compliance are permitted. A public accommodation may lower a portion of the counter, provide an auxiliary counter, or provide equivalent facilitation through such means as installing a folding shelf on the front of the counter at an accessible height to provide a work surface for a person using a wheelchair.

Section 7.3., Check-out Aisles, provides that, in new construction, a certain number of each design of check-out aisle, as listed in a chart based on the total number of check-out aisles of each design, shall be accessible. The percentage of check-outs required to be accessible generally ranges from 20% to 40%. In a newly constructed or altered facility with less than 5,000 square feet of selling space, at least one of each type of check-out aisle must be accessible. In altered facilities with 5,000 or more square feet of selling space, at least one of each design of check-out aisle must be made accessible when altered, until the number of accessible aisles of each design equals the number that would be required for new construction.

• Section 9, Accessible Transient Lodging

Section 9 addresses two types of transient lodging: hotels, motels, inns, boarding houses, dormitories, resorts, and other similar places (sections 9.1 through 9.4); and homeless shelters, halfway houses, transient group homes, and other social service establishments (section 9.5). The interplay of the ADA and Fair Housing Act with respect to such facilities is addressed in the preamble discussion of the definition of “place of public accommodation” in Sec.36.104.

The final rule establishes scoping requirements for accessibility of newly constructed hotels. Four percent of the first hundred rooms, and roughly two percent of rooms in excess of 100, must meet certain requirements for accessibility to persons with mobility or hearing impairments, and an additional identical percentage must be accessible to persons with hearing impairments. An additional 1% of the available rooms must be equipped with roll-in showers, raising the actual scoping for rooms accessible to persons with mobility impairments to 5% of the first hundred rooms and 3% thereafter. The final ADAAG also provides that when a hotel is being altered, one fully accessible room and one room equipped with visual alarms, notification devices, and amplified telephones shall be provided for each 25 rooms being altered until the number of accessible rooms equals that required under the new construction standard. Accessible rooms must be dispersed in a manner that will provide persons with disabilities with a choice of single or multiple-bed accommodations.

In new construction, homeless shelters and other social service entities must comply with ADAAG; at least one type of amenity in each common area must be accessible. In a facility that is not required to have an elevator, it is not necessary to provide accessible amenities on the inaccessible floors if at least one of each type of amenity is provided in accessible common areas. The percentage of accessible sleeping accommodations required is the same as that required for other places of transient lodging. Requirements for facilities altered for use as a homeless shelter parallel the current MGRAD accessibility requirements for leased buildings. A shelter located in an altered facility must have at least one accessible entrance, accessible sleeping accommodations in a number equivalent to that established for new construction, at least one accessible toilet and bath, at least one accessible common area, and an accessible route connecting all accessible areas. All accessible areas in a homeless shelter in an altered facility may be located on one level.

• Section 10, Transportation Facilities

Section 10 of ADAAG is reserved. On March 20, 1991, the ATBCB published a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (56 FR 11874) to establish special access requirements for transportation facilities. The Department anticipates that when the ATBCB issues final guidelines for transportation facilities, this part will be amended to include those provisions.

Subpart E – Enforcement

Because the Department of Justice does not have authority to establish procedures for judicial review and enforcement, subpart E generally restates the statutory procedures for enforcement.

Section 36.501 describes the procedures for private suits by individuals and the judicial remedies available. In addition to the language in section 308(a)(1) of the Act, Sec.36.501(a) of this part includes the language from section 204(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000a – 3(a)) which is incorporated by reference in the ADA. A commenter noted that the proposed rule did not include the provision in section 204(a) allowing the court to appoint an attorney for the complainant and authorize the commencement of the civil action without the payment of fees, costs, or security. That provision has been included in the final rule.

Section 308(a)(1) of the ADA permits a private suit by an individual who has reasonable grounds for believing that he or she is “about to be” subjected to discrimination in violation of section 303 of the Act (subpart D of this part), which requires that new construction and alterations be readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities. Authorizing suits to prevent construction of facilities with architectural barriers will avoid the necessity of costly retrofitting that might be required if suits were not permitted until after the facilities were completed. To avoid unnecessary suits, this section requires that the individual bringing the suit have “reasonable grounds” for believing that a violation is about to occur, but does not require the individual to engage in a futile gesture if he or she has notice that a person or organization covered by title III of the Act does not intend to comply with its provisions.

Section 36.501(b) restates the provisions of section 308(a)(2) of the Act, which states that injunctive relief for the failure to remove architectural barriers in existing facilities or the failure to make new construction and alterations accessible “shall include” an order to alter these facilities to make them readily accessible to and usable by persons with disabilities to the extent required by title III. The Report of the Energy and Commerce Committee notes that “an order to make a facility readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities is mandatory” under this standard. H.R. Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess, pt 4, at 64 (1990). Also, injunctive relief shall include, where appropriate, requiring the provision of an auxiliary aid or service, modification of a policy, or provision of alternative methods, to the extent required by title III of the Act and this part.

Section 36.502 is based on section 308(b)(1)(A)(i) of the Act, which provides that the Attorney General shall investigate alleged violations of title III and undertake periodic reviews of compliance of covered entities. Although the Act does not establish a comprehensive administrative enforcement mechanism for investigation and resolution of all complaints received, the legislative history notes that investigation of alleged violations and periodic compliance reviews are essential to effective enforcement of title III, and that the Attorney General is expected to engage in active enforcement and to allocate sufficient resources to carry out this responsibility. Judiciary Report at 67.

Many commenters argued for inclusion of more specific provisions for administrative resolution of disputes arising under the Act and this part in order to promote voluntary compliance and avoid the need for litigation. Administrative resolution is far more efficient and economical than litigation, particularly in the early stages of implementation of complex legislation when the specific requirements of the statute are not widely understood. The Department has added a new paragraph (c) to this section authorizing the Attorney General to initiate a compliance review where he or she has reason to believe there may be a violation of this rule.

Section 36.503 describes the procedures for suits by the Attorney General set out in section 308(b)(1)(B) of the Act. If the Department has reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights granted by title III or that any person or group of persons has been denied any of the rights granted by title III and such denial raises an issue of general public importance, the Attorney General may commence a civil action in any appropriate United States district court. The proposed rule provided for suit by the Attorney General “or his or her designee.” The reference to a “designee” has been omitted in the final rule because it is unnecessary. The Attorney General has delegated enforcement authority under the ADA to the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights. 55 FR 40653 (October 4, 1990) (to be codified at 28 CFR 0.50(l).)

Section 36.504 describes the relief that may be granted in a suit by the Attorney General under section 308(b)(2) of the Act. In such an action, the court may grant any equitable relief it considers to be appropriate, including granting temporary, preliminary, or permanent relief, providing an auxiliary aid or service, modification of policy or alternative method, or making facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, to the extent required by title III. In addition, a court may award such other relief as the court considers to be appropriate, including monetary damages to persons aggrieved, when requested by the Attorney General.

Furthermore, the court may vindicate the public interest by assessing a civil penalty against the covered entity in an amount not exceeding $50,000 for a first violation and not exceeding $100,000 for any subsequent violation. Section 36.504(b) of the rule adopts the standard of section 308(b)(3) of the Act. This section makes it clear that, in counting the number of previous determinations of violations for determining whether a “first” or “subsequent” violation has occurred, determinations in the same action that the entity has engaged in more than one discriminatory act are to be counted as a single violation. A “second violation” would not accrue to that entity until the Attorney General brought another suit against the entity and the entity was again held in violation. Again, all of the violations found in the second suit would be cumulatively considered as a “subsequent violation.”

Section 36.504(c) clarifies that the terms “monetary damages” and “other relief” do not include punitive damages. They do include, however, all forms of compensatory damages, including out-of-pocket expenses and damages for pain and suffering.

Section 36.504(a)(3) is based on section 308(b)(2)(C) of the Act, which provides that, “to vindicate the public interest,” a court may assess a civil penalty against the entity that has been found to be in violation of the Act in suits brought by the Attorney General. In addition, Sec.36.504(d), which is taken from section 308(b)(5) of the Act, further provides that, in considering what amount of civil penalty, if any, is appropriate, the court shall give consideration to “any good faith effort or attempt to comply with this part.” In evaluating such good faith, the court shall consider “among other factors it deems relevant, whether the entity could have reasonably anticipated the need for an appropriate type of auxiliary aid needed to accommodate the unique needs of a particular individual with a disability.”

The “good faith” standard referred to in this section is not intended to imply a willful or intentional standard –that is, an entity cannot demonstrate good faith simply by showing that it did not willfully, intentionally, or recklessly disregard the law. At the same time, the absence of such a course of conduct would be a factor a court should weigh in determining the existence of good faith.

Section 36.505 states that courts are authorized to award attorneys fees, including litigation expenses and costs, as provided in section 505 of the Act. Litigation expenses include items such as expert witness fees, travel expenses, etc. The Judiciary Committee Report specifies that such items are included under the rubric of “attorneys fees” and not “costs” so that such expenses will be assessed against a plaintiff only under the standard set forth in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 434 U.S. 412 (1978). (Judiciary report at 73.)

Section 36.506 restates section 513 of the Act, which encourages use of alternative means of dispute resolution. Section 36.507 explains that, as provided in section 506(e) of the Act, a public accommodation or other private entity is not excused from compliance with the requirements of this part because of any failure to receive technical assistance.

Section 36.305 Effective Date

In general, title III is effective 18 months after enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act, i.e., January 26, 1992. However, there are several exceptions to this general rule contained throughout title III. Section 36.508 sets forth all of these exceptions in one place.

Paragraph (b) contains the rule on civil actions. It states that, except with respect to new construction and alterations, no civil action shall be brought for a violation of this part that occurs before July 26, 1992, against businesses with 25 or fewer employees and gross receipts of $1,000,000 or less; and before January 26, 1993, against businesses with 10 or fewer employees and gross receipts of $500,000 or less. In determining what constitutes gross receipts, it is appropriate to exclude amounts collected for sales taxes.

Paragraph (c) concerns transportation services provided by public accommodations not primarily engaged in the business of transporting people. The 18-month effective date applies to all of the transportation provisions except those requiring newly purchased or leased vehicles to be accessible. Vehicles subject to that requirement must be accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities if the solicitation for the vehicle is made on or after August 26, 1990.

Subpart F – Certification of State Labs or Local Building Codes

Subpart F establishes procedures to implement section 308(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the Act, which provides that, on the application of a State or local government, the Attorney General may certify that a State law or local building code or similar ordinance meets or exceeds the minimum accessibility requirements of the Act. In enforcement proceedings, this certification will constitute rebuttable evidence that the law or code meets or exceeds the ADA’s requirements.

Three significant changes, further explained below, were made from the proposed subpart, in response to comments. First, the State or local jurisdiction is required to hold a public hearing on its proposed request for certification and to submit to the Department, as part of the information and materials in support of a request for certification, a transcript of the hearing. Second, the time allowed for interested persons and organizations to comment on the request filed with the Department (Sec.36.605(a)(1)) has been changed from 30 to 60 days. Finally, a new Sec.36.608, Guidance concerning model codes, has been added.

Section 36.601 establishes the definitions to be used for purposes of this subpart. Two of the definitions have been modified, and a definition of “model code” has been added. First, in response to a comment, a reference to a code “or part thereof” has been added to the definition of “code.” The purpose of this addition is to clarify that an entire code need not be submitted if only part of it is relevant to accessibility, or if the jurisdiction seeks certification of only some of the portions that concern accessibility. The Department does not intend to encourage “piecemeal” requests for certification by a single jurisdiction. In fact, the Department expects that in some cases, rather than certifying portions of a particular code and refusing to certify others, it may notify a submitting jurisdiction of deficiencies and encourage a reapplication that cures those deficiencies, so that the entire code can be certified eventually. Second, the definition of “submitting official” has been modified. The proposed rule defined the submitting official to be the State or local official who has principal responsibility for administration of a code. Commenters pointed out that in some cases more than one code within the same jurisdiction is relevant for purposes of certification. It was also suggested that the Department allow a State to submit a single application on behalf of the State, as well as on behalf of any local jurisdictions required to follow the State accessibility requirements. Consistent with these comments, the Department has added to the definition language clarifying that the official can be one authorized to submit a code on behalf of a jurisdiction.

A definition of “model code” has been added in light of new Sec.36.608.

Most commenters generally approved of the proposed certification process. Some approved of what they saw as the Department’s attempt to bring State and local codes into alignment with the ADA. A State agency said that this section will be the backbone of the intergovernmental cooperation essential if the accessibility provisions of the ADA are to be effective.

Some comments disapproved of the proposed process as timeconsuming and laborious for the Department, although some of these comments pointed out that, if the Attorney General certified model codes on which State and local codes are based, many perceived problems would be alleviated. (This point is further addressed by new Sec.36.608.)

Many of the comments received from business organizations, as well as those from some individuals and disability rights groups, addressed the relationship of the ADA requirements and their enforcement, to existing State and local codes and code enforcement systems. These commenters urged the Department to use existing code-making bodies for interpretations of the ADA, and to actively participate in the integration of the ADA into the text of the national model codes that are adopted by State and local enforcement agencies. These issues are discussed in preamble section 36.406 under General comments.

Many commenters urged the Department to evaluate or certify the entire code enforcement system (including any process for hearing appeals from builders of denials by the building code official of requests for variances, waivers, or modifications). Some urged that certification not be allowed in jurisdictions where waivers can be granted, unless there is a clearly identified decision-making process, with written rulings and notice to affected parties of any waiver or modification request. One commenter urged establishment of a dispute resolution mechanism, providing for interpretation (usually through a building official) and an administrative appeals mechanism (generally called Boards of Appeal, Boards of Construction Appeals, or Boards of Review), before certification could be granted.

The Department thoroughly considered these proposals but has declined to provide for certification of processes of enforcement or administration of State and local codes. The statute clearly authorizes the Department to certify the codes themselves for equivalency with the statute; it would be ill-advised for the Department at this point to inquire beyond the face of the code and written interpretations of it. It would be inappropriate to require those jurisdictions that grant waivers or modifications to establish certain procedures before they can apply for certification, or to insist that no deviations can be permitted. In fact, the Department expects that many jurisdictions will allow slight variations from a particular code, consistent with ADAAG itself. ADAAG includes in Sec.2.2 a statement allowing departures from particular requirements where substantially equivalent or greater access and usability is provided. Several sections specifically allow for alternative methods providing equivalent facilitation and, in some cases, provide examples. (See, e.g., section 4.31.9, Text Telephones; section 7.2(2) (iii), Sales and Service Counters.) Section 4.1.6 includes less stringent requirements that are permitted in alterations, in certain circumstances.

However, in an attempt to ensure that it does not certify a code that in practice has been or will be applied in a manner that defeats its equivalency with the ADA, the Department will require that the submitting official include, with the application for certification, any relevant manuals, guides, or any other interpretive information issued that pertain to the code. (Sec.36.603(c)(1).) The requirement that this information be provided is in addition to the NPRM’s requirement that the official provide any pertinent formal opinions of the State Attorney General or the chief legal officer of the jurisdiction.

The first step in the certification process is a request for certification, filed by a “submitting official” (Sec.36.603). The Department will not accept requests for certification until after January 26, 1992, the effective date of this part. The Department received numerous comments from individuals and organizations representing a variety of interests, urging that the hearing required to be held by the Assistant Attorney General in Washington, DC, after a preliminary determination of equivalency (Sec.36.605(a)(2)), be held within the State or locality requesting certification, in order to facilitate greater participation by all interested parties. While the Department has not modified the requirement that it hold a hearing in Washington, it has added a new subparagraph 36.603(b)(3) requiring a hearing within the State or locality before a request for certification is filed. The hearing must be held after adequate notice to the public and must be on the record; a transcript must be provided with the request for certification. This procedure will insure input from the public at the State or local level and will also insure a Washington, DC, hearing as mentioned in the legislative history.

The request for certification, along with supporting documents (Sec.36.603(c)), must be filed in duplicate with the office of the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights. The Assistant Attorney General may request further information. The request and supporting materials will be available for public examination at the office of the Assistant Attorney General and at the office of the State or local agency charged with administration and enforcement of the code. The submitting official must publish public notice of the request for certification.

Next, under Sec.36.604, the Assistant Attorney General’s office will consult with the ATBCB and make a preliminary determination to either (1) find that the code is equivalent (make a “preliminary determination of equivalency”) or (2) deny certification. The next step depends on which of these preliminary determinations is made.

If the preliminary determination is to find equivalency, the Assistant Attorney General, under Sec.36.605, will inform the submitting official in writing of the preliminary determination and publish a notice in the Federal Register informing the public of the preliminary determination and inviting comment for 60 days. (This time period has been increased from 30 days in light of public comment pointing out the need for more time within which to evaluate the code.) After considering the information received in response to the comments, the Department will hold an hearing in Washington. This hearing will not be subject to the formal requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. In fact, this requirement could be satisfied by a meeting with interested parties. After the hearing, the Assistant Attorney General’s office will consult again with the ATBCB and make a final determination of equivalency or a final determination to deny the request for certification, with a notice of the determination published in the Federal Register.

1If the preliminary determination is to deny certification, there will be no hearing (Sec.36.606). The Department will notify the submitting official of the preliminary determination, and may specify how the code could be modified in order to receive a preliminary determination of equivalency. The Department will allow at least 15 days for the submitting official to submit relevant material in opposition to the preliminary denial. If none is received, no further action will be taken. If more information is received, the Department will consider it and make either a final decision to deny certification or a preliminary determination of equivalency. If at that stage the Assistant Attorney General makes a preliminary determination of equivalency, the hearing procedures set out in Sec.36.605 will be followed.

Section 36.607 addresses the effect of certification. First, certification will only be effective concerning those features or elements that are both (1) covered by the certified code and (2) addressed by the regulations against which they are being certified. For example, if children’s facilities are not addressed by the Department’s standards, and the building in question is a private elementary school, certification will not be effective for those features of the building to be used by children. And if the Department’s regulations addressed equipment but the local code did not, a building’s equipment would not be covered by the certification.

In addition, certification will be effective only for the particular edition of the code that is certified. Amendments will not automatically be considered certified, and a submitting official will need to reapply for certification of the changed or additional provisions.

Certification will not be effective in those situations where a State or local building code official allows a facility to be constructed or altered in a manner that does not follow the technical or scoping provisions of the certified code. Thus, if an official either waives an accessible element or feature or allows a change that does not provide equivalent facilitation, the fact that the Department has certified the code itself will not stand as evidence that the facility has been constructed or altered in accordance with the minimum accessibility requirements of the ADA. The Department’s certification of a code is effective only with respect to the standards in the code; it is not to be interpreted to apply to a State or local government’s application of the code. The fact that the Department has certified a code with provisions concerning waivers, variances, or equivalent facilitation shall not be interpreted as an endorsement of actions taken pursuant to those provisions.

The final rule includes a new Sec.36.608 concerning model codes. It was drafted in response to concerns raised by numerous commenters, many of which have been discussed under General comments (Sec.36.406). It is intended to assist in alleviating the difficulties posed by attempting to certify possibly tens of thousands of codes. It is included in recognition of the fact that many codes are based on, or incorporate, model or consensus standards developed by nationally recognized organizations (e.g., the American National Standards Institute (ANSI); Building Officials and Code Administrators (BOCA) International; Council of American Building Officials (CABO) and its Board for the Coordination of Model Codes (BCMC); Southern Building Code Congress International (SBCCI)). While the Department will not certify or “precertify” model codes, as urged by some commenters, it does wish to encourage the continued viability of the consensus and model code process consistent with the purposes of the ADA.

The new section therefore allows an authorized representative of a private entity responsible for developing a model code to apply to the Assistant Attorney General for review of the code. The review process will be informal and will not be subject to the procedures of Sec. 36.602 through 36.607. The result of the review will take the form of guidance from the Assistant Attorney General as to whether and in what respects the model code is consistent with the ADA’s requirements. The guidance will not be binding on any entity or on the Department; it will assist in evaluations of individual State or local codes and may serve as a basis for establishing priorities for consideration of individual codes. The Department anticipates that this approach will foster further cooperation among various government levels, the private entities developing standards, and individuals with disabilities.

Pool Extension Final Rule Guidance and Section-by Section Analysis

NOTE: The Guidance and Section-by-Section Analysis for the updates made by the Pool Extension Final Rule can be found at: https://archive.ada.gov/regs2010/ADAregs2012/finalrule_existingpools_FR_may21.htm

ADA Amendments Act Final Rule Guidance and Section-by-Section Analysis

APPENDIX E – GUIDANCE TO REVISIONS TO ADA TITLE II AND TITLE III REGULATIONS REVISING THE MEANING AND INTERPRETATION OF THE DEFINITION OF “DISABILITY” AND OTHER PROVISIONS IN ORDER TO INCORPORATE THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ADA AMENDMENTS ACT

For guidance providing a section-by-section analysis of the revisions to 28 CFR parts 35 and 36 published on August 11, 2016, see appendix C of 28 CFR part 35.

Movie Captioning and Audio Description Final Rule Guidance and Section-by-Section Analysis

Appendix F to Part 36—Guidance and Section-by-Section Analysis

Section 36.303(g)(1) Definitions

In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 79 FR 44976 (Aug. 1, 2014) (NPRM), the Department proposed § 36.303(g)(1), which set forth definitions for certain terms specifically referenced in paragraph (g). The Department sought public comment on these proposed definitions.

“Analog movie”

Although the Department did not specifically propose a definition of “analog movie” in the NPRM, the Department defined the term in the preamble and solicited comment on the state of analog movies and their availability. In the final rule, the Department has added a definition of “analog movie” in order to distinguish between movies shown in digital cinema format and movies shown in analog format. “Analog movie” is defined to mean “a movie exhibited in analog film format.”

“Audio description”

In the NPRM, the Department used the term “audio description” to refer to the spoken description of information describing the visual elements of a movie to an individual who is blind or has low vision and who is unable to see the images and action on the screen. Proposed § 36.303(g)(1)(i) defined “audio description” as the “provision of a spoken narration of key visual elements of a visually delivered medium, including, but not limited to, actions, settings, facial expressions, costumes, and scene changes.” Although the Department believes that the term “audio description” is most commonly used to describe this service, it sought public comment on whether to use this or some other nomenclature.

All commenters addressing this issue agreed with the Department’s proposal and supported the use of the term and the Department’s definition. In the final rule, the Department has retained the term “audio description,” and has slightly modified the definition for clarity to read as follows: “Audio description means the spoken narration of a movie’s key visual elements, such as the action, settings, facial expressions, costumes, and scene changes. Audio description generally requires the use of an audio description device for delivery to a patron.”

“Audio description device”

In the NPRM, at proposed § 36.303(g)(1)(iii), the Department used the term “individual audio description listening device” to refer to the “individual device that patrons may use at their seats to hear audio description.” The sole commenter on this definition expressed concern that the term “individual audio description listening device” was unnecessarily long. The Department agrees with the commenter and has revised the name of the device accordingly in the final rule. The final rule retains the text of the proposed definition with minor edits.

“Captioning device”

In the NPRM, at proposed § 36.303(g)(1)(iv), the Department used the term “individual captioning device” to refer to the “individual device that patrons may use at their seats to view the closed captions.” The sole commenter on this definition recommended that the Department shorten the nomenclature for this device to “captioning device.” The Department agrees with the commenter and has revised the name of the device accordingly in the final rule. The final rule retains the text of the proposed definition with minor edits.

“Closed movie captioning”

The NPRM defined “closed movie captioning” as “the written text of the movie dialogue and other sounds or sound making (e.g. sound effects, music, and the character who is speaking).” The NPRM further provided that closed movie captioning be available only to individuals who request it, and that, generally, it requires the use of an individual captioning device to deliver the captions to the patron.

Commenters were equally split as to whether the Department should use “closed movie captioning” or some other language to refer to the technology. Some commenters urged the Department to use the term “closed captioning.” Other commenters disagreed, however, and stated that the Department should avoid using the term “closed captioning” to distinguish it from the “closed captioning” that is turned on at home by a person viewing the television. In the final rule, the Department is retaining the term “closed movie captioning,” but the definition is modified for clarity to read: “Closed movie captioning means the written display of a movie’s dialogue and non-speech information, such as music, the identity of the character who is speaking, and other sounds or sound effects. Closed movie captioning generally requires the use of a captioning device for delivery of the captions to the patron.”

“Digital movie”

The Department has added a definition of “digital movie,” meaning “a movie exhibited in digital cinema format.”

“Movie theater”

The NPRM proposed defining “movie theater” as “a facility other than a drive-in theater that is used primarily for the purpose of showing movies to the public for a fee” in order to make clear which facilities are subject to the specific captioning and audio description requirements set forth in § 36.303(g). The Department intended this definition to exclude drive-in movie theaters as well as facilities that screen movies if the facility is not used primarily for the purpose of showing movies for a fee, such as museums, hotels, resorts, or cruise ships, even if they charge an additional fee. The Department asked for public comment on the proposed definition and whether it adequately described the movie theaters that should be covered by this regulation.

Commenters generally supported the Department’s proposed definition for “movie theater,” but there were some concerns about the proposed definition’s scope. Some commenters asserted that the definition of “movie theater” should be expanded to include the institutions that the Department expressly excluded, such as museums, hotels, resorts, cruise ships, amusement parks, and other similar public accommodations that show movies as a secondary function, whether or not they charge a fee. One commenter expressed concern that such entities might believe that they are otherwise exempt from any requirement to furnish auxiliary aids and services to ensure effective communication, and another commenter urged the Department to consider developing additional regulations that would specifically address public accommodations that are not covered by the proposed definition but otherwise exhibit movies or other video content.

The Department declines to make any changes at this time to address public accommodations that do not meet the definition of “movie theater” and are, therefore, not subject to the requirements of paragraph (g). The Department’s title III regulation has always made clear that all public accommodations must provide effective communication to the public through the provision of auxiliary aids and services, including, where appropriate, captioning and audio description. See generally 28 CFR 36.303; 28 CFR part 36, app. A. The requirements of this rule were not intended to supplant the general obligation to provide effective communication through the provision of auxiliary aids and services. They are only intended to provide clarity about how “movie theaters” must meet this obligation. The Department notes that many public accommodations that screen movies as a secondary function already provide appropriate auxiliary aids and services, and where the Department has identified the need for enforcement action, these types of public accommodations have been willing to comply with the ADA and the effective communication requirement. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Justice Department Reaches Settlement with National Museum of Crime and Punishment to Improve Access for People with Disabilities (Jan. 13, 2015), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-settlement-national-museum-crime-and-punishment-improve-access (last visited Sept. 12, 2016).

Two commenters asked the Department to revise the definition of “movie theater” to clarify that public accommodations used as temporary screening locations during film festivals, such as pop-up tents, convention centers, and museums with theaters, are not subject to the requirements of paragraph (g). According to such commenters, most movies screened at festivals are not ready for distribution, and typically have not yet been distributed with captioning and audio description. To the extent a film is already distributed with these features, the commenters argued that the myriad of logistics entailed in coordinating a festival may preclude a film festival from making such features available.

The Department does not believe that its definition of “movie theater” encompasses the temporary facilities described by the commenters that host film festivals. However, operators of film festivals, just like any other public accommodation that operates a place of entertainment, are still subject to the longstanding general requirement under § 36.303 to provide effective communication unless doing so would be a fundamental alteration of the program or service or would constitute an undue burden. Moreover, if a festival programmer schedules the screening of a movie that is already distributed with captioning and audio description at a movie theater that is subject to the requirements in paragraph (g), then the effective communication obligation would require the festival to ensure that the accessible features are available at all scheduled screenings of a movie distributed with such features.

The Department also received several comments regarding the exclusion of drive-in movie theaters in the proposed definition. Many commenters agreed that drive-in movie theaters should not be subject to the requirements of paragraph (g) because the technology still does not exist to exhibit movies with closed movie captioning and audio description in this setting. A few commenters pointed out innovative ways for drive-in movie theaters to provide captioning and audio description and argued that such options are feasible. For example, one commenter suggested that drive-in movie theaters provide audio description through a second low-power FM broadcast transmitter or on a second FM channel. However, these commenters did not clearly identify technology that is currently available or under development to provide closed movie captioning in this setting. Finally, one commenter expressed concern that if audio description was broadcast at a drive-in theater, it would likely be heard by patrons who do not require audio description and would result in a fundamental alteration of the movie-going experience for such patrons.

The Department declines to change its position that drive-in movie theaters should be excluded from the requirements of paragraph (g). Given the diminishing number of drive-in movie theaters, the current lack of accessible technology to provide closed movie captioning and audio description in this setting, and the fact that it is unlikely that such technology will be developed in the future, the Department remains convinced that rulemaking regarding drive-in movie theaters should be deferred until the necessary technology becomes commercially available.

For the reasons discussed above, the Department has retained the text of the proposed definition of “movie theater” with minor edits. The final rule defines “movie theater” as “a facility, other than a drive-in theater, that is owned, leased by, leased to, or operated by a public accommodation and that contains one or more auditoriums that are used primarily for the purpose of showing movies to the public for a fee.”

“Open movie captioning”

The NPRM proposed defining “open movie captioning” as “the provision of the written text of the movie dialogue and other sounds or sound making in an on-screen text format that is seen by everyone in the movie theater.”

While commenters were evenly split on whether the new regulation should use the term “open movie captioning” or “open captioning,” the Department chose the former to avoid confusion and emphasize that the term refers only to captioning provided at movie theaters. The final rule defines “open movie captioning” as “the written on-screen display of a movie’s dialogue and non-speech information, such as music, the identity of the character who is speaking, and other sounds and sound effects.”

Section 36.303(g)(2) General.

In the NPRM, the Department proposed at § 36.303(g)(2)(i) that “[a] public accommodation that owns, leases, leases to, or operates a movie theater shall ensure that its auditoriums have the capability to exhibit movies with closed movie captions.” That paragraph further provided that in all cases where the movies the theater intends to exhibit are produced, distributed, or otherwise made available with closed movie captions, the public accommodation must ensure that it acquires the captioned version of those movies and makes closed movie captions available at all scheduled screenings of those movies. An identical provision requiring movie theaters to exhibit movies with audio description was proposed at § 36.303(g)(3)(i). The Department proposed applying the requirements for closed movie captioning and audio description to all movie screens (auditoriums) in movie theaters that show digital movies and sought public comment as to the best approach to take with respect to movie theaters that show analog movies. The Department sought public comment on whether it should adopt one of two options regarding the specific obligation to provide captioning and audio description at movie theater auditoriums that display analog movies. Option 1 proposed covering movie theater screens (auditoriums) that display analog movies but giving them 4 years to come into compliance with the requirements of § 36.303(g). Option 2 proposed deferring the decision whether to apply the rule’s requirements to movie theater screens (auditoriums) showing analog movies and considering additional rulemaking at a later date.

Many commenters generally agreed with the provisions as they related to movie theaters displaying digital movies. These commenters stressed, however, that movie theaters should in no way be prohibited or limited from exhibiting a movie that is not available with captioning or audio description, or be required to add captioning and audio description when these features are not available.

Commenters were split in response to the Department’s question concerning the best approach to take with respect to analog movie theaters. A slight majority of commenters supported deferral for movie theater auditoriums that exhibit analog movies exclusively. In support of Option 2, these commenters pointed to the state of the movie industry, the financial condition of many small movie theaters, and the unintended consequences of a 4-year compliance date. According to the comments, there are very few remaining movie theaters that display analog movies exclusively, and despite the industry’s urging that such movie theaters must convert to digital to remain viable, many of these movie theaters have not converted because they cannot afford the high cost to do so. Therefore, these commenters argued that a regulation covering analog movie theaters will have minimal overall impact in addition to being an unnecessary strain on small businesses, considering the high cost of compliance for such movie theaters.

The remaining commenters responding to this question stated that the Department should adopt Option 1’s 4-year compliance date for movie theaters displaying analog movies. These commenters reasoned that fairness and equality concerns justified adoption of Option 1 because, in their view, Option 2 could incentivize more movie theaters to delay their digital conversion, resulting in fewer movie theaters being subject to the regulation, and individuals with hearing and vision disabilities continuing to face unequal access to movie theaters. A few disability groups argued that because a movie theater is subject to title III of the ADA regardless of whether it displays analog movies or digital movies, adoption of Option 2 could be seen as carving out an exception within the ADA where none exists otherwise.

In consideration of these comments and the Department’s independent research, the Department has decided to defer until a later date the decision whether to engage in rulemaking with respect to movie theater auditoriums that exhibit analog movies exclusively. Thus, the final rule makes clear that the requirements of paragraph (g) apply only to movie theaters with auditoriums that show digital movies. The Department agrees with commenters that very few analog movie theaters remain, and that the number of such movie theaters has declined rapidly in recent years. The Department believes that it is prudent to wait until it is clear whether there will be any movie theaters that continue to show analog movies and whether analog movies will continue to be produced at all, or distributed with captioning and audio description. Although movie theater auditoriums that exhibit analog movies exclusively are not subject to the specific requirements of paragraph (g) at this time, such movie theaters are nonetheless public accommodations and subject to the effective communication requirements of title III.

The final rule provides that “[a] public accommodation shall ensure that its movie theater auditoriums provide closed movie captioning and audio description whenever they exhibit a digital movie that is distributed with such features. Application of the requirements of paragraph (g) is deferred for any movie theater auditorium that exhibits analog movies exclusively, but may be addressed in a future rulemaking.” The requirements of paragraph (g) do not in any way prohibit a movie theater from displaying a movie that has not been made available with captioning and audio description features nor do the requirements require a movie theater to independently add such features to a movie that is not distributed with such features. In addition, all movie theaters, regardless of size, status of conversion to digital cinema, or economic viability, continue to have available to them the individualized and fact-specific undue burden limitation specified in § 36.303(a). This regulation does not change the availability of this compliance limitation nor the circumstances under which it can be asserted. See 28 CFR 36.104 (defining undue burden and listing factors to be considered in determining whether an action would result in an undue burden). It does, however, provide clarity about how movie theaters can meet their longstanding effective communication obligations under the ADA.

The Department notes that even if a movie theater cannot initially install captioning and audio description equipment in all of its auditoriums because it is an undue burden, the movie theater is still obligated to comply with renumbered § 36.303(h) and provide alternatives to full compliance by providing captioning and audio description in some of its auditoriums up to the point where the cost becomes an undue burden. In such a situation, the movie theater should take steps to maximize the range of movie options for customers who are deaf or hard of hearing, or blind or have low vision, by dispersing the available equipment throughout their auditoriums so that the theater is able to exhibit as many movies as possible with captioning and audio description throughout the day and evening on weekdays and weekends. If, for example, a six-auditorium movie theater can only afford to install captioning equipment in half of its auditoriums, and it has auditoriums with different capacities, it should install captioning equipment in a large, a medium, and a small auditorium. This distribution of equipment would permit exhibition of different types of movies, as blockbusters generally are shown in larger auditoriums first and lower budget or older movies may only be shown in medium or small auditoriums.

It has been, and continues to be, the Department’s position that it would not be a fundamental alteration of the business of showing movies in theaters to exhibit movies already distributed with closed movie captioning and audio description in order to ensure effective communication for individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing, or blind or have low vision. The service that movie theaters provide is the screening or exhibiting of movies. The use of captioning and audio description to make that service available to those who are deaf or hard of hearing, or blind or have low vision, does not change that service. Rather, the provision of such auxiliary aids is the means by which these individuals gain access to movie theaters’ services and thereby achieve the “full and equal enjoyment,” 42 U.S.C. 12182(a), of the screening of movies. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants and Urging Reversal at 15-17, Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. Harkins Amusement Enters., Inc., 603 F.3d 666 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-16075); see also NPRM, 79 FR 44976, 44982-83 (Aug. 1, 2014). The Department received no public comments challenging that position.

Section 36.303(g)(3) Minimum requirements for captioning devices

In the NPRM, the Department proposed that movie theaters be required to have available a minimum number of captioning devices equal to approximately half the number of assistive listening receivers already mandated for assembly areas by sections 219 and 706 of the 2010 Standards. The calculation was based on a movie theater’s total seating capacity and 2010 Census data estimating that 3.1 percent of the U.S. population ages 15 and older (7.6 million) has difficulty hearing. See U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Department of Commerce, P70-131, Americans with Disabilities: 2010 Household Economic Studies at 8 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p70-131.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2016). Thus, the proposed § 36.303(g)(2)(iii)(A) required that a movie theater maintain captioning devices for approximately 2-4 percent of all available seats and stated that: “a public accommodation that owns, leases, leases to, or operates a movie theater shall provide individual captioning devices in accordance with the following Table [below]. This requirement does not apply to movie theaters that elect to exhibit all movies at all times at that facility with open movie captioning.”

The proposed § 36.303(g)(2)(iii)(A) required that a movie theater maintain captioning devices for approximately 2-4 percent of all available seats and stated that: “a public accommodation that owns, leases, leases to, or operates a movie theater shall provide individual captioning devices.

The Department received more than 70 comments on its proposed scoping requirements for captioning devices. All commenters disagreed with the formula in the NPRM, and with the exception of a very few individuals and a law school clinic, commenters uniformly maintained that the Department’s proposed requirements substantially overestimated the number of captioning devices necessary for a variety of reasons.

Many commenters asserted that seating capacity does not equate with the need for captioning devices because movie theaters are rarely at 100 percent seat occupancy, and not all Americans attend the movies simultaneously. They stressed that even at peak attendance times (weekends), average seat occupancy rates are substantially less than half of capacity while small movie theaters in rural areas with one or two auditoriums report even lower attendance rates. Other commenters noted that old historic theaters often have large seating capacities, despite low attendance rates. And some noted that at large, multi-auditorium complexes, not all auditoriums are simultaneously in use at all times. Thus, these commenters asserted that average movie attendance during weekend hours, not the number of theater seats, most accurately predicts anticipated demand for captioning devices.

Some commenters maintained that the Department’s proposed scoping requirements significantly overestimated the need for captioning devices because the percentage of persons in the population who have difficulty hearing does not reflect those who will actually benefit from or use the devices. In their view, captioning devices will not be used by the vast majority of individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing because such devices are only needed by persons who have “severe” difficulty hearing, and assistive listening receivers, which amplify the volume of sound, are already required and available at movie theaters. These commenters also cited statistics showing that a significant percentage of Americans do not attend the movies at least once a year, and while hearing loss disproportionately affects seniors, they represent a smaller proportion of persons who actually attend the movies.

Commenters also stressed that in their experience, the Department’s proposed scoping requirements for captioning devices far exceed demand in those movie theaters that currently stock and advertise the availability of such devices. To support this conclusion, NATO offered device usage data from five movie theater companies (which included a small business with a total screen (auditorium) count in the 1-75 range, three regional companies with a total screen (auditorium) count in the 300-700 range, and a national company with a 2000+ screen (auditorium) count) that stock and advertise the availability of captioning devices on their Web sites, at ticket counters, and on third-party Web sites. According to NATO, that data showed that even though four of these five companies stocked far fewer captioning devices than the NPRM proposed, actual demand rarely, if ever, exceeded supply even at peak attendance times. Other movie theaters and a trade association also submitted tracking records to confirm the same.

Several commenters objected to the Department’s proposed scoping requirements because they provided a fixed, nonadjustable number that was not tied to actual consumer demand and failed to account for variations in attendance based on theater location and patron demographics. These commenters noted that while movie theaters near areas with a high concentration of residents or students who are deaf or hard of hearing may experience greatest demand for devices, a movie theater in a small rural area may have only a few requests. Many commenters also expressed concern that because the Department’s proposed scoping requirements would result in the vast majority of movie theaters having to purchase expensive technology far in excess of what is needed or would be used, those movie theaters would likely avoid investing in new, superior technology as it becomes available.

Although commenters overwhelmingly disagreed with the Department’s proposed approach to scoping, most did not suggest a formula for determining the number of captioning devices that should be required. Instead, they recommended that the number of required devices be based on one or more factors, including actual or average weekend movie attendance, percentage of individuals who have severe hearing difficulty and will likely use the devices, demand for devices, number of movie theater seats, screen count, and patron demographics. For example, a Federal agency recommended that the Department set scoping requirements in accordance with the optimal number of devices sufficient to provide accessibility to the disability community (based on relevant factors such as device usage, demand, and weekend theater attendance) while minimizing the burden on small businesses. A few movie theaters maintained that any minimum device requirement would be a waste of resources and unnecessary because movie theaters seek to satisfy their patrons’ needs, and as a result, many already advertise and provide captioning devices upon request.

NATO and four advocacy groups representing persons who are deaf or hard of hearing submitted a Joint Comment offering a three-tiered approach to scoping that was referenced and supported by many commenters. First, the Joint Comment recommended that movie theaters obtain a minimum number of captioning devices based on the number of screens (auditoriums) displaying digital movies, in accordance with the following:

• Single Screen 4 devices
• Miniplex (2-7 screens) 6 devices
• Multiplex (8-15 screens) 8 devices
• Megaplex (16+ screens) 12 devices

Second, in order to address the limited circumstances when demand for captioning devices exceeds minimum requirements, the Joint Comment proposed that movie theaters record weekend demand for captioning devices and adjust the number of devices biannually to be equal to 150 percent of the average weekend demand during a 6-month tracking period. For example, under this formula, a movie theater that is initially required to have 6 devices and calculates an average actual weekend demand of 8 devices during a tracking period must increase the number of available devices to 12 (150 percent of 8). Finally, the Joint Comment recommended that the Department require every movie theater company to submit an annual report of its tracking records to the Department.

After considering all comments, census data, statistics regarding movie theater attendance, actual usage data, and its independent research, the Department has modified its approach to captioning device scoping and has adopted a final rule that requires movie theaters to have on hand the minimum number of captioning devices proposed in the Joint Comment. Thus, the final rule at renumbered § 36.303(g)(3)(i) states that “[a] public accommodation shall provide a minimum number of fully operational captioning devices at its movie theaters in accordance with the following Table:&rduo;

The Department imposes these requirements because its own research and analysis confirms that they will easily satisfy maximum weekend demand for captioning devices at movie theaters across the nation in almost every location. Thus, the Department believes that the final rule obligates movie theaters to provide the optimum number of captioning devices sufficient to provide accessibility to individuals with disabilities who will need and use them, without requiring movie theaters to purchase equipment that may likely never be used.

Despite NATO’s and a number of other comments to the contrary, the Department has also decided not to impose specific requirements at this time for providing additional captioning devices when actual demand for them exceeds the rule’s minimum requirements. While the Department acknowledges that there are a few movie theaters located in areas where there is an unusually high concentration of individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing, comments, usage data, and independent research all indicate that only in those rare circumstances is there a reasonable possibility that regular demand for devices may exceed the rule’s minimum requirements. That same information also reflects that many movie theaters located in markets that consistently have an unusually large number of patrons with hearing difficulties are already making voluntary efforts to satisfy consumer demand. For example, because open movie captioning is popular with many movie patrons who are deaf or hard of hearing, some movie theaters near schools that educate persons who are deaf provide open-captioned screenings on-demand, or in accordance with a convenient, regular, and frequent schedule. In any event, the Department currently lacks adequate information and data to craft an appropriate standard to address these situations.

In addition, the Department decided not to impose a recordkeeping requirement on movie theaters at this time, even though some commenters suggested that the Department do so in order to require movie theaters to keep records of actual demand for devices. The NPRM did not solicit information about existing movie theater recordkeeping practices with respect to the provision of assistive listening receivers or captioning and audio description devices, and the Department lacks adequate data as to the costs and the burdens of imposing such a requirement on all movie theaters. Moreover, the Department has not previously imposed this type of recordkeeping requirement on public accommodations, and it declines to do so without more information about the need and the costs. The Department intends, however, to reach out to stakeholders in the future and obtain additional information about whether it should consider engaging in supplemental rulemaking regarding a recordkeeping requirement and imposing a standard that addresses situations when actual demand exceeds the rule’s minimum requirements.

In the interim, for those movie theaters that are located in the few places where there is an unusually high concentration of individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing, the Department strongly encourages these public accommodations to voluntarily work with the local disability community to identify and maintain an appropriate number of captioning devices, or to utilize other approaches, including open movie captioning, to satisfy their patrons’ regular and actual demand.

Section 36.303(g)(4) Minimum requirements for audio description devices

In order to ensure that individuals who are blind or have low vision have access to audio-described movies when such movies are available, movie theaters must provide a reasonable number of audio description devices. In the NPRM, the Department proposed at § 36.303(g)(3)(ii)(A) that movie theaters maintain one audio description device per auditorium, with a minimum of two devices per movie theater. However, the Department noted at proposed § 36.303(g)(3)(ii)(B) that “[a] movie theater may comply with this requirement by using receivers it already has available as assistive listening devices in accordance with the requirements in Table 219.3 of the 2010 Standards, if those receivers have a minimum of two channels available for sound transmission to patrons.” The Department theorized that many movie theaters utilized the newer, multi-channel assistive listening receivers, and as a result, most movie theaters would not be required to purchase additional devices in order to comply with this requirement.

The Department received extensive comments regarding the proposed scoping for audio description devices. Although commenters overwhelmingly supported the proposed rule’s goal of ensuring access to audio description in movie theaters, only three commenters agreed with the proposed scoping.

Several commenters recommended a greater number of audio description devices than the Department proposed in the NPRM to accommodate an increase in the number of individuals who are blind or have low vision who will likely attend the movies if accessible technologies are available. A few commenters recommended two audio description devices per auditorium, citing a movie theater’s usage data to support the suggestion. One commenter, concerned that a movie theater should be able to accommodate a larger group of blind or visually impaired movie patrons, recommended at least eight audio description devices per movie theater, or two devices per auditorium, whichever is greater. Finally, one commenter proposed requiring three audio description devices per auditorium to accommodate a larger user pool, and to counteract a reduction in available devices that may arise in the event of equipment failure, or when devices are being recharged.

The majority of commenters, however, stated that the recommended scoping was excessive and too inflexible. These commenters reasoned that the proposed scoping failed to consider attendance variability or demographics, and inhibited movie theaters from moving devices between locations to effectively meet demographic needs. Commenters recommended basing the number of required audio description devices on factors such as weekend attendance, annual attendance, tracked usage rates, and market demand. The Department received a large number of comments from movie theaters stating that current requests by patrons for audio description devices are extremely low. Additionally, a trade association submitted comments stating that member companies reported signing out a maximum of 1-4 audio description devices at any time, and that these companies never had more requests for devices than the number of devices available. Based on this information, the trade association recommended that the Department require one audio description device for every two auditoriums, with a minimum of two devices per movie theater.

In addition to comments criticizing the proposed scoping, commenters also addressed the Department’s belief that most movie theaters utilize multi-channel headsets to meet their assistive listening device obligations. A couple of movie theaters indicated that they have the dual-channel receivers. However, a trade association commented that many movie theaters still rely on single-channel headsets to meet their assistive listening device obligations and that the Department erred in assuming that most movie theaters would not need to buy additional devices in order to comply with these scoping requirements.

In consideration of the comments received and the Department’s independent research, the Department has adjusted the required number of audio description devices to one device for every two auditoriums. The Department believes that the available data supports its view that the revised scoping ensures that movie theaters will have available an adequate number of devices without requiring movie theaters to purchase more equipment than is likely necessary. The final rule at renumbered § 36.303(g)(4)(i) reads as follows: “A public accommodation shall provide at its movie theaters a minimum of one fully operational audio description device for every two movie theater auditoriums exhibiting digital movies and no less than two devices per movie theater. When calculation of the required number of devices results in a fraction, the next greater whole number of devices shall be provided.” The Department has retained the provision in proposed § 36.303(g)(3)(ii)(B) regarding the use of multi-channel assistive listening receivers to meet this requirement. The Department notes that if movie theaters are purchasing new receivers to replace existing single-channel receivers, they may choose to purchase two-channel receivers and then use them to meet both their requirements to provide assistive listening receivers and audio description devices if use of the two-channel receivers is compatible with their audio description and assistive listening systems. The Department does not, however, intend this provision to discourage movie theaters from using induction loop systems for sound amplification while using a different system for transmission of audio description. Renumbered § 36.303(g)(4)(ii) states that “[a] public accommodation may comply with the requirements in paragraph (g)(4)(i) by using the existing assistive listening receivers that the public accommodation is already required to provide at its movie theaters in accordance with Table 219.3 of the 2010 Standards, if those receivers have a minimum of two channels available for sound transmission to patrons.”

Section 36.303(g)(5) Performance requirements for captioning devices and audio description devices

In the NPRM, the Department proposed performance requirements for the individual devices used by movie patrons at their individual seats. Proposed § 36.303(g)(2)(iii)(B) stated that the individual devices needed to be adjustable; be available to patrons in a timely manner; provide clear, sharp images; be properly maintained; and be easily usable by the patron in order to ensure effective communication.

While the comments were generally supportive of the existence of performance requirements, there were differences of opinion expressed about the specifics of this provision. Some commenters supported the Department’s language, but others expressed concern that the requirements as written were vague and subjective. For example, a few commenters proposed that the Department define specific quantifiable and technical standards, and several commenters suggested that the Department develop a program to encourage the development of better accessibility technology due to their concerns associated with the design and quality of current technology.

The Department also received conflicting comments with respect to adding requirements beyond those proposed in the NPRM. Several commenters suggested that the Department require captioning devices to have an adjustable font size while many disagreed, stating that an adjustable font size requirement would be problematic. Other commenters believed that the Department should require that all devices be clean, in addition to being available and functional. Commenters also suggested requiring quality assurance procedures, frequent testing, and regular maintenance schedules to ensure that the devices are functional and deliver complete and accurate captions and audio description. One commenter encouraged the Department to require that movie theaters maintain the most recent technology in a range of device styles and consult with customers and consumer groups to decide which devices to purchase. Although the NPRM language focused on captioning devices, many of the comments urged the Department to ensure that both captioning and audio description devices are maintained and readily available.

After considering all comments, the Department has decided to retain the performance requirements as proposed in the NPRM with minor structural edits and to make clear that the requirements for maintenance and timely availability apply to both types of devices. The Department declines to impose any additional requirements related to ensuring the functionality of the captioning and audio description devices provided by movie theaters. The rule imposes the responsibility on movie theaters to ensure that the equipment is fully operational (meets all of the performance requirements in the regulation) and available. The Department believes that movie theaters are able to determine the best approach for ensuring compliance with the regulatory requirements and notes that § 36.211(b) (Maintenance of accessible features) “does not prohibit isolated or temporary interruptions in service or access due to maintenance or repairs.”

The Department also declines to include specific technical specifications regarding the captioning and audio description devices. The Department notes that its approach to performance requirements for captioning and audio description devices is similar to the approach the Department took with respect to performance standards for video remote interpreting services. See § 36.303(f).

The Department also declines to impose an obligation that movie theaters must upgrade to the most recent technology. While the Department is in favor of technological development, such a requirement is beyond the scope of this regulation. Additionally, the Department believes that many of the concerns about current devices raised by commenters (e.g., poor power connection or poor signal) are adequately addressed by the requirements in paragraphs (g)(3) through (5)—that devices be fully operational and maintained.

Renumbered § 36.303(g)(5) of the final rule retains the performance requirements proposed in the NPRM, but it has been restructured for clarity.

Section 36.303(g)(6) Alternative technologies

Although commenters on the 2010 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 FR 43467 (July 26, 2010) (ANPRM), encouraged the Department to require open movie captioning at movie theaters, the Department declined to make such a proposal in the NPRM, noting that in the debate leading up to passage of the ADA, the House Committee on Education and Labor explicitly stated that “[o]pen-captioning, for example, of feature films playing in movie theaters, is not required by this legislation.” H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 108 (1990). The Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources included a statement in its report on the ADA to the same effect. S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 64 (1989). As the House Committee also recognized, however, “technological advances*** may require public accommodations to provide auxiliary aids and services in the future which today would not be required because they would be held to impose undue burdens on such entities.” H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 108.

The Department included a provision in the NPRM giving movie theater owners and operators the choice to use other technologies to comply with the captioning and audio description requirements of this rule. Proposed § 36.303(g)(2)(ii) provided that “[m]ovie theaters may meet their obligation to provide captions to persons with disabilities through use of a different technology, such as open movie captioning, so long as the communication provided is as effective as that provided to movie patrons without disabilities. Open movie captioning at some or all showings of movies is never required as a means of compliance with this section, even if it is an undue burden for a theater to exhibit movies with closed movie captioning in an auditorium.”

Commenters disagreed on whether this provision struck an appropriate balance between the cost to movie theaters, the benefit to individuals with hearing and vision disabilities, and the impact on the movie-going experience for individuals without disabilities. The majority of comments on this provision concerned open movie captioning. Although some commenters expressed concern that an open-movie-captioning requirement would have an impact on the cinematic experience of hearing patrons, most commenters argued that the Department should require open movie captioning. Several open-movie-captioning requirements were proposed by commenters, including: requiring open movie captioning at 100 percent of showings; requiring one open-captioned movie per day; requiring dedicated open-captioned auditoriums; or requiring open movie captioning if closed movie captioning is unavailable for any reason. One commenter who supported an open-movie-captioning requirement asserted that 95 percent of the deaf and hard of hearing community prefers open movie captioning to the use of captioning devices.

The commenters proposing an open-movie-captioning requirement ultimately disagreed with the Department’s interpretation of the legislative history as indicating congressional intent that the ADA did not require the provision of open movie captions at movie theaters. One commenter reasoned that because modern open movie captioning is significantly different from the open movie captioning available in 1990, the legislative history on this point represents a latent ambiguity. Therefore, in this commenter’s view, the Department is not bound by the legislative history concerning open movie captioning and is free to require it. Other commenters, however, agreed with the Department’s statement in the NPRM and argued that because the legislative history states that open movie captioning is not required as a means of compliance with the ADA, the rule should not mandate any conditions concerning open-captioned showings.

In response to the Department’s questions concerning the parameters of the option to provide open movie captioning rather than closed movie captioning, several commenters suggested that the Department define what constitutes a “timely request” when a movie patron requests open movie captioning. These commenters provided a variety of suggestions, which ranged from the specific (e.g., 1 hour or 1 day before the showing) to the ambiguous (e.g., it should be reasonably easy).

Other comments also addressed whether the Department adequately addressed new technology. One commenter agreed that the “different technology” language encompassed any future technology, but further suggested that the effectiveness of new technologies should be judged from the baseline of “as effective as captioning and/or audio description devices.” Other commenters disagreed and criticized the rule for not addressing other currently available technologies, such as hearing loop systems, Invisivision glasses, or smart phone applications.

After considering all of the comments, the Department has decided to retain the option to comply with the captioning and audio description requirements of this rule through the use of any other technology that is or becomes available to provide effective communication to patrons with hearing and vision disabilities, including open movie captioning. The Department has clarified, however, that in those circumstances where a public accommodation chooses to use open movie captioning at all showings of all movies available with captioning or at all times it receives a request to turn on open movie captions prior to the start of the movie, it is not also required to comply with the specific requirement to obtain captioning devices. However, if a public accommodation only makes open movie captioning available to patrons who are deaf or hard of hearing at some showings of movies available with captioning, it will still have to comply with the requirements to provide captioning devices because it must provide effective communication at all showings of all movies available with captioning.

The Department has made other changes to the structure and language of this provision in response to comments and to better preserve the intent and longevity of this paragraph. The final rule now reads “through any technology,” instead of “through use of different technology.” Although the Department declines to endorse specific technologies, the Department believes that the revised language better articulates the purpose of this paragraph to encompass current and future technologies that may serve individuals with hearing and vision disabilities. The requirement that public accommodations provide auxiliary aids and services to ensure communication as effective as that provided to movie patrons without disabilities remains unchanged as that is the standard for effective communication required by § 36.303(c). See 28 CFR part 36, app. C (explaining that public accommodations must provide appropriate auxiliary aids and services “to ensure that communication with persons with disabilities is as effective as communication with others”).

The Department maintains its view that Congress did not intend the ADA to require movie theaters to provide open movie captioning. Although the technology to provide open movie captioning has changed and enables movie theaters to provide the service more easily, open movie captioning as it exists today remains visible to all movie patrons and has not changed in this respect. As a result, the Department’s position remains consistent with the legislative history on this point, and the final rule retains the language (with some minor edits) in proposed § 36.303(g)(2)(ii), which provided that “[o]pen movie captioning at some or all showings of movies is never required as a means of compliance with this section, even if it is an undue burden for a theater to exhibit movies with closed movie captioning in an auditorium.” In the final rule, however, the Department has moved this language to new § 36.303(g)(10).

The revised provision addressing other technologies, renumbered in the final rule as § 36.303(g)(6), enables a public accommodation to meet its obligation to provide captioning and audio description through alternative technologies that provide effective communication for movie patrons with hearing and vision disabilities. Section 36.303(g)(6) further provides that a public accommodation may use open movie captioning as an alternative to complying with the captioning device scoping requirements of this rule by providing open movie captioning at all showings, or whenever requested by or for an individual who is deaf or hard of hearing.

Section 36.303(g)(7) Compliance date for providing captioning and audio description

In the NPRM, the Department proposed at § 36.303(g)(4)(i) that all movie theaters with auditoriums displaying digital movies must comply with the requirements of the rule within 6 months of the publication date of the final rule. The Department also proposed to give movie theaters that converted their auditoriums with analog projection systems to digital projection systems after the publication date of the rule an additional 6 months from the date of conversion to comply with the rule’s requirements. Although the Department expressed the belief that 6 months was sufficient time for movie theaters to order and install the necessary equipment, train employees on how to use the equipment and assist patrons in using it, and notify patrons of the availability of these services, the Department requested public comment on the reasonableness of a 6-month compliance date.

The Department received many comments both against and in favor of the proposed 6-month compliance date. A minority of comments from a few disability advocacy groups and a few private citizens supported the proposed 6-month compliance date. These commenters asserted that because most movie theaters had already committed to providing captioning and audio description to their patrons by the end of 2014, the 6-month compliance date was, in their view, reasonable.

The vast majority of commenters, however, asserted that 6 months was not enough time for the remaining movie theaters to comply with the requirements of this rule. These comments raised concerns about manufacturers’ ability to sustain the sudden, increased demand that the scoping requirements would likely create for captioning and audio description devices. Industry commenters stated that movie theaters already experience considerable delays between order date and delivery date and that, with increased demand and a limited supply, the prices of these devices would likely increase, especially for lower volume purchasers. Industry commenters further advised the Department that a trained technician must install the captioning and audio description equipment and that their experience indicates that there is a waiting period for such services. Commenters also expressed concern that the compliance date proposed in the NPRM was drastically different from the phased compliance date proposed in the ANPRM and that the Department’s rationale for the change was insufficient.

Finally, some commenters expressed concern that small movie theaters in particular would have difficulty complying with the requirements of the rule within the proposed 6-month compliance date. Commenters advised that small movie theaters would need additional time to raise the necessary funds or adjust their budgets in order to purchase the equipment.

Based on these concerns, commenters offered a variety of alternative compliance dates. The Joint Comment suggested that the Department require movie theaters to issue purchase orders for the equipment within 6 months of the final rule’s publication, but require fully functional and operational devices and trained staff either within 2 years of the final rule’s publication or 6 months of system delivery, whichever came first. Other commenters suggested compliance dates ranging from 1 year to 4 years. One major movie theater chain in particular recommended an 18-month compliance date, stating that this is the amount of time that it currently takes to order and install the necessary equipment. Some commenters suggested a sliding compliance schedule based on a movie theater’s gross revenue or a movie theater’s size, and others suggested a phased compliance date similar to the schedule articulated in the ANPRM.

In consideration of these comments and the Department’s independent research, the Department agrees that 6 months may be an insufficient amount of time for movie theaters to comply with the requirements of paragraph (g) of this section, and the Department instead will require compliance beginning 18 months from the date of publication of the final rule. The Department believes that an 18-month compliance period sufficiently accounts for potential delays that may result from manufacturer backlogs, installation waitlists, and other circumstances outside a movie theater’s control. This date also gives small movie theaters that are financially impacted as a result of the unrelated costs of digital conversion a sufficient amount of time to plan and budget accordingly. The Department declines to include a requirement that movie theaters issue purchase orders for the equipment within 6 months of the final rule’s publication because such a requirement is unenforceable without imposing recordkeeping and reporting requirements.

The final rule continues to provide additional time for movie theaters converting their auditoriums from analog projection systems to digital projection systems after the publication date of the final rule. Once the installation of a digital projection system is complete, meaning that the auditorium has installed the equipment needed to exhibit a digital movie, the movie theater has at least an additional 6 months to ensure compliance with the requirements of the rule and provide closed movie captioning and audio description when showing digital movies in that auditorium. Renumbered § 36.303(g)(7)(ii) states that “[i]f a public accommodation converts a movie theater auditorium from an analog projection system to a system that allows it to exhibit digital movies after December 2, 2016, then that auditorium must comply with the requirements in paragraph (g) of this section by December 2, 2018, or within 6 months of that auditorium’s complete installation of a digital projection system, whichever is later.” The Department believes that this approach will provide movie theaters in the process of converting to digital projection after the publication date of the rule a sufficient amount of time to acquire the necessary equipment to provide captioning and audio description.

Section 36.303(g)(8) Notice

The Department believes that it is essential that movie theaters provide adequate notice to patrons of the availability of captioned and audio-described movies. In the NPRM, the Department proposed at § 36.303(g)(5) that movie theaters provide information regarding the availability of captioning and audio description for each movie in communications and advertisements intended to inform potential patrons of movie showings and times and provided by the theaters through Web sites, posters, marquees, newspapers, telephone, and other forms of communication.

Commenters on the NPRM unanimously supported the inclusion of some form of a notice requirement in the final rule but differed on the scope of that requirement. Some commenters supported requiring notice in all places where a captioned or audio-described movie is advertised, and another commenter asked the Department to include as many forms of communication as possible in the language of the final rule, including mobile phone applications. These commenters reasoned that individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing, or blind or have low vision, should be able to find this information easily. Several other commenters, however, asked the Department to limit the notice requirement to the box office, ticketing locations, and the movie theater’s Web site. Although such commenters raised concerns about the high cost associated with a requirement that covers all communications and advertisements, they offered no other rationale for why they were proposing a limited requirement.

In addition to the scope of the requirement, commenters also addressed the form of the notice required. One commenter requested that the Department require a uniform notice by all movie theaters, and another commenter suggested that the Department require movie theaters to include within the notice the universal symbols for captioning and audio description as well as the type of device available.

Other commenters pointed to industry realities in order to highlight their concerns with the proposed provision. Some commenters expressed concern that movie theaters would be liable for a third party’s failure to include information about captioning and audio description availability in their communications although movie theaters lack control over these communications. Commenters also advised the Department that there may be circumstances where compliance with the notice requirement would be difficult for some types of media. These commenters contend, for example, that movie theaters often book a film without knowing whether it is captioned or audio-described and that print deadlines may materialize before that information is available.

After considering these comments and the information available to the Department, the Department has revised its proposed notice language. The Department agrees that notice may not be necessary on all forms of communications and advertisements but disagrees that the notice obligation should be limited only to the box office, ticketing locations, and the movie theater’s Web site. For example, telephone recordings serve an especially important medium of communication for individuals who are blind or have low vision and who may not utilize Web-based or print media to access information concerning movie showings. Similarly, newspapers serve an especially important medium of communication for individuals who may not use Web-based media generally. Moreover, according to the Department’s research, movie theaters utilize proprietary mobile phone applications to inform potential patrons of movie showings and times, and some already advertise the availability of captioning and audio description devices on these applications. Therefore, the Department has decided to require movie theaters to provide notice on communications and advertisements provided at or on any of the following: the box office and other ticketing locations, Web sites, mobile apps, newspapers, and the telephone.

The Department declines to require a specific form of notice to describe the availability of captioning or audio description. The Department notes that movie theaters already appear to be using a relatively uniform method of advising the public about the availability of captioning and audio description. A review of Web sites and newspaper advertising indicates that movie theaters routinely use “CC” and “OC” to indicate the availability of closed and open movie captioning and “AD” or “DV” to indicate the availability of audio description.

As the Department specifically noted in the NPRM and makes clear in the final rule, the rule does not impose obligations on independent third parties that publish information about movies, and these third parties will not face liability under the ADA if they fail to include information about the availability of captioning and audio description at movie theaters.

Renumbered § 36.303(g)(8) of the final rule requires that whenever a public accommodation provides captioning and audio description in a movie theater auditorium exhibiting digital movies on or after January 17, 2017, its notices of movie showings and times, provided at the box office and other ticketing locations, on Web sites and mobile apps, in newspapers, and over the telephone, must inform potential patrons of the movies that are being shown with captioning and audio description. The final rule further provides that this obligation does not extend to third parties that provide information about movie theater showings and times, as long as the third party is not under the control of the public accommodation.

This provision applies to movie theaters once they provide captioning and audio description for digital movies on or after the effective date of the rule, January 17, 2017. Thus, movie theaters that already show digital movies with closed movie captions and audio description must comply with this provision as soon as the rule takes effect.

Section 36.303(g)(9) Operationa requirements

In response to the ANPRM, the Department received a significant number of comments from individuals with disabilities and groups representing persons who are deaf or hard of hearing and who are blind or have low vision strongly encouraging the Department to include a requirement that movie theater staff know how to operate captioning and audio description equipment and be able to communicate with patrons about the use of individual devices. Having considered those comments, the Department included in the NPRM proposed § 36.303(g)(6), which required movie theaters to ensure that at least one individual was on location at each facility and available to assist patrons whenever showing a captioned or audio-described movie. The proposed § 36.303(g)(6) further required that such individual be able to operate and locate all of the necessary equipment and be able to communicate effectively with individuals with hearing and vision disabilities about the uses of, and potential problems with, the equipment.

All of the comments on the NPRM that addressed this proposed language acknowledged that staff training regarding the operation of equipment is vital to the proper functioning of the rule. A number of commenters stated that on numerous occasions when they attempted to go to a movie advertised as having captioning or audio description, there was no staff available who knew where the captioning devices were kept or how to turn on the captioning or audio description for the movie. Many of these commenters indicated that they were unable to experience the movie fully because of the lack of trained personnel, even if the auditorium was properly equipped and the movie was actually available with captioning or audio description.

A handful of commenters requested that the Department expand its proposed operational requirement, emphasizing concerns about movie theater staff’s current knowledge concerning the operation of available equipment. One commenter encouraged the Department to specifically require all movie theater personnel to be properly and uniformly trained in providing such services, and other commenters suggested that all movie theater personnel be trained as to the availability of these services. Other comments encouraged the Department to enumerate specific requirements to ensure that movie theater staff is capable of operating the captioning and audio description equipment, including a requirement that management document employee training and a requirement that employees receive periodic refresher courses.

A few commenters questioned the need for the proposed language in § 36.303(g)(6)(iii), which required movie theaters to “[c]ommunicate effectively with individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing and blind or have low vision regarding the uses of, and potential problems with, the equipment for such captioning or audio description.” One commenter asserted that an “effective communication” requirement in the proposed paragraph (g)(6)(iii) was superfluous given the overarching requirements in § 36.303(c). Other commenters supported the proposed language, stating that movie theater staff, including managers, often are not knowledgeable on how to properly communicate with individuals who are deaf, hard of hearing, blind, or have low vision. A State government also pointed out that in Camarillo v. Carrols Corp., 518 F.3d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam), the Second Circuit held that a public accommodation’s failure to provide employee training on effective communication with individuals with disabilities can constitute a violation of title III, specifically 42 U.S.C. 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii).

The final rule retains the operational requirements proposed in the NPRM in renumbered § 36.303(g)(9) and adds the requirement that if a movie theater is relying on open movie captioning to meet the requirements of paragraph (g)(3), it must also ensure that there is an employee available at the theater who knows how to turn on the captions. The Department declines to add a specific requirement that all personnel be trained, as it believes that it is sufficient if a movie theater has at least one knowledgeable employee on location at all times to ensure that the service is available and provided without interruption. While the Department agrees that it would be a good idea for movie theaters to implement reasonable staff training programs and periodic refresher courses, the Department declines to take these recommendations and has not included in the final rule specific logistical requirements concerning movie theater staff training.

The Department has decided to retain in the final rule the language in proposed § 36.303(g)(6)(iii) requiring movie theater staff to effectively communicate with individuals who are deaf or hard of hearing, or blind or have low vision, regarding the uses of, and potential problems with, the captioning and audio description devices. The Department notes, however, that communicating effectively with patrons about the availability of captioning at a movie theater would not require a movie theater to hire a sign language interpreter. Communication with a person who is deaf or hard of hearing about the availability of these services or how to use the equipment involves a short and relatively simple exchange and therefore can easily be provided through signage, instructional guides, or written notes.

Final § 36.303(g)(9) requires that whenever a public accommodation provides captioning and audio description in a movie theater auditorium exhibiting digital movies on or after January 17, 2017, at least one theater employee must be available to assist patrons seeking or using the captioning or audio description equipment. The employee must be able to quickly locate and activate the necessary equipment; operate and address problems with the equipment prior to and during the movie; turn on the open movie captions if the movie theater is relying on open movie captions to meet its effective communication requirements; and communicate effectively with individuals with disabilities about how to use, operate, and resolve problems with the equipment.

This provision applies to movie theaters once they provide captioning and audio description for digital movies on or after the effective date of the rule, January 17, 2017. Thus, movie theaters that already show digital movies with closed movie captions and audio description must comply with this provision as soon as the rule takes effect.

Section 36.303(g)(10)

Section 36.303(g)(10) in the final rule provides that “[t]his section does not require the use of open movie captioning as a means of compliance with paragraph (g), even if providing closed movie captioning for digital movies would be an undue burden.” The NPRM proposed similar language at § 36.303(g)(2)(ii). See discussion of comments on final § 36.303(g)(6), supra